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Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to investigate the nature of policy requirements and market 
imperfections, and their implications for the sustainability and resilience of inshore fishing in the 
county of Cornwall, England and dairy farming in Somerset, England respectively, as part of the 
EU-funded Horizon 2020 project, Sufisa (Sustainable finance for sustainable agriculture and 
fisheries).  
 
Data collection methods 
Key to the approach taken has been to put the fishers and farmers themselves at the centre of 
the research, in order to get their perspectives on the key issues that need to be considered. In 
the first instance, a media analysis was conducted (which covered national, regional and 
specialised media from 2005 to 2016), as well as a desk-based analysis of market conditions and 
regulations (sources reviewed included: academic publications; government and policy 
documents; market research and consultancy reports; industry reports and NGO documents), 
supplemented with 30 expert interviews. Following analysis of the resultant data, three focus 
groups (FGs) were held with fishers at three locations in Cornwall, followed by a workshop 
composed of Cornwall fishery experts. For the dairy case study, three FGs were held in Somerset 
with dairy farmers, complemented by 11 supply chain interviews, and followed by a workshop 
composed of key dairy industry stakeholders (see below for more details on the FGs, interviews 
and workshops). 
 
Inshore fishing sector, Cornwall 
 
Inshore fishing and the Cornish economy 
In 2014, there were an estimated 11,845 fishers in the UK, down 12% since 2004. In the same 
year, UK vessels landed 756,000 tonnes of sea fish (including shellfish), 60% of which was landed 
in the UK and 40% abroad, with a total value of £861 million. In 2014, fishing accounted for 4.1 
per cent of gross value added for the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing sector. The focus 
of this case study is on inshore boats which are less than 10 m long and which fish out of the 
U10m pool. They are responsible for relatively small quantities of demersal and pelagic species 
landings, with around 80% of their catch being shellfish, which typically gain higher than average 
prices (MMO 2015). Although some issues are common to all fishers within the UK, the inshore 
fleet faces particular issues, not least in terms of its continued existence and contribution to the 
socio-economic contexts/communities within which it operates. In this respect, Cornwall 
represents one of the areas where inshore fishing remains a key part of the rural community, 
both economically and culturally. 
 
Cornwall forms the westernmost part of the south-west peninsula of the UK, with a population 
of just over 530,000 people. It is one of the poorest parts of the UK in terms of per capita GDP, 
with relatively low average earnings and relatively high unemployment. In 2011, Cornwall's 
wealth was a little over 60% of the EU average per capita. As such, the county is a European 
Convergence area, meaning that it has access to both ERDF and ESF funds. Key to the 
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dissemination of European funds in Cornwall is the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Fisheries Local 
Action Group (FLAG). The formal aim of the 2012 FLAG was to "maximise the economic 
opportunities and benefits open to Cornish fishing communities in a sustainable and cooperative 
environment". In the second round of FLAG, which started in 2016, a key focus is on innovation 
and adding value to the fish caught, not least in response to the landing obligation (see below), 
as well as to maximise the tourist £. 
 
Tourism is the most important industry in Cornwall, representing about 25% of the county's 
GDP, with 4.5 million visitors to the county every year. The presence of a fishing industry is an 
important part of the tourism appeal of Cornish coastal towns. As such, the continuation of the 
fishing industry within Cornwall is important to the county's future prosperity. There are over 
600 registered fishing vessels in Cornwall, of which almost 90% are U10m in length. It is 
estimated that the Cornish fishing industry employs approximately 3300 people, based on 900 
active fishermen, plus an estimated 2.75 jobs on shore for every fisherman. When tourist jobs 
created as the direct result of fishing are also considered, it is suggested that the multiplier is 
4:1 (Morrissey and O’Donoghue 2012). 
 
Policy and regulatory conditions 
Collectively, fishers benefit from policies that rule the fleets’ capacity: the number of vessels, 
gross tonnage and engine power (hence the licenses for approved vessels to fish); as well as the 
management of the natural resource (hence total allowable catches, quotas, the management 
of time spent at sea, and other technical measures). However, the combination of restrictive 
licensing, individual vessel quotas, days at sea allocation and catch composition rules 
significantly reduce the flexibility of fishing operations that might otherwise enable individual 
fishers to adapt to changing conditions. Decisions on what, where, when and how to fish are 
now very tightly circumscribed, affecting both short-term and longer-term business planning 
(Symes et al. 2015). 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) sets out the overarching regulatory conditions for all fishers 
within the EU. First implemented in 1983, it has subsequently been reformed three times: in 
1992, 2002 and 2013. The main challenge for the CFP is to manage a highly heterogeneous 
fisheries sector, and to design optimal policies for multi-ecosystems, multi-species and multi-
fleet fisheries (Frost and Andersen 2006).  
 
In the run-up to the 2013 reforms, Greenpeace and NUTFA (New Under Ten Fishermen’s 
Association), amongst others, produced a 'manifesto for fairer fisheries'. It emphasised the 
importance and value of inshore fishing, as well as highlighting that the majority of quota 
(effectively, the right to fish) has been targeted at large-scale fishing operations. In terms of 
numbers, the inshore sector in the UK comprises nearly 80% of the boats, yet receives only 
around 8% of the annual quota (MMO 2015). Arguably, therefore, in order to reflect the 
different orientation between the two fisher groups, there should be different management 
regimes for large-scale fisheries and small-scale fisheries, with the former focused on economic 
efficiency, while the latter focuses more on social objectives (Urquhart et al. 2011). Indeed, 
Phillipson and Symes (2015, p. 344) argue that “the European Commission has never been 
comfortable in its handling of socioeconomic issues in fisheries”, with the main focus of both 
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research and policy being on the biological and economic aspects of fishing, with scant attention 
paid to the social and cultural impacts of the pressures faced by fishers.  
 
In 1983, as part of the CFP, a system of allocating Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for each EU 
Member State (MS) was introduced, as a means of conserving fish stocks and sharing access to 
EU fisheries resources between member states. The TAC is set each year by the Council of 
Fisheries Ministers following negotiations on catch options that are provided by the Advisory 
Committee (ACOM) of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Once a TAC 
is agreed for each stock and fishing area, it is allocated as national quotas to MSs in accordance 
with fixed percentages based on historic fishing rights. The MSs are responsible for ensuring 
quotas are not overfished. When the entire quota is fished, the fishery has to close. It is clear 
that some MS have greater influence than others in the decision making process. Greater 
transparency is required to determine what takes place during the closed door negotiations at 
the Council of Fisheries Ministers (Carpenter et al. 2016). Anecdotally, many of those involved 
in fishing in Cornwall are concerned that the science is always behind the reality, in that fish 
stocks fluctuate dramatically from season to season. 
 
In the UK, management of quota for the over 10 m offshore vessels has been largely devolved 
to Fisheries Producer Organisations (FPOs). However, for vessels U10 m there is a single block 
of quota allocation that reflects the aggregated activity of that part of the fleet during a 1994 to 
1996 reference period. For the most part, allocation of quotas for the inshore fishing fleet is 
managed directly by the national fisheries administration (Defra in the UK) and specifically its 
appointed agency, the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) (Le Floc’h et al. 2015), rather 
than the POs. The MMO set monthly catch limits for each quota species (which can vary 
significantly throughout the year). Having monthly catch limits means that in 'good' months a 
vessel's catch may be restricted, leading to the possibility of discards; it also means that vessels 
are unable to make up for any 'bad months' where catches of a particular species are lower than 
the allocated quota. At present, the higher catching U10m vessels often lease quota at the start 
of the year in case they land a valuable catch which would cause them to exceed their monthly 
catch limit (Defra 2014). This quota is leased from the over 10 m sector quota allocation, in that 
the U10 m quota is non-tradable. There is no quota on crab or lobster at present, both of which 
are very important to the inshore fishing industry in Cornwall; nor are there any other 
restrictions apart from minimum landing sizes and the need to have a permit. However, there 
are concerns that more and more pots are being set out, potentially impacting the sustainability 
of this part of the fisheries sector.  
 
Another issue in relation to the management of quota, is that it has evolved from one where 
quotas were effectively community / state owned to one of privately owned individual quota 
rights (i.e. the privatisation of a state resource), where quota is freely tradable. As fishermen 
retire or otherwise exit the industry, quotas are sold and increasingly the highest bidders are 
larger companies outside Cornwall. This trend reduces the availability of quota left to the 
existing Cornish fleet, making it almost impossible for new entrants to join the industry. Access 
to additional quota for the U10 m boats is particularly problematic, in that it is often sold in lots 
that are too expensive for small boats. 
 
A further issue in relation to quota is ‘latent capacity’. At the beginning of March 2016, the MMO 
sent out letters to all under 10 m vessel owners that did not have a history of catching a 
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particular species in a recent three year reference period (2010-2013). If their licence allowed 
for them to catch a particular species and yet none of these fish were caught during this 
reference period, then their licences were capped and they would no longer be able to catch 
this species. The license for this will then be transferred to other boats within the under 10 m 
sector. The MMO perspective is that there is quota available which is not being utilised (known 
as ‘latent capacity’); from the perspective of the smaller fishers it reduces their flexibility in 
terms of what they can catch and when. In practice, very few fishers have had their licences 
capped, in part due to the appeals procedure that is available. 
 
The discarding of fish is a widespread problem in EU fisheries, resulting from a number of 
interrelated issues. In order to reduce waste, and pushed by public opinion, the EU is in the 
process of implementing a discard ban by introducing an obligation to land all catches. This 
obligation is gradually being introduced on a fisheries-by-fisheries basis between 1st January 
2015 and 1st January 2019. The phased implementation is to allow time for fishermen to adapt 
their fishing practices. At the time of this research, the implications of the discard ban had not 
really been experienced by those involved. A key concern, however, was in relation to ‘choke’ 
species. This can happen where a fisher has fully caught their quota for one species before 
catching all their allocated quota for another species in the same sea area. If this happens, then 
the vessel concerned will have to stop fishing in that sea area due to the fact that they cannot 
guarantee avoiding the species for which they have no quota left. The species that they have 
run out of quota for is known as a ‘choke species’.  
 
There is a widespread perception that fisheries management in the EU, via the CFP, has failed to 
deliver sustainable fisheries and economic vitality, with one of the generally accepted reasons 
for this being a lack of transparency and the failure to include a wide range of stakeholders and 
perspectives. A key impetus for change within the UK was the Defra publication Safeguarding 
our Seas (2002), which resulted in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (MCAA). Under this 
Act, the UK Government is committed to implementing a network of Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs), which are to be developed via a stakeholder participation process that entails the 
collaboration of scientists, fishermen and conservationists (Seafish 2013). The MCAA also 
resulted in the formation, in April 2011, of 10 Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) 
to replace the existing 12 Sea Fisheries Committees (SFC). Membership of the IFCAs is more 
inclusive than the previous SFCs, with the aim of developing a more open and inclusive 
governance model that can deliver sustainable fisheries and help instil a sense of trust and 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, despite this inclusive approach, there are clearly tensions between 
conservation and fishing.  
 
Markets and marketing 
It is critical to note that the economic and market performance of the fisheries sector is not only 
important to the fishers themselves, but also to the wider communities in which they operate. 
It has been estimated, for example, that every fisher at sea creates a further four jobs on land. 
These jobs include processing, transportation and perhaps most critically, tourist jobs. In other 
words, the fishing economy at a local level involves more than simply the value of fish caught 
(Morrissey and O’Donoghue 2012). 
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Reed et al. (2011, p. 4) suggest that inshore fishermen have three principal routes to market: 
fish merchants, who then take it to the end user/consumer; selling at harbour side auctions; and 
(less usually) selling direct into the hospitality trade. Access to the multiple retailers is effectively 
impossible for small scale inshore fishers, in that these retailers almost exclusively use supply 
chains covered by various (usually expensive) certification processes (often MSC – see below). 
The FLAG in Cornwall has had a part to play in developing the local fishing sector in coordination 
with the wider food economy, not least by making investments to improve the quality/qualities 
of locally caught fish, and to give it a 'story' that is associated with traceability and sustainable 
fishing practices. However, while diversifying market outlets in this way may help to develop 
resilience for fishers, it also requires additional knowledge, investment and competence 
(Doeksen and Symes 2015).  
 
The most important market outlet for Cornwall fishers is harbour markets, which include 
Newlyn, Looe and Plymouth. Significantly, approaching 80% of the fish landed in Cornwall are 
exported, in many cases to France and Spain in Vivier lorries that are able to carry live crab and 
lobsters, with little value added locally, although this is starting to change. A key issue in 
developing the (domestic) markets for fish in the UK is to educate the British public about eating 
a wider variety of fish species. This led one interviewee to suggest that: “A huge amount of 
fishing economics is around the marketability of the product, rather than the catchability of the 
species”. 
 
Many observers feel that, especially smaller scale fishers, must add value to their catch if they 
are to survive. The smaller day boats turn over perhaps £200-£400 in a day, however it is difficult 
to be certain how many days a year it will be possible for them to go out (due to bad weather, 
choke species, a lack of quota etc.); as such, they need to develop a greater sense of 
entrepreneurialism and to actively develop their own markets. For many fishermen, selling their 
fish at harbour-side is all they really consider in terms of markets, judging that they do not really 
have the time to go and market the fish themselves, preferring instead to focus their energy on 
catching the fish in the first place. Nevertheless, there is evidence that more and more fishers 
are seeking to access Cornwall’s local markets, which is helped by the Cornwall Good Seafood 
Guide that provides an information portal for those interested in buying Cornish seafood. There 
is also increasing evidence of fishers using social media to make direct contact with buyers and 
to cut out the middleman, with some now selling direct to buyers in London. Selling to London 
(and indeed other large cities) has the potential to realise considerably greater prices for the fish 
sold, in that London-based restaurants and fishmongers have more buying power than their 
Cornish equivalents. 
 
There is some debate about the value of certification schemes for inshore fishers. At one level, 
in order to put fish that have been caught on the market, both the EU and national governments 
require some minimum safety standards. In this respect, public standards are increasingly being 
supplemented by private safety and traceability standards from corporate retailers. Two of the 
largest fisheries certification schemes are Friend of the Sea (FoS) and the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC), covering about 18% of global sea fisheries production. Yet in economic terms the 
benefits of certification remain uncertain. From the point of view of retailers they can result in 
price premiums and increased consumer trust, but for fishers it seems that the only benefit is 
access to certain supply chains, without necessarily obtaining significant price premiums on the 
catches concerned (Bellmann et al. 2016). Having said that, certification may be important for 
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processors to gain access to certain market outlets, which inevitably has a knock-on effect in 
terms of the prices they can pay to the fishers themselves. 
 
Resilience 
Understanding the potential for resilience amongst inshore fishers is a key outcome of this case 
study. Tendall et al. (2015, p. 18) argue that “resilience implies the capacity to continue 
providing a function overtime despite disturbances… thus form[ing] an essential part of what 
enables sustainability”. Over recent decades, the long-term sustainability of many smaller 
fishing communities has come under pressure, leading to the loss of basic local services, a lack 
of affordable housing, and difficulties in recruiting crew members as young people are unwilling 
or unable to go into fishing (Symes and Phillipson 2009). Individual fishers and their families 
often struggle for regular income, in that they face a range of risks and uncertainties, many of 
which are beyond their direct control, including seasonality, severe weather, market instability 
and variability in terms of fish stocks.  
 
The risks faced by fishers have been compounded by management restrictions imposed through 
the CFP. In this respect, policy-making is often associated with being ‘top-down, distant, 
centralised and lacking local specificity’, thereby alienating many inshore fishing communities 
who tend to be suspicious of 'policy' and 'science', which are perceived as external or outside 
interference. Flexibility is seen as a key attribute of fishing sustainably and regulation is seen as 
"reducing the scope for fishermen to practice many of the attributes associated with being a 
good skipper, such as using local ecological knowledge to determine what to fish" (Ross 2015, p. 
319). Flexibility also involves internalising costs, to engage in pluriactivity, to embrace the ethos 
of self-employment, and to reduce crew size. Through these measures, small-scale inshore 
fishers and their households have shown remarkable levels of resilience and the ability to adapt 
to changing circumstances, with research suggesting that it is only as a last resort that fishers 
will exit the industry (Coulthard and Britton 2015). 
 
Intergenerational continuity is a key issue when addressing the sustainability and resilience of 
inshore fishing across Europe. Traditionally, many fishers came through the hereditary pathway. 
However, fishing is no longer seen as the occupation that it once was in terms of status, financial 
rewards or job security. There is no longer the same pressure within families to persuade sons 
to follow their fathers, with the result that aspiring fishers increasingly come from outside the 
fishing community. This creates an additional problem for aspiring fishers, both in terms of 
finding the necessary finance to purchase a boat and license, but also in terms of gaining 
experience through working on boats and 'learning the ropes'. Working as crew is now less 
common, as many inshore fishers have adapted their boats to enable them to fish single-
handedly in order to reduce crew costs and improve their profitability. The result is that aspiring 
fishers must increasingly look to buy their own boat, which involves considerable investment in 
terms of the vessel itself, fishing gear and a fishing license. This is leading to an ever increasing 
average age of fishers, with less than 20% being under the age of 30 and the average age 
approaching 60 (White 2015). Looking to the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall, there are 
clearly concerns that the sector is under pressure: 
"I can see the smaller harbours not having boats working for them... So I can see some of 
the smaller places becoming just tourist harbours... I can't see that being reversed unless 
there is some sort of change in policy to support small-scale fisheries" (Interviewee 1). 
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Focus groups and workshop feedback: drivers, strategies and future performance 
A series of three focus groups (FGs) were held with Cornish inshore fishers over the period 
December 2016 and January 2017, in order to provide an insight into their perspective on the 
issues they face. A workshop with key stakeholders involved in the inshore fishing sector was 
subsequently conducted in March 2017, following reflection on the FG data, with two main aims. 
Firstly, to ‘ground truth’ the findings of the research to date; and secondly, to develop a range 
of scenarios regarding the future viability of the inshore fisheries sector in Cornwall, which are 
inevitably linked to the Brexit negotiations. Analysis of the data revealed that there were six key 
areas that required further examination, each of which is now taken in turn. 
 
First. Reasons for going fishing.  
Discussions at the FGs revealed that fishers are passionate about what they do and do not want 
to do anything else. This is significant, in that they are likely to carry on fishing until the bitter 
end, enduring difficulties that those involved in other livelihoods might find too much. In this 
sense, they are innately highly resilient. 
 
Second. What is distinctive about inshore fishing 
Firstly, that they are highly localised, tending to fish within 6nm of the coastline 
(notwithstanding that those with a larger engine/deck size may venture further out). Because 
they are restricted to a relatively confined geographical area, the smaller inshore boats are 
effectively embedded in their local environment, giving them an incentive to look after the 
fishing grounds in their immediate area. This sentiment was sometimes expressed in relation to 
larger, more nomadic fleets of boats which may have less connection with, and incentive to look 
after, their local area/fishing grounds. 
 
Secondly, due to the fact that they are highly localised and are relatively small-scale in terms of 
their operations, the fishers feel that they are inherently ecologically sustainable. In this respect, 
they are restricted in terms of the distance they can travel from their home port, as well as in 
terms of the fishing gear they can carry; furthermore, in most cases their gear is static gear. This 
perspective is encapsulated in the following:  
"I mean, we're under 10 m boats, we've got a limited distance, a limit to what we can 
carry, gear-wise and catch-wise. Why not say catch whatever you want, your impact on 
the overall fish stocks is going to be minimal… If we ruin our own ground, then we're all 
out of a job” (Padstow FG). 
 
However, for these distinctions to hold good, there is a need to consider re-categorising what is 
meant by inshore fishing. At one level inshore fishing boats can be categorised as those under 
10 m and fishing out of the common pool managed by the MMO; yet this is only part of the 
story. In general, the inshore fleet will fish within 6nm of the shore, although some of the more 
powerful vessels may go out further than that; there is also clearly an issue with what are known 
as 'rule beaters'. The latter are boats that have been specifically designed to be under 10 m in 
order to benefit from fishing as inshore vessels, and in many cases has involved cutting down 
larger vessels to 9.9 m in length. While the difference between a 6.5 m and 10 m boat may not 
sound that significant, it needs to be thought of in terms of the cubic relationship, with the 'rule 
beater' boats often having very much larger deck spaces and engines which allows them to carry 
much more gear. The result is that although they may be under 10 m in length, "they've 
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effectively got the capacity of a 15 or 20 m boat" (Padstow FG), negating the benefits outlined 
above. The result is that U10 m boats vary enormously in terms of the value of fish they land. At 
one end of the spectrum it might be as little as £15,000 a year, whereas others might gross up 
to £200,000. The idea of re-categorisation resulted in considerable debate in the workshop, 
whereby it seems that any re-definition will need to encompass geographical distance, size of 
the boat and the type of gear used. In this respect, the 6nm limit is likely to be significant in 
demarking what might be understood as the inshore sector. 
 
Third. Markets, marketing and institutional arrangements 
In relation to markets and marketing, adding value was the most critical issue discussed, 
inextricably linked with the quality of the fish being sold. In this respect, the catch of inshore 
fishers was recognised as having the potential to be of the very highest quality available (in that 
is it usually landed on a daily basis), although this necessitates that the fishers involved look after 
their fish. Linked with 'looking after your fish' is the establishment of a reputation for providing 
quality fish, as well as the development of personal relationships with individual buyers, such as 
head chefs or fish merchants. This is recognised as enabling better prices, although it is "very 
hard to get yourself a good name, but very easy to get yourself a bad name" (Helston FG). 
 
The majority of fin fish landed in Cornwall goes to the harbour markets in Newlyn, Brixham, 
Plymouth and Looe, whereas Crustacean and Mollusca go either to processors or more usually 
are sold abroad (mainly to France and Spain) via Vivier lorries. Overall, approximately 80% of the 
fish caught in Cornwall are exported. There was a strong sense amongst fishers at the FGs that 
you have to have a strategy in terms of marketing your fish: "otherwise you are at the mercy of 
what the buyer is going to give you" (Newlyn FG). In this respect, that a degree of 
entrepreneurship is critical and it is no longer enough to be simply good at catching fish. 
 
A number of fishermen sell their produce to restaurants or dealers in London, such as Dreckly 
Fish and Kernow Sashimi. In taking this approach, it is possible to get a very considerable mark-
up over local market prices, perhaps in the order of 300-400%. Yet, at the same time this requires 
considerable extra work and know how, which many fishermen are not prepared to do, 
preferring instead simply to catch fish. For example, developing Dreckly Fish involved travelling 
to London to make face-to-face contact with potential customers, as well as continuing to 
develop those personal relationships (based on trust and continued quality) over time.  
 
Selling to local restaurants is another market avenue that adds considerable value to the catch. 
In order to do this, it is important to develop a good relationship with the head chef, to the 
extent of calling them every day to tell them about the catch that is available. In this respect, 
Cornwall is luckier than most in that there are a number of high-end restaurants and foodie 
hotspots, such as Padstow. However, it was pointed out in both the FGs and the workshop that 
in the UK, and even in Cornwall, fish is generally speaking not part of our culinary culture (unlike 
France for example). There is scope therefore to encourage domestic demand with the right 
incentives and policy initiatives. 
 
In terms of developing new institutional arrangements (IAs), it is apparent that there is minimal 
horizontal coordination between the inshore fishers. Indeed, findings from the focus groups 
suggest that in most cases fishers are highly independent, and indeed secretive, both in terms 
of what they catch, but also where they sell it and for how much. Where coordination does take 
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place, it is likely to be within families. Similarly, in terms of vertical coordination where, despite 
some evidence of fishers working with local processors (such as Kernow Sashimi), most of the 
inshore fishers in Cornwall sell their catch directly through the harbour markets. In terms of 
policy incentives to change how fishers sell their catch, the local FLAG have provided both advice 
and money, although a key finding of this research is that fishers need to be encouraged to be 
more entrepreneurial. 
 
Fourth. Quota. 
In all three FGs, discussions around quota were the most vibrant and heated, with access to 
sufficient quota being the single biggest issue, often related to the CFP and the opportunities 
presented by Brexit. There was a strong feeling that there are plenty of fish around and it is just 
a matter of allocating them more fairly and re-visiting historic ‘grandfather rights’ and Relative 
Stability. There were also concerns that the quota system is not managed properly in terms of 
determining what an appropriate quota is. Likewise, in terms of the “disproportionate allocation 
between the over 10s and the under 10s”, whereby “94% of the quota goes to the over 10s and 
a measly 6% is shared out between the mass of the boats” (Helford FG). There was also 
frustration that the U10m boats are only allocated their quota on a monthly basis, rather than 
on an annual basis which would give them much greater flexibility. 
 
The monetisation of licenses and quota was another issue raised in the FGs, as well as the 
workshop. Originally, both licences and quota were distributed by the UK Government for 
nothing, but now you have to buy them and there are brokers who sell both licences and quota. 
U 10 m boats are unable to own quota, which is allocated to them from the U 10m pool by the 
MMO, but the monetisation of licences creates a considerable cost barrier to those wishing to 
get into fishing. “There's no value to a licence, but I can't go to sea without a licence and I've got 
to buy a licence of about £280 per kilowatt… You're talking £10,000 plus for a little boat like 
mine to have a licence, it's ridiculous" (Padstow FG). Related to the cost of licenses, is the notion 
of 'latent capacity’, as discussed above. Where a licence is capped, then its value is hugely 
reduced. It effectively devalues the boat as well, in that the license is tied to the boat. It also 
removes a degree of flexibility, as some of the boats clearly like to focus on one particular stock 
-- such as lobster -- but keep others in reserve.  
 
Fifth. Policy, management and representation. 
The key issue discussed in relation to policy and management was that legislation and 
bureaucratic necessities need to be better tailored to the needs of smaller boats, as captured in 
the following:  
“One of the main factors in Cornwall is that it’s such a mixed fishery in terms of things 
turning up and things being available to fishermen… What fishermen want to be able do 
inshore is take advantage of these opportunities and to be versatile; that’s the absolute 
key to inshore fisheries being successful. There’s such diversity of fishing types that trying 
to find one rule that fits everybody is incredibly difficult. I mean days at sea would be ideal 
for some people, but it could crucify somebody else” (WSP 1). 
There are also concerns that the ‘voice’ of inshore fishers is not being sufficiently heard and that 
their access to policymakers is restricted. Even though there is nominal representation on the 
IFCA, other lobbies are felt to have more sway. Similarly, with the Cornish Fish Producers 
Organisation (CFPO), which has 200 members (80 of which are inshore fishers) and the potential 
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to be a significant lobby force. Nevertheless, there was a strong perception amongst the FG 
attendees that the CFPO is predominantly concerned with the interests of the larger scale 
fishermen: “They should take under 10s into consideration, but they don't at the minute” 
(Newlyn FG). This perception was endorsed in the workshop, where it was discussed that the PO 
exists principally to manage quotas and that they don't do much for the inshore fishing sector. 
Of particular concern to the fishers is representation at the forthcoming Brexit meetings: “These 
big players, like CFPO the other North Eastern POs, they are going to be around the table and 
we don't have any representation, it's hopeless, we have no salt in the river” (Helston FG). Partly 
as a response to this feeling of under-representation, one of the FG attendees had visited Defra 
to attend the inaugural meeting of a new coastal PO whose remit is to support the interests of 
the inshore fishing sector across the UK. This was felt by those at the FG to be an important step 
forward, especially in relation to the allocation of quota to the U10m sector. 
 
Sixth, resilience, succession and the future 
The innate passion of fishers means that they are likely to be inherently highly resilient and to 
continue in fishing beyond the time that makes economic sense. In order to do this, they exhibit 
a range of different adaptive capacities, such as: carrying extra gear and leaving it to lie for an 
extra day (which means that there is even more gear on the ground, adding to the pressure on 
particular fisheries); putting more and more pots down (which requires more investment and 
adds to the pressure on stocks); going further out to sea (which is inherently more risky); fishing 
single-handed (which reduces the opportunities for new/young fishers to gain experience); 
adding value and developing their markets (which requires new skills and perhaps additional 
investment, such as in IT equipment) and so on. 
 
Although there was optimism about those currently fishing, remaining in fishing, people were 
much less sanguine about the ability of future generations to get into fishing:  
“The people that are in the game, who have been in it for many years are resilient and 
will probably see it through to retirement. But when it comes to succession… I think we 
are going to see some ports peter out to nothing. In the future, it’s hard to see what will 
attract enough people. It’s never going to be making your fortune – it’s a lifestyle choice 
and it’s probably not as popular a lifestyle choice as it was” (WSP 2). 
 
In this respect, cost and opportunity were seen as the two main constraints. Cost in terms of the 
boat itself, but also the licence and gear, including the monetisation of licences. “When we left 
school, you could go and buy a boat… The licence didn't have a value… Now if you bought a boat 
for 10 grand, your licence would be 10 or 15 grand on top of it and then the same again for 
gear… So the youngster hasn't got a hope in hell" (Helston FG). There were also concerns in 
relation to opportunities, in that there is an increasing tendency for inshore fishermen to go 
single-handed in order to remain viable, which has reduced the opportunities for potential 
fishermen to get into the industry as crew. 
 
Looking to the future, fishers are not looking for handouts, such as being paid for creating 
community or for public good services, but what they do want is: "better legislation, less 
bureaucracy and more quota" (Helston FG). In other words, there is a strong feeling that the 
U10m boats need to have legislation and management that is more specifically tailored to their 
needs. 
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The future: Brexit and beyond 
Any discussions about the future of fishing in the UK inevitably involve looking at what the Brexit 
negotiations will result in. As such, Brexit was discussed at length in both the FGs and the 
workshop. Two of the workshop participants, in particular, were adamant that the CFP was not 
fit for purpose and that Brexit offered the opportunity for change: "We need suitable 
management through fisheries legislation which we haven't got at the moment". Likewise in the 
FGs, Brexit was often mentioned as being pivotal to the future of the inshore fishing sector in 
Cornwall, as well as the fishing sector more generally. 
“This is British fishing's main chance it will ever have. If the Government cock this up we'll 
never have a chance like it again. We've got to get EU boats out of our waters. We've got 
to try and take back control of the quota” (Newlyn FG). 
 
Apart from access to more quota, the key issue discussed was to try and extend the limit of 
waters that are exclusive to UK fishermen. At the moment, EU vessels with 'grandfather rights' 
are able to fish within the 6-12 nm range (in Cornwall this is mainly French and Belgian boats), 
with many of the participants arguing that the whole notion should be revisited, including that 
the rights should cease once a boat is sold. The main reason for pushing for this change, 
especially from an ‘inshore boat that lays pots’ perspective, is that any pots they lay between 6 
and 12 nm are in danger of being towed out by the trawlers (although not explicitly 
acknowledged in the FGs, there are also UK-based trawlers fishing in this area). Over the years, 
many of the fishers have lost hundreds, if not thousands, of pounds worth of gear to this process. 
As a result, in order to try and reduce this risk, many of the fishers have decided not to lay their 
pots beyond the 6 nm limit. It was argued that extending the limit to 12 nm would help space 
out where the pots are placed, because at present they are effectively squeezed into the 6 nm 
zone. “Opening up to the 12 mile and pushing the foreign boats outside into international 
waters, would free up everybody's fishery here” (Padstow FG). In the workshop it was suggested 
that in terms of negotiation, the UK should start by demanding that the UK reclaim its 200 mile 
EEZ, but more realistically aim to end up with the 12 nm limit. 
 
When asked what would be the impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall should the UK 
Government fail to get the 12 nm limit imposed, the response was: “Disastrous really: we’ve got 
to get that 6 miles back. So from the point of view of the inshore sector it could make the 
difference between surviving in perpetuity and actually going out of business when this 
generation of fishers dies off?” A statement that was greeted with a chorus of ‘yes!’. In this 
respect, there was a general sense that things are not going to get any worse post-Brexit in 
relation to the inshore fishing sector, and hopefully will get better. 
 
Whatever happens in terms of the negotiations, several of the participants emphasised the 
importance of having accurate science in terms of fish stocks, otherwise it becomes impossible 
to determine whether something is sustainable or not. In this respect, there was recognition 
that there will still need to be coordination with those countries fishing under the CFP, or there 
is a danger that there will be overfishing. This will require negotiation between the UK and the 
EU in terms of what the stocks of a particular species are, as defined by ICES, notwithstanding 
that the advice they give is invariably watered down by political processes. In this respect, that 
there are two separate issues at play in the Brexit negotiations: one is the right to fish within a 
particular area in the sea; the other is the right to catch a share of the fish available in that area. 
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In other words, fishers may have access to fishing grounds, but they may not have quota to catch 
the fish once they get there. 
 
Despite a general sense of optimism (or at least hope) that Brexit will result in positive change 
for the inshore fishing sector, there was also concern expressed at the Helston FG, in particular, 
about the dangers of the Brexit negotiations, especially in relation to the export markets for fish. 
For example, that the EU may impose significant tariffs on UK exports of fish, or perhaps even 
withhold access to certain markets. This could be devastating, in that between 80-85% of fish 
caught in Cornwall is sold to Europe. Similarly, instinctive enthusiasm for Brexit was tempered 
by a concern that nothing much will change in reality, not least because fishers are unconvinced 
that the UK Government will fight their corner. “Our Government doesn’t really seem to give 
two hoots about the fishing industry. I think we will be used as a bargaining chip for something 
else, like farming” (Padstow café). 
 
Whatever the nature of the Brexit negotiations, there was a perception that change is going to 
take time, perhaps as long as 10 years, not least because government departments in general, 
and Defra in particular, have faced considerable cuts over recent years and are short of staff. 
This perception is captured in the following quote from the workshop: “I think there’s going to 
be so much chaos in the next 5 years. I think the negotiations over quota will be hostile and 
ongoing for the first few years and we’ll be desperately trying to write our own legislation. We 
will have copy and pasted it by then, but I think we will be looking to change certain parts, but 
it won’t have changed fast enough for the industry and they will be unhappy that change has 
not been delivered. I think in 10 years’ time things will take shape again and markets would have 
balanced themselves out again. But 5 years’ time, I don’t think it will be a good place.” 
 
A key aim of the workshop was to develop a range of scenarios regarding the future viability of 
the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall, from the discussion outlined above. In this respect, the 
idea of transition is central: transition in a temporal sense, but also in terms of what is 
negotiated. There is an ‘ideal’ starting position (likely, perhaps to be the UK’s EEZ or Median 
Line), which will be the subject of a hard negotiation, ending up with something that is more, or 
less, acceptable. On this basis, it is possible to suggest three scenarios for the inshore fishing 
sector in Cornwall.  
 
However, before doing so, it is imperative to consider a number of over-arching factors. First, 
the voice of the sector is in danger of not being heard by those making the decisions regarding 
the future of the fishing industry. Second, that the definition of an ‘inshore fishing sector’ is 
insufficiently precise and in need of refinement. Third, it is important in policy terms to be clear 
as to the purpose of the inshore sector (howsoever the sector is defined). Is it about catching 
fish or preserving a way of life; making a meaningful contribution to food and nutrition security, 
or simply providing a luxury product; or primarily in terms of its socio-economic contribution to 
rural communities? Fourth, how best to deal with the monetisation of licences and quota. In 
both cases, neither had any monetary value when originally issued, but due to their limited 
availability have been increasingly traded between fishers. One option is for the UK Government 
to buy back this quota and to allocate it to fishers as they see fit. Inevitably this would be very 
expensive, but would allow for a different and more policy-targeted approach to be taken in 
terms of quota allocation. Fifth, the timescale involved for any of the possible scenarios to come 
to fruition may be as long as 10 years. Sixth, the fisheries sector as a whole is very small in terms 
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of its contribution to the overall GDP of the UK, with the inshore sector only contributing a very 
small percentage of that. As such, there are concerns that it may be used as a bargaining chip in 
the wider Brexit negotiations and effectively become marginalised. Bearing these caveats in 
mind, the three scenarios were developed as follows: 
 
Scenario 1: Retention of the Status Quo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2: UK regains control of its waters to 12 nm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
1. access to fishing areas and the allocation of quota will remain broadly in line with the 
current arrangements under the CFP; 
2. access to the EU’s markets will remain unchanged and no tariffs will be introduced; 
3. management of the UK’s fisheries will continue to be through negotiations with EU 
members in Brussels, rather than at a national or local level; 
4. existing EU environmental designations will be incorporated into UK legislation. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
1. insufficient quota to allow many of them to survive, economically; 
2. often inappropriate and burdensome legislation; 
3. insufficient opportunities for successors; 
4. the decline of the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall. 
 
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
1. the London Convention 1964 will be repealed, ending Relative Stability and 
‘grandfather rights’; 
2. access to non UK boats will be restricted to beyond 12 nm; 
3. more quota is reserved for UK boats, including for inshore boats; 
4. the EU imposes tariffs of 5-10% on all fish imports from the UK. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
1. able to extend their fishing out to 12 nm with less fear of damage to their gear; 
2. reduces the pressure on inshore stocks - especially beneficial to pot fishermen; 
3. more quota is available to inshore fishers than at present, reducing the impact of 
‘choke’ species and improving their economic viability; 
4. a 5-10% tariff is balanced by the fall in the value of the £ relative to the €; 
5. EU market demand continues, but more incentive to develop domestic markets; 
6. succession opportunities improve and the decline in inshore fisher numbers is halted. 
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Scenario 3: UK regains control of its EEZ/median line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presentation of the project’s findings to DEFRA 
Although the Sufisa project has been financed by the European commission, and it is to the 
Commission that the results of the research should be reported, it was felt important to also 
present the results to the UK's government department responsible for fisheries - Defra 
(Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs) – not least due to the forthcoming 
Brexit negotiations. A meeting was arranged for 10th May 2017 at Defra's offices in London. 
Some of the key messages presented by the research team, included: 
• The inshore sector is desperate for more quota and there are concerns about the 
introduction of licence capping. 
• There is a need to consider buying out licences and quota that have been increasingly 
traded over recent years, so that they can then be re-distributed by the state. 
• Fishers see Brexit as an opportunity for change, but are sceptical that the UK 
Government will argue the fisheries’ position strongly enough in the Brexit negotiations. 
• The research team presented that the feeling from the FGs and workshop was that the 
UK’s starting position in the Brexit negotiations should be to get the EEZ back and to 
hopefully end up with the 12 nm zone returned to UK control. 
• It was acknowledged by Defra that it would be critical to review, and perhaps repeal, 
the London Fisheries Convention, in that this convention enshrines the notion of 
‘relative stability’ and hence historic fishing rights. 
• The need to give voice to the inshore fishers, not least because neither Fishing for Leave 
nor the CFPO do this sufficiently well. In this respect, that there was support at the local 
level for the development of a Coastal PO. 
• Frustration that much of the regulation developed at the Commission is not necessarily 
appropriate at a local level, especially in Cornwall where there is such a diverse fishery. 
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
1. the London Convention 1964 will be repealed, ending Relative Stability and 
‘grandfather rights’; 
2. the UK will take back control of its 200 nm EEZ, or the median line; 
3. UK fishing will be based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
4. the EU imposes tariffs of 30-35% on all fish imports from the UK**; 
5. access to EU waters for UK boats is strictly curtailed. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
1. marine planning of all UK waters is completely under control of the UK authorities; 
2. legislation can be better tailored to local conditions; 
3. a greater share of the quota allocated goes to the inshore sector, reducing the impact 
of ‘choke’ species and improving their economic viability; 
4. EU markets demand for their catch is reduced by 30%, meaning that it is imperative 
to develop more local markets; 
5. restricted access to EU waters will not affect the inshore sector; 
6. greater opportunities and optimism for the future of the sector, including succession. 
 
** If this were to be the case, then tariffs would be set to WTO levels. These operate on a sliding 
scale, with processed fish having tariffs in the order of 25% and raw fish being lower than this. 
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In this respect, that 'one size does not fit all’ and that there is a need for more 
appropriate bottom-up regulation that has been developed at a local level. 
• Concern about the potential loss of EU markets. Related to this, there is recognition that 
fishers need to become more entrepreneurial in terms of how they market their catch, 
and that perhaps there is a need to support this through both policy and monetary 
support. 
• While the inshore fishing sector may be marginal in economic terms, it is of critical value 
to the wider economy in Cornwall, especially tourism, as well as to the social fabric of 
many of the communities involved. In this regard, it was discussed that it would be of 
value to conduct an SROI (Social Return on Investment) on the inshore fishing sector in 
Cornwall. This would then provide a clearer idea as to the wider benefits of the inshore 
sector, expressed in monetary terms. 
• Ultimately, if change along the lines suggested above does not come about to some 
extent, the research team made the point that the future of the inshore fishing sector 
in Cornwall does not look bright, especially after the current generation of fishers die 
off. In this respect, that existing fishers are inherently highly resilient, but that fishing as 
a vocation/job has much less appeal these days, as well as providing fewer opportunities 
than it did a generation ago. 
 
 
Dairy producers in Somerset 
 
Context: dairy restructuring and dairy farming in Somerset 
The UK is the third-largest milk producer in the EU after Germany and France, and the tenth-
largest producer in the world (Bates 2016). The dairy sector accounts for about 18% of the UK’s 
total agricultural output. In the last ten years the number of dairy farms has declined at an 
average rate of 4% per year. There is a concentration of dairy farms in the mid-west and western 
regions of England, although even these established dairying areas have experienced a decrease 
in the total number of dairy farms. The pattern of structural change on UK dairy farms is thus 
towards fewer, larger farms, a pattern which has been well-observed throughout developed 
market economies. 
 
Various studies have been commissioned to examine the factors driving structural change in the 
UK dairy sector (e.g. DairyCo 2013), which are usually clustered into two main categories: ‘social’ 
(e.g. lack of succession, age of the farmer, education) and ‘economic’ (profit, cost of production, 
milk price). Poor milk price is the most significant factor. The milk market, particularly liquid milk, 
is dominated by supermarkets through which as much as 80% of milk produced is sold. In 
2014/2015 dairy farms in the UK had an average Farm Business Income (FBI) of £83,904, which 
is 4.2% lower than the previous year (McHoul et al. 2016). In 2015, there was a SOS Dairy 
Campaign and a number of well-publicised farmer protests at leading supermarkets and 
processors. Farmers argued that the price they were receiving for their milk was not sufficient 
to cover production costs. Milk prices in 2017 have significantly improved, but this may not last 
and the key challenge is how farmers deal with price volatility, particularly when prices are very 
low. The impact and strategies available to manage price volatility will vary too depending on 
the type of dairy farm, which in the UK range from small scale, family, extensive units where 
animals are exclusively grazed, to units where cows are housed and fed for the duration of their 
lactation (Dairy UK 2013). 
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The case study sought to better understand key market and regulatory conditions that 
potentially impact dairy businesses, including price volatility, and the key strategies emerging to 
manage these risks. Somerset was selected as a case study area. Somerset is a rural county 
located in south-west England with a strong tradition of agriculture, especially dairy and 
livestock farming. Dairy farms account for about 12% of Somerset’s farms. The number of dairy 
farms has remained concentrated over time, although the sector locally has seen some exiting 
the sector. Herd size numbers in the county have increased, but the county retains a profile of 
mostly smaller-scale, family run dairy farms. Somerset is also home to a number of large 
processors and high-quality dairy industries, including Dairy Crest, Müller Wiseman Dairies, 
Wykes, Barber’s, and Yeo Valley Organic. Among Somerset’s traditional dairy products, West 
Country Farmhouse Cheddar was awarded a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) label in 1996. 
 
Policy and regulatory conditions 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has played a fundamental role in shaping UK agriculture 
and regulation of the dairy sector since the UK joined the then European Economic Community 
in 1973. The key policy changes that have had an influence on the UK dairy sector are: the 
introduction of milk quotas in 1984; the 1992 CAP Reform and farmers’ payments for ecosystem 
services; the abolition of the Milk Marketing Boards in 1994 (Banks and Marsden 1997); and the 
abolition of milk quotas in 2015. The CAP provides direct financial support to dairy farmers 
through its two pillars: the direct support package (Pillar I) and the rural development 
programme (Pillar II). Interviewees noted that when milk prices are good the reliance on subsidy 
support is not as significant as some other sectors, or for those farmers in more deprived 
regions. However, in periods of poor milk price the basic payment is a lifeline, particularly for 
smaller farms and/or farms exposed to global market fluctuations. 
 
Milk quotas were abolished in March 2015. The decision to remove milk quotas was motivated 
by the increase in demand for dairy products globally, especially in emerging countries like 
China. The quota regime was viewed as a potential barrier to EU producers responding to this 
growing global demand, hence limiting the EU dairy sector’s competitiveness and growth. Along 
with opportunities for expansion and intensification of production, the abolition of quota also 
created production and marketing issues that dairy farmers had to face. Abolishing milk quotas 
had several implications, but two main effects were noted in the literature: 
 
• Production effect: Predicting the changes in milk production due to the lifting of quotas is 
not straightforward. In theory, removing the quota should result in an increase in output 
and, consequently, in a decrease of milk prices (Kovács 2014). 
• Price effect: The dairy market is not a single commodity market, but it is composed of several 
types of products, with different levels of processing (liquid milk, cream, powdered milk, 
butter, fresh cheese, mature cheese, etc.). This implies that each product can suffer from 
specific price effects. 
 
Interviewees argued the abolition of milk quota was not really an issue for UK dairy farmers, 
because reaching quota has not been an issue for several years due to significant restructuring 
and downsizing in terms of dairy farm numbers. In other words, the UK has not been close to 
meeting its quota limit. However, as interviewees also pointed out, the removal of quota 
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impacts the wider milk pool, particularly at a European level. The impact of milk quota on UK 
dairy farmers has thus, so far, been indirect. 
 
A “Milk Package” was published by the European Commission in March 2012. It consists of a 
series of measures and policy instruments devised to better support the participation of dairy 
producers in the milk chain, in response to the 2009 milk market crisis. It was also designed to 
help ensure the long-term future and sustainability of the dairy sector following the abolition of 
the milk quota system. The milk package measures have been applicable since 3 October 2012 
and will apply until mid-2020. The measures constitute a major amendment to the Common 
Organisation of the Markets in Agricultural Products (Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council) in which the milk sector is integrated. The overall aim 
of the package is to enhance information availability and the transparency of the market. 
According to the Milk Package, written contracts between dairy producers and processors can 
be made compulsory at member state level, and dairy purchasers are obliged to offer minimum 
contract durations to farmers. The contracts should be made in advance of delivery and must 
set specificities such as price, volume, duration, payments, collection and rules for force 
majeure. Contracts are expected to be negotiated and farmers may refuse offers of minimum 
contract duration. An important aspect of the package is the possibility for farmers to 
collectively negotiate contracts. With the abolition of milk marketing boards in 1994, the role of 
producer organisations (PO) has also increased. 
 
Following the aid package, in April 2016, the European Commission published new rules 
providing the opportunity for farmers to jointly plan milk production. This option is provided in 
the context of Article 222 of the CAP Market Regulation (1308/2014), which was introduced for 
the first time in the 2013 CAP Reform. As interviewees explained in 2015, there was no plans at 
that time for the UK dairy sector to take advantage of Article 222, but other countries (e.g. 
France) were in favour of market stabilisation measures, including restrictions on the amount of 
milk produced. 
 
Various regulations and legislation are of significant importance to dairy farmers, including the 
Animal Welfare Act 2006, animal health regulations and nitrogen reduction measures within the 
Water Framework and Nitrates Directives. The points noted in the interviews are as follows: 
 
• In terms of animal health, diseases and related regulations fall into two main categories: 
‘notifiable diseases’ and ‘non-notifiable diseases’. There are very few regulations for most 
non-notifiable cattle diseases. For instance, there are no specific regulations for lameness, 
mastitis or fertility, but supermarkets and other retail customers will have certain 
expectations and will require dairy farmers to meet minimum standards in terms of 
lameness, housing, etc. which are often included in milk contracts or via farm assured 
standards. The most significant piece of animal health regulation that impacts dairy farms 
concerns bovine Tuberculosis. Interviewees regarded animal movement restrictions as 
particularly significant and delimiting for dairy farms. 
• In terms of the EU Water Framework Directive (Dir. 2000/60/EC), in the UK, one of the major 
challenges for the implementation of the directive is the reduction of diffuse pollution from 
agriculture. In the case of dairy farmers, the main source of pollution comes from nitrates 
from livestock manure. In total, 62% of the land area of England was designated as Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones in 2010. If a dairy farm is within an NVZ zone the regulations are 
prescriptive regarding allowable nitrate levels and farms must have adequate slurry storage 
(6 months), which has meant significant investment costs for some farms. 
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• The UK Food Safety Act of 1990 is an important piece of legislation for the dairy supply chain. 
The Act defines the traceability standards required for food safety. Traceability can benefit 
high-value dairy producers who want to diversify their product from others, monitoring 
where their milk is processed and/or which are the most successful commercial strategies. 
• The Red Tractor farm assurance scheme is an important voluntary standard. It was 
developed by the UK dairy industry to ensure benchmark standards of animal welfare and 
product quality at the farm level. 
• The EU protection of food names legislation on a geographical or traditional recipe basis, 
introduced in the 1990s, is also of importance, particularly for producers supplying 
customers who produce West Country Farmhouse Cheddar (PDO). 
 
Markets and marketing 
Global, European and UK dairy markets are strongly integrated and changes in production 
volumes, supply and prices in one place can have repercussions on dairy markets at the opposite 
side of the globe. Drops in milk price were linked to the EU Russian trade sanction and 
oversupply of milk on the global market, for example. Despite the loss in market share, both the 
EU as a whole and the UK in particular are still major global dairy producers, and production 
volumes in the UK are relatively stable. Higher production volumes in 2014/2015 were followed 
by an increase in dairy exports, turning the overall UK dairy trade balance from negative to 
positive. The positive trade balance was mainly driven by liquid milk, while imports of cheese 
and butter exceeded UK exports (Bates 2016). 
 
UK dairy farmers operate at higher average production costs than other global and EU 
producers, such as Ireland. The extra cost in the UK is 4 pence per litre (ppl) with respect to the 
global average. However, costs of production vary from farm to farm and they also change from 
year to year (DEFRA 2016). In the last ten years, total dairy production costs followed an upward 
trend, but since 2014 this trend has reversed. UK domestic milk production is not sufficient to 
fulfil demand for dairy products, with milk from UK dairy farms supplemented by imported milk. 
The bulk of available milk, including imports, is almost entirely transferred to dairy industries 
and cooperatives which transform half of the raw milk supplied into manufactured dairy 
products (e.g. cheese, yogurt, desserts), with the remaining raw milk pool treated according to 
different specifications and sold as liquid milk for human consumption. 
 
Overall, the dairy sector concerns mainly fresh and highly perishable products which need 
adequate logistical organisation to be distributed daily throughout the UK. Whilst farmer 
engagement in processing is rising, almost 91% of UK milk is purchased and processed by 
dedicated processing facilities/companies, which process over 100 million litres of milk (Dairy 
UK 2013). There are five major organisations leading the UK dairy industry. Three are UK co-ops: 
Arla Foods, First Milk, and United Dairy Farmers; one is a public UK company: Dairy Crest; and 
one is a German-based private company: Müller Wiseman Dairies.  The UK dairy industry and 
supply chain is therefore characterised by a relatively low level of concentration compared to 
continental counterparts, hence further opportunities for industry rationalisation and merges 
still exist (Dairy UK 2013). UK dairy processors typically have direct links with dairy farmers and 
purchases are often ruled by specific contracts (see below), but not all milk bought from farmers 
is processed by the purchaser; the purchaser can sell the liquid milk to other companies for 
processing. A substantial percentage of UK milk goes into the ingredients sector (as processed 
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milk). This sector is diverse and fragmented but continues to grow as consumers eat more 
processed and prepared foods (Dairy UK 2013). The UK retail market is dominated by four major 
supermarkets (Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons), accounting for 76% of all dairy sales in 
the UK. Only a small proportion of the industry’s total output is sold directly to consumers via 
doorstep delivery service or through local markets. 
 
Milk price is a major and sensitive issue for dairy producers. However, farmers receive different 
prices depending on the buyers and product quality (see contracts section below). There are two 
further issues to consider: asymmetric price transmission and price volatility. In relation to the 
first issue, when discussing dairy prices in the UK it is important to distinguish between three 
price categories: 1) farm gate prices; 2) wholesale prices and; 3) retail prices. The dairy supply 
chain is characterised by asymmetric price transmission – i.e. prices at different stages of the 
chain do not move up and down in line with each other (Ruslan 2011). Asymmetric price 
transmission is due to: differences in market power between supply chain actors; differences in 
market and cost structures across actors; government intervention; and the value added by 
manufacturing of dairy products with respect to liquid milk. For these reasons, the price received 
by farmers can be disproportionately small when compared to the price of the final product sold 
in supermarkets. Regarding milk price volatility, in the last ten years it has increased in the EU 
and in the global market (Tangermann 2011), which coincided with a progressive reduction of 
farmers’ protection towards a more market-oriented EU agricultural sector (Bardaji 2011). Price 
volatility is often considered a negative issue related to low prices and income instability. 
However, price volatility can also be advantageous to those who can seize opportunities and 
build strategies around it (Assefa et al. 2015). 
 
To understand why UK dairy farmers are particularly exposed to price volatility, it is important 
to understand the peculiarities of the UK dairy market. About 65% of dairy production in the UK 
is sold as liquid milk, with only 25% is turned into cheese and 10% into powders and butter. This 
contrasts with the rest of Europe, where only 30% of dairy production is sold as liquid milk. Since 
liquid milk cannot be easily stored in the same way as milk powder or cheese or butter, UK 
farmers tend to be more affected by volatility and global market changes (DEFRA 2016). When 
prices are low, farmers’ production decisions can be affected, influencing farms’ productivity. 
Milk demand in the UK is quite inelastic, meaning that the volumes of milk sold do not change 
dramatically if milk prices change, because milk supply in the UK is a staple good (DEFRA 2016). 
The “price war” around milk thus reflects asymmetric price transmission. Supermarkets are 
transparent in stating that the retail price is not necessarily related to the farm-gate price. Only 
around 7% of the milk produced in the UK is sold on the basis of a pricing mechanism which 
relates to the cost of production. 
 
The main benefit of production contracts for farmers is achieving a degree of price stability, by 
agreeing in advance the purchase price. This provides a certain degree of protection from price 
volatility. However, contracts can also have disadvantages. For example, producers can face 
penalties if they decide to exit the contract before the signed ending of the agreement. To 
enhance contractual relationships within the supply chain, the industry agreed the Dairy 
Industry Voluntary Code of Best Practice on Contractual Relationships in September 2012. The 
code was developed to improve the equity of contractual relationships and to provide an 
alternative to the government regulation of contracts. Adoption of the code is voluntary, but 
currently involves 85% of UK milk purchasers (Dairy UK 2013). The code provides purchasers 
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with greater flexibility in deciding purchase prices according to developments in the market 
place and farmers can in theory obtain fairer prices, security and continuity with respect to 
market access (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
The story of organic milk is different to conventional milk. Similar to supermarket-aligned 
conventional dairy farmers, the price for organic milk is currently good. The situation was 
different a few years ago when some organic milk producers exited and returned to 
conventional. This is not the case now. The UK is the second largest organic dairy market in the 
EU, involving about 11% of dairy producers (OMSCo 2015). From 2013 to 2014 the organic sector 
experienced 6.4% value growth compared to a decline of 1.6% in the conventional milk sector. 
The UK dairy organic sector is dominated by private label and branded products. The leading 
brand, Yeo Valley, recorded a 13.2% increase in sales value, versus 4.5% for private label organic 
dairy sales (OMSCo 2015). Although organic represents a key strategy in the UK for dairy farmers 
to achieve price premiums at a time of depressed milk prices, supply for UK organic milk is 
currently in balance, and there is little scope for new producers to enter the market (OMSCo 
2015). 
 
Standards such as the Red Tractor play an increasingly important role as a system of private 
governance. Standards are important also for international trade. Some interviewees noted, for 
example, that European standards will need to be reached even if the UK is not in the EU. 
Interviewees also noted farmer frustrations regarding the paperwork required to comply with 
standards and duplication between some standards. 
 
Focus groups, supply chain interviews and workshop feedback  
Three focus groups were held with Somerset/north Devon dairy farmers in March 2017. To 
complement the focus group data, 11 supply chain interviews were completed with dairy 
processors, farmer co-operative representatives or individuals who were in some way involved 
in buying milk from dairy farmers and/or helping to set up milk contract arrangements. This 
helped to deepen the analysis and understanding of different institutional arrangements 
available to dairy farmers. Two members of the research team also meet with Defra in April 2017 
to inform them about the ongoing research work and proposed plans in relation to Brexit. It was 
too early in the research cycle to report concrete findings but some preliminary findings were 
reported in terms of new contractual arrangements. A workshop was subsequently conducted 
in May 2017, following reflection on the focus group and interview data, to firstly present the 
key findings of the research conducted for feedback and comments, and secondly, to discuss a 
range of scenarios regarding the future viability of dairy farming in Somerset, linked to the Brexit 
negotiations. Analysis of the interview and focus group data revealed six key areas, as well as 
Brexit, which are summarised below. 
 
1. Milk price and price volatility. Participants argued that milk price volatility was a key 
characteristic of the dairy industry. Volatility was intensifying, resulting in more dramatic 
highs and lows, as well as becoming more frequent. Participants understood milk price 
volatility as the product of global issues, rather than an isolated national problem. Low milk 
prices in 2015, for example, were linked to lower global demand of milk combined with milk 
oversupply, the ban of dairy exports to the Russian market, and the deregulation of the EU 
milk quotas. As a dairy farmer, low milk price is the key issue and underlying concern, but 
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price volatility is also significant because of the challenges and uncertainty it creates in terms 
of farm management. Participants agreed that issues of oversupply and undersupply were 
the key cause of market volatility and that producers needed to be far more sensitive to the 
market in order to maintain a stable milk price. The terms ‘accommodation milk’ and ‘milk 
washing’ (i.e. oversupply) also emerged in the focus groups as a cause of milk price volatility. 
Price wars between supermarkets, started initially by ‘Iceland’, were also blamed for 
triggering price lows. 
 
2. Institutional arrangements for milk. The supply chain interviews identified a number of 
different institutional arrangements for selling milk. These different arrangements 
represent different strategies that potentially help dairy farmers to manage market 
volatility. For dairy, these arrangements are essentially different types of contract. Some 
have been in place for some time but there are developments within these arrangements 
(e.g. new pricing mechanisms) in response to volatility. The analysis suggests contractual 
relationships in the UK dairy industry are highly developed. Dairy farmers can engage with 
the dairy industry through a variety of contract types (see below). In general terms, it is 
possible to distinguish between collective and individual arrangements: 
• Collective organisational sales 
(i) Co-operatives (e.g. Arla, OMSCo, First Milk) 
(ii) DPO (Dairy Crest Direct)  
• Individual sales  
(i) Supermarket aligned contracts  
(ii) Direct to processor/milk buyer (e.g. Muller non-aligned, Crediton Dairies, Barber’s, 
Wykes) 
(iii) Informal arrangements (direct to the consumer, such as a milk hut)   
 
In the case of the former, the contact concerns a group of farmers and the members can 
benefit from improved bargaining power. 
 
3. Contractualisation and pricing instruments. Contracts are an increasingly important feature 
of dairy supply chains. The analysis used the following attributes of contract arrangements 
to compare dairy contracts:  
• Pricing determination 
• Length of contract in years 
• Cancellation/notice period 
• Quantity to supply buyer 
• Exclusivity 
• Price change notice period  
 
In terms of price determination, the main pricing mechanisms used are as follows. First, cost 
of production plus, in which the farmer receives a price for their product that covers cost of 
production as a minimum, plus a bit more, ensuring sustainable profitability of their 
business. They applied in supermarket-aligned contracts and account for about 10% of the 
industry. Second, A and B pricing, which is a pricing matrix with a core price and a market 
realisation price. This was used by Dairy Crest Direct and some of the smaller dairies and 
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cheese producers, such as Crediton and Barber’s. There is some debate about whether A 
and B pricing is the best way forward, or whether it would be better to just have one price. 
Third, formulaic or basket pricing, where dairy farmers are offered one price for their milk 
for a period, which is derived from four or five prices currently offered by processors in the 
market. This pricing mechanism was used, for example, by Muller (non-aligned contracts), 
the Arla co-operative as well as one smaller milk broker.  There is some debate about 
offering future prices for milk but currently only one dairy, Yew Tree Dairies, offer this 
hedging option, although Muller plan to introduce this option for one of their manufacturing 
contracts. Most contracts examined were exclusive and evergreen and producers are usually 
notified 12 months in advance if a contract will be cancelled. In terms of price changes, the 
notice is usually 30 days. The biggest difference in contracts is in terms of the quantity 
supplied. Processors who favoured A and B pricing, including one who was present at the 
workshop, argued it was a good way to control supply. This was critical for smaller cheese 
processors and dairies. Co-operatives like Arla have no limit and guarantee to take whatever 
a farmer produces. Muller require farmers to notify them if they will exceed 10% of their 
previous milk year. There is some debate about what mechanism is best, with some arguing 
no limit contracts were one of the reasons why oversupply happens. 
 
4. Collective action (DPO and co-operative models). The DPO model was closely examined in 
this study because in theory it gives producers greater power in terms of negotiating 
contracts. So far there has been limited uptake of this option. Those farmers participating in 
the Dairy Crest Direct DPO, the only one running in the UK, felt it was beneficial. Some 
argued it was the next best thing to a co-operative. It was recognised that the scheme was 
rather cumbersome (at least as implemented). Stakeholders and farmers recognised the 
need for greater co-operation to sell milk, including joint ventures at a farm level (to share 
capital, expertise, etc.). Although there is only one DPO, a number of milk pools set up by 
other dairies were effectively running as DPOs, but without the formalised governance 
structure. There was some concern that the Dairy Crest Direct DPO did not have any leverage 
over the price the processor is offering. Several farmers surveyed supplied Arla. Farmers in 
the focus groups were passionate advocates of the co-operative model. It was argued that 
a strong co-operative was critical to farmers when it came to negotiating milk prices. 
 
5. Market data and futures. A wealth of market data and statistics exist to support dairy 
farmers and processors in their decision-making. In the literature the high degree of one-
way transparency and information asymmetry in favour of the retailers has been described 
as ‘highly unfair’ (Lehman et al. 2013), positioning retailers in a stronger position to assert 
price claims against dairy companies. However, with reference to the availability of such 
information, some focus group participants and dairy processors argued farmers can, and 
should, use this information to their advantage. Although this data is widely available, and 
can be used to improve farmers’ bargaining power, a number of interview participants noted 
farmers’ lack of engagement with such material. This is because a lot of dairy farmers are 
simply too busy. Interestingly, some dairies and processors that were interviewed, notably 
Barber’s, were making efforts to get farmers to engage with such material. Dairy farming in 
a time characterised by such volatility will require, it was argued, a different set of skills – 
particularly business skills – which will require closer engagement with market data and 
futures. Workshop participants and interviewees were positive about the use of futures data 
as a means of controlling milk price volatility. In this regard, futures contracts can help in 
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planning cash flows, as they help farm business management on the basis of a guaranteed 
income for the milk commodity. This form of contract, which has an element of hedging is 
now being discussed much in the dairy sector. At the moment futures contracts exist for 
butter, skimmed milk powder and whole milk powder. 
 
6. The future (succession and social drivers). There was significant concern that opportunities 
in dairy farming remained limited for young people without familial connections to the 
industry because of the high start-up costs. Whilst participants recognised opportunities to 
be employed as a non-familial employee were abundant, they feared entry into the industry 
in any other way was typically impossible because of the capital required to do so. This 
concern prompted participants to appeal for innovative start up initiatives such as share 
farming schemes developed in New Zealand. Participants recognised an increase in interest 
in and enthusiasm towards agricultural work in contrast to recent years. This positivity ties 
in with wider observations in the academic literature of a renewed interest in agricultural 
careers, attributable to the (re-)emergence of food security in the political agenda in 
developed market economies. Whilst there was significant positivity about interest in the 
industry, others described dairy farming as generally unappealing – mainly relating to the 
unsociable working hours required, but also relating to the hard work required. Whilst a 
familial connection to the industry had been recognised as often the only way into farming, 
the family structure was also identified as problematic for the progression of young people 
in the industry. This issue – also known as the ‘farmer’s boy problem’ – has previously been 
recognised in the family farming literature (Chiswell, 2016) and is considered highly 
debilitating for the younger generation. There is scope here to think about how to facilitate 
succession in the dairy industry, so as to allow ‘young blood’ to come through and benefit 
the industry. 
 
Brexit 
Brexit represented a divisive topic. Participants had a range of views and responses to the Brexit 
vote and cited a range of potential implications for the dairy industry after the UK exits the 
European Union. Some respondents refused to speculate on Brexit impacts because of the 
uncertainties surrounding future trading options. In general terms, focus group discussions 
identified three key concerns: 
• Trade and a trade deal 
• The availability of labour 
• Subsidies and competitiveness  
 
Trade, and specifically whether a trade deal with the EU would be secured, was the biggest post-
Brexit concern amongst participants. Unsurprisingly, groups that were reliant on exports and/or 
the ability to move products across European boundaries were most concerned about the 
impacts of no trade deal.  
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In the participatory workshop four Brexit scenarios (adapted from van Berkum et al. (2016) and 
Buckwell (2016)) were developed relating to trade and policy support: 
 
Scenario 1: Baseline/status quo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2: A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the UK and the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 3: WTO-default position – ‘no deal agreed’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 4: UK trade liberalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four scenarios were designed to facilitate a discussion with key stakeholders from the 
industry on the future of the dairy industry and more specifically the potential impacts of Brexit 
(depending on the final outcome) on the dairy industry in Somerset and beyond. 
 
 
Under this scenario the UK leaves the EU, but continues to have free access to the Single 
Market and continues to have full access to the four EU ‘freedoms’ (labour, capital, goods 
and services). 
 
As part of this scenario, the UK would adopt a British Agricultural Policy (BAP), requiring the 
same budget contributions as the CAP. Direct support would remain the same as current 
levels. 
Under this scenario the UK seeks a FTA with the EU. This option is not as advantageous as 
free access to the Single Market that EU membership confers but inclusion in the EU 
Customs Union is a possibility. Whilst some products will not be subject to tariffs, ‘sensitive 
products’ such as milk may be subject to some form of tariff e.g. Tariff Rate Quotas. 
Agricultural matters are normally the most difficult part of any FTA, so a functioning FTA 
may take many years to be agreed.  
 
As part of this scenario, levels of direct support would be 50% of their current levels. 
If no deal were to be agreed, the UK would revert to the WTO-default position and would 
trade with the EU on the same basis as other WTO members. In other words, UK 
imports/exports would fall under the WTO’s non-discrimination Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rules and would be subject to a 36% tariff. The EU would apply a Common Customs 
Tariff (CCT) to UK imports and border and customs controls would increase. 
 
As part of this scenario, levels of direct support would be 50% of their current levels. 
In this scenario, the UK allows wider access to UK markets by reducing tariff rates by 50% 
across the board (i.e. removes barriers to trade). This scenario is similar to the WTO-default 
scenario, including increased trade facilitation costs, with the only difference that the UK 
and the EU have different border tariffs: the UK applies 50% MFN tariffs to all imports and 
the EU applies CCT to UK exports to the European Union.  
 
As part of this scenario farmers would no longer receive any agricultural support. 
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General reactions to the scenarios:  
• As was the case during the interviews and focus groups, workshop participants were 
uncertain about what post-Brexit scenarios were most likely to prevail. There was a 
preference to talk about the implications of Brexit in general terms.  
• Overall, it was felt that whatever scenario was adopted, it would be less protectionist 
than the status quo and would expose the dairy industry to more competition, for which 
it would have to be fitter and more competitive.  
• Workshop participants perceived one of the biggest challenges associated with Brexit to 
be the infrastructure and manpower required to deal with border control. 
• There was a feeling amongst workshop participants that in anticipation of the policy 
change, Brexit was already having an impact on farmers in terms of their business 
decision making and the availability of labour. 
• It was noted that reliance on labour extended beyond the availability of seasonal labour 
in the dairy industry, which has relied on European workers to perform skilled work (e.g. 
input via the veterinary profession) for a substantial period of time. 
 
Preference and likelihood of the scenarios 
• After the status quo, the FTA was considered the most desirable option (and perhaps 
the most likely option in the long run). However, participants felt it was not going to be 
easy to implement and would likely take some time – perhaps even a decade. 
• There was a feeling that a trade liberalisation scenario would be ‘dangerous’. 
Participants attributed this to the issue of equivalency; liberalisation could mean that 
US products, not made to the same standard as the UK, would be able to undercut the 
UK’s prices. It was synonymous with a ‘hard Brexit’ throughout the discussions. 
• However, participants made a number of references to the success of New Zealand 
compared to protectionist regimes such as Ireland. 
• Scenarios one and four were viewed as least likely. Much of the discussion focussed on 
scenarios two (FTA) and three (WTO) – the middle scenarios.  
• Participants saw the WTO as a possible interim option on the way to a FTA, and felt the 
eventual outcome might be ‘somewhere in the middle’ depending on the negotiations. 
• Although there was initial enthusiasm for domestic producers under a WTO option, 
there was concern that becoming entirely self-sufficient in dairy would eventually 
thwart both investment and innovation.  
 
Opening the door to competition: implications for dairy 
• It was anticipated that dairy farming following Brexit would need to be more 
competitive, regardless of the exact scenario adopted.  
• Without the security of unlimited free trade within the EU (the status quo) and direct 
support, it was felt that the dairy industry would need to ‘up its game’ to compete in 
the global market. 
• Overall participants took a more positive view on the potential reduction of agricultural 
support; they felt it offered an opportunity to revise the way agricultural support is 
targeted and could eventually help to increase the industry’s productivity, efficiency and 
resilience in the global market. 
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• Rather than direct support, workshop participants anticipated indirect mechanisms, i.e. 
payments for research, skills development and teaching, tax incentives etc. as a possible 
way of delivering agricultural support for a more efficient dairy industry. 
• Some participants recognised the WTO position as an opportunity for domestic 
production. This demonstrates the importance of recognising the different institutional 
arrangements when considering the implications of post-Brexit policy on UK dairy 
farming; different scenarios will have different implications for the different 
arrangements. 
 
Producer survey  
 
The results of the Producer Survey (Task 2.6) are presented in relation to dairy farms in 
Somerset and Devon. The questionnaire was composed of the following sections: 
A. Farm business characteristics 
B. Production and sales channels 
C. Characteristics of the sale agreement and sustainability 
D. Strategies and drivers of farming 
E. Farmer characteristics 
 
For the purposes of this report, data are analysed using descriptive statistics. The sample is 
composed of 88 farms located in Somerset and 112 in Devon. This proportion reflects the 
higher total number of dairy farms in Devon. 
 
The survey highlights the following characteristics in relation to the farm and farmers: 
• The majority of farmers were male (89%) 
• The majority of farmers were between 41 and 65; young farmers only accounted for 
12.5% of the sample 
• Farmers typically had a high school education 
• 57% of farmers had an agricultural education 
• Family farms (as opposed to private companies) were the dominant organisation (81%) 
• Organic farming only accounted for 5.5% of the farms  
• More than half of the survey participants expected that one day the farm will be taken 
over by a family member (54.4%) 
 
Interestingly, being a member of at least one farmer organisation was very common in 
Somerset and Devon. About 3 out of four farms (74%) were members of a farmers’ union. 
Membership in cooperatives and/or POs were also quite frequent among dairy farmers.  
 
The survey highlight a range of different roles played by farmers’ organisations in terms of 
sales arrangements. The main role was to buy farmers’ milk (82%), but also provided a wide 
range of services beyond purchasing milk, e.g. acting as intermediaries with other buyers and 
supporting the design of contracts between farmers and buyers.  
 
The producer survey reveals the average dairy farm size in Devon and Somerset was 183.7ha, 
which is considerably above the South West and national averages of 70ha and 86ha 
respectively. The average herd size was 237.6 cows, with an average productivity of 7.9 
thousand litres per cow, per year.  
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The survey highlights the importance of farm income to total income for farm households, 
with just under 90% of income coming via agricultural activities. Within farm income, milk was 
unsurprisingly the main source (accounting for 80.7% of this farm income).  
 
Over half the farms in the survey did not diversify and were therefore purely specialised in milk 
production. The main risk management strategy was reported to be insurance, however, 
there were significant differences in the uptake of insurance for livestock, compared to crop 
cover.  
 
The survey revealed significant differences between the types of sales for collective and 
individual organisations. Differences included the duration of contract, moment of payment 
and costs associated with the arrangement/agreement. The attributes and services associated 
with dairy sale agreements also differed between collective and individual organisations.  
 
Milk price and production costs continue to be a controversial topic. The survey revealed how 
production costs are 81.7% of prices but in some circumstances production costs were as 
much as 140% of prices. The analysis considers reasons why the cost of production can differ 
so significantly for different farmers and selling arrangements.  
 
Overall, all farmers were quite satisfied with the agreement they have for their main milk sale, 
with an average answer close to 4 out of 5. Farmers selling to individual businesses were 
particularly satisfied. The reason for such a high level of satisfaction seems to be linked to the 
fact that the agreements guarantee higher prices and, even more important, that prices were 
fairly stable, mitigating the risks of price volatility. 
 
One key objective of the survey was to gather information about how farmers perceive the 
sale agreements they have in place in terms of sustainability. On average, the overall 
sustainability of the arrangements is just above the threshold 3 (on a scale of 1 -5), for both 
arrangements with collective and individual organisations. 
 
The focus of the survey was on producers’ sales agreements with buyers; however, additional 
questions regarding future farming strategies and the drivers of potential farming changes 
were also asked. On average, all farms blame low market prices and price volatility as key 
drivers of dairy farming production strategies, underlying the importance of market 
uncertainties for this sector and the dominance of market factors in farmer thinking. 
 
In terms of future strategies, the majority of dairy farms (53.5%) do not have particular 
strategies in mind and they expect to maintain their existing scales of operation. Only 6.5% of 
all farms expected to abandon farming altogether.  
 
CSP inventory  
 
The final componement of this report is a summary of the inventory data pertaining to both 
UK dairy and fishing conditions, strategies and performances.  
 
Dairy  
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• Key conditions 
o Price levels and volatility as a condition was cited 11 times, representing 37% 
all reported conditions for this commodity 
o Regulation and policy were the second most cited condition (23%) 
o Socio-demographic conditions accounted for 10%; as did market access and 
ecological/environmental conditions  
o Demand conditions (7%) were less discussed compared to other conditions  
o Factor access was the least cited condition (3%) 
• Key strategies were diverse, although market orientation emerged as the most 
significant strategy; in the absence of quota, production has increasingly become 
based or oriented towards market demand  
o This variety of strategies reported in the CSP inventory reflects the 
heterogeneous nature of the dairy sector. There cannot be one strategy to 
address all the issues faced by the sector. In fact, just as the removal of quota 
can be viewed either as a business opportunity or a risk factor, Brexit can be 
also be perceived an opportunity or threat, dependent on the farm business 
involved.  
 
Fish  
 
• Key conditions 
o Regulation and policy conditions were the most cited, representing 34% all 
reported conditions for this commodity. This is unsurprising given their role in 
the operational aspects of inshore fisheries, particularly in relation to what can 
be caught and when. 
o Market access was another significant issue (19%) 
o As was ecological/environmental conditions (16%) – this was mainly related to 
marine protection 
• Key strategies  
o The inventory strategies data suggests how inshore fishing is not only about 
catching fish and in order to survive the challenges highlighted by the report, 
fishers have to deploy a range of strategies to ensure they can earn a living. 
The most dominant strategy was market orientation (25%), followed by 
training, advice and investment in research and development (13%) and a 
deliberate focus on environmental issues (13%) 
o The sector’s sustainability depends economically on accessing new markets, 
and on the long-term availability of marine resources. Some fishers are turning 
to processing as well as investing in direct marketing. Added value is a key 
aspect of many strategies which seek to differentiate fishing businesses from 
each other and thereby earn a better price on their products.  
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1 Introduction and methods 
The purpose of this UK report is to investigate the nature of policy requirements, market 
imperfections and their implications for the resilience of inshore fishing in the county of 
Cornwall and dairy farming in the county of Somerset, respectively. It is based on the conceptual 
framework developed in WP 1, and aims to go beyond the relatively fragmented insights 
consolidated in WP 1 to produce a more comprehensive and holistic view of the conditions faced 
by inshore fishers and dairy farmers and the strategies they employ to ensure their 
sustainability, resilience and continuation. The two case studies have their own sections with 
the UK National Report, but it will become clear that many of the issues faced by inshore fishers 
are also faced by milk producers. This is significant and a key benefit of conducting simultaneous 
investigations into these two different primary production sectors. In this report the main 
objective is to identify key market and regulatory conditions as they relate to and impact upon 
the commodities and regions selected for analysis. Regulatory and market conditions are the 
focus but other conditions (e.g. social conditions) that have emerged as important are also 
reported. A comparison between the two sectors is not provided in detail in this report, but in 
the final report similarities will be highlighted where appropriate, as well as the distinctive 
nature of the responses, thereby having the potential to provide a valuable learning experience. 
 
For both inshore fisheries and dairy a media analysis was conducted, as well as a desk-based 
analysis of market conditions and regulations for each case region/commodity, supplemented 
with expert interviews per case study. In more detail, the media analysis examined national, 
regional and specialised media from 2005 to 2016, with a focus on publications reporting on the 
economic and financial sustainability of primary producers. Table 1 summarises the press 
coverage in terms of the types of sources analysed. Specialist media were derived from three 
main sources: 1) industry-related publications and specialised magazines; 2) government-
related publications and 3) public-orientated publications, including material from NGOs, blogs 
and newspaper articles. 
 
Table 1. Summary of media analysis sample  
Source Number of articles analysed % of sample 
National press 112 47% 
Regional press 65 27% 
Specialised media 62 26% 
Total 239  
 
The desk-based review involved analysis of key policies, regulations and market issues that 
impact on fishery and dairy producers in Cornwall and Somerset, respectively. Sources reviewed 
included academic publications (research papers, books and websites related to sectors and/or 
key regulations, policies, market issues, standards or instruments); Government and policy 
documents and websites; market data, market research and consultancy reports; industry 
data/reports and NGO documents. A number of academic articles were reviewed for both 
sectors, with particularly good research coverage in relation to inshore fisheries. The Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were both reviewed in detail, 
as well as relevant regulations related to each sector, supplemented with analysis of policy 
documents. The key standards for both sectors were also reviewed. Market research and data 
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on each commodity sector was also reviewed, as well as relevant industry data, including 
analysis of secondary data to examine socio-economic changes in both sectors over time. 
 
The analysis of market and regulatory conditions was designed to reflect two things: firstly, it 
reviewed what the current market and regulatory conditions are; and secondly, it reflected the 
perceptions and experiences of those who have to work under those market and regulatory 
conditions. In other words, it was not necessary to provide a detailed account of the history of 
specific policies or regulations, but instead gave a sense of policy evolution in order to 
contextualise the current situation. The aim was therefore to review the most recent papers, 
reports, market data etc., although older material was accessed to understand production 
changes. The review of both sectors thus covered: an overview of the key policies / regulations; 
quota or subsidy issues; environmental regulations/legislation or management issues; zoning 
laws; sector specific regulations; analysis of relevant public and private standards (e.g. food 
safety standards set by the EU, government regulations, or private standards set by food 
retailers or processors; analysis of market conditions and finance markets (in the form of 
product markets) (i.e. just buying and selling issues and not factor markets). 
 
The review thus describes the key components that relate to and condition our specific 
commodities studied. Some issues emerged in both the regulation and market analysis sections 
because of their interrelated nature (the trading of fish quota, for example, is both a regulation 
and market issue). Producers’ structural diversity was also accounted for e.g. differences in 
structure that may result in different strategies. 
 
The stakeholder interviews were intended to supplement the desk-based review. The aim of the 
interviews was therefore to gain further insight into the nature and complexity of market and 
regulatory conditions and emergent CSP issues. Having conducted a desk-based review of the 
literature available on each commodity, the interviews were used to make sure the report 
provides an accurate and up-to-date grasp of the issues by asking those stakeholders who are 
directly involved in the sector for their inputs. In other words, from their perspective what are 
the key issues, especially in relation to regulations and markets, that need to be accounted for 
in order to develop sustainable and resilient systems of production. A total of 30 interviews were 
completed for the UK National Report, 13 for dairy and 17 for fisheries. The interviews 
completed for each sector are listed in Appendix 1 and 7, with a summary of the type of 
stakeholder interviewed in each case. Inshore fishing is a new area of research for the team so 
a few more interviews were necessary. The interviewees provided invaluable insight into 
regulatory and/or market conditions in the two commodity sectors, including also the 
perspectives of three interviewees from the banking sector. Most interviews lasted one hour or 
so, but some were longer than this. As mentioned, the interviews covered regulatory conditions 
and market conditions for each sector, but in some cases the interview focused on a particular 
theme (e.g. the nature of markets for milk, marine regulations for inshore fisheries). Whilst the 
research was being conducted, the UK public voted in a referendum and decided to leave the 
European Union (Brexit). Brexit is likely to provoke major changes in all UK economic sectors, 
particularly agriculture and food. A new section has been added to the report which provides a 
review of how Brexit might impact agriculture and, in particular, the two commodity sectors 
studied for SUFISA. This provides a key piece of regulatory and market change for the UK and 
will be further studied and updated in the final report. 
 
 42 
The structure for the rest of the report is as follows. The next section of the report provides a 
summary of the key media analysis findings, both in general and in relation to dairy and inshore 
fishing. An overview of the Brexit vote and its potential implications for both sectors is then 
provided. The main part of the report is then made up of the two commodity case studies, which 
firstly reviews key regulatory and market conditions for inshore fisheries and dairy farming 
respectively, including a summary of the key issues/conditions emerging in both sectors. It then 
examines strategies employed by producers and other actors in each commodity chain to 
manage their business, especially in relation to regulatory and market issues. The strategy-level 
analysis also provides further assessment of Brexit using data collected with stakeholders from 
each sector  
 
2 Media Content Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The media analysis presented here is focused primarily on the sustainability of primary 
producers in the dairy and fisheries sectors in the UK. In more detail, this section summarises 
key findings from a media analysis exercise which sought to identify the most debated issues in 
relation to primary producers’ sustainability in agriculture generally and in the dairy and inshore 
fisheries sectors specifically. The media analysis methodology has been described above. Key 
findings from analysis of national, regional and specialised media sources from 2005 to 2016 is 
presented below, starting with analysis of media discourses for UK agriculture. 
2.2 The predominance of price volatility in media discourses about UK 
agriculture 
In terms of the agricultural sector generally, price volatility was found to be a predominant 
theme in the articles sampled. The media analysis suggested that farm businesses are nowadays 
operating in a less stable and more complex global economic environment.  Price volatility in 
media publications is understood to mean excessive price fluctuations and variations in 
agricultural commodity prices over time. As noted in one source, the problem with price 
variations arises when they are not predictable (Farmers Guardian, 18th March 2015). This 
degree of uncertainty combined with low prices received by farmers for their produce 
challenges the capability of farmers to cover their costs and to make a living. 
 
The European Union Committee report on price volatility published in May 2016 states that 
successive CAP reforms, which have gradually reduced price support over time, have 
incrementally resulted in farmers being more exposed to market forces. The position of the 
committee is nuanced in terms of what price volatility is and its impacts on farm business 
economic sustainability. For example, price volatility is viewed as “an inherent feature of 
agricultural commodities markets” and “that the adverse effects at farm level are caused more 
by unanticipated periods of sustained low prices than by an increase in levels of volatility” 
(European Union Committee, 2016). 
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Price volatility is not a new topic - it has featured in media discourses for some time and 
particularly since the 2008 credit crunch. In 2008 wheat prices fluctuated from £75 to £170 per 
tonne and back down, all in the space of 24 months. In the same period tractor diesel went from 
35p a litre up to 67p a litre and then dropped back down again. For dairy farmers, the milk price 
also fluctuated significantly during this period and according to some industry sources the price 
has not really recovered since, despite some occasional spikes in price. Such uncertainty is 
reported to pose significant issues for farmers, particularly in terms of profit and cash flow 
(Western Morning News (Plymouth, UK), 22nd December 2008). 
 
For Promar’s divisional director, the combination of fluctuating oil prices combined with the 
impacts of climate change, population growth, changing dietary patterns, and increasingly 
deregulated world markets has created a set of external market conditions that have resulted 
in the current period of market volatility (Farmers Guardian, 8th June 2015). The dairy sector is 
noted as “[a] prime example of global volatility’s influence on the UK farmgate…[which has led 
to]… the current commodity downturn.” He notes that high levels of production globally at that 
time implied a well-supplied market. However, falling demand in China combined with the 
Russian import ban on European goods drove UK average dairy prices down, from 33.7ppl to 
25.45ppl in 2014 to March 2015. What this example shows is the increased exposure of some 
commodity sectors to global markets and socio-economic pressures. 
 
Several strategies to curb the negative effect of price volatility were discussed in the media 
sources. It was suggested, for instance, that a variety of forward selling and hedging strategies 
are available in the arable sector (Western Morning News, 22nd December 2008); however, the 
structure of a sector like UK dairy means that farmers often remain reliant on their buyers 
determining farm-gate prices (Farmers Guardian, 8th June 2015). For the European Commission, 
direct income payments are considered as a source of financial stability, which help farmers to 
withstand periods of low commodity prices (European Union Committee, 2016). The NFU shares 
this position and argues that these payments provide a form of security against which farmers 
can invest and leverage additional private investment from banks (NFU Online, 17th May 2016). 
The tax system change in 2015, which extended farmers’ averaging to over a five-year period, is 
expected to facilitate planning and budgeting and hence help primary producers to manage cash 
flow problems (Famers Guardian, 18th March 2015). Overall, the media analysis suggests that to 
cope with market volatility, government support, including subsidy support, and tools from the 
financial sector are necessary. 
2.3 Inshore fisheries 
The media discourse related to the sustainability of inshore fisheries businesses is mainly 
debated in regional and specialised media sources and much of the discourse is framed in 
relation to the EU-imposed Common Fisheries Policy reforms- i.e., fish stocks and discard bans, 
marine conservation zones and quota allocations. In the following analysis, we summarise the 
main issues debated and reported in the media. 
 
• The fishing quota system is reported to carry inequities which are a source of frustration for 
inshore fishers. In 2013, the High Court ruled in favour of reallocating some fishing rights from 
big producers to small-scale fishers. Whilst the judge ruled that the initial distribution of quota 
did not amount to discrimination, £1 million worth of quota was reallocated to small-scale 
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fishers (BBC News, 10th July 2013). The issue is a persistent problem according to surveyed media 
sources. An inshore fisherman is quoted as being ‘beaten down’ and ‘robbed’ ever since the 
quota system was introduced and it was reported that 5000 small vessels in the UK had access 
to just 4% of  fishing quota (The Independent, 4th November 2014).  The Chief Executive of the 
New Under Ten Fishermen’s Association (NUTFA), Dave Cuthbert, argued that the restricted 
quotas were affecting the livelihoods of many fishers, adding that some could not make a living 
and were turning to work in factories or other forms of alternative employment (The 
Independent, 25th January 2015, Serina Sandhu). 
 
Inshore fishers’ case is argued and supported by organisations such as The New Economic 
Foundation (NEF) and Greenpeace UK. For example, for NEF reported that “[w]ell-resourced 
fishers and other large Producer Organizations have been able to trade and accumulate quota. 
This has resulted in an extreme concentration of quota towards larger organisations over the 
past decades and has come at the expense of smaller fishers. This means that the majority of 
working fishers have few rights to this costly tradeable commodity, even though they are able 
to easily catch it” (NEF blog, 21st October 2015, Chris Williams). Greenpeace and inshore fisheries 
groups were reported to be joining forces in campaigning against trawlers and larger-scale 
fishery enterprises that monopolise quota (Greenpeace, 23rd January 2015). In arguing that case 
it is noted too that larger-scale fishers use trawling and dredging which are highly damaging to 
the environment. While it has been pointed out that the vast majority of inshore fishers use 
selective and sustainable techniques (Greenpeace, 8th August 2012), trawlers and dredgers not 
only drag up the seabed, but they also drag up the crab and lobster pots laid down by inshore 
fishers (BBC Two, February 2012, The Fisherman’s Apprentice with Monty Halls). 
 
However, opinions diverge in the industry regarding the sustainability of larger-scale vessels. 
Barry Deas, Chief Executive of the National Federation of Fisherman’s Organisation, which 
represents the interests of both inshore fishers and larger-scale industrial vessels, argued that 
“it was “sheer nonsense” to say the larger vessels were unsustainable” and noted that “[m]any 
of these vessels fishing large shoaling offshore stocks like mackerel and herring are operating in 
exceptionally well managed fisheries… if these pelagic quotas were reallocated to the inshore 
fleet, they would remain uncaught” (The Independent, 25th January 2015, Serina Sandhu). 
 
• There is a significant regional disparity in terms of fish stocks in the UK. The Centre for 
Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) advisor Ewen Bell stated, for example, 
that lobster stocks in the West of England are ‘OK and being fished sustainably… Those in the 
North West have been hit much harder’ (Western Morning News, 12th April 2015). There is also 
debate within other sources about the levels of seafood available. The National Lobster Hatchery 
in Cornwall talk, for example, of UK stocks being depleted and this is backed up by Seafish, the 
UK public body that promotes the seafood industry – they mark all lobster stocks in the UK as 
‘high risk’ (The Daily Telegraph, 3rd April 2015). 
 
It is interesting to note the discrepancy in narratives. An important narrative in some media 
reports analysed is the idea that fisheries are extremely important to communities, so local 
reporting in some places may focus less on fish stock problems despite the reality. Generally, 
scientists tend to be quoted and reported when commenting on depleting stocks of fish. Clyde 
fishery has received special attention, with York University conducting research there and 
finding that stocks are at significant threat of collapse (The Scotsman, 27th May 2013). However, 
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the Clyde Fisherman’s Association contested the findings and argued that the situation was not 
as bad as had been reported (Herald Scotland, 23rd November 2015). There is a feeling in fishing 
communities reported in the media that they understand stocks well, and it often takes too long 
for policy to respond to this (BBC Two, February 2012, The Fisherman’s Apprentice with Monty 
Halls).  
 
• There is also regional disparity in terms of regulations concerning fish size. Scientists are keen 
to see regulations on fish size tightened to assist in protecting and maintaining fish stocks. CEFAS 
suggested fish size should be altered to protect stocks whilst accepting that this could have 
major implications for inshore fishers (Eastern Daily Press, 18th November 2013; The Telegraph, 
16th November 2014). However, there has also been praise for the authorities for implementing 
regional standards rather than across-the-board regulations (Western Morning News, 12th April 
2015). There is regional disparity among media sources in their reporting on this issue, which 
suggests that the east coast of England is experiencing more problems than the west of the 
country.  
 
• The introduction of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) has been reported in media sources. It is 
viewed as posing a threat to inshore fishers in terms of their ability to access fishing grounds and 
it is suggested that this is a major reason why many fishers do not support their introduction 
(Wales Online, 25th April 2013, Graham Henry). That said, there is disparity in the discourse 
regarding the efficiency of MPAs to protect biodiversity and thus achieve their primary purpose. 
From the media analysis, reports suggest that some inshore fishers feel let down by government 
policy on this issue and more generally. They feel a sense of abandonment (The Scotsman, 6th 
July 2015, Alistair Munro) against the scientific lobby who argue for MPA. Of the 127 proposed 
sites for conservation zones, only 27 have been implemented. This represents less than a quarter 
of those originally proposed (The Guardian, 21st November 2013, Damian Carrington). However, 
some are questioning the adequacy of those that have been introduced as they do not ban the 
use of certain fishing equipment, which could be the cause of much of the damage (The 
Ecologist, 18th July 2014, Jason Hall-Spencer).  
 
• Land obligations and fish size: how can the inshore fishers benefit? The landing obligation or 
‘discard ban’ is part of the new Common Fisheries Policy. It came into force for pelagic species 
in January 2015 and for demersal species obligations will be applicable and implemented 
between 2016 and 2019. The discard ban applies to all quota species – both targeted and by-
catch – and to all UK fishing vessels catching them (Fishing Focus, Autumn 2014, Issue 35). This 
reform has been welcomed by ecologists. For instance, the Fish Fight campaign 
(www.fishfight.net), which was launched in 2010 and fronted by celebrity chef Hugh Fearnley-
Whittingstall, reported that up to 90% of catches were being thrown back into the sea. However, 
the NFFO chief argued that it might be difficult to implement this policy on a practical fishery-
by-fishery basis (The Ecologist, 2013, Rosie Magudia). The onus is now on the fishers to adapt to 
the regulation and to innovate to find new ways of fishing, so as not to fall foul of the new 
discards ban (The Huffington Post, 10th March 2014).  
 
Balancing discard bans and quotas is a key theme identified in the media sources. In a recent 
blog, NEF highlights the benefits of selective fishing, which they view as welcome news for many 
working fishers around England’s coast. The reason, they suggest, is related to regulations and 
quotas. Summarising the current situation the NEF blog comments that “[i]n most instances the 
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fish are thrown overboard to avoid breaking the law – not because they are unwanted. This is 
because fishers do not have enough quota (the legal right to catch a particular species in 
allocated amounts) to land the fish and is a particular problem for inshore, small scale fisheries. 
This is known as ‘regulatory discarding’ and it puts access to quota at the centre of the problem” 
(NEF, 21st October 2015, Chris Williams). The problem was that the majority of inshore fishers 
operate in mixed fisheries and do not have the quota to enable them to fish for the variety of 
species they catch, making the catch illegal if they do not discard. However, the European 
Commission will be increasing quotas to deal with the fact that fish that was previously discarded 
will now have to be counted against quota. The suggested good news for inshore fishers, 
following the Fisheries Minister, George Eustice’s announcement, is that the government is 
committed to “introducing new flexibilities to help fishers manage their quotas and […] giving 
more quota to the under 10 metre fleet.’ (NEF, 21st October 2015, Chris Williams) The first 100 
tonnes of any additional quota received, and 10% of anything more obtained, will be allocated 
to the English inshore fleet.  
 
Indeed, some opinions reported in the media sampled suggested that in the current context, in 
order to achieve enough income, fishers need to be flexible and to be prepared to catch what 
they can when they can, rather than relying on one or two species (BBC Two, February 2012, 
The Fisherman’s Apprentice with Monty Halls). Previous success stories, such as that of a 
fisherman in Cornwall who adapted his catches and sales to what he was seeing out in the sea, 
an abundance of sardines, and was able to turn it into a profitable business (Western Morning 
News, 1st April 2014, Simon Parker), suggests that the discard ban combined with a better 
allocation of quota could be of some benefit to inshore fishers.  
2.4 The dairy sector 
The milk price that farmers receive (market condition) and the abolition of the milk quota system 
(regulatory condition) were the two main issues discussed in the media in relation to the dairy 
sector, alongside price volatility already discussed above.  
 
• The milk price that farmers receive is often discussed in terms of the costs of production and the 
structure of the milk supply chain. The milk market, particularly liquid milk, is dominated by 
retailers through which as much as 80% of milk produced is sold (The Guardian, Food and Drink 
industry, 11th August 2015). The issue of milk price has been an on-going debate in the regional 
media. It received particular attention in the national media in 2015 when several protests 
organised by dairy farmers outside targeted supermarkets/processors were reported. The 
Guardian (11th August 2015), reported that the protests were in response to an unprecedented 
drop of 25% in the farm-gate price that dairy farmers received between 2014 and 2015. Figures 
from the Department of Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) were used in a BBC news item at the time 
which showed that in June 2015 farmers were receiving on average 23.66p/litre (BBC News 
Business, 11th August 2015). With cost of production at 30p per litre of milk, dairy farmers in 
various reports argued that operational costs were currently unsustainable and were driving 
many farms out of business (The Guardian, 12th, 14th January 2015; Sustainable Food Trust, 
Farming, 9th October 2015; Farmers Weekly, 3rd February 2016). 
 
The media analysis identified two opposing camps in relation to the milk price crisis: dairy 
farmers and supermarkets. Dairy farmers were depicted as victims caught in the midst of a 
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supermarket ‘price war’. In August 2015, the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) argued in a BBC 
Business online article that “a supermarket price war, which has seen a 2.3-litre bottle of milk 
sell for 88p, has devalued the product in the eyes of the public, "purely to get customers through 
the door"”.(BBC News, Business, 11th August 2015). In response, supermarkets argued that the 
low prices were a result of the Russian ban on European dairy products and the consequent 
oversupply in the market. Commercial confidentiality means that access to information about 
retailer and processor profit margins are difficult to access, which adds to the complexity of 
negotiations (BBC News, 11th August 2015). 
 
However, as noted in several media reports, some retailers now buy milk directly from farmers. 
For instance, “Waitrose, Marks & Spencer, Tesco, Sainsbury's and the Co-op have established 
schemes which ensure farmers are paid a price above the average cost of production for fresh 
milk.” (BBC News, 11th August 2015; NFU Online, 23rd January 2015). While some farmers benefit 
from these schemes, the majority of farmers are not aligned to supermarket contracts and are 
thus vulnerable to market fluctuations and price volatility. This raises several questions 
regarding strategies that farmers adopt to manage risks related to market uncertainty. Media 
reports suggest two pathways are commonly adopted by farmers who decide to stay in business: 
1) increasingly production to benefit from economies of scale (BBC News, 1st April 2015, Claire 
Marshall); and 2) specialisation into the production of value-added products (Farmers Weekly, 
9th April 2015, Charlie Taverner). 
 
Producer organisations argued (Farmers Guardian, 8th June 2015), however, that these 
strategies, although useful for some, do not directly address the basic problem of price 
fluctuations. Interestingly, contracts, although key to ensure a farmer can secure a stable price 
for their production (Farmers Guardian, 20th February 2016, Olivia Midgley), are not much 
covered in the general media, and are discussed instead more frequently in the specialised 
media. Articles from the farming industry have also started to mention dairy futures market 
(Farmers Weekly, 15th June 2015, Sarah Alderton) as a possible strategy to provide “some 
security to the industry”. However, the topic is relatively new and received very limited attention 
in the public sphere and national media sources. A 2015 article in Farmers Weekly reported a 
range of contrasting views about the possibility of a UK futures milk market. For example, Peter 
Isaac, head of feed sales for Mole Valley Farmers commented at a Total Dairy Seminar event 
that “If it’s another way to market milk and give a guaranteed price then I think it’s a good thing. 
It could help give some security to the industry”. In contrast, another participant at the seminar 
argued that “A futures market would face massive viability, regulatory and access issues. It’s 
unlikely it will come and needs a more pragmatic solution.” Another participant stated that 
“[w]ithout a [Milk Marketing Board] MMB the British milk industry and small scale dairy farmers 
are doomed” (Farmers Weekly, 15th June 2015, Sarah Alderton).  
 
• The abolition of the European milk quota system in April 2015 has been a primary issue discussed 
in the media. Media sources suggest that the abolition of milk quota, in place for 30 years, has 
propelled the UK dairy sector into a new open market, in which international competitors like 
Australia and the United States have been operating in for two decades or more. While some 
European countries such as Germany the Republic of Ireland and the Netherlands have 
reportedly been preparing for this new era of market deregulation by increasing production, the 
UK dairy sector, some reports suggest, is lagging behind (BBC News, 1st April 2015, Claire 
Marshall). This assessment is understandable but as other articles note UK dairy has been under 
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its quota target in recent years and the industry operates in a very different environment to, for 
example, the Republic of Ireland, which has had strong policy support and encouragement to 
increase production post-milk quota. 
 
The reason for milk quota removal was to enable EU dairy businesses to “compete with 
international rivals in supplying fast-growing markets in Asia and Africa” (BBC News, 1st April 
2015). Expectations were that demand would grow in parallel with a degree of optimism in the 
EU dairy sector regarding likely growth projections (Farming Life, 20th April 2016, Myles Patton 
and Siyi Feng). However, the Russian ban on imports of European products and the withdrawal 
of China from the powdered milk market were identified as two international events which 
subsequently pushed prices down and have challenged the industry (Farming Life, 20th April 
2016, Myles Patton and Siyi Feng).  
 
It was clear from the media articles analysed that the impacts of changing market and regulatory 
conditions on farmers’ sustainability are still difficult to predict. However, many 
communications predict further volatility and instability for producers. For example, the 
European Milk Board expects “chronic price collapses” and predicts that the “next crisis is on its 
way” (Express, 1st April 2015, Batchelor Tom).  
 
There were two diverging sets of opinions in the media regarding the impact of the abolition of 
milk quotas. Media reports suggest that many small dairy farmers fear that only larger 
businesses will benefit from the end of the quota system, given predicted further drops in the 
farm-gate liquid milk due to oversupply in the market. For some the free market reality is difficult 
to accept and some call for more regulation. For example, a BBC News article of 1st April 2015, 
reported comments from Somerset dairy farmer, James Hole, who argued that: "All they are 
going to end up doing is create huge milk pools coming out of Europe…Long term there will 
probably have to be another form of capping. I can't see how they can just make it a free-for-
all." In the same article, NFU Dairy Board chairman, Rob Harrison, argued that the abolition of 
milk quota “could push farmgate milk prices down further in the EU and stall any recovery in the 
dairy markets” (BBC News, 1st April 2015, Claire Marshall).  
 
However, a European Commission representative argued that “[d]airy farmers often struggle 
with price volatility” and “quotas have not made their lives easier in that respect.” (BBC News, 
1st April 2015, Claire Marshall) In similar vein, Judith Bryans, Chief Executive of Dairy UK, an 
association that represents milk companies in Britain, argued that quotas have been a barrier to 
the competiveness of the UK dairy sector. As she put it, “[a]lthough quotas may have been 
considered as an appropriate response at the time of their introduction, they also held back the 
development of a truly efficient and competitive European dairy industry over the last thirty 
years.” (Express, 1st April 2015, Batchelor Tom). In the same article, the European Dairy 
Association, which represents the interests of milk processors in the EU, reported in favour of 
ending the quota system, suggesting that it “will lower the administrative burden on all levels” 
(Express, 1st April 2015, Batchelor Tom). In fact, as an article in Farmers Forum argued, farmers 
with low production costs who are prepared for the competition have been welcoming this new 
phase of deregulation (Farmers Forum, 11th May 2015, Melanie Epp). 
 
Whether for or against market deregulation and quota abolition, most experts expect “the Irish 
Republic, the Netherlands and Germany to increase production sharply” (Express, 1st April 2015, 
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Batchelor Tom) and agree too that such increases will have an impact on the UK milk price and 
by extension dairy farmers’ incomes. According to the Promar 2020 Dairy report, now that milk 
quotas have ended, UK dairy farms will gradually specialise as either high-input or extensive-
grazing systems. Furthermore, it is expected that “efficient farmers” would try to match their 
production with their milk buyers’ needs and thus “mixed systems could become less popular.” 
(BBC News, 9th April 2015, Charlie Taverner). This study’s conclusion suggests that the 
deregulation of milk markets will give rise to further differentiation between those producers 
who are market sensitive, large scale and aligned with producing for the liquid milk commodity 
market and those differentiate and/or specialize to survive. 
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3 Brexit and the UK agri-food sector 
3.1 Brexit: introduction 
On 23rd June 2016 the British public voted in a referendum to decide whether to remain or leave 
the European Union. The results were narrowly but clearly in favour of leaving the EU (52% / 
48%). In the context of this study, the majority of UK farmers and fishers voted to leave the EU, 
especially older voters from both sectors. The UK government confirmed that the decision will 
lead to the exit of Britain from the EU (Brexit), of which it has been a member since joining in 
1973. Brexit will likely provoke major changes on all sectors of the UK economy and on UK 
citizens’ lifestyle. Agriculture and food are likely to be particularly affected by the changes that 
Brexit will introduce (Lang 2016). 
 
Currently, it is difficult to foresee the extent of the impact that Brexit will have on the UK agri-
food sector, in that at the time of writing this report the negotiations are still at a very early 
stage and the UK will officially remain an EU Member State until 29th March 2019. Article 50 of 
the Lisbon Treaty (the official procedure for leaving the EU) was triggered by the UK Government 
on 29th March 2017 initiating a two-year transitional period of intense negotiations and decision 
making about the details and terms on which the UK leaves the EU block. Over 12 thousand EU 
laws, regulations and statutory instruments will need to be replaced or renegotiated (Lang 
2016).  
 
The outcome of the negotiations will significantly shape the future UK agri-food sector. Although 
details of Brexit are continually emerging, it is foreseen that the following five areas are likely 
be affected (AgraFacts 2016b): 
 
• policies and income subsidies;  
• markets and trade;  
• access to migrant labour;  
• farm regulations and practices; and 
• fisheries’ regulations and practices. 
 
Each area is discussed in more detail below. To understand the potential impact that Brexit can 
have in terms of agricultural policies and income subsidies it is important to look first at what 
the UK is renouncing. Agriculture is the sector that receives the most EU public support. The CAP 
is a major component of the EU budget, ranging from 70% of the total budget in the 1980s to 
40% in the 2010s (Helm 2016). The CAP has been designed to achieve both economic and social 
objectives, safeguarding the interests of producers and consumers (Article 39 TFEU). Its specific 
objectives are: 
 
• To increase agricultural productivity, promote technical progress and ensure the 
optimum use of production factors, in particular labour; 
• To ensure a fair standard of living for farmers; 
• To stabilise markets; 
• To ensure the availability of supplies; and  
• To ensure reasonable prices for consumers. 
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According to these objectives, the current support provided by the CAP is structured as follows 
(Watts et al. 2016): 
 
• Pillar 1. Direct payments decoupled from production to help stabilise farmers’ incomes 
against volatile markets and unpredictable weather conditions. Direct payments are 
linked to safety, environmental and animal welfare standards; 
• Pillar 2. Co-financing of projects on farm investment and modernisation, young 
farmers, agri-environment measures, organic conversion, agri-tourism, village renewal, 
broadband in rural areas; and 
• Market support measures against failure of normal markets. 
 
CAP support to UK farmers is significant. In 2015, the Single Farm Payment (SFP) formed 55% of 
farm income (FBS). With Brexit, the UK will lose about €3.5 billion per year of farm subsidies. 
Removing these subsidies would seriously undermine the competitiveness of British agriculture, 
especially because the countries remaining in the EU will continue to be highly subsidised by the 
CAP (Helm 2016). Moreover, because decoupled payments are unrelated to production but are 
linked to land area, they are capitalised in terms of land prices. Therefore, removing Pillar I 
payments can reduce land prices and rents to tenant farmers, potentially affecting the wealth 
of landowners and farms’ access to credit (Helm 2016; Watts et al. 2016). 
 
However, in the short term no major changes are expected to subsidies. The current round of 
CAP funding is in place until 2020, and on August 13th 2016 the UK Treasury pledged to honour 
the level of direct subsidies, agri-environment payments, research and rural development grants 
until 2020, covering any funding gap after the UK leaves the EU (AgraFacts 2016b). The issue of 
subsidy will therefore arise more concretely after 2020, as the UK Government has so far not 
made clear their plans for subsidy support beyond this point. By 2020 the British Government 
will likely have put in place a new policy in place of the CAP. Supporters of the leave campaign 
argued that once the UK leaves the EU it will be freed of the constraints of the CAP and with the 
repatriation of the UK’s contribution to the EU budget, policymakers will have a blank sheet of 
paper in terms of designing new food, farm and environmental policies best suited to British 
circumstances (Helm 2016). 
 
Given the current inefficiencies of the CAP (and of the CFP), there are concrete opportunities for 
the UK to improve its agricultural, fisheries and environmental policies. However, it is unlikely 
that policymakers will have the opportunity of designing a new policy from scratch, because 
they will work under constraints, including budget limits and political pressure from former EU 
partners, the devolved administrations (i.e. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and 
stakeholder groups (Swinbank 2016). Moreover, timing is not favourable. The next reform of the 
CAP is due in 2020, as well as the negotiation of the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(Watts et al. 2016). New British agricultural and food policies will therefore coincide with a 
period of significant change in terms of EU policy, making it even more difficult for policymakers 
to make deals and to predict the potential outcomes of their new policies. 
 
In terms of trade, large impacts on prices, costs, production and consumption are expected from 
changes in trade-related policy (Buckwell 2016). The consequences of the Brexit vote will largely 
depend on the outcome of future trade agreements. Brexit has already had an immediate trade 
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impact due to the change in exchange rates with the rest of the world. The current drop in value 
of the sterling means that the UK, which imports 30% of its food, is paying more for the same 
amount of food imported (Lang 2016). The UK government has repeatedly stressed that it will 
seek to maintain full access to the EU’s single market, but is also insisting on limiting the free 
movement of EU citizens. From an EU point of view, access to the single market goes hand in 
hand with the free movement of people. Therefore, trade restrictions are likely to be imposed 
on the UK if it does not agree to the free movement of people (AgraFacts 2016b). If the UK 
succeeds in negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU, which avoids the reintroduction of 
tariffs on agri-food trade, trade costs are still likely to rise. Additional trade costs are likely due 
to: greater administrative paperwork; requirements to prove the UK origin of products with duty 
exemption; sanitary and phytosanitary inspections; greater delays at cross-channel ports; 
different labelling, packaging, food additive and food composition standards (Matthews 2016). 
 
Increases in trade costs can lower producer prices but increase consumer prices, creating a price 
wedge and social inequalities (Buckwell 2016). Abreau (2013) estimated that the total amount 
of costs in preferential trade agreements can be equivalent to a 5% ad valorem tariff on trade 
flows in both directions (Matthews 2016). In other words, it is unlikely that any future UK-EU 
trade agreement will be as profitable as being a member of the EU. As well as the EU, the UK 
will also have to start trade talks with other countries around the world. As well as tariff levels, 
British farmers will need to be protected from lower animal welfare and transparency rules in 
the rest of the world (Helm 2016). In this respect, it is assumed that the UK will seek to join the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and keep its international obligations. This means that any 
support from a future British agricultural policy must ensure compliance with WTO rules, adding 
a further constraint to the decisions of UK policy makers (Watts et al. 2016). 
 
A third major issue brought up by Brexit concerns free movement of migrant labour from the 
EU and access to skilled labour. A number of sectors of UK agriculture and food processing rely 
heavily on foreign-born labour. Horticulture is probably the most reliant, but other sectors will 
also be impacted (e.g. dairy). In 2013, 15% of the UK farm labour force was seasonal and 38% of 
labour in the UK food manufacturing sector was foreign-born (Lang 2016). Preventing the free 
movement of labour is likely to therefore have major impacts on the UK’s food system. 
 
In terms of farm regulations and practices, exit campaigners argued that once outside the EU 
the UK could relax its farming rules, increase access to new technologies, such as genetically 
modified crops, and avoid the ban on key agrochemicals like glyphosate, azoles and 
neonicotinoids (AgraFacts 2016b; Matthews 2016). However, the level of access to the single 
market will determine how much the UK will have to continue to meet EU farming and 
environmental rules (AgraFacts 2016b). For example, the type and quantity of agrochemicals 
allowed on apples and pears by the EU can affect pesticide use decisions of British producers; if 
the UK decides to authorise the cultivation of GM crops farmers need to adopt segregation and 
coexistence rules for those GM varieties that are not authorised in the EU. The availability of 
innovative technologies to the UK agri-food system may also be limited by a reduction in 
research funds. The UK has been a significant beneficiary of European research funds, 
particularly agri-food research programmes, such as Horizon 2020. The UK is the second highest 
recipient of EU research funds after Germany. The EU research funding system is the richest in 
the world, with a total of €80 billion of funding in the current 7 years research programme. Any 
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reduction in the UK’s access to EU research funds can potentially affect domestic agri-food 
research and the sector more generally. 
 
The discussion so far has related to the agri-food sector generally. Some specific comments are 
now provided in relation to the two sectors analysed in the UK: inshore fisheries (section 3.2) 
and dairy farming (section 3.3); see also section 4.7 and section 5.6. 
 
3.2 Brexit: fisheries, including inshore fisheries 
Fisheries are quite distinctive when compared with the rest of the agri-food sector and in the EU 
are governed by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), rather than the CAP. As with so many of the 
issues surrounding Brexit there is a great deal of uncertainty in relation to fisheries, but the 
following issues are some of the main ones that need to be borne in mind. They are taken from 
two key publications. The first is a House of Commons Library Briefing paper entitled Brexit: 
What next for UK fisheries? (House of Commons Library 2017); the second is a publication by 
the House of Lords European Union Committee entitled Brexit: fisheries (House of Lords 2016). 
In addition to these insights into how Brexit might affect fisheries, generally, section 4.7 of this 
report provides the perspective of those inshore fishers in Cornwall who were engaged as part 
of the Sufisa research project. This includes the development of a number of different scenarios, 
dependent on the Brexit approach taken.  
 
By and large, most fishers voted for Brexit, seeing it as an opportunity to take back control of UK 
waters. The following quotations are taken from a BBC radio four programme which was looking 
into fishing futures, and typify many of the comments made by fishers. 
'A one in a 150 year opportunity'; 'A very mixed fishery' that makes a one size fit all 
approach almost impossible’; 'The CFP has been a disaster'; 'Our right to fish was given 
away'; ‘I want us to control our own seas, which we can do with UNCLOS, but at the same 
time we are also legally bound to have regard for the historic fishing rights of others’; ‘It 
is not a case of more fish being caught, but that the distribution needs to change’; ‘Fishing 
around the UK is one of the most difficult places in the world to manage fisheries, in that 
there are so many people involved’; ‘Brexit provides an opportunity to better manage our 
waters and marine environment’; 'How hard will the government really fight?'; 'We can't 
afford to miss this opportunity'. (BBC Radio 4 2017). 
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Figure 1. ‘Fishing for leave’  
  
Source: These images have been taken from: http://ffl.org.uk/material/ Accessed 17.01.2017 
 
The House of Lord report on Brexit cautions that: “The fishing industry represents a very small 
part of the UK’s GDP. Yet it is of great importance to many coastal communities across the UK”. 
This has made some in the industry nervous that fishers’ voices will not get heard in the 
negotiations, an accusation that was also made at the time the UK originally joined the EU. This 
point is strongly made in the House of Lords report: “Notwithstanding the comparatively small 
contribution of fisheries to the UK economy, the voices of the industry, the coastal communities 
that support, and thrive on, the industry, and its supply chains must be heard in the wider Brexit 
negotiations”. (House of Lords 2016, p. 4) 
 
The CFP covers four main policy areas, each of which is likely to be affected by the Brexit 
negotiations. These four areas are: fisheries management; funding; market organisation; and 
environmental regulation. Each of these is now discussed in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Fisheries management 
“Withdrawing from the European Union will mean withdrawing from the CFP. But fish know 
nothing of political borders and most commercial fish stocks are shared between UK waters and 
those of other EU or European coastal states. Species of fish may spend different stages of their 
life cycles in different nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and their spawning grounds may 
be in a different region from that in which they are caught when mature.” (House of Lords 2016, 
p.3) 
 
Fisheries management is highly complex within the European environment. The Brexit 
negotiations will need to cover a range of different issues, as follows. 
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3.2.1.1 Control over a greater area of sea 
Countries such as Norway and Iceland are responsible for fishing in their EEZ, up to 200 nautical 
miles from the coast. This is the norm under international law. This contrasts with the EU, where 
Member States share access to fishing grounds between 12-200 nautical miles from their coasts. 
In addition, the London Convention 1964 established rights for the vessels of certain countries 
to fish in the 6-12 nautical mile region, if they had 'habitually finished' in the same region 
between 1953 and 1962. Similarly, article 17 of the CFP framework regulation, EC No. 2371/2002 
granted so-called 'grandfather rights', allowing access for certain member states to fish for 
certain species of fish in UK waters; in turn, the UK was granted access to the inshore waters of 
a number of other Member States. In 1983, the principle of Relative Stability was established, 
whereby it was agreed that fisheries and quotas in the EU EEZ would be shared on the basis of 
who was already fishing in those areas. The intention was to prevent any dramatic consequences 
for particular fisheries when the EU EEZ was introduced at that time. In retrospect, it has been 
argued that this disadvantaged the UK fishing sector, but a reluctance by Member States since 
them to renegotiate Relative Stability would suggest that negotiations in this area will be 
difficult. 
In the event that the UK declares an EEZ independent from EU waters, the UK would be able to 
control access that all foreign vessels have to fish in UK waters. Should this happen, as an 
independent coastal state the UK would then be required under the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea to manage the living resources and fishing activities within its EEZ in a sustainable 
way; furthermore, they will be required to cooperate with adjacent coastal states to manage 
those stocks which are being shared with neighbours, as well as any 'straddling stocks' in order 
to minimise the risk of overfishing. (House of Lords 2016, p. 55). 
 
3.2.1.2 Renegotiating the UK's share of fish quotas 
Those campaigning for Brexit argued that the UK government would be able to represent itself 
in quota negotiations and achieve higher quotas for UK fishermen. However, others question 
the loss of the collective bargaining power of the EU in relation to countries such as Norway, 
Iceland and Russia. 
Some argue that the ability to walk away from negotiations if the UK is not happy with its share 
of the quota is a strong bargaining position. Others argue that if the UK walks away from 
negotiations and unilaterally sets higher quotas for its fishers, the EU could respond harshly. 
Ultimately there appears to be significant uncertainty as to the implications of Brexit in relation 
to how much bargaining power the UK will have in fish quota negotiations. 
In reality, the UK will need to co-operate with the EU after Brexit on quota settings, in that most 
of the commercial species are migratory and therefore cross EEZ boundaries. Indeed, such 
cooperation is enshrined in international law. The UN Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996, both of which 
the UK has ratified, require cooperation on both the conservation and management of fish 
stocks that straddle national jurisdictions. 
The extent to which Brexit will lead to higher quotas for UK fishers of stocks that are shared with 
other countries will be a matter of negotiation. At present, the allocation of quotas to Member 
States is via the notion of Total Allowable Catches, which are ultimately political decisions, albeit 
informed by scientific advice. In this regard, the House of Lords (2016, p. 56) report cautions that 
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the UK government should resist the temptation to raise quotas above scientific 
recommendations, even if it has more autonomy to do so post-Brexit.  
 
3.2.1.3 A new UK fisheries policy and management system 
One of the potential benefits of Brexit, and something that is strongly endorsed in the case study 
specific data discussed under section 4.7, is the UK's ability to take more locally appropriate 
fisheries management decisions, rather than relying on a top-down, 'one size fits all' approach 
that has been decided in Brussels. 
However, the House of Lords (2016, p. 56) report urges caution, in saying: “A new fisheries 
management regime within the UK will only be effective if there is a degree of alignment to, and 
co-operation with, neighbouring states. Such regional co-operation will necessitate co-
ordinated objectives and similar management practices, without which the sustainability of 
shared stocks may be undermined. The UK should not discard the positive elements of the CFP 
that successive Governments have worked hard to achieve, such as sustainability and regional 
co-operation”. In other words, in practice it is likely that the UK will develop a system that in 
large part reproduces what already happens under the CFP. 
 
3.2.2 Funding 
The UK was allocated €243.1 million in fisheries funding from 2014-2020. These funds are then 
matched by the UK government and can be used to help support sustainable fishing and coastal 
communities. These funds have been very important in a Cornish context, implemented by the 
Fisheries Local Action Group (FLAG). There is concern that these funds will not continue after 
Brexit. The EU also provides extensive scientific funding in relation to fisheries (and other areas 
of agri-food research), of which the UK is a major net beneficiary. Again there are questions as 
to whether this will continue post-Brexit. 
 
3.2.3 Market organisation 
As noted above, market access may well be negotiated in tandem with access to fisheries and 
quota allocation. In the absence of any kind of agreement, the UK may no longer have tariff-free 
access to the EU market. Tariffs are already applied on fish imports from non-EU countries such 
as Norway. This may also apply to the UK, or the UK may become dependent upon WTO tariff 
rules. 
 
The European Parliament’s fisheries committee has recently recommended that access to British 
fishing grounds should be linked to British access to EU markets in the forthcoming Brexit 
negotiations, saying that they are inseparable. While the EU Parliament will not actually be 
involved in the Brexit talks, the Parliament must eventually pass the agreed deal by a simple 
majority vote. Boats from other EU countries on average caught 58% of the fish and shellfish 
landed from UK waters between 2012-2014, worth more than £400 million a year. By contrast, 
UK Fishing boats fishing elsewhere in the EU waters caught fish worth about £100 million 
(Johnson 2017). It is important to acknowledge these tensions in that 80% of wild caught 
seafood is exported, with four of the top five destinations being in the EU. Indeed, the House of 
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Lords (2016, p. 56) report argues that: “Trade in fish and seafood is essential to the wider 
seafood industry, which relies heavily on importing raw goods at reduced or zero tariffs for 
domestic consumption, and on exporting domestic catches and production. Any disruptions to 
the current trading patterns could have profound effects on both the catching and processing 
sectors”. 
 
3.2.4 Interaction with EU environmental laws 
Protection of the marine environment in the UK is already significantly dependent upon EU 
legislation, such as the Birds and Habitats Directives, which have made an important 
contribution to the creation of a network of marine protected areas around the UK. 50% of the 
UK's MPA network was set up under EU laws. European Marine Sites currently cover 12% of UK 
seas. The UK government has designated 50 Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) since 2013 
under the Marine and Coastal Access Act. The laws governing MCZs are weaker than those for 
EMS, in terms of protection from damaging activities such as developers, fishers or heavy 
industries. Protection of the conservation features within EMS has so far been upheld by the EU 
Court of Justice. After the UK leaves the EU, this will no longer be the case. The designation of a 
third and final tranche of domestic MCZs within UK waters (up to a further 50 sites) has been 
put on hold until the implications of Brexit are fully thought through (MPA News 2017). 
 
3.2.5 In conclusion 
“The vote to leave the European Union, and with it the Common Fisheries Policy, has raised 
expectations for the future of fisheries policy that may be hard to deliver. In withdrawing from 
the EU, the UK will be able to develop a domestic fisheries policy and control fishing activity 
within its EEZ. However, the majority of commercial fish stocks in UK waters are shared with 
other states, rendering continued co-operation with the EU and other neighbouring states 
crucial to the sustainability of those stocks.” (House of Lords 2016, p. 58) 
 
Fishing for Leave (FFL) is a pressure group that was set up in 2016 with the express aim of 
ensuring that the UK voted for Brexit, fervently believing that it was in the best interests of the 
UK fishing industry to do so. Their response to the report of House of Lords, quoted above, is 
typified by the following:  
"If the EU were allowed unlimited access to our farmland, could take 58% of the animals, 
of which half were discarded dead at the side of the road and then sell them back to us, 
there would be national rage of biblical proportions but that is what is happening at sea". 
FFL are adamant that the UK should be allowed to take back exclusive access to its EEZ; 
furthermore that market access should not override reclaiming fisheries resources within 
the EEZ. FFL were furious that the House of Lords joined together trade and access, which 
FFL claim are two entirely separate things. FFL argue that British fishing was seen as 
'expendable' during the UK's accession to the EEC, but that it should be given a higher 
consideration during the current/forthcoming Brexit negotiations” (Fishing for Leave 
2016) 
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3.3 Brexit: dairy farming 
Regarding the potential impacts of Brexit on the UK dairy sector, it is important to note that 
about 7% of UK dairy farm income comes from EU subsidies (Bellamy 2016), although this can 
vary and be much higher at times of poor milk price. Any reduction in subsidies can reduce the 
profitability of dairy farms and, as a consequence, can potentially affect UK milk production 
levels. The UK is 77% self-sufficient regarding milk, but over 85% of cheddar imports are from 
other EU countries, especially from Ireland. Any reduction of free access into the UK dairy 
market may allow UK producers to increase their domestic market share (Bellamy 2016). The 
lower value of the sterling may also stimulate exports, but the impact can be negative in terms 
of imports and the cost of acquisitions of UK companies by foreign investors can be lower 
(Bellamy 2016). Currently, UK companies already meet EU standards, but the UK dairy industry 
benefits from the free movement of foreign-born workers, and access to a skilled workforce is 
crucial (Dairy UK 2016). 
 
In conclusion, the impact of Brexit on the UK agri-food sector will depend on future agreements 
between the UK and the EU and between the UK and other countries across the world. It will 
depend also on the details of a future British agricultural policy, especially in terms of farm 
income support. Details on these elements will not be finalised or available for 2-5 years and 
possibly even longer. The UK agri-food sector is currently in a period of transition. Farmers and 
fishers are operating in uncertain policy and market environments, with doubts around the 
security of their future income. 
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4 UK Case Study A: Inshore fishing sector, Cornwall, 
England 
4.1 Case study introduction and context 
The purpose of this case study is to investigate the nature of policy requirements, market 
imperfections and their implications for the resilience of the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall, 
England. It is based on the conceptual framework developed in WP 1, and aims to go beyond 
the relatively fragmented insights consolidated in WP 1 to produce a more comprehensive and 
holistic view of the conditions faced by inshore fishers and the strategies they employ to ensure 
their sustainability, resilience and continuation. It is one of two case studies being conducted 
within the UK, with the second case study examining milk producers in the county of Somerset. 
This second case study has its own section within the UK National report, but it will become clear 
that many of the issues faced by inshore fishers are also faced by milk producers. This is 
significant and a key benefit of conducting simultaneous investigations into these two different 
primary production sectors. The similarities will be highlighted where appropriate, as well as the 
distinctive nature of the responses, thereby having the potential to provide a valuable learning 
experience. 
 
4.1.1 Fishing in the UK 
In 2014, Greece had the highest number of fishing vessels in the EU (15,704), while the UK fleet 
was seventh with 6383 vessels, down 26% since 19961. Of these 6383 vessels, 5026 were under 
10 m and 1357 were over 10 m. There were an estimated 11,845 fishermen in 2014, down 12 
per cent since 2004. Of these, 5,367 were based in England, 850 in Wales, 4,796 in Scotland and 
832 in Northern Ireland. Part-time fishermen accounted for 18 per cent of the total, the same 
proportion as a decade ago. In total, in 2014, UK vessels landed 756,000 tonnes of sea fish 
(including shellfish), 60% of which was landed in the UK and 40% abroad, with a total value of 
£861 million. In 2014, the UK imported 721,000 tonnes of fish, while exporting 499,000 tonnes, 
leaving a trade gap of 222,000 tonnes. Imports were highest for cod, tuna, shrimps, prawns and 
salmon; while the main exports were salmon, mackerel and herring. Imports into the UK were 
highest from China, Iceland, Denmark, Germany and Norway; while in terms of exports the 
largest amounts went to France, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the USA. In 2014, fishing 
accounted for 4.1 per cent of gross value added for the agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
sector (at £426 million), down from 4.5 per cent in 2013, but up from 3.9 per cent in 2004. 
Consumer expenditure on fish rose in 2013 to £4.3 billion compared with £4.0 billion in 2012; 
while household expenditure on fish as a proportion of overall expenditure on food increased 
to 5.3 per cent (MMO 2015). 
 
87% of all landings by the UK fleet in 2014 were by vessels which were members of a producer 
organisation. Over one third of UK vessels over 10 m in length were not members of a producer 
                                                          
1 In large part, the reduction in vessel numbers is the result of a series of decommissioning exercises in 
2001-2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008-2009, designed to reduce the capacity of UK fisheries and help ensure a 
sustainable future (MMO 2015). 
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organisation in 2014, meaning they had limited access to fishing quota and primarily targeted 
shellfish species which are not subject to quotas. Vessels under 10 m without producer 
organisation membership are part of what is known as the '10 metre and under pool'. They are 
responsible for relatively small quantities of demersal and pelagic species landings, with around 
80% of their catch being shellfish, which typically gain higher than average prices (MMO 2015). 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the UK fishing fleet by administration port; Figure 3 shows the 
capacity of the fishing fleet by administration port; Figure 4 shows the landings into the top 20 
UK ports by UK vessels by species type; and Figure 5 the distribution of the UK fishing fleet by 
administration port. In 2014 Newlyn had the largest number (614) of vessels in its 
administration, 87 per cent of which were of 10 metres and under in length. This high percentage 
of smaller boats is reflected in the relatively smaller gross tonnage of the boats involved, as well 
as the relatively larger number of fishermen involved. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of vessels by 
administration port, 2014  
Figure 3. Capacity (gross tonnage) of 
fleet by administration port, 2014 
  
Source: MMO (2015, p.34 & 17) (MMO 2015, p. 34) (MMO 2015, p. 17) 
 
In terms of landings and value: “In 2014, Brixham was the port with the largest quantity of 
landings in England (12 thousand tonnes), followed very closely by Newlyn and Plymouth with 
11 thousand tonnes each. The value of landings in Newlyn (£22 million) and Brixham (£21 
million) were much higher than in Plymouth (£14 million). This is largely due to the different 
species landed in each port; Newlyn and Brixham receive much greater proportions of demersal 
fish and shellfish, which typically sell at higher prices per tonne than pelagic species, which 
constitute the majority of landings in Plymouth” (MMO 2015, p. 60). 
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Figure 4. Landings into the top 20 UK 
ports by UK vessels by species type, 2016 
Figure 5. Number of fishers by 
administration port, 2014 
  
Source: MMMO (2016, p.10 & p.44) (MMO 2016, p. 10) (MMO 2015, p. 44) 
 
The focus of this case study is inshore fishing which involves boats that are less than 10 m long. 
Inshore boats in the UK are classified as follows (Seafish 2015): 
• Under 10 m demersal trawl/seine: the number of these vessels has fallen by about 
18% since 2005, reaching 195 units in 2014. More than 60% of their landing value 
consists of nephorps (53% of total catches) and sole (13% of total catches), but they 
also catch scallops, squid, shrimp, bass and whiting. Over the last ten years, the 
average annual operating profit per vessel of this kind was £12,800. Over the same 
period, the average annual operating profit per vessel increased by about 80%. 
• Under 10 m drift fixed net: the number of these vessels has increased by about 720% 
since 2005, reaching 245 units in 2014. The majority of their landing value is 
represented by sole (25% of total catches) and bass (19% of total catches), but they 
also catch pollack, anglerfish and brown crab. Over the last ten years the average 
annual operating profit per vessel was about £12,300. Over the same period, the 
average annual operating profit per vessel increased by about 43%. 
• Under 10 m pots and traps: the number of these vessels has increased by about 
126% since 2005, reaching 1,020 units in 2014. These vessels are specialized in 
catching shellfish. The majority of their landing value is represented by lobsters (34% 
of total catches), brown crab (22% of total catches) and nephorps (16% of total 
catches), but they also catch whelks and velvet crab. Over the last ten years the 
average annual operating profit per vessel was about £11,600. Over the same 
period, the average annual operating profit per vessel increased by about 69%. 
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• Under 10 m using hooks: the number of these vessels has increased by about 326% 
since 2005, reaching 150 units in 2014. The majority of their landing value is 
represented by razor clam (31% of total catches), bass (22% of total catches) and 
scallops (17% of total catches), but they also catch whelks and velvet crab. Over the 
last ten years the average annual operating profit per vessel was about £9,800. Over 
the same period the average annual operating profit per vessel decreased by about 
7%, suggesting that this method of inshore fishing is the least successful. 
 
The remaining inshore vessels are classified as “inactive” or “low activity” under 10 meters, as 
they have average landings of less than £10,000 per year, which means they often operate at 
negative profit margin (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Percentage of vessels ‘10m & under’ & ‘>10m’ sectors by country, 2014  
 
Source: MMO (2015, p.11) 
(MMO 2015 p. 11) 
Although some issues are common to all fishers within the UK, the inshore fleet faces particular 
issues, not least in terms of its continued existence and contribution to the socio-economic 
contexts/communities within which it operates. Specifically, the focus within this case study is 
on inshore fishing within the county of Cornwall, in that Cornwall represents one of the key areas 
where inshore fishing remains a key part of the rural community both economically and 
culturally. It is also facing a range of issues that are typically faced by primary producers across 
Europe, including climate change, globalisation and responding to a 'post-productivist society' 
in which there are a wide range of user groups with an interest in coastal areas. Symes et al. 
(2015, p. 247) describe these as 'wicked problems' that can best be examined and understood 
in terms of resilience theory. 
 
4.1.2 An introduction to Cornwall 
Cornwall forms the westernmost part of the south-west peninsula of the UK (see Figure 7). The 
population of the county is just over 530,000 people, with the city of Truro as its administrative 
centre. The county is noted for its long and varied coastline, extensive stretches of which are 
protected as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The north coast is exposed to the storms of 
the Atlantic Ocean and is typified by a rugged coastline, although there are also extensive sandy 
beaches that are important tourist destinations. By contrast, the south coast is more sheltered 
and there are a number of protected estuaries that have grown up as ports, such as Falmouth, 
which is the most important port in Cornwall and one of the largest natural harbours in the 
world. 
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Figure 7. Cornwall location map  
 
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a3/Cornwall_outline_map_with_UK.png 
 
Cornwall is one of the poorest parts of the UK in terms of per capita GDP. It has relatively low 
average earnings compared to the rest of the UK, as well as relatively high unemployment. A key 
factor in Cornwall's relatively low economic performance is that 88% of its businesses are micro-
businesses, very often one or two man bands, that have proved very difficult to develop further 
(IF: Interviewee 4). At the same time, an influx of relatively wealthy retired people and second 
home owners has driven up house prices, whereby many local people struggle to live near their 
place of employment. The combination of these factors has led to a gradually increasing, but 
ageing, population as younger people have tended to leave the county in search of employment 
and further education, and older people have come to retire there.  
 
Historically, both tin and china clay have been important to the local economy, as well as fishing 
and farming. Today, tourism is the most important industry, with 4.5 million visitors to the 
county every year. This represents about 25% of the county's GDP, despite Cornwall's 
geographical disadvantage of being relatively isolated from the main centres of population, 
industry and commerce. In 2011, Cornwall's wealth was a little over 60% of the EU average per 
capita. As such, the county is a European Convergence area, meaning that it has access to both 
ERDF and ESF funds2.  
 
Of particular interest to this case study are coastal communities that support the fishing 
industry. Phillipson and Symes (2015, p. 349) highlight that such communities show relatively 
high levels of economic deprivation as well as inactive people of working age. They go on to 
quote the Cornwall FLAG strategy, in demonstrating that "one in three people in the county as 
being touched in some way by the fishing industry, whether through ancillary, processing and 
tourism activities or through living in a coastal location that supports fishing"; furthermore, that 
the presence of a fishing industry is an important part of the tourism appeal of the Cornish 
coastal towns. As such, the continuation of the fishing industry within Cornwall is important to 
the county's future prosperity. 
                                                          
2 Previously it had been an Objective 5b (1994-1999) and Objective 1 (2000-2006) area. 
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Phillipson and Symes (2015, pp. 349-350) describe how “Cornwall’s fishing activity is dispersed 
among some 50 or so ports, harbours and small coves along its long indented coastline with 
Newlyn hosting the largest concentration and ranked as the UK’s eighth largest port by volume 
of landings in 2010. With a fleet of 619 registered fishing vessels, of which almost 90 per cent 
are under 10 m in length, and 898 active fishermen of whom a quarter work part-time, the sector 
is diverse and versatile. Fishing activity ranges from beam trawling, scallop dredging, drift 
netting and long lining, to hand lining, crab and lobster potting. There are two official markets 
at Newlyn and Looe, though landings at many of the smaller harbours are usually handled by 
travelling merchants for onward sale, or sold direct to local outlets. A high proportion of the 
Cornish catch is exported to mainland Europe (mainly France and Spain), with little value added 
locally. Some development of domestic markets has taken place, including several added value 
initiatives (e.g., hand line caught mackerel, bass and pollack) as well as the supply of high quality 
fresh fish to high-end restaurants in Cornwall and beyond”.  
 
There are three main auction markets for Cornish landed fish: Newlyn and Looe (both of which 
are within the county of Cornwall), and Plymouth which is just across the border in Devon. As 
Table 2 shows, both Newlyn and Plymouth are of significant importance within a UK context. 
 
Table 2. Landing by UK vessels 2014 
 
Source: MMO (2015, p.6) (MMO 2015, p. 6) 
 
Crucially, the Cornish fishing industry is integral to the county's cultural and social fabric. It is 
estimated that the Cornish fishing industry employs approximately 3300 people, based on 900 
active fishermen, plus an estimated 2.75 jobs on shore for every fisherman (when tourist jobs 
created as the direct result of fishing are also considered, it is suggested that the multiplier is 
4:1 (Morrissey and O’Donoghue 2012)). While it is difficult to get hold of accurate figures, it is 
estimated that the total value of the seafood sector in Cornwall is in excess of £100 million. 
Perhaps more importantly, it also provides vital support to Cornwall’s £1.8bn tourism industry 
(Duchy Fish Quota Co 2016). 
“Obviously it creates employment, but it is part of the fabric of Cornwall basically. 
Cornwall wouldn't be Cornwall if it didn't have fishing harbours and there wouldn't be 
fishing harbours if there wasn’t a fishing fleet. I saw an interesting statistic in a tourist 
publication about three or four years ago and it really surprised me. They were obviously 
canvassing opinions of visitors and the major reason people came to visit Cornwall was to 
visit the fishing harbours, not the beaches, not surfing, it was to visit the great fishing 
harbours. The top reason they visited, you know, I would bare my boots, that it was they'd 
come for the beaches; not the case apparently.” (IF: Interviewee 1) 
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Most of the UK-registered fishing vessels in Cornwall are registered either with the South 
Western Fish Producers’ Organisation (SWFPO) or the Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation 
(CFPO). The principal landing port for SWFPO vessels is Brixham in Devon and for CFPO vessels 
Newlyn in Cornwall. There are just over 200 vessels in the CFPO, of which 80 are 10m or under 
in length (i.e. inshore vessels); the SWFPO has about 70 vessels, of which eight are 10m or under. 
The inclusion of 80 inshore vessels in the membership of CFPO is unique within the UK (Phillipson 
and Symes 2015). The boats within the CFPO range from a 5 m single-handed cove boat, up to a 
38 m beam trawler, and they use a diverse range of fishing techniques that include: trawling, 
beam trawling, crab/lobster potting, gill-netting, long lining, drift-netting, scallop dredging, ring-
netting and hand lining. The CFPO aims to manage quota on behalf of its members (only those 
boats in the over 10 m sector; quota in the under 10 m sector is managed by the Marine 
Management Organisation); to increase the unit value of its members' catches; and to represent 
the views and opinions of their members (CFPO 2016). 
 
4.1.2.1 Inshore fishing in Cornwall 
This case study is based on the ‘inshore fishing sector in Cornwall'; however, it is important to 
clarify what is understood by 'inshore fishing'. In the first instance, it can be defined as boats 
that are under 10 m in length and managed by the Marine Management Organisation (MMO). 
But that is only part of the story. In general, the inshore fleet will fish within six miles of the 
shore, although some of the more powerful vessels may go out further than that. Indeed there 
is legislation that limits the size of boats that can fish within six miles of the shore, although 
some boats that are larger than 10 m have historic rights to fish inside the six mile limit. Within 
Cornwall and the CFPO membership larger beam trawlers are unable to fish inside the six mile 
limit, but smaller beam trawlers are allowed if they are using four meter beams. Scallop dredging 
within the six mile limit is also heavily constrained (IF: Interviewee 1). No foreign vessels are 
allowed to fish within the six mile limit, although some EU countries can fish between 6-12 n 
miles as a result of negotiations at the time the UK joined the EU in the early 1970s3. There is 
something called the Rainbow Chart which itemises which Member States have access to the 
UK’s 6 n mile limit, which changes around the coast. In the North Sea it is predominantly German 
and Dutch boats; whereas in Cornwall it is French and Belgian boats, which can be quite large 
trawlers. There is no access for Spanish boats, in that they were not members of the EU at the 
time the negotiations on access were held (IF: Interviewee 3). The following quote gives an 
indication of the range of boats that are classified as under 10 m, and hence form the focus of 
this case study. 
"You get different sorts of under 10 m boat. You get the 'rule beaters' which are quite 
powerful, they have plenty of gear, they have a lot more options, and then you get your 
older, smaller type that aren't a particular threat to any individual fishery. The beauty of 
those is their versatility. Because they can't travel very far, one day they might be fishing 
for herring, then they might do a bit of spider crab, then they will go and do something 
else, and they can make use of what is there and available. In other words, flexibility has 
always been key to their survival. Part of this is being able to respond to what fish are 
available at any one time” (IF: Interviewee 13).  
                                                          
3 The London Fisheries Convention 1964 was central to this, resulting in the notion of ‘Relative Stability’. 
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This flexibility has been significantly curtailed by the recent capping of latent capacity (see 
section 4.2.2.3). 
 
'Rule beaters' are boats that have been specifically built to be under 10 m in length, with many 
of these boats being 9.99 m in length. Fishers may have taken advantage of one of the various 
decommissioning schemes to sell their quota, boats and license, but there was nothing to stop 
them subsequently moving into the under 10 m fleet. They were paid to scrap a boat and took 
the decommissioning money, but then re-entered fishing effectively through the back door. Due 
to their high-level specification, they were able to catch the maximum amount they were 
allowed to every month under the 10 m quota, enabling them to quickly develop a strong 
catching track record. The result is that under 10 m boats vary enormously in terms of the value 
of fish they land. At one end of the spectrum it might be as little as £15,000 a year, whereas 
others might gross up to £200,000. (IF: Interviewee 13). 
 
Proponents of inshore fishing (defined in terms of being under 10 m boats) argue that it is 
inherently more sustainable than offshore fishing, but this is not a view that is shared by 
everyone: 
“We recognise that smaller boats operating close to shore probably do have a smaller 
environmental impact. But it's a bit over-simplified to say that all inshore fishing is good 
and all offshore fishing is bad because the offshore sector has vastly improved the 
situation by reducing capacity, reducing days at sea, bringing in escape panels in trawler 
nets, reducing the areas that trawling / scallop dredgers can go, and so on. So it's a bit 
naïve really just to say that we could just support inshore guys and no-one else, because 
the offshore guys are still going to be around and we need to work with them all really to 
make sure they're all having a more sustainable future.” (IF: Interviewee 8). 
 
Indeed, some people argue that it is critical to have a mixed fleet, in that to some extent the 
larger boats can help subsidise the onshore infrastructure for the smaller, under 10 m boats, as 
well as maximise the use of quota and hence fish caught (see for example section 4.3.1 on access 
to markets). 
"The small boats are an important part of the fleet. It is a mixed fishery out there and the 
best thing to catch the fish is a diverse fleet. A mixture of very small boats to quite large 
boats and everything in between. I think it is that diversity that enables us to survive" (IF: 
Interviewee 13). 
 
The structure of this case study report is as follows. Section 4.2 examines the policy and 
regulatory conditions that impact upon inshore fisheries. This includes a sub-section on the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), as well how the inshore fishing industry seeks to ensure its 
resilience and continuation. Section 4.3 then examines the market conditions as they affect 
inshore fisheries, drawing out the importance of access to markets as well as certification 
schemes. Section 4.4 then draws out the key CSP that are faced by inshore fishers, while section 
4.5 identifies the key strategies adopted by inshore fishers and their impact on performance and 
resilience. The issues identified within sections 4.4 and 4.5 were subsequently examined further 
within Task 2.3 (focus groups and workshops), the results of which are reported within section 
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4.6. The case study report on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall then concludes with an 
analysis of the implications of Brexit for the sector, set out in section 4.7. 
 
4.2 Policy and regulatory conditions 
4.2.1 Introduction to the Common Fisheries Policy 
Fishing is an economic activity based on labour, capital and fish stocks. In the same way that 
land is for farmers, fish stocks are a limited resource, potentially undermined and drastically 
eroded by overcapitalization (in terms of the overcapacity of fleets in relation to natural fish 
stocks). As Frost and Andersen (2006) highlight, the overcapitalization problem is identical to 
that of the overexploitation of land. Rational fishers will, collectively, have an incentive to invest 
in capital up a point that avoids the over-exploitation of fish stocks, but this will not necessarily 
be at a level that maximises profit potential. Collectively fishers benefit from policies that rule 
the fleets’ capacity: the number of vessels, gross tonnage and engine power (hence the licenses 
for approved vessels to fish); as well as the management of the natural resource (hence total 
allowable catches, quotas, the management of time spent at sea, and other technical measures). 
 
The combination of restrictive licensing, individual vessel quotas, days at sea allocation and 
catch composition rules significantly reduce the flexibility of fishing operations that might 
otherwise enable individual fishers to adapt to changing conditions. Decisions on what, where, 
when and how to fish are now very tightly circumscribed, affecting both short-term and longer-
term business planning (Symes et al. 2015). 
 
The challenge of a Common Fisheries Policy is to manage a highly heterogeneous fisheries sector 
such as that of the EU. In other words, it is difficult to design optimal policies for multi-
ecosystems, multi-species and multi-fleet fisheries (Frost and Andersen 2006). 
 
4.2.2 Common Fisheries Policy 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) sets out the overarching regulatory conditions for all fishers 
within the EU. The CFP was first implemented in 1983 and has subsequently been reformed 
three times: in 1992, 2002 and 2013.  
 
The key measure developed as part of the first CFP reform (1993-2002) was a series of vessel 
decommissioning schemes. One of the major problems of the 1992 regulation was the exclusion 
of stakeholders from the decision making process. The fact that fishers were not involved in the 
formulation of the CFP measures undermined its legitimacy and, ultimately, compliance with its 
policies (Gray and Hatchard 2003).  
 
The second reform (2003-2012) focused on regional policies such as recovery and management 
plans. The 2002 Reform was claimed as a radical revision of the previous unsuccessful system 
(since 1993, several EU fish stocks had reached dangerously low levels), aiming for sustainable 
development in environmental, economic and social terms. In order to overcome the 1992 
Reform problem of excluding stakeholders from the decision-making process, the 2002 Reform 
provided Regional Advisory Committees (RACs), which aimed to ensure better quality 
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regulations and greater compliance. However, the involvement of stakeholders in the decision 
making process was still limited, confined to the pre-decision phases of the CFP in which RACs 
had simply a consulting role (Gray and Hatchard 2003).  
 
The 2002 Reform was characterized by strong centralization to the Fisheries Council, who set 
the quotas through a multiannual management plan, and to the European Commission (EC) who 
enforce the CFP regulations, strengthening its powers of monitoring and applying counter-
measures against the non-compliant, such as quota cuts (Gray and Hatchard 2003). As part of 
monitoring and enforcement, the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) was established 
in 2003, subsequently renamed the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA). 
 
Under the 2002 Reform, the way in which Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are discussed, 
designed and implemented has become a complex process involving the EC, the European 
Parliament (EP), the Scientific and Technical Committee of Fisheries (STECF), the Regional 
Advisory Committees (RACs), the ministers of each Member State, and other stakeholders. The 
volume of catches is determined, as follows: i) the EC makes a proposal for TACs on the basis of 
the scientific recommendations of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 
RACs and the opinions of the STECF; ii) the Council approves it after arduous negotiations (Da 
Rocha et al. 2012). 
 
The 2002 Reform also introduced a fleet policy in the form of fleet capacity (kW and gt) ceilings 
determined and agreed for each MS. While TACs and quotas were not subsidised, the fleet policy 
initially used subsidies to influence a fleet’s capacity, especially concerning the modernization 
and construction of new vessels. However, since 2005 the granting of subsidies has been 
abolished for: the introduction of new capacity; the export of fishing vessels, or the 
establishment of joint enterprises with third countries; the modernization of the fleet, unless it 
concerns on-board safety measures, more selective fishing techniques or improvements to the 
quality of production. Overall, from 2005 the Member States’ programmes were adapted to give 
priority to measures that will permanently reduce fishing capacity (kW and gt) (Frost and 
Andersen 2006). 
 
Despite all the new measures approved and described above, the 2002 Reform was not 
considered an improvement with respect to overfishing and the depletion of fish stocks. Its 
failure is mainly in terms of the decision-making process, where the Council of Ministers is the 
one that ultimately decides TACs via a political process, often disregarding technical advice. In 
this respect, Khalilian et al. (2010) estimated that the TACs approved by the Council of Ministers 
are on average 48% higher than those advised by scientists. 
 
In order to start planning a new CFP reform, the EC issued “The Green Paper for the Reform of 
the CAP and the Lisbon Treaty” in 2009. In this Green Paper the Commission identified five 
central structural failings of the CFP: 
• A deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity. 
• Insufficient guidance for decisions and implementation. 
• A short-term focus on the management of natural resource. 
• An insufficient responsibility of the industry. 
• A lack in Member States of political will to ensure compliance. 
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Building on the Green Paper, the Commission issued a reform package in July 2011 that lead to 
the latest reform of 2013, effective from January 2014. The 2013 Reform includes five main 
policies: the implementation of discard bans; Maximum Sustainable Yield as a key objective of 
fisheries management (which is now a key factor when determining the annual TAC); incentives 
to help develop the regionalisation of fisheries management; an increased emphasis on the 
social dimension/sustainability of fisheries; and the promotion of Transferable Fisheries 
Concessions (TFCs) (Le Floc’h et al. 2015, p. 375). In this respect, the intention is to give more 
responsibility to the fishing industry itself, in the hope that it will prove to be more effective at 
reducing overcapacity than a top-down regulatory approach. 
 
4.2.2.1 Total Allowable Catches and quota  
In 1983, as part of the European Union (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), a system of 
allocating Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for each EU member state was introduced, as a means 
of conserving fish stocks and sharing access to EU fisheries resources between member states 
(Duchy Fish Quota Co 2016). The TAC (corresponding to a particular harvesting rate), and 
technical measures (mainly mesh sizes and minimum landing sizes) based on scientific advice, 
involve most commercial fish stocks. In the EU, the TAC is set each year by the Council of 
Fisheries Ministers following negotiations on catch options that are provided by the Advisory 
Committee (ACOM) of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).  
“ICES advice is based on stock assessments carried out at international working groups, 
where fishery scientists from the UK and the other nations compile fisheries data, 
biological data and survey data for use in fisheries science models. The age structure of a 
stock (the relative proportion of the different age groups) is largely determined by the 
fishing rate and by the numbers of young fish that enter the stock each year. When 
information on age structure is combined with data on landings, fishing effort, and the 
results of standardised stock surveys carried out by research vessels, the models are able 
to estimate the historical trend in fishing rate and stock abundance, up to the last full year 
of data. The assessment is then used to forecast the expected catch in an upcoming TAC 
year for a range of fishing rate options, taking into account the number of young fish that 
are expected to enter the stock, based either on survey data, or a recent historic average” 
(MMO 2015, p. 91). 
 
Within the UK, the chief body responsible for assembling data on fisheries' stocks is CEFAS (The 
Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science). With their head office in Lowestoft 
and Weymouth, they also have small, port-based offices in a variety of places, including Exeter 
and Newlyn. They are recognised as a world leader in marine science and technology, providing 
key data on UK fisheries that feed into the ICES deliberations (CEFAS 2016). Anecdotally, many 
of those involved in fishing in Cornwall are concerned that the science is always behind the 
reality, in that fish stocks fluctuate dramatically from season to season. There is little argument 
that fishing stocks need to be monitored, but the debate is how best to do this. There is limited 
funding to allow scientists to go out on boats to monitor stocks; at the same time not all 
fishermen are prepared to take scientists out on their boats, further compromising the ability to 
collect the most up-to-date data. The landings obligations and discard ban (discussed under 
section 4.2.2.4) will help provide more accurate data, in that previously undersized or over quota 
species were simply discarded, effectively removing them from analysis of the stock levels. 
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“Although local fishermen might say this stock is abundant, if you don't have any proof in 
terms of peer review scientific research, as a marine conservation organisation we can't 
really do a lot unfortunately. Local knowledge is great and it should inform detailed 
research, but sadly the funding for detailed research is a massive problem across the 
whole of Europe and in Cornwall it feels unfair from my perspective because our 
fishermen are often reporting healthy fish stocks and certainly the trend does appear to 
be on the up. People are landing more fish than they were a few years ago… In Cornwall, 
very few of our stocks are well studied, including some of our most important ones, 
economically: scallops, monkfish and lemon sole. We have very little research on those 
three which are really economically important… Without that information, we don't know 
how sustainable a fishery is” (IF: Interviewee 8). 
 
Once a TAC is agreed for each stock and fishing area, it is allocated as national quotas to Member 
States in accordance with fixed percentages based on historic fishing rights. The MS are 
responsible for ensuring quotas are not overfished. When the entire quota is fished, the fishery 
has to close. Quotas can be exchanged between MS (MMO 2015, p. 91). It is clear that some MS 
have greater influence than others in the decision making process. Of all Member States, 
Denmark and the UK often receive the highest TACs in terms of volume above scientific advice. 
However, relative to the size of their TACs, Spain and Portugal exceed scientific advice by the 
greatest percentage. Greater transparency is required to determine what takes place during the 
closed door negotiations at the Council of Fisheries Ministers (Carpenter et al. 2016). 
 
In the UK, management of quota has been largely devolved to Fisheries Producer Organisations 
(FPOs) since the 1980s4, at least for the over 10 m offshore vessels; furthermore, “until 1999 PO 
quota allocations were based upon average landings of member vessels over the previous three 
years, but from 1999 these historical rights were 'frozen' as Fixed Quoted Allocations (FQAs)” 
(Le Floc’h et al. 2015, p. 380). These allocations “are associated with individual fishing licences 
and normally move with the licence when it is transferred or aggregated onto another vessel” 
(Defra 2014, p. 9). POs are effectively fishermen's co-operatives and they have a considerable 
degree of flexibility in terms of how they manage quota amongst their members. UK fishermen 
can join a PO in any part of the country, although most have a strong regional identity, with 
potential members being attracted by the particular quota management system used in a PO 
(Le Floc’h et al. 2015). Vessel owners must notify UK Fisheries Administrations when transferring 
between FPOs for the purposes of quota management; furthermore, “a comprehensive 
database of membership of FPOs is maintained which augments the vessel data provided by the 
Register of Shipping and Seamen” (MMO 2015, p. 142). 
 
The data collected from over 10 m vessels tends to be more arduous than for the under 10 m 
vessels. Data for the over 10 m vessels comes primarily from a fishing logbook, which captures 
data on fishing activity for each day of activity on a fishing trip. This includes details of the catch, 
the species caught, the quantity retained on board. Information is also collected on the fishing 
gear used. Supply of this logbook data is compulsory in respect of all species caught. Logbook 
data for UK vessels must be submitted within 48 hours of landing to UK authorities, including 
                                                          
4 More details on the management of quotas in the UK can be obtained from the MMO at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/quota-management-rules 
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landings into foreign ports. Two additional sources are used to collect data on the landings of 
over 10 m vessels: landing declarations and sales notes. Landing declarations provide 
information on the weight and presentation of fish landed by species. As with logbooks, they 
must be submitted to authorities within 48 hours of completion of the landing. Sales notes are 
required in terms of the first sale of fish and fisheries products; again they must be submitted 
to the UK Fisheries Administrations within 48 hours of sale by the registered buyer of the fish, 
except at designated auction centres where the registered seller has responsibility. Over time, 
the paper based system has been phased out with on-board vessel systems now being 
electronic-only reporting. A UK Electronic Reporting Systems Hub has been set up to collect, 
process and store these electronic data (MMO 2015, p. 143).  
 
By contrast, there is no statutory requirement under either EU or national legislation for under 
10 m vessels to declare their catches. Historically, data have been collected with the cooperation 
of the industry. This has included log sheets and landing declarations voluntarily supplied by 
fishermen, as well as sales notes and landing assessments collected from market sources and 
correspondents located in ports. Since September 2005, a scheme of registration for buyers and 
sellers of first sale fish has been introduced (as for the over 10 m vessels, above). In addition, 
during 2005 and 2006, new reporting requirements have been introduced for under 10 m vessels 
that require the completion of daily activity diaries that need to be submitted on a monthly 
basis. These are intended to supplement the sales notes data above (MMO 2015, p. 143). 
Nevertheless, the administrative burden is considerably greater for the over 10 m vessels, 
compared with the under 10 m vessels. 
 
In the south-west of England, the Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation (CFPO) “has adopted 
what is commonly known as a 'pool-plus' system, whereby quota is pooled but individual vessels 
are able to supplement their monthly landings limits from the pool with quota leased privately 
from other vessels... Both the CFPO and, to a lesser extent, the South West Fish Producers’ 
Organisation (SWFPO), have invested in FQAs in order to secure additional quota for the 
membership as a whole... Both POs assist their members with quota trading where required, for 
example by arranging exchanges ('swaps') with other UK POs via the MMO, but are not 
otherwise actively involved in quota trading" (Le Floc’h et al. 2015, p. 381). It is critical that the 
CFPO do manage any quota trading, in that they need to be able to demonstrate to the MMO 
how much quota their members are catching and therefore how much is available for the rest 
of the year (IF: Interviewee 1). 
 
For vessels under 10 m there is a single block of quota allocation that reflects the aggregated 
activity of that part of the fleet during the 1994 to 1996 reference period. This approach was 
taken due to the lack of data for individual vessels during this reference period, with the result 
being that annual quota is allocated to the U10m fleet as a pool, rather than individually. For the 
most part, allocation of quotas for the inshore fishing fleet is managed directly by the national 
fisheries administration (Defra in the UK) and specifically its appointed agency, the Marine 
Management Organisation (MMO) (Le Floc’h et al. 2015), rather than the POs. The MMO set 
monthly catch limits for each quota species (which can vary significantly throughout the year). 
Having monthly catch limits means that in 'good' months a vessel's catch may be restricted, 
leading to the possibility of discards; it also means that vessels are unable to make up for any 
'bad months' where catches of a particular species are lower than the allocated quota. Concern 
about this situation led Defra, in 2014, to set up a consultation about the possibility of allocating 
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Fixed Quota Allocations (FQAs) to individual licence holders in the U10m pool. FQAs would give 
U10m vessels more flexibility in terms of what they can catch over the course of the year and 
when they can catch it, potentially leading to higher value catches, fewer days at sea and less 
need to lease extra quota. At present, the higher catching U10m vessels often lease quota at the 
start of the year in case they land a valuable catch which would cause them to exceed their 
monthly catch limit (Defra 2014). This quota is leased from the over 10 m sector quota allocation, 
in that the under 10 m quota is non-tradable (IF: Interviewee 1). 
 
There is no quota on crab or lobster at present, both of which are very important to the inshore 
fishing industry in Cornwall. However, there are concerns that more and more pots are being 
set out, potentially impacting the sustainability of this part of the fisheries sector. There are 
currently no restrictions apart from minimum landing sizes and the need to have a permit. In 
this respect, minimum landing sizes are particularly pertinent to lobsters. Originally this was set 
at 80 mm, but has gradually been increased to 90 mm5, in two stages. Initially, fishermen were 
resistant to this process, but have come to recognise that it is beneficial in that it gives lobsters 
the chance to breed and thereby maintain the viability of the sector. In addition, some 
respondents feel that there should be a limit on the number of pots that can be put out per 
fishermen. One suggestion is for 100 pots per man, whereas one of the boats working out of 
Falmouth has 1800 pots, with a number of the Cadgwith boats working 5-600 pots (IF: 
Interviewee 6).  
 
In the run-up to the last round of CFP modification in 2012, Greenpeace, NUTFA (New Under 
Ten Fishermen’s Association), UK Fisherman's Associations and fishermen produced a 
'manifesto for fairer fisheries'. They argued that: “The CFP favours the most influential parts of 
the European fishing industry, often those operating with the highest environmental impact and 
least benefit to society. Meanwhile, responsible fishermen, who use sustainable methods, are 
in real danger of losing their livelihoods. The CFP currently threatens the future of our fish, our 
fishermen and the coastal communities that rely on them. The UK’s maritime heritage is at 
stake” (Greenpeace and NUTFA 2012, p. 1). The focus of this manifesto was to recognise the 
importance and value of inshore fishing, and to highlight that the majority of quota (effectively, 
the right to fish) has been targeted at large-scale fishing operations. In terms of numbers, the 
inshore sector in the UK comprises nearly 80% of the boats, yet receives only around 8% of the 
annual quota (MMO 2015). Arguably, therefore, in order to reflect the different orientation 
between the two fisher groups, there should be different management regimes for large-scale 
fisheries and small-scale fisheries, with the former focused on economic efficiency, while the 
latter focus more on social objectives (Urquhart et al. 2011). 
 
4.2.2.2 Protecting local quota 
“The management of each country’s share of TAC (or quota) is decided at member state level. 
Within the UK, the quota management system has evolved from one where quotas were 
effectively community / state owned to one of privately owned individual quota rights (i.e. the 
privatisation of a state resource, where quota is freely tradable) with each vessel owner holding 
a share of the quota known as a Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA) unit. As fishermen retire or 
                                                          
5 The minimum size limit is 90 mm within the 6 nm zone, and 87 mm beyond that limit. The 90 mm limit 
is set by the UK, whereas the 87 mm limit is set by the EU. 
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otherwise exit the industry quotas are sold and increasingly the highest bidders are larger 
companies outside Cornwall. This trend reduces the availability of quota left to the existing 
Cornish fleet, making it almost impossible for new entrants to join the industry… Without young 
fishermen the Cornish industry has no future”. In addition, existing Cornish fishing businesses 
are unable to grow or modernise, if restricted in terms of the quota they can access/afford to 
purchase (Duchy Fish Quota Co 2016) – see Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Duchy Fish Quota Co.  
 
 
 
Without access to quota, fishermen are unable to fish. In this respect, it is estimated that since 
2005 £4 million of Cornish linked fish quota has been lost from the county due to purchases by 
larger companies outside of Cornwall. For example, if a fisherman in Cornwall decides to retire 
then there is no guarantee that their quota will stay local, it could go to a Spanish or Scottish 
boat. Some of the larger trawlers have quota that is worth in the region of £1 million. There are 
very few fishermen in Cornwall who would be able to afford to buy this level of quota. If sold to 
a company from outside the county, £1 million worth of fish a year could be lost from Cornwall. 
When this happens, the wider supply chain also suffers as well as the wider economy. In 
addition, access to quota for the under 10 m boats is problematic, in that it is often sold in lots 
that are too expensive for small boats. As stated on the Duchy Fish Quota Company (DFQC) 
website: “Taken to its logical conclusion Cornwall – a county, surrounded by sea and abundant 
fish stocks - could be left without quota for Cornish fishermen to catch these fish”. To try and 
help counter this trend, the DFQC was established as a not-for-profit company in 2001 by 
members of the fishing industry who were concerned at the trade in fish quota and the impact 
this was having and might continue to have on the Cornish fishing industry. Its stated mission is 
to ‘Keep Cornwall Fishing’, both now and forever. Key to this is the ambition to raise £24m 
(which was the approximate market value of all quota held by Cornish vessels in 2015) to buy 
fishing quota back from fishermen, which will then be community-owned and available to lease 
back to current and future generations of Cornish fishermen. It is difficult to say what the 
average value of quota attached to an inshore fishing boat is, but it is in the region of £5000. In 
other words a boat can land £5000 worth of fish, which also means that they need to catch a lot 
of non-quota species in order to make an adequate living (Round Table 1). 
 
Quotas are released on an annual basis at established market rates, meaning that they are then 
compliant with EU State Aid rules. Applications from both under 10 m and over 10 m vessels are 
treated equally, in that the DFQC recognise that irrespective of vessel size there is often 
insufficient quota available. Between 2001 and 2015, DFQC invested £250,000 (raised by 
corporate donations, public fundraising and bond sales) into fishing quota, and leased quota in 
£5000 chunks (making it affordable to smaller scale fishermen) to more than 50 Cornish vessels. 
In other words, a good start, but they still have a long way to go to reach their stated ambition. 
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4.2.2.3 Latent capacity 
At the beginning of March 2016, the MMO sent out letters to all under 10 m vessel owners that 
did not have a history of catching a particular species in a recent three year reference period 
(2010-2013). If their licence allowed for them to catch a particular species and yet none of these 
fish were caught during this reference period, then their licences were capped and they would 
no longer be able to catch this species. The license for this will then be transferred to other boats 
within the under 10 m sector. There is some scepticism about this within the industry, which is 
typified by this response: "it will be the same amount of quota, the same amount of fish caught, 
by fewer boats and therefore it is easier to manage. It's about control; it's not about preserving 
fish stocks in my view" (IF: Interviewee 1). The MMO perspective is that there is quota available 
which is not being utilised (known as ‘latent capacity’). By transferring it to those who will catch 
their allocated quota, the amount of fish caught can be maximised.  
“There is a massive amount of quota which hasn't been used at all, just sitting dormant, 
and so they looked at a reference period of three years and set fairly low benchmarks 
(about 300kgs). They have to have used at least that much in at least one of the years of 
the reference period or they will be capped”. (IF: Interviewee 3) 
 
Any quota that is capped will go back into the main pool. (IF: Interviewee 2). However, whatever 
the perspective taken on this process, it is clear that it reduces the flexibility of smaller fishermen 
in terms of what they can catch and when: 
“They've said to those boats that haven't been using their quota, we're going to cap your 
licence now. But the whole point about inshore fishing is opportunism and diversity… I 
mean people have paid full price for their licenses, with the expectation that they can 
diversify into this, that and the other, as needs be, which is what you need to have in the 
inshore fisheries to be successful. It's how it’s always operated, for hundreds of years… 
I've got a full licence, now you're telling me I can't do this or that based on a track record 
going back several years… Suddenly you've got a boat with its licence attached to it which 
is not worth so much because it can't do half the things it used to be able to do. So if that's 
supporting inshore fisheries communities, I'll eat my hat! (IF: Interviewee 3). 
 
It is clear that this is issue has angered a number of people, as evidenced by this quote: 
"If a small boat has a track record of not catching many pressure stock fish, the 
government are trying to cap it at that level. And they made a reference period recently 
of 2010-2013 and anybody who hadn't caught a certain amount of pressure stock fish in 
that time had their licence capped. The dishonesty of government is quite incredible. 
Since 2013, many people have bought a licensed boat in good faith, with no idea that this 
license capping was coming in and they bought it to be able to carry on fishing from the 
under 10 m pool. And suddenly they are told, having invested in gear, a boat, licence and 
everything else, that the licence they have got is going to be capped, which effectively 
stops them from earning a living. It is the license that is capped because they haven't 
caught enough quota over the reference period. So if somebody bought a boat in 2014, 
and it hadn't caught a lot between 2010-2013, they are likely to have their licence 
capped". (IF: Interviewee 13). 
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4.2.2.4 Discards and landing obligation 
The discarding of fish is a widespread problem in EU fisheries, resulting from a number of 
interrelated issues. First, TACs create incentives to discard the over quota catch of lower valued 
quota species in the expectation of catching higher value fish later on. Second, regulations on 
mesh size and minimum landing size leads to the discarding of undersized fish and to the use of 
non-selective gears. As a result, a large amount of fish are regularly disposed of at sea, often 
already dead, generating both waste and a reduction in fish stocks and biodiversity that are not 
accounted for in the statistics. From a production point of view, by-catches and their subsequent 
discard are a waste of future fishing opportunities; from an ecological perspective, discards have 
a negative impact on marine ecosystems. Discard rates range from 25-70% depending on the 
target species, gear used and trawling speed. 
 
In 2010, appalled by the amount of edible fish being thrown back into the sea as discards, the 
chef/broadcaster/campaigner Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall launched a campaign known as 'Fish 
Fight' that sought to change the way fish is caught, sold and consumed in the UK, across Europe 
and around the world (Fearnley-Whittingstall 2010). It garnered huge support through its 
website and the wider social media, and there is little doubt that it had an important part to play 
in encouraging the latest reform of the CFP to include a reduction of discards as a specific 
objective, and to focus on encouraging more selective fishing that would avoid undersized, over 
quota or non-target species.  
 
In order to reduce waste, and pushed by public opinion, the EU is in the process of implementing 
a discard ban by introducing an obligation to land all catches. This obligation is gradually being 
introduced on a fisheries-by-fisheries basis between 1st January 2015 and 1st January 2019. The 
reason for the phased implementation is to allow time for fishermen to adapt their fishing 
practices. This may include improving equipment and fishing gear for selectivity, as well as 
onshore operations making changes that enable them to handle undersized fish that are not 
intended for direct human consumption (Seafish 2013). 
 
From 1st January 2015 all vessels catching pelagic species, such as mackerel and herring, have 
had to land all pelagic fish caught. From 1st January 2016, the landing obligation was extended 
to certain demersal species, such as haddock, sole and plaice dependent upon which sea area is 
being fished and what type of fishing gear is being used. Currently (February 2016), the landing 
obligation only includes pelagics, salmon and cod in the Baltic Sea. By 2019, it is planned to be 
in force in all EU waters and to cover both pelagic and demersal fisheries. Once the phased 
approach is complete in 2019, all quota species will be included (Seafish 2013). 
 
Essentially, the discard ban concerns species that are subject to catch limits or minimum landing 
size. Catches of these fish should be retained on board the fishing vessel, recorded and landed; 
they will then be counted against any quota that the fisher has, in weight terms. Taking this 
approach can help reduce the level of undocumented catches; it will also help collect more 
accurate data in relation to stock assessment and thereby help to better allocate TACs (Condie 
et al. 2014). “Undersized fish cannot be marketed for the purpose of human consumption. The 
pelagic fish species most likely to be affected in Cornish waters under the landing obligation are 
mackerel and herring caught by ring nets, but non pelagic quota species caught at the same time 
must also be landed. Undersized fish not under quota must continue to be returned to the sea” 
(Cornwall IFCA 2015b, p. 9). Exceptions to the obligation to land include species that have a high 
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survival rate (in other words those species that have a high survival rate once caught and can 
therefore be thrown back alive), species that it is prohibited to catch, or when from a 
technological point of view selectivity is particularly difficult to achieve (Salomon et al. 2014). 
The Discard ban is a strong incentive for fishers to adopt more selective gear. However, given 
that the ban applies only to species of economic interest, it is not expected to have a huge impact 
on safeguarding marine biodiversity (Salomon et al. 2014). 
 
The discard problem in the EU has historically been associated with medium to large-scale fleets 
(in particular large mixed species trawl fisheries), yet the discard ban also concerns and affects 
small inshore fishers. In this respect, the landing obligation will also impact fishers that have 
smaller boats with a relatively small storage capacity, a limited workforce and limited 
technological capacity. It will also involve more time in handling and sorting the fish; while at 
ports there will be a need for increased processing and storage capacity for the less valuable 
species that would previously have been discarded. Increasing the storage capacity of these 
boats will require investment (although the CFP helps in this respect) and the landed discards 
will become a “special waste” with high disposal costs. According to Veiga et al. (2016), the long-
term effects of the landing obligation are unpredictable, although current evidence suggests 
that in the short to medium term it will bring more negative social, economic and ecological 
impacts, than benefits. 
 
A situation that can occur in areas where different species of fish swim together in the same 
habitat (known as mixed fisheries), is a choke situation. What this means is that if a fisher has 
fully caught their quota for one species before catching all their allocated quota for another 
species in the same sea area, then the vessel concerned will have to stop fishing in that sea area 
due to the fact that they cannot guarantee avoiding the species for which they have no quota 
left, even though they may be intent on catching another species for which they still have quota. 
The species that they have run out of quota for is known as a ‘choke species’ and will always be 
a species liable to quota (Seafish 2016). This is a real problem for fishers in Cornwall, where the 
average trawler may well catch up to 30 different species every day it goes to sea (IF: Interviewee 
13). 
 
As the landing obligation was driven by a public debate on discards and a petition signed by 
650,000 people organized by NGOs, fishers were not involved in the decision to establish landing 
obligations and they can have a role only during their implementation at the regional level of 
specific discards plans (de Vos et al. 2016). The landing obligation is unpopular and not 
supported by the fishing sector. Although many fishers agree that something needs to be done 
regarding by-catches, the actual regulation is for many not implementable. They state that 
regulations are being made by people that lack knowledge of fisher practices. Because of this 
lack of legitimacy, fishers have responded with suspicion, and anger, and it is important to 
consider that it is the fishers’ behaviour that ultimately will determine the success or not of the 
policy (de Vos et al. 2016). 
 
Discard bans are not a novelty in the regulation of fisheries. They are currently implemented in 
Alaska, British Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland. Experience from 
these countries highlights that landing obligations can result in a reduction of discards. However, 
simply banning discards will not result in a significant reduction in discards; to be effective it is 
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necessary to have a high level of surveillance as well as economic incentives to encourage fishers 
to land more of their catch and to fish more selectively (Condie et al. 2014). 
 
The fishing fleets of the MS within the EU have very different characteristics compared to those 
countries currently using landing obligations (such as in NZ or Norway). The EU fisheries are less 
extensive and more mixed. In this respect, the EU fleet is highly heterogeneous containing a 
large number of inshore fisheries. The landing obligation does not account for such 
heterogeneity, and is applied in the same way to all fisheries (Veiga et al. 2016). 
 
4.2.2.5 Funding initiatives: European Fisheries Fund - FLAGs 
The classic European rural developmental model in post-war Europe has been an exogenous 
one, focused upon technological development, intensification and specialisation within sectors. 
Decisions have been taken at a distance (at a national or EU level), rather than at the level of 
particular contexts or territories. By the early 1980s, it was increasingly acknowledged that this 
approach had not worked and rural development support moved from exogenous to 
endogenous approaches. The LEADER programme and Axis 4 of the European Fisheries Fund 
(EFF) are examples of endogenous approaches, reflecting a move away from solely sector-
focused development towards the territorial, wherein local skills and assets are recognised and 
supported. In relation to fisheries, which are generally perceived to be an industry in terminal 
decline and therefore not able to drive economic development in the areas concerned, new 
narratives are emerging which suggest that fisheries do have an important part to play in 
developing local economies. Axis 4 of the EFF6 (Council Reg 1198/2006 Article 4) ran from 2007-
2013, and aimed to ‘encourage sustainable development and the improvement of the quality of 
life in areas with activities in the fisheries sector’. As such, Phillipson and Symes (2015, p. 346) 
suggest that “Axis 4… raises the question of whether fisheries, rather than simply being defined 
and managed as a national or European economic sector producing commodities for distant 
markets, can become re-integrated as a positive force for territorial development”. Phillipson 
and Symes (2015, p. 347) go on to ask: “But how should sectoral and territorial development 
trajectories be balanced and integrated? Should the emphasis be on fisheries initiatives, 
supporting the sector’s competitiveness, sustainability and attracting new blood to the sector? 
Or should it be on the wider social and economic diversification of coastal economies and re-
skilling of fishers out of the industry?” In other words, direct support for the fishing industry, or 
more in terms of support for economic diversification? 
 
Central to the approach of Axis 4 are Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs), which are described 
by Phillipson and Symes (2015) as a 'middle way' between sectoral and territorial development. 
FLAGs are public-private partnerships, intent on mobilising the internal capacities of the areas 
concerned, including social capital, in order to develop local fisheries and the wider quality of 
life in the territories involved. In the process, stakeholders from a range of local economic 
interest groups, including fisheries, are brought together in order to help develop an integrated 
development strategy that can help combat a range of issues faced in the local area. “A 
cornerstone of the Axis 4 approach is its aim of gathering together different stakeholders in 
order to stimulate new thinking about how all economic sectors can interact at the local level to 
deliver mutually beneficial outcomes” (van de Walle et al. 2015, p. 372). Despite a slow start, by 
                                                          
6 The EFF was established in 2007 and ran until the end of 2013. 
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early 2014 there were over 300 FLAGs across 21 of the 27 EU member states (Phillipson and 
Symes 2015). Van de Walle et al. (2015), in discussing the importance of the fishing industry to 
the Pays d’Auray region of France, argue that it is a significant and 'authentic' attraction for 
visitors to the area that has been supported and preserved by the local FLAG for the greater 
good of the area. 
 
In Cornwall, the first FLAG Strategy and Delivery Plan was agreed in 2012 and covered the whole 
of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly. Building on the “Objective 1 Cornwall & Isles of Scilly Fishing 
Industry Task Force Strategy 2000–2010…[its] emphasis [was] placed on the fisheries sector 
rather than territorial development per se” (Phillipson and Symes 2015, p. 350). “The formal aim 
of the FLAG [was] ‘to maximise the economic opportunities and benefits open to Cornish fishing 
communities in a sustainable and cooperative environment, which builds the capacity of those 
who live and work in them” (Cornwall & Isles of Scilly Fisheries Local Action Group 2011, p. 4 
quoted in Phillipson and Symes 2015, p. 350). The FLAG board was responsible for managing the 
strategy, together with the Cornwall Development Company (CDC), which is an arms-length 
economic development company of the local authority who help determine the eligibility of 
funding proposals. The FLAG comprises a wide range of interests, including representatives from 
the Cornish Fish Producers' Organisation, harbour masters, port-based fishermen's associations 
and a range of public, private and third sector representatives. The FLAG also invites 'advisers’ 
to attend meetings on an ad hoc basis, including representatives from the Cornwall and Isles of 
Scilly Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (IFCAs). 
 
In relation to new entrants (see also section 4.2.4 below), the FLAG recognise that the key barrier 
to a single/young person trying to access the industry is that they can't afford a boat; 
furthermore that the skipper of a two-man boat wants someone with experience. In other 
words, the new entrant is caught in a double bind (IF: interviewing 5): 
"You've got your qualifications, you've done three weeks, but you haven't got the 
experience. So we're currently working on a separate bid to fund a new entrants' training 
boat that will pay for an older skipper and will give new entrants a month's experience so 
they can then at least apply for jobs saying they have got a month's real experience behind 
them". 
 
In the second round of FLAG (which started in 2016), £800,000 is available, with one of the key 
areas of focus being on innovation and adding value to fish (access to the market is covered in 
more detail under section 4.3.1), not least due to the landing obligation (see section 4.2.2.4) and 
the obligation on fishermen to land everything that they have caught. What this means in 
practice is that there are (IF: Interviewee 5):  
“A lot of species coming in that don't have markets, and a lot of sizes that aren't popular. 
So the restaurant trade wants a number three sole, which fits perfectly on a plate, but if 
you're landing a lot more smaller one, there's got to be some work and education about 
how that value is done and also by-products. There's an awful lot of filleted fish that's 
sold, but all those fish skins are a waste product… But in France they've been doing lots of 
work on turning it into leather and we're quite keen here to see if we could use FLAG 
money to take fishermen and show them other things - fish or pesca tourism or fish 
leather or anything else that people are doing with fish or fish by-products”. 
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Making best use of the potential purchasing power of the 4.5 million visitors who come to 
Cornwall every year is another key aim of the FLAG. A key focus in this respect is providing fishers 
with the skills and tools to access the market in order to increase their profits, as well as ensuring 
that the profits stay within the county and the wider fishing community. For example (IF: 
Interviewee 5): 
“A Hayle crab boat was struggling to sell his crab for a reasonable price. So the FLAG 
supported him in investing in a crab potting process. This involved preparing the crab 
meat and putting it in nice jars with nice branding. He now can't keep up with demand. 
This is a really good way of marketing a product that comes in all year round, but can be 
preserved and then sold to the millions of tourists who come down only in the summer". 
 
4.2.2.6 Acknowledging the ‘social’ within policy and regulation 
As outlined above, there is no question that the fishing industry is under pressure, with many 
commercial species in serious decline. This is having a major impact on the livelihoods of fishers, 
especially small-scale inshore fishers, together with the communities in which they live. 
However, the main focus of both research and policy has tended to be on the biological and 
economic aspects of fishing, with scant attention paid to the social and cultural impacts of the 
pressures faced by fishers. At a European level, the focus of fisheries policy under the CFP has 
tended to be in terms of modernisation and rationalisation, linked to licensing and quotas. In 
this respect, the focus has been on technical measures such as net mesh size, closed seasons 
and boat decommissioning, together with restrictions on the quantities of fish that may be 
caught each year through the use of annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) restrictions that are 
allocated to each Member State (MS). It is then up to each MS to allocate national quotas as 
they see fit, through the use of both Fixed Quota Allocations and Individual Transferable Quotas. 
In this sense, there is a division of responsibility between the EU and member states, with the 
former responsible for strategies to prevent overfishing and the latter for determining how best 
to achieve these ends. In taking this approach, quantitative scientific data tends to get 
prioritised, rather than examining the lives of those involved in fishing; what is also clear is that 
any social problems resulting from such strategies are the responsibility of the MS rather than 
the EU (Ross 2015; Symes and Phillipson 2009, p. 4; Urquhart et al. 2011). 
 
Indeed, Phillipson and Symes (2015, p. 344) argue that “the European Commission has never 
been comfortable in its handling of socioeconomic issues in fisheries. In the past, funding was 
available for modernisation and renewal of the industry’s physical capital (vessels, port 
infrastructure and processing plant), but little energy was expended on renewal of social capital 
(employment, skills and entrepreneurship). There was a brief flicker of interest in the 1990s, 
with the creation of a separate fund to support the industry (FIFG 1994–2006) and a dedicated, 
albeit short lived, initiative (PESCA 1994–1999) focusing on community development and 
alternative employment opportunities outside fishing”. “Rather than serving as an active 
influence in shaping fisheries policy, social issues are seen rather more as the irritating 
consequences of policy” (Symes and Phillipson 2009, p. 3).  
 
It is significant, however, that the resilience of inshore fishers and their associated communities 
involves more than simply the economic, generating both social and cultural capital that in many 
cases provides "the glue that holds the community together" (Urquhart et al. 2011, p. 243). In 
this sense, there is a need to respect that fishing is often more than simply a way to earn a living, 
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but also a means of defining identity. The risks and uncertainties associated with inshore fishing 
(such as weather conditions, species availability and market prices) also help build a sense of 
solidarity as those sharing the same challenges are able to have a sense of 'shared empathy' and 
understanding (Ross 2015). Understanding resilience within this context requires a 
multidisciplinary approach, involving the natural, social and political sciences, in order to 
encompass the breadth of users who have an interest in coastal communities. However, Symes 
et al. (2015, p. 249) stress that the social is particularly important, in that "resilience is deeply 
embedded in the social structures, relationships and behaviours associated with coastal fisheries 
and their host communities". 
 
4.2.3 Finance 
The following data is taken from an interview with Barclays Bank, Cornwall (IF: Interviewee 12). 
Over the last 10 years or so it is apparent that the number of smaller fishing vessels that the 
bank supports has declined by about 25%. This is usually due to decommissioning, or that fishers 
have sold up and moved out of the industry. The fishers that this bank supports vary from small 
handliners up to small fleets. The bank has three key criteria that they consider before offering 
a fisher a loan: firstly, what is being offered as security -- whether it is a fishing vessel, licence or 
house; secondly, can they prove they are able to service the loan, as well as have enough money 
to live on; thirdly their track record. The bank will look at the value of the boat and license 
combined and then lend up to 50% of that value, as a guideline. They might also take a charge 
over the fisher’s home. The bank will only lend up to a maximum of £25,000 as an unsecured 
loan; anything over that requires security. Normally, the maximum period of a loan is 10 years. 
If the bank feels unable to provide a loan, then this interviewee felt there are very few other 
places that a fisher might turn to for financial support. 
 
There is recognition that the fishing industry requires a careful lender, in that there are so many 
things outside its control, such as the weather, natural breeding processes and 
legislation/regulation. The bank no longer use quota as a form of security, because it is not 
something that the bank can control in terms of whether it is sold or not. Whereas with the 
vessel and licence, the bank is able to take a formal legal charge over them meaning they cannot 
be sold without the bank's permission. Nevertheless, where a fisher does have a large amount 
of quota, it is indicative of the business investing in its future. In relation to the value of a fishing 
vessel, they have a professional valuer to do this for them. Key issues to look at are the condition 
of the boat, as well as its maintenance and service history. Has it got at least a ten-year lifespan. 
An older vessel may well require expensive maintenance, as well as use more fuel (the main 
ongoing and increasing expense that fishers face). As a result, the profit potential of the boat 
can be significantly degraded. 
 
In relation to succession, discussed in more detail in section 4.2.4 below, finance can be a 
problem for those wanting to get into the industry.  
"Most of the young guys that I've met that want to get into the industry, do it through the 
family initially. It's just like buying a house: if you haven't got the stake, it's very difficult 
to start isn't it?... I've been asked to fund boats for £30,000 upwards. The last one I did 
was £1.2 million. I mean they need to take the long route and get the experience, crew, 
then skipper for somebody else and then get their own vessel” (IF: Interviewee 12). 
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4.2.4 Recruitment and succession 
Intergenerational continuity is a key issue when addressing the sustainability and resilience of 
inshore fishing across Europe. Traditionally, many fishers came through the hereditary pathway. 
However, fishing is no longer seen as the occupation that it once was in terms of status, financial 
rewards or job security. There is no longer the same pressure within families to persuade sons 
to follow their fathers, with the result that aspiring fishers increasingly come from outside the 
fishing community. This creates an additional problem for aspiring fishers, both in terms of 
finding the necessary finance to purchase a boat and license, but also in terms of gaining 
experience through working on boats and 'learning the ropes' (White 2015).  
 
To date, policy support at an EU level has been principally financial, through the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) [Regulation No. 508/2014] (2014–2020), wherein Article 29 
relates to support for apprenticeships and Article 31 endorses start-up support for young fishers. 
However, White (2015) posits that a sectoral approach is likely to be too narrow: recruitment 
also needs to look to the wider coastal rural economy and to develop integrated multi-sectoral 
strategies through a FLAG, for example. 
 
Normally, fishing employment is either as crew, or as a skipper-owner. Working as crew is now 
less common, as many inshore fishers have adapted their boats to enable them to fish single-
handedly in order to reduce crew costs and improve their profitability. The introduction of 
obligatory training courses for new entrants has created an additional hurdle, in that in most 
cases boat skippers will not fund them, meaning that the aspiring entrant must pay for them 
themselves. Even where an aspiring entrant completes a training course, this may not help them 
find employment in that most fishers place more importance on experience-based learning 
through working on boats. In this respect, research by White (2015, p. 297) suggests that "formal 
training requirements are seen by fishermen as 'hurdles without meaning' and as undermining 
the natural process of recruitment". 
 
The result is that aspiring fishers must increasingly look to own their own boat, which involves 
considerable investment in terms of the vessel itself, fishing gear and a fishing license. Getting 
hold of a fishing license can be problematic in itself, in that no new licences are being issued. 
There is some provision to disaggregate licenses, whereby you can create two licenses out of 
one7. Essentially, this enables you to put two smaller licenses on two smaller boats, in that the 
licence has a capacity rating in terms of engine and tonnage (IF: Interviewee 1). In terms of cost, 
a beach boat is in the region of £30,000-£40,000, up to more like £200,000 for a larger crabber; 
in addition, the cost of a licence8 can be more than £10,000. Taken together, this level of cost 
prevents many aspiring skippers from becoming active fishers; it is also leading to an ever 
increasing average age of fisherman, with less than 20% being under the age of 30 and the 
average age approaching 60 (White 2015). White (2015, p. 304) argues that there is a parallel 
here between fishing and farming, which she suggests represents "a wider crisis of youth 
                                                          
7 However, each time this happens, some of the capacity of the licence is lost. 
8 In addition to the financial cost of the licence, it is necessary to find an existing licence holder who is 
prepared to give up their licence, in that no additional licenses can be issued / are available (White 2015). 
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employment in rural areas". In this respect, she argues that: "If maintaining small-scale fisheries 
is a policy objective, ensuring recruitment is crucial to future resilience" (White 2015, p. 306). 
 
The latent capacity issue set out under section 4.2.2.3 has the potential to exacerbate the 
problem of recruitment and succession, as exemplified by the following quotation (IF: 
Interviewee 1): 
“I think the latest round of licence capping is only going to make it more expensive for 
people to enter the industry from the bottom up because it is getting prohibitively 
expensive. Even to buy a small 15 foot boat can be anywhere up to between £10-20,000 
and for somebody that doesn't have that sort of money, it's very very difficult to get in 
and by limiting the number of boats that are able to catch enough fish to make a living, 
then you're only going to increase the price. So for the small Cornish communities, 
particularly the coves, that's going to be a problem…and I can see that in some places 
there being no fishing boats left, because of policy to reduce the number of licences that 
enable fishermen to actually go and make a living.” 
 
4.2.5 Fisheries management and marine conservation 
Over the last 50 years, there have been significant terrestrial conservation measures; by contrast 
the oceans are poorly protected, with only 1.17% of the Marine area designated as marine 
protected areas (MPAs). The marine environment is extremely complex and variable, meaning 
that it is also scientifically uncertain. As a result, management decisions are often based on the 
'precautionary principle', although what this means in practice is inevitably subjective and 
contested (Fleming and Jones 2012).  
 
There is a widespread perception that fisheries management in the EU, via the CFP, has failed to 
deliver sustainable fisheries and economic vitality, with one of the generally accepted reasons 
for this being a lack of transparency and the failure to include a wide range of stakeholders and 
perspectives. In countries where there is a more devolved management structure, such as 
Norway, USA and Canada, there has been "some success in instilling in stakeholders a sense of 
trust and legitimacy in the fisheries management decision-making process and in doing so 
improve[e] the rate of compliance” (Rodwell et al. 2014, p. 285). 
 
Defra’s vision for the English fishing fleet is for it to be “an economically and environmentally 
sustainable industry”; in addition, they aim to “protect the viability of stocks while safeguarding 
and enhancing the marine ecosystem” (Defra 2014, p. 3). Functionally, it is the Marine 
Management Organisation (MMO), an executive non-departmental public body, who are 
responsible for marine planning and fisheries management in the UK. More broadly, Natural 
England is the UK Government's adviser for the natural environment in England. Specifically in 
relation to the marine environment, they have responsibility for advising on how to ensure 
marine biodiversity and its protection in inshore waters (0 to 12 nautical miles) (Natural England 
2016). To help facilitate this, they are permanently represented on Inshore Fisheries 
Conservation Authorities’ committees (see below). 
 
A key impetus for change within the UK was the Defra publication Safeguarding our Seas (2002), 
which set out the aspiration to adopt an ecosystem approach to marine policy; furthermore that 
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this required the empowerment of a wide range of marine users/stakeholders, most notably 
those operating in inshore waters. A key result of this publication was the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 (MCAA), which resulted in the Government developing a new framework to 
integrate fisheries and environmental management goals, and to enable those who may have 
very different views to have a better chance of making collaborative decisions through 
participatory governance (Rodwell et al. 2014). Under this Act, the UK Government is committed 
to implementing a network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which are to be developed via a 
stakeholder participation process that entails the collaboration of scientists, fishermen and 
conservationists. MPA is a blanket term which covers areas of sea and coast where wildlife and 
habitats are protected from damage and disturbance. In the UK, MPAs have primarily been set 
up to help conserve or recover nationally significant or representative examples of marine 
diversity (Seafish 2013).  
 
Natural England is a non-departmental public body who advise DEFRA on marine nature 
conservation, including MPAs. They provide advice to DEFRA in terms of designating particular 
sites, but also then providing conservation advice to the regulators such as the MMO, harbour 
authorities or IFCA. In this respect, it is important that Natural England is represented on the 
board of the local IFCA, who in most instances are the site managers. In seeing a protected area 
on a chart, the immediate reaction of many fishermen is to feel that they will be unable to fish 
in that area. In reality, the extent to which MPAs might affect fishing depends upon the type of 
fishing involved: for example, whether it involves static gear or trawling; it will also depend upon 
the reason why the site is protected. Natural England are intent on communicating with fishers, 
recognising that their decisions will affect people and that the MPAs are likely to be more 
effective if those involved can see the logic behind their designation. MPAs are considered 
integral to ensuring that fishing within Cornwall remains sustainable (IF: Interviewee 7): 
“I think that the one thing everybody wants to see in Cornwall is a sustainable fishing 
industry. It is part of the heritage, it's part of the culture, it's what encourages tourism. 
It's livelihoods for small villages around the coast. It's what the MMO, the IFCA, Natural 
England, PO, all of them, want. All of us work together to ensure that we have that... There 
are lots of external pressures on the industry, marine protected areas being one of them. 
But I truly believe that everybody wants to have a sustainable fishing industry in Cornwall. 
It's really important.” 
 
The importance of working with the industry to achieve sustainability goals is emphasised by IF: 
Interviewee 8, who works for the Cornwall Wildlife Trust: 
“I don’t think many environmental organisations are dead set against fishing… We've got 
to work with the industry…Certainly some of the most successful initiatives have actually 
come from the fishing industry, such as the Trevose box (or cod box), which is a closed 
area…That is an area which fisheries, scientists and fishermen have known for a long time 
is incredibly important to many species during spawning time, and it was actually the 
Cornwall FPO members who initially said that they were unhappy that massive amounts 
of fish were being taken during spawning time…So they got together with fisheries 
representatives from all across Europe and came up with a plan to have that as a closed 
area through spawning season every year, and it’s been really highly successful. Not only 
do cod spawn there, but also a lot of flat fish species… We'd like to see more like that”. 
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There are a number of different types of MPA (Figure 9) each of which has different levels of 
protection and different regulations and codes of practice (Cornwall IFCA 2015b; 2016): 
• European Marine Sites, which include Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) – there are 
five in the Cornwall IFCA district - and Special Protection Areas (SPAs) - there are two in 
the Cornwall IFCA district - which are designated under the EU Habitats and Birds 
Directives respectively and form part of the European-wide Natura 2000 network of 
internationally important sites. 
• Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), which are designated under the UK’s Wildlife 
and Countryside Act 1981. These are primarily land-based, but sometimes extend below 
the low water mark. 
• Ramsar sites. The Cornwall IFCA district does not contain any of these sites. 
• Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) protect a range of nationally important marine 
wildlife habitats and seabed features - there are five which are situated wholly or partly 
within the Cornwall IFCA district. No site-specific regulations are currently in place for 
the designated MCZs. 
 
Figure 9.  Different types of Marine Protected Areas 
 
Source: Seafish (2013, p. 3) (Seafish 2013, p. 3) 
 
Another form of MPA is 'No-take Marine Protected Areas (NTMPA), which can be defined as 
"marine areas in which the extraction of living and non-living resources is permanently 
prohibited, except as necessary for monitoring or research to evaluate effectiveness” (Jones 
2008, p. 749). Inevitably, conservation measures such as these are a cause of concern for fishers 
in that they directly affect their right to fish. In this respect, a key question in relation to 
stakeholder participation is: "what constitutes an appropriate balance of power in order to fairly 
consider both the achievement of conservation goals and the fulfilment of more local economic 
and social properties" (Fleming and Jones 2012, p. 372). At present, there are no 'no-take' areas 
within Cornwall (IF: Interviewee 1). 
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Figure 10. Cornwall Marine Protected Areas  
 
Source: Cornwall IFCA (2017, p. 2) 
 
The Marine Act (2009) also resulted in the formation, in April 2011, of 10 Inshore Fisheries 
Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) to replace the existing 12 Sea Fisheries Committees (SFC). The 
stated mission of the IFCAs is to 'lead, champion and manage a sustainable marine environment 
and inshore fisheries, by successfully securing the right balance between social, environmental 
and economic benefits to ensure healthy seas, sustainable fisheries and a viable industry' 
(Cornwall IFCA 2015a, p. 7). As such, “their remit includes fisheries regulation, stock 
enhancement, monitoring and enforcement. They are… also responsible for environmental 
management tasks such as ensuring that fishing is compatible with the conservation objectives 
of the Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). IFCAs are funded by local authorities but they report 
to Defra and are guided and supported by the MMO, a senior member of which sits on each 
IFCA” (Rodwell et al. 2014, p. 280). Membership of the IFCAs is more inclusive than the previous 
SFCs, with the aim of developing a more open and inclusive governance model that can deliver 
sustainable fisheries and help instil a sense of trust and legitimacy. Key to this approach is to 
proactively engage with fishermen, merchants and other stakeholders to listen to any concerns 
or suggestions they may have. As part of this approach, appointees to the IFCA are legally 
required to represent all local commercial and recreational fishing, as well as marine 
environmental interests, in a balanced way taking into account a wide range of economic, social 
and environmental needs. To this end, the 21 members of the Committee comprise seven 
members from Cornwall Council, 11 appointments by the MMO, as well as officers from the 
MMO, Natural England and Environment Agency. Nevertheless, despite this inclusive approach, 
there are clearly tensions between conservation and fishing, with concern amongst fishers about 
the increasing emphasis on marine conservation zones (Rodwell et al. 2014). 
 
“The Cornwall IFCA District extends from Marsland Mouth on the north coast of Cornwall, 
around Land’s End to the western end of the Plymouth Breakwater in Plymouth Sound on the 
south coast, for all the waters out to the six mile limit and includes the rivers and estuaries up 
to tidal limits…[and] includes a number of protected areas including five Marine Conservation 
Zones (MCZ) and seven European  Marine Sites (EMS). Four further MCZs are expected in a 
future tranche of MCZ designation” (Cornwall IFCA 2015a, p. 6). Cornwall IFCA create and 
enforce local bylaws, as well as enforcing relevant national and European fisheries legislation. 
They inherited 64 bylaws from the preceding Sea Fisheries Committee, the Environment Agency 
and the Devon Sea Fisheries Committee. They conduct patrols and inspections at sea, which 
includes patrols around the coast, as well as visiting ports and harbours. They are financed 
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through a combination of local (Cornwall County Council) and Central government funding 
(Defra). 
 
Figure 11. Cornwall IFCA District  
 
Source: Cornwall IFCA (2015a, p. 6) 
 
4.2.5.1 Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management 
One approach to managing the marine environment is to take an Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries Management (EAFM). As mentioned above, this approach was promoted by DEFRA in 
2002, as well as in the MCAA 2009. It has also been endorsed by the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries as an appropriate 
management strategy in the face of overarching uncertainty in relation to climate change and 
attendant changes to the ocean’s chemistry. This code sets out the importance of conserving all 
species that belong to a particular ecosystem, which entails monitoring the impact of human 
activities on that ecosystem. Key to an EAFM approach is building resilience in relation to fish 
habitats and populations, as well as people's livelihoods and well-being. It encompasses the 
precautionary approach, as well as encouraging cooperation and coordination amongst 
institutions and different interest groups. To this end, “an EAFM aims to ensure that the capacity 
of ecosystems to produce fish and shellfish for food, employment and livelihoods, and to provide 
other essential services, is maintained for the benefit of the present and future generations in 
the face of variability, uncertainty and natural changes to coastal environments” (Heenan et al. 
2015, p. 185). Crucial also, are clear communication processes in order to develop trust and 
confidence amongst the range of disparate stakeholders involved in the EAFM approach. An 
EAFM approach, therefore, through incorporating a wide range of stakeholders, has the 
potential to recognise and better encompass the social and cultural dimensions of inshore 
fishing (Urquhart et al. 2011). Two such approaches involve the National Lobster Hatchery and 
the 'Living Seas' programme (run by the Cornwall Wildlife Trust), both of which are described 
below. 
 
4.2.5.2 The National Lobster Hatchery 
One of the most important species, particularly for the inshore fishers of Cornwall, is lobster. It 
is a relatively high-value species, as well as not being subject to quotas. Its conservation is 
therefore critical to the ongoing sustainability of inshore fishers. It is targeted by around 400 
vessels in Cornwall. Any boat that wishes to target shellfish must have a permit from the IFCA. 
The permit is issued for free, but on the condition that the boat concerned must submit monthly 
fishing statistics to the IFCA. Due to the importance of the lobster fishery, there are a wide range 
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of laws to help protect it. Amongst these, are the large minimum landing sizes, which are the 
largest in Europe. (IF: Interviewee 3) 
“It tends to be mostly a day boat inshore fishery; intrinsically quite sustainable. It is quite 
localised, lots of small day boats... Obviously, the gear itself is fairly low impact, being 
static. The pots are lowered down in one place. They are lifted up again. There is not 
extensive dragging. They tend to be quite selective in what they catch. So they will catch 
crabs and lobsters. You get the odd dogfish in there, but the majority of stuff tends to 
come up alive… You don't have the problem of the whitefish scenario of scooping up a 
net and by the time you have got it up, it is all dead anyway. And the boats that catch 
them tend to be quite diverse. They will catch lobsters during the busy periods, they will 
also be catching some crabs, maybe doing a bit of netting in the winter. So they are not 
just hammering one species, with one type of gear all the time. They are spreading their 
bets across the ecosystem, depending on what is abundant at certain times of the year. 
But at the same time there are sustainability challenges” (IF: Interviewee 9). 
 
Lobster stocks around the world are increasingly vulnerable, with stocks in both Scandinavia and 
the Mediterranean having completely collapsed in the past. The National Lobster Hatchery has 
as its primary aim "to help conserve the vulnerable lobster populations and preserve coastal 
marine diversity. In doing so [to safeguard] the livelihoods of small coastal communities and 
preserve our rich coastal heritage" (National Lobster Hatchery 2016). In other words, it is intent 
on conserving both the natural stock of lobster, while at the same time recognising that fishers 
need to continue catching them in order to survive as small businesses. In other words it is about 
sustainability, rather than stopping fishing. The hatchery aims to conserve the natural stocks of 
lobster, principally through its lobster stock enhancement programme, where they grow baby 
lobsters from eggs which are harvested in the wild, before releasing tiny lobsters back into the 
wild. They receive between 250-300 females a year from around 12 fishermen. The largest 
female can spawn as many as 50,000 eggs. 
 
In 2014, they released 53,000 juveniles back into the wild. This requires the help of both local 
fishermen and dive groups, who provide the Hatchery with the egg-laden hen lobsters. They also 
conduct research into lobsters, as well as operating a visitor centre that has over 40,000 people 
per year, with the principal aim of educating potential consumers about the lobster fishery and 
the sustainability issues it faces. Critically, it also provides a key source of income to sustain the 
whole Hatchery project. (National Lobster Hatchery 2016) 
 
4.2.5.3 The ‘Living Seas’ conservation programme 
The coast around Cornwall has a very rich marine wildlife, but in many instances they are under 
threat. The Cornwall Wildlife Trusts Living Seas programme has been instrumental in pushing 
for the development of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the English Channel area, keeping 
pressure on the Government "to ensure the Marine Act provides the necessary protection, 
especially through Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs) to give our marine wildlife the chance to 
recover and thrive". In this respect, the Government has decided that MCZs will be introduced 
in three tranches. The first tranche, in November 2013, involved 27 MCZs across the UK (8 in 
Cornwall). In January 2016, a further 23 MCZs were designated across the UK (9 in Cornwall), 
with the promise of a third tranche in 2018. The Cornwall Wildlife Trust is intent on working with 
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both the Government and interested stakeholders to ensure that the designated MCZs are 
properly managed and achieve their aims (Cornwall Wildlife Trust 2016b). 
 
One of the key projects associated with the Living Seas programme is the development of the 
Cornwall Good Seafood Guide, which is intended to provide both consumers and businesses 
with information that enables them to make better informed choices about purchasing Cornish 
seafood. It is described in more detail under Section 4.3.1.2, below. 
 
4.3 Market conditions 
Fish and fishery products are among the most traded food commodities worldwide. Global fish 
exports increased from 25% of the total catch in the 1970s to 37% in 2012, reflecting the sector’s 
growth in the global economy. In recent years, liberalisation policies, technological innovations, 
as well as improvements in processing, packaging, distribution, marketing and transportation 
have further accelerated this trend, increasing the complexity of supply chains in which seafood 
often crosses national borders several times before final consumption (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
In global markets, both the EU and the US are net importers of seafood, in contrast to Asia, 
Oceania and Latin American which are net exporters. The EU is by far the largest import market, 
importing almost 25% of the seafood globally traded, followed by the US, Japan and China. In 
many developing countries (e.g. Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mozambique), fisheries export is a 
critical source of earnings, job creation, income generation, and ultimately growth and 
development (Bellmann et al. 2016).  
 
According to the 2015 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, over the next ten years per capita fish 
consumption will increase in all continents. Changing diets, rising incomes, and urbanization are 
likely to lead to an increased consumption of fish, with significant implications for fish prices. 
Fish prices are influenced by demand and supply factors, such as the costs of production and 
transportation, and the price of alternative commodities, especially meat. The limited potential 
to increase fish captures limits future supplies and may further increase fish prices (Bellmann et 
al. 2016). 
 
The level of tariff protection on traded seafood is relatively low, for several reasons. The 
recognition of national Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (which entered into force in 1994), gave exclusive national rights 
over fish stocks leading the rich importing countries to keep low tariffs on raw fish. However, 
tariffs on processed seafood are higher, which has the effect of excluding developing countries 
from exporting high value-added processed fish products. 
 
Looking at the UK seafood market capacity, in 2014 UK vessels (inshore plus offshore) landed 
756,000 tonnes of seafood for a value of £861 million. Compared with 2013, this represents a 
21% increase in volume and a 16% increase in value. In 2014, average prices for demersal 
(whitefish and flatfish) species and shellfish increased, whereas the average prices for pelagic 
species fell (Seafish 2015). While shellfish represented only 32% of the UK seafood landed in 
terms of quantity, it represented 45% of the landed value. 
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In the UK, approximately 70% of seafood value is imported or landed by foreign ships. The most 
important countries delivering fish to the UK are Iceland, China, Germany, Canada, Denmark and 
Faroe Islands. In contrast, the top five UK seafood exports concern salmon, mackerel, nephrops9, 
scallops and prawns, which are mainly exported to France, the U.S., Ireland, Spain, China and 
Italy (Seafish 2015). 
 
Since 2006 total UK seafood sales have steadily increased, reaching almost £3 billion of sales 
value in 2015. Fresh seafood is the main product driving sales growth, while frozen and ambient 
seafood sales have slightly declined since 2009. The top ten seafood varieties by sales value in 
the UK are: salmon, cod, tuna, prawns, haddock, pollack, mackerel, sea bass, scampi and trout 
(Seafish 2015). Seafood consumption in the UK is higher in the older stratum of the population 
rather than among the young, with seafood consumption particularly linked to a healthy lifestyle 
(Seafish 2015). A key issue in developing the markets for fish in the UK is to educate the British 
public about eating a wider variety of fish species. At present, the demand for cod and haddock 
dominates, while most British people have never eaten Megrim (for example), which is 
abundant in Cornish waters (IF: Interviewee 2). 
 
It is important to note that the economic and market performance of the fisheries sector is not 
only important to the fishers themselves, but also to the wider communities in which they 
operate. It has been estimated, for example, that every fisher at sea creates a further four jobs 
on land. These jobs include processing, transportation and perhaps most critically, tourist jobs. 
In other words, the fishing economy at a local level involves more than simply the value of fish 
(Morrissey and O’Donoghue 2012). A seaside location, harbour and fishing heritage all draw 
visitors to a community. As such, in addition to the direct economic importance of inshore 
fishing, is the wider development of social and cultural capacity in the communities concerned 
(Reed et al. 2011). 
 
IF: Interviewee 9 usefully summaries the issues that many fishermen face in relation to 
marketing their catch: 
"The business model of fishermen is inherently flawed from a strictly economic 
perspective. Because when your peak season is, is everybody's peak season because these 
things are environmentally driven. In June when your pots are full, every other fishermen 
in the county's pots are also full. And when prices then drop, fishermen tend to react to 
that by trying to catch more and more and more and a lot of the time that is counter-
productive because the prices just go further down, because you are swamping the 
market. So developing new markets is something to aim for. A huge amount of fishing 
economics is around the marketability of the product, rather than the catchability of the 
species.” 
 
4.3.1 Access to markets 
Reed et al. (2011, p. 4) suggest that inshore fishermen have three principal routes to market: 
fish merchants (the most common outlet), who then take it to the end user/consumer; selling 
at harbour side auctions; and (less usually) selling direct into the hospitality trade. The latter 
                                                          
9 A genus of lobsters comprising a single extant species. 
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route to market results in the greatest economic returns for the fishermen, as well as for the 
wider community in that the fish then becomes part of the overall tourist offer. By contrast, the 
first two groups "strip the fish of its provenance, particularly in the case of prawns or other 
shellfish that are aimed at continental markets where they compete with other fish sold as a 
commodity”. 
 
Access to the multiple retailers is effectively impossible for small scale inshore fishers, in that 
these retailers almost exclusively use supply chains covered by various (usually expensive) 
certification processes (most usually MSC). As a result, the fish supply chain within the UK is 
largely "bifurcated, with the domestic inshore catch unable to find a way into the multiple 
retailers and in turn the supermarkets reliant on imported or farmed fish" (Reed et al. 2011, p. 
63). Reed et al. (2011, p. 69) go on to suggest that inshore fishers must highlight the localness 
of their fish and build more linkages with the local community, including tourist enterprises such 
as restaurants and hotels. In so doing, they need to "celebrate what is particular, seasonal and 
tasty about their catch", thereby adding value to their catch as well as to the wider community. 
It also allows them to develop a degree of control over their market outlets. Diversifying their 
market outlets in this way helps develop resilience, but at the same time requires additional 
knowledge, investment and competence (Doeksen and Symes 2015). 
 
The FLAG in Cornwall has had a part to play in developing the local fishing sector in coordination 
with the wider food economy. This is evident in Padstow, for example, where the town has been 
developed as a year-round gastronomic tourist destination, which is promoted on the basis of 
locally caught fish. Similarly, larger ports such as Newlyn are still principally about fish 
commodity sales, but they have also developed routes into the hospitality trade. In order to 
achieve this, there have been investments made to improve the quality/qualities of locally 
caught fish, not least by giving it a 'story' and a Cornish seafood brand that is associated with 
traceability and sustainable fishing practices. The lobster hatchery in Padstow is an example of 
this process (Reed et al. 2011). 
 
Currently, fishers in Cornwall, especially the inshore fishers, use a variety of different outlets to 
gain market access. The most important market outlet for Cornwall fishers is harbour markets. 
The great advantage of these is that buyers pay directly to the fishermen, thus improving their 
cash flow. The most important harbour market in Cornwall is Newlyn, from where 80% of the 
fish landed are exported. This is mainly because there is simply not the demand for fish in the 
UK. The Newlyn market is a 'shout auction', which involves spreading the fish out in a market 
hall so that the merchants can see them. This differs from Plymouth, where the merchants 
usually do not physically see the fish, because they are graded and described (see below). There 
are ambitious plans for the Newlyn market, to develop it in terms of improving the onshore 
infrastructure (such as providing engineering facilities) as well as developing it as an Internet 
auction. (IF: Interviewee 15). 
 
Looe fish market is the second largest in Cornwall, although the particularly large tides in this 
area restrict when day boats can come in or go out to sea. Fish sold at this market have been 
brought in from Mevagissey, Polperro and sometimes Newquay, in addition to those landed at 
Looe itself. Like Plymouth, it is also an electronic market, meaning that people can bid for fish 
from anywhere in the country. "If you go to our market in the morning, there are only two people 
there. The others are in their nice warm offices" (IF: Interviewee 16). Much of the fish sold here 
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is exported to France in vivier trucks that carry live crab and lobsters. Cuttle fish and squid go to 
Italy. It is clear that there is some frustration that more fish aren't consumed locally: "Half the 
battle is getting people to eat fish. There are lovely fish here. I do think people in Britain are 
getting better about fish" (IF: Interviewee 16). Port Isaac, on the northern cost of Cornwall, is 
specialized in trading lobsters and spider crabs for which it is the leading fishing port in the West 
Country. Padstow is specialized in spider and brown crabs. Shellfish landed in Port Isaac and 
Padstow are also mainly exported to France and Spain in ‘Vivier’ trucks, which enable the live 
export of shellfish. These trucks may only visit once or twice a week, so many of the local boats 
have pots located at the entrance to the estuary, which they use to store their catch in until the 
trucks arrive. 
 
Cornwall fishers also have relatively easy access to larger harbour markets located in Devon. 
Brixham in Devon is the most important fishing port in England in terms of value of catch landed, 
with more than 40 different types of fish being regularly sold at auction. 50% of the auction is 
exported worldwide, although buyers include national processors and local fishmongers and 
restaurants. The catch landed at Brixham includes fish landed by local boats, non-local vessels 
and fish transported overland from other ports. Brixham fish market is also a tourist attraction. 
Plymouth is the second largest fresh fish market in England. Its turnover is steadily increasing 
every year, sustaining about 600 jobs either directly or indirectly. On average, Plymouth market 
trades 6,000 tonnes of fish a year, with a value of £17.35 million in the 2013/2014 financial year. 
At a regional level, Plymouth is the most important fisheries hub in the South West region. 
Indeed, about 70% of the fish sold at Plymouth market arrives by road from fishermen landing 
at other ports in the South West. The advantage for Cornwall’s fishermen of selling through 
these ports is their greater international integration, allowing, depending on the season, for 
higher prices. 
 
The Plymouth fish market is run by Plymouth Trawler Agents, who were founded in 1995. It is 
owned by about 110 shareholders, most of whom are fishermen. Originally it was a 'shout 
auction' before becoming an 'electronic auction'. In 1994 £700,000 worth of fish were sold; in 
2014 £17 million worth of fish was sold. They now sell fish on a secure Internet site, which 
enables the market to attract buyers from all over the UK. Between 3-400 different boats land 
with them each year, including a large number of under 10 m vessels. Because they are 
effectively owned by fishermen, and their income is on commission only, it is very much in their 
best interests to get the best price for the fish they are selling. "It is in our best interests to get 
the best price for every kilo of fish, which benefits the boats and keeps the company going". 
Most of the under 10 m boats selling through the market are from Mevagissey, with sales in the 
region of £2 million a year. They also have a few under 10 m boats that land from Newlyn, 
Salcombe, Exmouth, Weymouth and Chesil Beach. Selling from the smaller boats does not really 
make commercial sense for the market, in that if a boat lands £100 of fish, for example, the 
market’s commission at 4% nets £4, which needs to cover sorting the fish, grading it into species, 
icing it, putting it into a chiller, storing it overnight, selling it the next morning before then 
despatching it onto lorries. “The truth is, is that it is the bigger boats, who land much bigger 
catches, will in effect pay for the smaller boats to land at a price that the smaller boats can 
afford". The same is true in terms of transport, from Mevagissey or Newlyn, for example. There 
is a charge for transport in addition to the 4% mentioned above, but it barely covers the market's 
costs. Again, "the bigger boats, the beam trawlers, who are often castigated, actually generally 
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generate the income that helps support the infrastructure and allows the smaller boats to pay a 
reasonable price" (IF: Interviewee 13).  
 
Every boat's catch is sold individually. The buyers at the market will not actually see the fish. 
They are buying it on the basis of the gradings made by the market, which means that they have 
to go beyond basic EU regulations. Their goal is to make the buying process as transparent as 
possible for their buyers: "We have got to be able to describe the quality of the fish more 
accurately than the EU grades allow us". The benefit of the smaller boats is that providing they 
look after their fish, which in most cases is less than a day old when it is landed, it has the 
potential to be of excellent quality.  
“However, in order to make the best prices, fish have to be both very fresh and well looked 
after, which means being kept cold. This is not always the case with line caught fish. For 
example, if a boat has only caught two fish they may not be brought down on the same 
day to the market. They may go in the back of his car, in a poly box with a bit of ice. He 
may then catch a couple more the next day and then bring them down. Well, there will 
be a tag in to say that it is line caught, but that extra time when it has not been as cold as 
it should have been, greatly diminishes the quality. Yes, it is line caught, but the quality 
isn't what is expected of day caught line fish”. (IF: Interviewee 13). 
 
Many observers feel that, especially smaller scale fishermen, must add value to their catch if 
they are to survive. The smaller day boats turn over perhaps £200-£400 in a day, however it is 
difficult to be certain how many days a year it will be possible to go out. For example, if the boat 
is catching a quota species they will be capped in terms of the quantities they can catch; 
something that may be exacerbated where a 'choke' species is involved. Bad weather in the 
winter will also mean that the smaller boats are unable to go out and therefore to earn a living. 
In other words, maximising the value-added potential of their catch is likely to become ever 
more critical. There is also a cost: price squeeze that affects all fishermen. Diesel fuel and 
insurance, for example, have risen very considerably over the last 20 years, yet the price of 
harbourside fish has remained relatively static, seasonal/demand peaks and troughs 
notwithstanding. This reinforces the importance of developing more local markets, whereby 
value-added can be retained within the county and amongst the fishing community (IF: 
Interviewee 9). In order to be resilient, more fishermen need to use modern technology and sell 
direct to the consumer. It is happening to some extent (as shown below), but there are instances 
where fish merchants have been known to say "'if you sell direct, we will never ever buy your 
fish again'; so for the fishermen involved it really is a leap of faith" to move from what they know 
(selling harbourside at the markets), to selling direct (Round Table 1). 
 
For many fishermen, selling their fish at harbourside is all they really consider in terms of 
markets, judging that they do not really have the time to go and market the fish themselves, 
preferring instead to focus their energy on catching the fish in the first place. Nevertheless, there 
is evidence that more and more fishermen are seeking to access Cornwall’s local markets, such 
as fish shops and pubs/restaurants as well through periodic/seasonal fish festivals; for example, 
the fish festival of Newlyn takes place annually on August Bank Holiday Monday. There is also 
increasing evidence of fishermen using social media to make direct contact with the markets for 
their produce and to cut out the middleman, not simply putting the fish on the auction market. 
In this respect, some of them now sell direct to London, pooling their resources and supplies of 
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fish to satisfy these niche markets (IF: Interviewee 1). One example of this approach to adding 
value though making direct contact with consumers is 'Dreckly Fish’, involving a group of three 
Newlyn-based fishermen selling hake, herring and shellfish. Key to their approach has been the 
development of a website that is linked to Facebook and Twitter, using the Twitter name 
@Drecklyfish. Tweeting what they are catching, while they are actually catching it, allows 
potential customers to track and bid immediately for their catch. This means that by the time 
the fishermen reach harbour-side, they have already sold their produce at a premium over the 
auction market. Over time, they have developed six key clients who buy from them, each of 
whom is based in or near London. They were helped in developing this business model by 
funding from the FLAG, which provided training as well as supplying them with computer tablets 
(CRRC 2016; IF: Interviewee 5). However, most of fishermen have no digital footprint at all10, 
which is something that the FLAG is trying to address through a project known as Get Fit for 
Fishermen. Its objective is to try and help fishermen and retired fishermen and their families to 
use the Internet. (IF: Interviewee 5). 
 
There are a number of further interesting examples of initiatives in Cornwall intent on improving 
both market access and value-added for fish products in Cornwall. These involve a group of 
fishermen forming themselves into an association (South West Handline Fishermen's 
Association); the Cornwall Wildlife Trust’s initiative to inform consumers about why they should 
buy Cornish fish in terms of its sustainability and quality (the Cornwall Good Seafood Guide); 
and an example of the approach taken by a Cornish fishmonger to promote and market what is 
special about Cornish caught fish. These three initiatives are briefly described in the following 
subsections. 
 
4.3.1.1 The South West Handline Fishermen's Association (SWHFA) 
The SWHFA represents more than 150 handline fishermen in SW England. Fishermen in the 
South West have been handlining for mackerel, pollack and bass for over 40 years, providing a 
vital source of income for many inshore fishermen. However, in recent years most mackerel 
caught is by large trawlers fishing off the North Scottish coast. Many of these vessels are capable 
of catching several hundred tonnes of fish in a single night. This increase in scale has had the 
effect of reducing the prices paid for mackerel, as well as had a significant impact on stocks. In 
contrast, mackerel caught by small vessels fishing with hand lines has a much lower impact on 
fishing stocks and arguably is much more sustainable. There is also no unwanted by-catch. The 
South West Handline fleet has a quota of 0.83% of the total UK quota for mackerel, or 1750 
tonnes, whichever is the higher. In reality, the mackerel fishermen in Cornwall have not caught 
all their quota for many years. An average day’s catch for a handline vessel is in the region of 
100-200 kg of fish. Proponents of handlining argue that this way of fishing is inherently 
sustainable and should be protected and encouraged (SWHFA 2016), not least in terms of the 
social benefits that it can contribute to. Small boats handlining for mackerel will also fish for 
other species such as bass, as well as potting. "I do potting and handlining; you've got to have 
your eggs in two or three baskets really" (IF: Interviewee 6). 
 
                                                          
10 This is an issue similarly faced by farmers, where Defra estimates that 13% of farmers have no digital 
footprint at all. 
 94 
A key strategy of the SWHFA is to promote the benefits of fishing in this way to the end 
consumer, which is done through their website and the use of numbered tags which are inserted 
in the gills or mouth by the fishermen (involving mackerel, bass and pollack), remaining in the 
fish until taken out by the end-user. The identities of the fishermen are also displayed on the 
website, further encouraging the end user to make active connections with the fish they are 
buying and to perhaps pay a premium price for it (SWHFA 2016). Although the quantities 
involved are likely to be quite small, the work of the SWHFA is intent on protecting the 
sustainability of this form of fishing and, in so doing, showing that catching fish can be in balance 
with the natural environment. 
 
4.3.1.2 Cornwall Good Seafood Guide 
The stated aim of this project is:  
“To provide clear and accurate information to help us all make environmentally informed 
decisions when purchasing locally caught seafood… Our Cornish fishing industry is 
something we should all be proud of, but knowing what fish to buy is a complicated issue. 
This website aims to address this by supporting the industry, highlighting good practice, 
and encouraging locals and visitors alike to buy Cornish… Draw[ing] together all available 
information into one place to enable consumers and business to make their own well 
informed choice when choosing Cornish seafood” (Cornwall Wildlife Trust 2016a).  
 
It is about reconnecting people with the seafood industry, demystifying some of its more 
complicated elements. The Cornwall Wildlife Trust, who has developed the guide, sees the 
fishing industry as a real opportunity to benefit the environment if properly managed and 
supported. As such they want to try and support sustainable fishermen in Cornwall, which 
includes helping them achieve better prices for seafood that has been sustainably harvested. 
In relation to shell fishing, apart from some concerns about the number of pots being used, 
this sector is felt to be sustainable. However, there are insufficient local markets for the fish 
that are caught, meaning there is a reliance on export markets which can fluctuate in terms 
of both demand and the prices obtained (IF: Interviewee 8). 
 
The project’s website sets out both historical and current fishing practices within Cornwall. 
There is also a guide to the 60 or more species that are caught in Cornish waters, including a 
picture and description of each of the commercial fish species caught and a rating for each 
species in terms of its sustainability on a scale of 1 to 5. The scoring system used is based on an 
internationally recognised methodology devised by the Marine Conservation Society (MCS) 
(MCS 2016), in order to ensure that the ratings used are comparable. The criteria used are based 
on five different elements of sustainability (Cornwall Wildlife Trust 2016a): 
• Exploitation or stock status. 
• Biological vulnerability of the species. 
• Management practices, including checks and enforcement measures. 
• Capture method and ecological effects. 
• Certification or accreditation. 
 
There are extensive fish recipes, as well as brief biographies of a number of the fishermen 
involved. There is also an interactive map of Cornwall that shows where to find and buy Cornish 
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seafood. The outlets highlighted include: wholesalers, restaurants, pubs, cafes, hotels, 
fishmongers and direct from the fishermen themselves. Developments in the management 
practices and capture methods used are also explained in some detail, demonstrating how the 
fishing industry in Cornwall is attempting to ensure that it is environmentally sustainable, both 
in terms of the fishing industry itself but also more broadly in terms of the marine environment. 
The result is an information portal that enables transparency for those interested in buying 
Cornish seafood. In this respect, it is clearly a very useful resource, although it is too early at this 
stage to assess the extent to which it has had an impact in terms of facilitating market access for 
those involved, or enabling better prices to be obtained. 
 
4.3.1.3 The Cornish Fishmonger 
The Cornish Fishmonger is a specialist family-run fishmonger which aims to "always source and 
provide the finest fish and freshest seafood, sourced from local inshore boats wherever 
possible". They are fully committed to supporting local fishermen and working with them to 
ensure the long-term sustainability of both fish and fishing within Cornwall. They buy daily from 
local fishermen, as well as from the markets at Newlyn, Plymouth, Brixham and Looe. They aim 
to provide as much information as possible to consumers, so that they fully understand the 
nature of the product they are buying (The Cornish Fishmonger 2016). 
 
4.3.2 The processing sector and its role in the market for fish 
The seafood processing sector in the UK is becoming more concentrated. In the period 2008-
2014, the number of processing units declined by about 34%, reaching 333 units; this was 
counterbalanced by a 33% increase in terms of the numbers employed in each unit. The total 
number of processing units in the South West of England in 2014 was 40 (24% less than in 2008), 
employing about 1,534 people (Yordanova et al. 2015). 
 
The total annual turnover of fish processors in the UK in 2012 was estimated at £4.2 billion, a 
16% increase since 2008. In 2012, the average turnover per unit was £12 million, up by 69% since 
2008. Large seafood processors generate 56% of the industry turnover. Spending on raw 
materials is the largest cost for seafood processors, representing about 70% of total costs. These 
costs are not fully passed on to consumers, potentially reducing profitability. Investments in the 
seafood processing industry focus on enhancing production efficiency, increasing production 
capacity and gaining access to new markets. Therefore, key areas of innovation are product and 
process innovation and marketing innovation (Yordanova et al. 2015). 
 
The market conditions within which UK processors operate change, depending on the seasonal 
availability of species, prevailing weather conditions and consumer demand. Consumer demand 
is typically higher during the Christmas and Easter periods, yet lower at the beginning of the 
year. The weather also influences consumer demand in terms of the types of products, with 
demand for shellfish products tending to be high during periods of good weather, when 
correspondingly the demand for fish and chips may suffer. End-consumer demand can also 
change as a result of marketing campaigns and celebrity chef endorsements (Yordanova et al. 
2015). 
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The main negative conditions that sea food processors highlighted in a survey conducted by 
Yordanova et al. (2015) in 2014-2015 are: unpredictable supplies and increasing prices of raw 
materials; regulatory and trade developments such as exchange rate movements; a lack of 
consumer awareness; skills shortages; securing finance; and retailer pressure on suppliers. At 
the same time, the survey highlighted some positive conditions that included a growing demand 
for seafood. 
 
The discards ban and landing obligation are not only a source of uncertainty for fishermen, but 
also for processors. The fact that it is still unclear how the landing obligation will affect the 
catching sector (and therefore the supply of raw materials) is creating difficulties for the long-
term business planning of processors. The main threat seen in the landing obligation, from the 
processors’ perspective, is the potential disruption to the supply of their raw materials; partly 
due to the reduction of fishermen’s profits and their consequent exit from the sector, and partly 
because some of the fishermen’s quota will inevitably be taken up with non-target fish, reducing 
the quantity of targeted fish caught and therefore available to buy. However, there are also 
some potential opportunities from the landing obligation, such as an increase in the supply of 
fish which would otherwise have been discarded. 
 
Figure 12. The UK seafood supply chain, 2013 
 
Source: Seafish (online) 
 
4.3.3 Public and private seafood standards 
Food safety standards present both challenges and opportunities for producers. They can 
provide access to large and lucrative markets, but can also require significant up-front and 
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ongoing investments in both technology and other processes, which is a particular challenge for 
smaller producers and for those without easy access to capital (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
In order to put the fish that have been caught on the market, the EU and national governments 
require some minimum safety standards. Public standards for seafood products are concerned 
mainly with traceability and product labelling, contaminants content and illegal fishing. The most 
recent traceability rules were introduced by Regulation 1224/2009, which requires that detailed 
product information is available and that the product is traceable throughout the food chain 
(OCEANA 2015; Yordanova et al. 2015). 
 
The labelling of sea fish products is mandatory, as defined by the Common Organisation of the 
Markets Regulation 1379/2013 (CMO). The information that must appear on the labels of fresh 
or frozen fish is:  
• Both the commercial and scientific names of the fish. These names must match those 
on the official list drawn up and published by each EU country; 
• The production method using the designations: ‘caught …’; or ‘caught in freshwater …’; 
or ‘farmed …’; 
• The catch area; 
• The fishing gear used among the categories: ‘seines’, ‘trawls’, ‘gillnets and similar nets’, 
‘surrounding nets and lift nets’, ‘hooks and lines’, ‘dredges’, and ‘pots and traps’; 
• Whether the product has been defrosted; 
• For live bivalve molluscs, the ‘best before’ date can be replaced by the label ‘these 
animals must be alive when sold’; 
• Information on allergens on the packages, or in the sale premises if unpacked. 
 
Many of the new terms used in the CMO have required interpretation at an EU level, causing 
difficulties in terms of compliance and potentially creating issues when exporting products from 
one MS to another (Yordanova et al. 2015). 
 
Contaminant limits are of particular concern with crabs. Crabs may contain relatively high levels 
of cadmium in the part of the flesh known as brown meat. The European Commission has 
decided that setting cadmium limits on brown meat is inappropriate because consumption 
patterns vary widely between consumers in different member states. For example, UK 
consumers prefer the white meat and consume relatively small amounts of brown meat, so that 
their exposure to cadmium through this route is small. In this respect, national advice is 
expected shortly from the Food Standards Agency. Other countries that import crabs from the 
UK may set limits for crab meat without distinguishing between the white and brown meats. As 
a result, this may cause problems for UK exporters (Yordanova et al. 2015). 
 
Standards in relation to illegal fishing are ruled under the EU’s Illegal Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing Regulation (Council Regulation No.1005/2008), which came into force in 
2010. The proportion of illegally caught fish consumed in large markets can be substantial, hence 
the Regulation provided that all the fish imported into the EU must be accompanied by a catch 
certificate verified by an authority of the vessel’s flag state. The EU can block fish imports from 
non-cooperating flag states. For example, Belize, Cambodia, and Guinea were declared “non-
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cooperating” in November 2013 and a ban on imports of fishery products fished by vessels under 
their flags was imposed (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
Public standards from the EU, or from other national governments, are increasingly being 
supplemented by private safety and traceability standards from corporate retailers. This is a 
result of the increasing importance of large food retailers in the supply chain and of increasing 
vertical integration in which independently certified private food safety standards provide 
verifiable quality assurance to companies. Private standards for seafood products can be private 
safety standards (similar to the public ones, but mainly intended to gain access to a particular 
supply chain rather than market access as a whole), or sustainability standards (Bellmann et al. 
2016). 
 
Sustainability standards have initially emerged in a number of developed country markets, partly 
as a reaction to the perceived failure of national governments to properly manage fisheries 
within their EEZs. Many different private standards are used by a wide range of players, from 
fishers to processors, traders and wholesalers, across a very heterogeneous industry. This 
heterogeneity in private standards reflects the proliferation of pocket guides to sustainable 
seafood issued by different environmental groups (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
The two largest sea fisheries certification schemes are Friend of the Sea (FoS) and the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC). Together, they cover about 18% of global sea fisheries production. 
Other schemes (for example, KRAV in Sweden and Naturland in Germany) provide certification 
for organic aquaculture and small scale sustainability certification schemes for fisheries 
(Bellmann et al. 2016). The impact of private sustainability standards on fish production is 
context specific. The costs of acquiring and maintaining certification vary significantly depending 
on: i) the dimension of the business involved; ii) the amount of pre-existing information; iii) the 
type of certification requested. Independent third-party MSC certification can cost up to 
€250,000 (see below), while simpler FoS certification schemes cost around €2,000. Some 
governments (e.g. the Netherlands and New Zealand) provide financial assistance to help their 
fishing industry obtain certification. The largest cost element of a certification, however, 
remains the underlying cost of managing the resource sustainably (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
The economic benefits of sustainability certification remain uncertain. From the point of view of 
retailers they can result in price premiums and increased consumer trust, but for fishers it seems 
that the only benefit is access to certain supply chains, without necessarily obtaining significant 
price premiums on the catches concerned (Bellmann et al. 2016). 
 
4.3.4 Sustainable seafood and certification 
The cultural politics around ethical food choices has become ever more complicated, involving 
the contestation and negotiation of what can be understood as 'good' or 'bad' food choices. In 
relation to fish, the term 'sustainable' also has many meanings, although Brinson et al. (2011, p. 
547) suggest that: “Sustainable seafood may be described as products that have high stock 
abundance, low levels of fishing pressure, nominal bycatch levels, minimal adverse gear effects, 
negligible habitat damage, or effective management”. However, fish/fisheries tend to be 
regarded primarily as natural resources, rather than as sources of food as such. In this respect, 
"food security for fisheries is most commonly discussed only in relation to maintaining viable 
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stocks of fish... without specifically addressing the broader 'food system'" (Olson et al. 2014, p. 
105). As a result, management tends to be about ensuring the health of the wild stock of fish 
rather than focusing on the incomes of fishers themselves.  
 
There is a strong political-economic dimension to contemporary fisheries management, which 
tends to favour large scale fish harvesting and processing. Since the 1990s, there has been a 
growth of third-party/private certification standards, most notably the MSC standards 
(described in more detail, below). Such schemes do not replace state led or EU fisheries 
management, but they do have an important role to play in seeking to view fish as food rather 
than as wildlife. Significantly, this suggests a change of focus from 'fisheries management' to 
'sustainable seafood' (Silver and Hawkins in press). As Olson et al. (2014, p. 105) argue: "thinking 
about fish as food provides a different frame of interpretation" in terms of the management of 
fish, fisheries and the marine environment; not least because it enables individuals to 
demonstrate an awareness of the issues surrounding seafood and to take an actively responsible 
role in ensuring its sustainability. 
 
The following subsections briefly describe three certification schemes that are of relevance 
within a Cornwall context: Marine Stewardship Council; Responsible Fishing Scheme; and 
Cornish Sardine Management Association. In some way, each of these schemes is intent on 
demonstrating to the end consumer that the fish caught under their label is sustainable. 
 
4.3.4.1 The Marine Stewardship Council seafood eco-label 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) seafood eco-label emerged from a partnership between 
Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund, with the intention of promoting sustainability initiatives 
in relation to seafood. Critically, the MSC label developed as a non-state market driven 
governance tool, wherein corporations could see that it was in their own self-interest to protect 
the stability of their seafood supplies. Schemes such as the MSC also enable retailers to 
demonstrate 'due diligence' in relation to their sourcing and procurement policies. While 
consumers may not be directly involved in developing initiatives such as MSC, they are the 
ultimate recipients of seafood and can therefore have an influence. The intention of those 
involved in the sustainable seafood movement is to use retailers as gatekeepers of sustainability, 
through making sustainable seafood sourcing the norm. However, for this to be successful, 
consumers will need to be aware of why such products may be more expensive, or there is a 
danger they will not buy into the process. In this respect, it is important that financial 
responsibility for ensuring sustainable fisheries is shared fairly across the supply chain (Gutierrez 
and Morgan 2015). 
 
The MSC label (Figure 13) has been criticised for being inaccessible to small-scale and developing 
world fisheries, as well as not leading to a measurable reduction of fish stock decline. As a result, 
some fishers have sought to go beyond minimum MSC standards, while NGOs have developed 
Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) as a means of enabling those fishers not currently able to 
achieve full MSC certification to access markets. In other words, there is now an MSC plus and 
an MSC minus, both of which are beyond the control of the MSC. This potentially creates a crisis 
of credibility as well as confusion. In addition, if retailers across Europe achieve their aim of only 
selling MSC certified fish, its use as a means of differentiation diminishes and consequently its 
ability to attract a price premium. If this becomes the case, retailers and fishers will need to 
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consider other ways to add value, in that it is critical price premiums are achieved in order to 
cover or exceed any additional costs that may be incurred by providing fish that have been more 
sustainably caught and sourced (Bush et al. 2013). 
 
Figure 13. MSC Label 
 
 
 
 
Within Cornwall, line mackerel was originally MSC certified, paid for by grant funding. However 
since the grant funding disappeared, the association no longer had the resources available to 
ensure continuation of the accreditation. MSC certification also involves complete fisheries, 
rather than individual species. There are concerns that it is a top-down approach driven by 
environmental NGOs putting pressure on supermarkets who are worried about their reputation. 
At best, it simply allows access to large-scale retailers for fishermen, but does not add value to 
their catch (IF: Interviewee 1). As such, at least from an inshore fishing perspective, it is of little 
value or relevance. 
 
4.3.4.2 The Responsible Fishing Scheme 
 
 
The Responsible Fishing Scheme (RFS) is a voluntary vessel based programme that has been 
developed to raise standards in the catching sector, enabling those within the seafood supply 
chain to demonstrate their commitment to the responsible sourcing of seafood. The RFS 
provides tangible evidence that the seafood landed by a vessel has been responsibly harvested, 
handled, and preserved to industry agreed best practice standards. It is intended to complement 
other certification schemes and to contribute to the ongoing sustainability of the fishing 
industry. It is the only global standard (developed and administered in the UK) that audits 
compliance on board fishing vessels, including ethical and welfare criteria. It is independently 
audited and demonstrates that a vessel and its skipper are operating to best practice in five core 
areas (Seafish 2016): 
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• Safety, health and welfare (including a commitment to generating a culture of integrity 
and respect towards labour). 
• Training and professional development (including improving skills, knowledge and 
understanding). 
• The vessel and its mission (including ensuring that the vessel complies with all current 
legislation). 
• Care of the catch (including a commitment to maintaining the value of the catch and on 
supplying a safe, high quality product with known provenance). 
• Care for the environment (including respecting the environment and supporting 
fisheries science through the allowance of observers on board). 
 
The scheme underwent a comprehensive review in 2014. It was developed in accordance with 
the requirements of internationally recognised standard ISO17065 and was re-launched in 
January 2016. The costs of annual certification are in the order of £100 per vessel, making it 
much more affordable than MSC certification (albeit the latter is based at the level of a whole 
fishery, rather than individual vessels). 
 
A good example of how the RFS is helping to promote and develop the quality of the fish 
processing industry within Cornwall is the Real Cornish Crab Company (RCCC). RCCC has now 
been trading for 20 years, supplying crab to both local and international markets. The crab is 
landed from the company’s own vessels in Newlyn harbour, direct to the factory. There are four 
boats involved, each of which is a vivier crabber, which means that it has a large tank below 
decks that is continuously circulated with fresh sea water, thereby ensuring that the crab is kept 
fit and healthy when it is landed. The RCCC website highlights that they are members of the RFS 
scheme and that this signifies they are actively contributing to sustainable and traceable fishing 
practices. This includes what the company calls ‘Crab-trax’, which is a programme that allows 
customers to scan a code on the packaging of the crab they have bought and to trace where 
their crab was caught (RCCC 2016). 
 
4.3.4.3 Cornish Sardine Management Association (CSMA) 
In 1993, EU legislation came into force that protected food names on either a geographical or 
traditional recipe basis. The intention was to highlight regional and traditional foods whose 
authenticity and origin can be guaranteed. The resulting certification can help increase 
consumer awareness about the products involved, as well as setting in place particular 
management mechanisms. In 2004, the CSMA came together as a group of Cornish fishermen 
and processors to agree common standards between themselves for catching, processing and 
marketing Cornish sardines. As part of this process, they managed to obtain a Protected 
Geographical Indication (PGI) certificate, which covers Cornish sardines (sardina pilchardus) that 
have been caught up to 6 miles off the Cornish coast and that furthermore have been landed 
and processed within the county of Cornwall. The characteristics of the Cornish sardine are 
linked to the geographical area on the basis of the traditions associated with catching and 
processing. Fishing for Cornish sardines is a vital part of Cornwall's heritage. The skill of locating 
and catching the fish has a long history in Cornwall, having been handed down over many 
generations. (SMA 2016) 
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It is a requirement of the PGI that skippers and owners record and submit details of their catch 
to the IFCA, in order to evidence that the product was caught within the requisite geographical 
area. Cornish sardines are brought aboard from drift or ring nets, before being iced to maintain 
quality and freshness. Once landed, the sardines are sold to fish merchants and processors 
either through auction markets or directly to merchants/processors (with the fishermen 
recording which processors have bought their fish in order to ensure further traceability 
throughout the supply chain). The fish can then be processed in several ways, but primarily 
through a combination of filleting, heading, gutting, salting, marinating, freezing and packing 
(SMA 2016). 
 
The aim of the CSMA in achieving PGI certification has been to both manage and develop the 
catching and marketing of Cornish sardines. The resultant reputation of Cornish sardines over 
the last 10 years has been associated with a high quality product that has achieved an increasing 
volume of sales, particularly in the UK retail market. Cornish sardines are now found on sale at 
the fish counters of a number of major UK retailers such as Waitrose, Tesco’s and Marks and 
Spencer (SMA 2016). 
 
4.3.5 Community supported fishing programmes 
Through the growing number of certification schemes, consumers are beginning to have a 
greater influence on how seafood is harvested and marketed through their purchasing choices. 
However, most certification programmes offer universal standards for the global consumer 
based on entire fishing stocks (notwithstanding those described above); this risks failing to 
recognise local fishing activity that may be highly sustainable at a local level, both in ecological 
and social terms. In this respect, the development of Community Supported Fishing (CSF) 
schemes has potential, in that there is a more direct relationship between individual fishers, the 
fish they catch and the end consumer (Olson et al. 2014). 
 
They are a relatively new phenomenon, having originated in the fishing town of Gloucester on 
the East Coast of the USA in 2010. They function in very much the same way as Community 
Supported Agriculture (CSA) schemes, wherein consumers are encouraged to more directly 
engage with the food they eat. The main purpose of CSF is to increase the profits for local 
fishermen, while at the same time providing high-quality and very fresh seafood to consumers. 
CSF have the potential to enable fishers to sell their fish at a premium price; to provide a market 
outlet for species that may have a low commercial value when sold through traditional outlets; 
and thirdly, they can have a part to play in stabilising the incomes of fishers. CSF also facilitate 
direct traceability of the catch, thereby differentiating it from any other fish on the market. In 
this respect, direct contact between the fisher and the consumer allows for greater explanation 
and understanding of the fish that have been caught. However, they do require an investment 
in start-up costs such as marketing, promotion and distribution, as well as involving a new set of 
skills (Brinson et al. 2011).  
 
In Cornwall, there was some enthusiasm for developing a CSF scheme following the intervention 
of the marine biologist and television presenter, Monty Halls, as part of his TV programme 
entitled 'The Fishermen's Apprentice' in 2012. Monty visited the CSF scheme in Gloucester, USA 
and tried to develop something similar with the fisherman at the port of Cadgwith, Cornwall. 
However, despite some initial enthusiasm, it proved to be too much commitment and extra work 
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for the fishermen involved, whose energies were more focused on actually catching fish, rather 
than marketing it. As a result, it failed to get off the ground even though there was evidently 
some consumer support for it (Halls 2012). 
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4.4 Key CSP identified in the literature, media and interviews 
As identified by van de Walle et al. (2015, p. 373) in the literature, it is apparent that “primary 
activities based on the marine environment are under increasing pressure from both external 
factors…and internal factors…that threatens their future sustainability” 
 
Some of the key issues identified within this report are shown in the form of a SWOT table, 
below. The text following then draws out the significance of these issues in more detail, 
highlighting what needs to be examined further as part of Task 2.3 (focus groups and 
workshops), as well as Task 2.6 (primary producer survey). 
4.4.1 SWOT analysis 
Table 3. SWOT analysis – fishing  
Strengths Weaknesses 
Diversity of fish species caught 
The number of inshore fishing boats 
A significant tourism spend on food 
Active fishing harbours as a critical tourist draw 
Established export markets 
'Cornwall' as a strong regional identity brand 
Quota availability and fish stocks 
Seasonality of the tourist trade 
Bad weather prevents small boats going fishing 
Succession issues 
Costs of boats, licences, quotas etc. 
Problems securing loans 
Opportunities Threats 
Newlyn harbour development 
Recovery of fish stocks/more quota allocated 
Growing consumer awareness 
Developing markets/demand 
Working together for sustainability in Cornwall 
Brexit 
Increasing costs (e.g. diesel) and stagnant prices 
Ever more stringent quota allocations 
An increase in regulation (e.g. MPAs, discards) 
Succession: lack of skills and new blood 
Increasingly intense weather patterns 
Brexit 
 
4.4.2 Policy and regulatory conditions 
• The first issue to come up in any conversation with those interviewed as part of this case 
study were restrictions on the amount of fish that can be caught due to an insufficient quota 
allocation. The focus here is on inshore fishermen, but this issue was recognised as affecting 
all fishermen, whatever their size. 
• One area of debate about the future of fishing in Cornwall is the reliability of the scientific 
evidence used for calculating quota (and at an EU-level the TAC for each MS). The decisions 
about quota are made in Brussels and are highly political. Anecdotally at least, fishermen 
very often say that there is more fish available than the science indicates. 
• There is a need for more accurate science on fish stocks. This requires greater funding for 
research, as well as greater cooperation from some fishermen. Some fishermen do allow 
scientists on board their boats, but others are resistant to the idea. Fishermen and scientists 
need to work together to further improve the data available. 
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• The recently introduced 'landings obligation' is seen as well-intentioned. It has the potential 
to reduce discards, but at present has not been fully thought through in terms of how to 
market or deal with all the fish that are landed. 
• Another issue with the landings obligation is what is known as a 'choke' situation. What this 
means in practice is that if a fisher has fully caught their quota for one species before 
catching all their allocated quota for another species in the same sea area, the vessel 
concerned will have to stop fishing in that sea area because they cannot guarantee avoiding 
the species for which they have no quota left, even though they may be intent on catching 
another species for which they still have quota. 
• The recent capping of many of the smaller inshore fishermen through addressing what is 
known as 'latent capacity' is a cause of concern for many involved. The intention is to 
maximise the catch capacity of the inshore fishing fleet, but in the process the flexibility of 
many smaller scale fishermen has been severely curtailed, potentially threatening their 
viability. 
• Quota used to be ‘publicly’ owned, but has become tradable and thereby effectively 
privatised. There is concern in Cornwall that quota allocation will be bought, and indeed is 
being bought, by fishing boats that are not Cornwall-based. There are attempts to buy up 
quota to help protect the future of local fishermen. 
• Non-quotas species, particularly shellfish (crab and lobster), are crucial in helping to ensure 
inshore fishers viability. There are concerns that in some instances the stocks are being 
overfished. Initiatives, such as seeking to limit the number of pots per boat, are being talked 
about. In addition, size restrictions are also in place. 
• The scale at which decisions are taken is clearly an area of concern. Some of the interview 
respondents suggested that the one size fits all approach of the EU is simply not appropriate, 
especially in relation to the small-scale inshore fishing fleet. In this respect, the Brexit 
negotiations may be an opportunity to reconsider how fishing is organised. In reality, there 
is a perception that most of the existing CFP regulations will need to remain the same. The 
one area that might change is in relation to the six and 12 mile fishing limits. Off the coast 
of Lands End, national fishing limits may also be extended to 200 miles. 
• A sustainable fishing industry is crucial to the ongoing viability and well-being of the Cornish 
economy. This is partly in relation to the income and employment it generates directly, but 
perhaps even more importantly in terms of contributing to the very significant tourism 
industry. Its future sustainability is therefore something that a wide range of organisations 
are keen to protect and ensure. 
• The inshore fishing sector, in particular, is critically important in social terms. It supports 
many small-scale businesses, as well as a large number of fishing communities and ports. 
Social support is not something that has been well supported from the EU level. A key 
question in this respect is: should support be targeted at a sector level, or territorially? The 
local FLAG has an important role in supporting the fishing industry, particularly the inshore 
fishing community. In this respect it is support at a sector level, which has territorial benefits. 
 
4.4.3 Recruitment and succession 
• Recruitment and succession is a big issue in the Cornwall inshore fishing industry. 
Traditionally, boats and know-how have been passed down from father to son; however, 
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this is happening less and less, as the economics around fishing mean that it has become a 
less attractive career option. It has become very expensive to get into fishing, with high 
prices for boats, but also licenses and quota, assuming that there are any licenses and quota 
available to be purchased. 
• The average age of fishers has been rising steadily to about 60, which is in line with farming. 
There is a recognition that new blood needs to be encouraged to come into the industry. 
Some educational qualification schemes have been introduced, but fishers tend to be 
suspicious of these, preferring instead young people who have had actual experience. Yet, 
getting this experience is difficult: many of the smaller boats have adjusted their practices 
to be single-handed boats, and most boats have sought to reduce the number of deckhands. 
• Crewing and skippering are the two traditional ways of accessing the fishing industry, both 
of which are now problematic for those seeking to enter the industry. 
4.4.4 Finance 
• Another factor that makes it difficult for younger fishers to get into the industry is a lack of 
finance. Unlike a farmer who owns their land, fishermen own a depreciating asset -- their 
boat. Banks will not lend against quota. In order for a fisherman to gain access to finance, 
they have to prove a good track record. This requires experience, etc. Access for aspiring 
fishers is therefore problematic. 
4.4.5 Market conditions 
• The most important factor in relation to market conditions is that inshore fishers must in 
some way add value to their catch, or they are going to really struggle to remain viable in 
the long term. 
• Inshore fishers will tend to land their fish every day, meaning that they have the potential 
to be the freshest fish available and thereby receive the best prices for their catch; however, 
they do need to look after the fish they catch in order to achieve these prices. 
• Traditionally, most fishers have marketed their fish through the auction markets, mainly in 
Newlyn, Plymouth and Looe. This means they have to accept the price that is achievable on 
the day. When there are a lot of fish caught, the price goes down and vice versa. In this kind 
of market, they are very much price-takers. 
• Some fishers have contracts with wholesalers, which can help even out the peaks and 
troughs. 
• More recently, fishers have been turning to social media to try and improve their direct 
contact with the end consumer, thereby achieving better prices. Others have made contact 
with local restaurants and so on. 
• One of the key issues in developing the market for fish, is to raise consumer interest and 
understanding of what is available. There is a suggestion that this is starting to happen but 
could be encouraged further. 
• In many instances, fishers in effect cannot be bothered to market their fish. They are more 
interested in catching it. The evidence would suggest that this attitude needs to change. 
• The FLAG has invested money in trying to support the better marketing of fish and fish 
products. This is particularly in relation to trying to maximise the opportunities offered by 
the huge influx of tourists into Cornwall every summer. 
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• Certification schemes, such as MSC, may facilitate access to supermarkets, but are too 
expensive for small scale fishermen and fisheries. The development of more localised 
certification schemes may help to differentiate Cornish fish. 
• The recent, and ongoing, introduction of the landings obligation has yet to be fully worked 
through in terms of the market/marketing implications. 
4.4.6 Environmental issues 
• There is an increasing number of MPAs. There is discussion that some of these may be 'no-
take' areas, although there are none of these at present. Fishermen tend to fear that MPAs 
will restrict their rights to fish in certain areas. In reality, most are unlikely to affect inshore 
fishermen, especially not those who are fishing for shellfish. 
• Static gear fishermen, such as those fishing for lobster and crab, are likely to do very little 
damage in environmental terms. 
• Even those whose main role is to protect the environment can see the benefits of working 
with and supporting the fishing industry. There is recognition that the inshore fishing sector 
(rather than the bigger boats) probably does less damage in most instances, but that there 
is a need to have both inshore and offshore fisheries. 
4.4.7 Tensions between the inshore and offshore fishing fleets 
• Those most directly involved with inshore fisheries argue that it is inherently more 
sustainable than the over 10 m fleet, and is therefore worthy of particular protection 
(something that came out strongly in the media analysis). However, there is also a view that 
the whole Cornish fishing fleet should be looked at together (rather than separately) when 
considering the sustainability of fishing in Cornwall. The key argument here is that there is a 
natural resource that needs to be looked after, but also exploited in order to harvest the 
resource available. The inshore fleet alone would be unable to catch all the quota available. 
For example there is 800 tonnes of Megwin quota available, which is sustainably caught by 
a fleet of 15 beam trawlers. If beam trawling was banned, it would not be possible to exploit 
this resource. 
• This tension is encapsulated in the following quote from the media analysis: 
o “Barry Deas, Chief Executive of the National Federation of Fisherman’s 
Organisation, which represents the interests of both inshore fishers and larger-
scale industrial vessels, argued that “it was “sheer nonsense” to say the larger 
vessels were unsustainable” and noted that “[m]any of these vessels fishing 
large shoaling offshore stocks like mackerel and herring are operating in 
exceptionally well managed fisheries… If these pelagic quotas were reallocated 
to the inshore fleet, they would remain uncaught” (The Independent, 25th 
January 2015, Serina Sandhu).” 
4.4.8 The sustainability of inshore fishing in Cornwall 
• Looking to the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall, there are clearly concerns that the sector 
is under pressure. "I can see the smaller harbours not having boats working for them... So I 
can see some of the smaller places becoming just tourist harbours... I can't see that being 
reversed unless there is some sort of change in policy to support small-scale fisheries" (IF: 
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Interviewee 1). Key to the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall is flexibility, as summarised 
in this quote: 
o “They need flexibility, to be able to target what is there at the time. So when 
there is an abundant fish stock there, at the level that they take it, I see no 
reason why they are restricted to some of the very small quantities that they 
have… You can just imagine how you'd feel if you knew there was fish there, you 
could make a living, but you're stopped from going out there to make a living, 
and in the grand scheme of things, the quantities that they would take pales 
into insignificance compared to the bigger boats, which perhaps have more 
opportunity to fish elsewhere, go different places, and do other things, and 
target other species, which might be on a different ground, but for the small 
inshore boats, flexibility is key” (IF: Interviewee 3). 
4.5 Understanding the potential for resilience 
Understanding the potential for resilience of inshore fishers (and primary producers more 
generally) is a key outcome of this case study. As such, the notion of resilience needs to be 
understood within this context. The text below has been drawn from extant academic literature, 
which provides some useful context and background on the issue. 
 
Resilience can be defined as "the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances, to be changed 
and reorganised so as to still retain essentially the same identity” (Doeksen and Symes 2015, p. 
328). While Tendall et al. (2015, p. 18) argue, that “resilience implies the capacity to continue 
providing a function overtime despite disturbances… thus form[ing] an essential part of what 
enables sustainability”. How individuals or firms do this will vary; in some cases there may be 
minimal adaptation, whereas in others there may be profound change. In this respect, there is 
likely to be a combination of 'resistance to change' and 'adapting to change' (Ibid.).  
 
Over recent decades, fishing communities across Europe have undergone major structural 
change, principally through processes of modernisation, concentration and technological 
development that have led to a halving of fishing employment over the last 20 years. This is 
putting pressure on the long-term viability of many smaller fishing communities, leading to the 
loss of basic local services, a lack of affordable housing, and difficulties in recruiting crew 
members as young people are unwilling or unable to go into fishing (Symes and Phillipson 2009). 
Individual fishers and their families often struggle for regular income, in that they face a range 
of risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond their direct control, including seasonality, 
severe weather, market instability and variability in terms of fish stocks. Against this backdrop, 
resilience thinking can provide a useful framework for understanding the ability of socio-
ecological systems to adapt and survive in such "ever-changing, turbulent conditions" (Doeksen 
and Symes 2015, p. 327). 
 
The risks faced by fishers have been compounded by management restrictions imposed through 
the CFP, principally in terms of combating overfishing. Key amongst these is the “curtailment of 
the concept of fisheries as a common property resource... [which] has seen the notion of free 
and equal access to fishing whittled away through restrictive licensing and quota restrictions" 
(Symes and Phillipson 2009, p. 2). Of critical importance to resilience is flexibility, which in 
relation to the inshore fishing sector involves the ability to target a range of different species 
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(through the deployment of multiple gears), to internalise costs where possible, to ensure they 
have low levels of indebtedness, to engage in pluriactivity (mainly through the fisher’s spouse 
working11), to embrace the ethos of self-employment, and to reduce crew size. Through these 
measures, small-scale inshore fishers and their households have shown remarkable levels of 
resilience and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. However, adaptation may well 
involve trade-offs and difficult choices; for example, one adaptive strategy in response to 
declining catches is to fish further from shore and to spend longer at sea. While this may result 
in greater income, it also involves potentially more danger as well as spending more time away 
from the family. Where the negatives of an adaptation response outweigh the positives, it is 
known as 'maladaptation'; however, research suggests that it is only as a last resort that fishers 
will exit the industry, in that there is a strong attachment to fishing as a way of life often 
associated with self-reliance and a pride and passion for what they do (Coulthard and Britton 
2015; Ross 2015; Salmi 2015; Symes and Phillipson 2009). As such, “the decision to exit the 
fishery was found to require both a necessity – a ‘push factor’ – such as financial unviability… 
and a ‘pull factor’, such as having a buyer for your boat”, or simply wanting to have a more 
predictable lifestyle (Coulthard and Britton 2015, p. 282). 
 
Salmi (2015) argues that key to understanding and enabling the future resilience of small-scale, 
inshore fishing livelihoods is the notion of 'post-productivist development' in coastal 
communities. Within this framing, it is necessary to acknowledge the increased complexity and 
diversity of uses and pressures that now confront coastal areas, over and above simply fishing, 
such as second home owners, tourism, and nature conservation. This requires a governance 
framework that allows for interaction, understanding and the development of synergies 
between fishers and other user groups that ultimately may contribute to the resilience of coastal 
fishers. This might include, for example, the direct sales of locally caught fish to tourists and local 
restaurants; or fishers making a specific contribution to the environmental management of 
marine resources. Crucially, “from a resilience perspective, future trajectories depend on the 
adaptability and transformability of the studied social-ecological system…building synergies 
between different user groups… and creating opportunities for the development of new forms 
of resilient fishing livelihoods … [through] interaction and adaptive local governance” (Salmi 
2015, pp. 270-271). 
 
Despite the resilience and adaptability of many small-scale, inshore fishers, it is clear that many 
are struggling to survive. Symes et al. (2015, p. 251-252) suggest that while policy should help 
to build resilience in the fishing industry/community, in reality it has become one of the most 
potent sources of instability for fisheries. Underlying this have been neoliberal policies that have 
supported technical solutions, specialisation and economies of scale, to the detriment of 
traditional practices. In this respect, policy-making is often associated with being "top-down, 
distant, centralised and lacking local specificity... blamed for undermining the autonomy and 
flexibility required to fish sustainably" (Ross 2015, p. 318) and, in the process, alienating many 
inshore fishing communities who tend to be suspicious of 'policy' and 'science', which are 
                                                          
11 “Strategies that women in fishing households adopt can be roughly categorised into ‘endogenous 
strategies’ where women’s work remains within the family fishing business, a role that is commonly 
referred to as a ‘Shore Skipper’ (for example helping to maintain nets and keeping the business accounts), 
and ‘exogenous strategies’, where women work outside the business to supplement income from a non-
fisheries source” (Coulthard and Britton 2015, p. 284). 
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perceived as external or outside interference. Flexibility is seen as a key attribute of fishing 
sustainably and regulation is seen as "reducing the scope for fishermen to practice many of the 
attributes associated with being a good skipper, such as using local ecological knowledge to 
determine what to fish" (Ross 2015, p. 319). The data used by scientists to determine policy is 
often seen as inappropriate at a local level, as well as ignoring local knowledge of the fish stocks 
available. Ross (2015) argues that if science and policy wants to ensure both sustainable fisheries 
and resilient fishing communities, then it needs to enable localised adaptive strategies and to 
respect the perspectives of those involved, both in ecological as well as social terms. This 
necessitates devolving responsibility for managing coastal fisheries to the local and regional 
level, as well as providing structures that enable interactive governance and buy-in at a local 
level, thereby enabling synergy between the various uses to develop and resilience to be built. 
4.6 Cornwall inshore fishing sector - focus groups and workshop 
This section reports on the findings of three focus groups and one workshop that were 
conducted as part of task 2.3, with the intention of complementing and building on the findings 
of task 2.2. 
 
A series of three focus groups were held with Cornish inshore fishers over the period between 
December 2016 and January 2017. Details of the numbers of fishers involved in each case and a 
brief synopsis of their socio-economic data are given in appendix 2. The main purpose of 
conducting these focus groups was to complement and build on the analysis of regulatory and 
market conditions reported above under sections 4.1-4.5 above, in order to provide an insight 
into the perspective of the fishers themselves (more broadly within the wider Sufisa project, the 
primary producers of food). Critically, although the focus groups were composed of individual 
fishers, analysis of the data is intended to elicit understanding of the wider inshore fishing sector 
within Cornwall, rather than simply of individual fishers. 
 
Helston focus group    Padstow focus group 
  
 
Each of the focus groups lasted approximately 1.5 hours and was digitally recorded for later 
verbatim transcription. A total of 106 pages of data were transcribed. In terms of their individual 
comments, anonymity was promised to the participants. As such, any direct quotations that are 
used in this report refer simply to the relevant focus group, rather than to any individual fishers. 
The focus group schedule was divided into seven different sections, details of which are given in 
appendix 3. 
 
The workshop was conducted in March 2017, following reflection on the focus group data, with 
two main aims. Firstly, to present the key findings of the research conducted as part of task 2.2, 
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together with the focus group findings, to a range of stakeholders from the fishing industry and 
to get their feedback and comments on it. In so doing, the focus of the research findings could 
then be sharpened as, effectively, they were ‘ground truthed’ by those at the workshop. The 
findings from the focus groups were reported under seven key areas (see below), which were 
then presented to those at the workshop for feedback and comments. In part due to the 
relatively small number of people at the workshop, it was possible for the presentation to be 
informal in nature and to allow the participants to make comments at any point. This led to a 
very participatory and interactive meeting that was both productive for the research team, and 
clearly enjoyable for the attendees (judging from their feedback comments, reported as part of 
WP5). It also means that it makes sense to include the workshop comments as part of the 
reporting of the focus groups data under section 4.6, below, rather than as a separate section. 
 
The second aim of the workshop was to develop a range of scenarios regarding the future 
viability of the inshore fisheries sector in Cornwall, which was inevitably linked to the Brexit 
negotiations. This part of the workshop was intended as a precursor to the work that will be 
conducted under WP4 in terms of developing solutions and scenarios more generally, with the 
aim of improving the sustainability of primary producers (in this case inshore fishers in Cornwall). 
As such, it is reported as a distinctive section from the other workshop and focus group data: 
section 4.7. 
Cornwall inshore fishing sector Workshop 
  
 
The workshop lasted for four hours and was digitally recorded for later selective transcription, 
which resulted in a 52 page transcript of the discussion. The agenda for the workshop is available 
in appendix 4, but involved presenting the focus group findings before a break for lunch, and 
developing the scenarios after lunch. There were a total of nine people at the workshop, four of 
whom were part of the research team. 22 people had been invited, so the number was slightly 
less than hoped for, but those who did attend are pivotal to the inshore fishing sector in 
Cornwall. Having a relatively smaller number of people at the meeting also meant that everyone 
there was able to have their say, and the resultant discussion was both vibrant and insightful. 
Details of those who attended are given in appendix 5. As with the focus groups, anonymity was 
promised to the participants, meaning that any direct quotations used in this report are given a 
number (e.g. WSP 1, where WSP means ‘workshop participant’), rather than identifying any 
individual participants’ names or affiliations. 
 
Analysis of the focus group data revealed that there were seven key areas that required further 
examination, and these structure this section of the fishing report, as well as the presentation 
that was given at the workshop. The seven key areas are as follows: 
1. Reasons for going fishing 
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2. What is distinctive about inshore fishing 
3. Markets and marketing 
4. Quota 
5. Policy and management 
6. Resilience and the future 
7. Brexit 
 
4.6.1 Reasons for going fishing 
Discussions at the focus groups revealed that fishers are passionate about what they do. Most 
of those present had been involved in fishing since they were teenagers, often being introduced 
to fishing by their father. They love fishing and do not want to do anything else. This is significant 
within the context of this research, in that they are likely to carry on fishing until the bitter end, 
enduring difficulties that those involved in other livelihoods might find too much. In this sense, 
they are innately highly resilient and will endeavour to find a way to overcome any problems 
they might encounter in terms of their continuing business viability. This passion is encapsulated 
in the following quote: 
“It's just what I've done. It's not a job; it's a way of life. It's salt water coursing through 
these veins and it always will, you know. I don't make a fortune, but I make a living. I love 
going to sea and I love doing what I do. I fish.” (Newlyn FG) 
 
4.6.2 What is distinctive about inshore fishing 
Four issues in particular emerged from the discussions. Firstly, that inshore fishing is highly 
localised; secondly, that it operates at a relatively small-scale; thirdly, that it is inherently 
ecologically sustainable; and fourthly, that there is a need to more appropriately categorise what 
is meant by inshore boats. Each of these requires further explanation. 
 
4.6.2.1 Highly localised 
In terms of being highly localised, the smaller inshore boats tend to fish within six nautical miles 
(6nm) of the coastline, although those with a larger engine/deck size may venture further out. 
Because by and large they are restricted to a relatively confined geographical area, the smaller 
inshore boats are effectively embedded in their local environment, giving them an incentive to 
look after the fishing grounds in their immediate area. This sentiment was sometimes expressed 
in relation to larger, more nomadic fleets of boats which may have less connection with, and 
incentive to look after, their local area/fishing grounds. This is encapsulated in the following: 
“We see ourselves as stewards. We've got to look after the ground because we can't travel 
very far. Then you've got these nomadic fleets that are like locusts. They’ve no interest in 
preserving anything in any given area, because they are going to move, and they keep 
moving. The scallopers, the beam trawlers, they just come through.  Some of these big 
crabbers, you know, they are working thousands of pots.” (Padstow FG). 
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4.6.2.2 Scale of operation 
The relatively small scale of operation of inshore boats is also seen as being significant. The quote 
above talks about some of the bigger boats working thousands of pots (which may be either for 
crabs or lobster), whereas traditionally a small boat would put out between 300-400 pots. This 
is relevant in terms of employment and the impact on the ports and communities that they fish 
from. In this respect, a large boat may employ four crew but catch as many fish as 50 small boats, 
which average perhaps 1.5 people per boat, making a total of 75 people. The smaller boats are 
also significantly limited by the weather conditions meaning that their number of fishing days 
per year will be limited, particularly on the north coast where the sea conditions tend to be 
rougher. In contrast, the larger boats are much less restricted by weather conditions and can 
fish almost every day of the year, if they so choose. 
 
The scale of operation also begs the question as to what is the main purpose of inshore fishing. 
Is it primarily about catching fish to eat, or is it more to do with supporting traditional 
communities and culture. As suggested above, a large Vivier crabber (these are boats that have 
large salt water tanks on board that allow crabs and lobsters to be kept alive) may catch as many 
tonnes of fish in a matter of days as 100 small fishermen may catch in a year. This is an issue 
that policymakers need to consider. In the past, European legislation and policy has tended to 
favour fish extraction as food, rather than supporting local social/cultural infrastructures. 
Although this issue was not directly considered by the fishers themselves, they were clearly 
aware of the socio-cultural significance of what they are contributing to Cornwall: 
“We're down at Cadgwith and people come down to see a working cove…because there's 
not very many places like ours left anywhere in the country. Tourism is big business, and 
they come to places like us…We are creating hundreds of thousands of pounds, just by 
the way we work” (Helston FG). 
 
The social importance of inshore fishing was also discussed in the workshop, in so far that active 
fishing ports are something that people expect to see in Cornwall, especially tourists. 
 
4.6.2.3 Ecologically sustainable 
Because the inshore fishing boats are highly localised and relatively small, the fishers feel that 
they are inherently ecologically sustainable. They are restricted in terms of the distance they can 
travel from their home port, as well as in terms of the fishing gear they can carry (much of which 
is static gear). As such, they have a strong motivation to look after their local fishing grounds: 
"I mean, we're under 10 m boats, we've got a limited distance, a limit to what we can 
carry, gear-wise and catch-wise. Why not say catch whatever you want, your impact on 
the overall fish stocks is going to be minimal… If we ruin our own ground, then we're all 
out of a job.” (Padstow FG) 
The option of allowing smaller boats free reign in terms of what they catch, subject to things like 
minimum landing size and other technical measures, was endorsed as a possibility in the 
workshop. It was argued that one of the key advantages of taking this approach was that there 
would be no discards and hence no associated waste of resources: “Let the smaller boats land 
everything they want, no discards, no danger of choke species; choke species are going to be a 
catastrophe if things don't change" (WSP 4). 
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However, this relatively simplistic perspective is not unproblematic. More than once there was 
discussion about how "you don't get any thanks for being conservation minded" (Padstow FG), 
not least because there is a danger that the boat concerned will not then develop a track record 
of catching a particular species, which might subsequently be an issue when quota is allocated. 
In other words, while an individual boat or boats may choose to preserve their local stocks by 
only fishing within certain limits, this may disadvantage them in terms of future access to fish. 
There is also concern that other boats may not be so concerned to preserve local stocks in the 
long term, effectively freeloading on fish availability in the short term. This point is also discussed 
under section 4.4.2 and the issue of 'latent quota'. 
 
In terms of ecological impact, it was discussed in the workshop that it is not only the size of the 
boat that is important, it is also the type of gear used: “Some of the small boats have massively 
powerful engines and are towing a lot of gear, whereas other small boats are hand-lining and 
arguably have a tiny impact.” (WSP 5) 
 
In the focus groups, there was a sense that the growing designation of MPAs would have minimal 
impact on the smaller, inshore fishing boats. However, discussion in the workshop suggested 
that MPAs will increasingly constrain what even the smallest boats can do. MPAs will soon cover 
nearly 70% of the Cornwall IFCA district, and are driving a lot of their work; furthermore, Defra 
continually bring in new targets for the management of MPAs and there is constant pressure 
from NGOs to classify further areas as MPAs. 
“So many MPAs have come in in the last 10 years, and especially in the last 4 or 5 years, 
and people that fish inshore will find the management measures that are coming in 
through the MMO and Cornwall IFCA following advice [from Natural England] will in some 
instances mean that they can’t carry on doing what they were doing before. Alongside 
that there is the issue of displacement, where people will still continue to fish but they’re 
going to do it somewhere else, which may be somewhere they’ve never been before, 
putting that fishery under pressure” (WSP 3).  
 
It was also discussed in the workshop that more and more bylaws are being drafted that will 
restrict an increasing amount of fishing activity within MPAs. At the moment these tend to focus 
on 'bottom tow gear', but increasingly are moving into other areas of management that will 
definitely affect the inshore sector (WSP 2). 
 
4.6.2.4 The need for re-categorisation 
While at one level inshore fishing boats can be categorised as those under 10 m and fishing out 
of the common pool managed by the MMO, there is clearly an issue with what are known as 
'rule beaters'. These are boats that have been specifically designed to be under 10 m in order to 
benefit from fishing as inshore vessels, and in many cases has involved cutting down larger 
vessels to 9.9 m in length. While the difference between a 6.5 m and 10 m boat may not sound 
that significant, it needs to be thought of in terms of the cubic relationship, with the 'rule beater' 
boats often having very much larger deck spaces and engines which allows them to carry much 
more gear. The result is that although they may be under 10 m in length, "they've effectively got 
the capacity of a 15 or 20 m boat" (Padstow FG), negating the benefits outlined above. As such, 
there was a sense that there needs to be a re-categorisation of what is meant by inshore boats. 
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The need to more appropriately define what is meant by the inshore fishing sector also proved 
to be an important debating point within the workshop. The definition used within this research 
has been that the inshore fishing sector includes those boats that are under 10 m in length and 
fish from the MMO-managed pool. However, the participants at the workshop problematised 
this definition of what might be included as an inshore boat:  
"An under 10 m boat could fish 20 miles offshore... whereas some 15 m boats might 
exclusively fish within 6 miles (WSP 2)… I think if you asked everyone around the table, 
they would just define them in terms of the 6 mile limit (WSP 3). Well, there’s probably a 
reason for that, in that through the Marine and Coastal Access Act inshore fisheries 
became the responsibility of the IFCAs for management and that’s probably why people 
think of it that way” (WSP 2).  
“I think we all know what we mean when we talk about small fishermen or small business 
owners, but we can’t define it… It’s not a term we really use … I tend to think in terms of 
size, really: under 10 fleet and over 10 fleet and also the type of fishing that they do. But 
not in terms of inshore and outshore” (WSP 1). 
“I’d define it as the IFCA – what they manage - the first 6nm, and 6-12nm is the MMO” 
(WSP 3). 
 
In this respect, it seems that the definition will need to encompass geographical distance, size 
of boat and type of gear used. To some extent the definition might depend upon what happens 
with the Brexit negotiations. For example, if the London Convention of 1964 is not repealed, 
then certain foreign vessels (mainly the Belgians and French in Cornwall) will still have access to 
the 6-12 nm area. If the Act is repealed, the UK will potentially have exclusive access within the 
12 mile limit. There might then be a logic to having this as the defining line. 
 
Participants at the workshop also stressed that the research team needed to be clearer in terms 
of whether it was referring to: inshore fishing boats; inshore fisheries; or the inshore fishing 
sector, in that each would elicit a slightly different definition and understanding. In response to 
this, in keeping with the wider aims of the Sufisa project, the focus in this research is on the 
'inshore fishing sector'. 
 
The research team agreed that it would give further consideration to its definition of the inshore 
fishing sector, but emphasised that the 6 mile limit was important for a number of reasons. This 
is partly because when pots are put down outside this limit they are in danger of being damaged 
by trawlers (whether UK-based or foreign); also that the 6 mile limit imposes a geographical 
focus wherein fishing is relatively localised and constrained, providing a very strong incentive 
for those involved to look after their immediate fishing environment. In relation to the latter, it 
also means that those involved in the inshore sector are inextricably embedded within their local 
environment, both socially and ecologically. 
 
4.6.3 Markets and marketing 
Access to markets and the ability to add value to the primary produce emerged from the 
literature as being of critical importance. It was also something that seemed to delineate 
between different types of fishers, with some being much more entrepreneurial than others. 
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Three main issues were discussed in relation to markets and marketing: certification and 
sustainability; cooperation between fishers; entrepreneurship and adding value. 
 
In addition to these issues, marketing was also discussed in relation to Brexit, particularly in the 
workshop. This was mainly in terms of the uncertainties posed by Brexit, in that approximately 
80% of the fish caught in Cornwall is exported. This is most particularly the case with crustacean 
fishing, which underpins inshore fishing in Cornwall, in that it is almost exclusively exported (live) 
to markets in France and Spain.  
 
4.6.3.1 Certification and sustainability 
The Hand-line Mackerel Fishery in Cornwall received Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
certification at one stage, when there was grant funding available to finance it. However 
subsequent renewals were considered to be too expensive in the absence of continued grant 
funding and the certification lapsed. The fishers were also doubtful that it was of any direct 
benefit to them, in that it is more oriented towards gaining access to supermarkets, which is not 
something the inshore fishers are doing.  
 
Participants in the workshop acknowledged that MSC certification may well appear to be of 
minimum value to many inshore fishers; nevertheless, while fishermen may not see a direct 
increase in price: 
“What it might have done is provide access to market for the processor – so there is a 
knock on in terms of the demand from processors that need access to say, Waitrose or 
M&S…It’s a bit like the red Tractor Mark … It’s access to markets. So while the fishermen 
don’t get paid any more, it effectively enables the processors to buy their fish which they 
might not otherwise do if they didn’t have anyone to sell it to… If you look at the Cornish 
Sardine Fishery, if you speak to the merchants that process that fish, they have a very 
large demand for MSC for sardines. If that MSC logo was lost, the accreditation effectively, 
then I think there would be serious implications for a few of the boats that are ring 
netting12 in the Cornwall and Plymouth area. The merchants themselves value it so highly 
that they basically pay for the MSC because it’s access to markets for them, both in this 
country and abroad” (WSP 2). 
 
Another scheme potentially of relevance to inshore fishers, is the Responsible Fishing Scheme 
(described under section 4.3.4.2 of this report); however, there was again scepticism that it is of 
benefit to them. Rather than certification, there was a sense that:  
"If you look after your fish, you get a better price don't you… You don't need responsible 
fishing laid on the top of it, because those buyers are going to buy it whether you’re part 
of that scheme or not, if it's good stuff. That's right isn't it? Do they pay you any more 
because you're in that scheme? No, I don't think they do.” (Helston FG) 
 
Linked with 'looking after your fish' is the establishment of a reputation for providing quality 
fish, as well as the development of personal relationships with individual buyers, such as head 
                                                          
12 A method of fishing for mid water shoaling fish species, especially sardines and occasionally anchovies 
and herring. 
 117 
chefs or fish merchants who identify high-quality fish on sale at the markets and then approach 
the fisher directly. This is recognised as enabling better prices, although it is "very hard to get 
yourself a good name, but very easy to get yourself a bad name" (Helston FG). In terms of adding 
value to their catch, developing personal relationships was also acknowledged in the workshop 
as being important. However, there was also an appreciation that the value added achieved 
through selling to London restaurants may not necessarily be achieved in Cornwall: "A lot of 
restaurants in Cornwall can't afford to pay those prices" (WSP 3). 
 
The Cornwall Good Seafood Guide, which is being developed by the Cornwall Wildlife Trust 
(CWT), was discussed in the workshop as effectively providing a 'recommendation' of which fish 
to eat, rather than being a certification as such. The intention of the CWT is to roll the Guide out 
further and to increase its impact. Over time, it is envisaged that this will have an impact on 
buying practices and, in turn, the demand for certain types of fish. 
 
A final point in relation to certification and sustainability, is the idea that there is a distinction 
between sustainable fishing and sustainable fish, with the participants at the Helston FG arguing 
strongly that their mode of fishing is inherently sustainable and that that is what should be 
promoted at the point-of-sale. Furthermore, that because the catch from inshore boats is usually 
landed on a daily basis (as opposed to the larger offshore boats which may go out to sea for up 
to seven days, keeping their catch on ice in the meantime), it has the potential to be the freshest 
and highest quality fish available: 
“People around the room are… catching decent sized fish and landing them daily at the 
highest possible quality. This is completely different to the big boat fleet… Quite often fish 
on these big boats that go to sea for a week, it's seven days old before it's landed. Well, 
in my mind, a fish's life in a cold room is a maximum seven days to start with… It's already 
past its sell-by date before it's even sold half the time… So because we're maximising the 
value of the resource, we should be given better regulations, more quota and put at the 
pinnacle of excellence as far as the fishing industry is concerned”. (Helston FG) 
 
The distinction between sustainable fish and sustainable fishing was also discussed in the 
workshop. There was recognition that although the fish species themselves might be 
sustainable, the practices involved in catching them could be damaging stock or other ecological 
features. One suggestion was that if fish are highlighted in the Cornwall Good Seafood Guide, 
then they could be considered as sustainable. The guide considers a variety of factors: the 
biology of the fish, stock numbers, management regimes, fishing gear used and so on. In this 
respect, it is perhaps too simplistic to simply label small boats as 'sustainable', in that a range of 
other factors also need to be considered before making that judgment. 
 
4.6.3.2 Cooperation between fishers 
At a community level, fishers know each other very well, have often grown up and gone to school 
together and would always help each other out in a crisis. However, in relation to their fishing 
business: "it's one of those businesses that it is sometimes best not to share too much" (Padstow 
FG). They keep where they have caught fish to themselves; similarly, if they have managed to 
get a good price for something. In this sense, there is minimum cooperation between individual 
fishers in terms of their business practices. Having said that, there are examples of cooperation 
in terms of marketing: for example, Dreckly Fish in Newlyn (which is described under section 
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4.3.1 above) involves a group of three Newlyn-based fishermen selling hake, herring and 
shellfish directly to six buyers in or near to London (one of the three members was at the Newlyn 
FG); similarly, Kernow Sashimi, which involves providing processed fish to restaurants in London, 
buys its fish from a number of local inshore fishermen, endeavouring to pay them 10% more 
than the average price in local fish markets on any particular day (three of the fishermen who 
sell to Kernow Sashimi, as well as the owner, were at the Helston FG). 
 
In relation to the lack of cooperation between fishers, one participant at the workshop stressed 
that: 
“There’s natural competition between fishers – there has to be – the best fishers know 
when to be in a particular place, for a particular thing, and if they can beat everyone else 
to it they’ll make the money … It’s a resource that everyone else wants... It drives people 
to get out there” (WSP 2). 
 
4.6.3.3 Entrepreneurship and adding value 
In relation to markets and marketing, adding value was the most critical issue discussed, 
inextricably linked with the quality of the fish being sold. In this respect, the catch of inshore 
fishers was recognised as having the potential to be of the very highest quality available, 
although this necessitates that the fishers involved look after their fish.  
 
The majority of fin fish landed in Cornwall goes to the harbour markets in Newlyn, Brixham, 
Plymouth and Looe, whereas the majority of Crustacean and Mollusca go either to processors 
or abroad via Vivier lorries. The local harbor markets are seen as having an important role to 
play in providing a baseline price which represents a fair reflection of demand on any one day; 
yet, more entrepreneurial fishers are clearly intent on adding value to their catch. There was a 
strong sense amongst those fishers at the focus groups that you have to have a strategy in terms 
of marketing your fish: "otherwise you are at the mercy of what the buyer is going to give you" 
(Newlyn FG). In this respect, that a degree of entrepreneurship is critical and it is no longer 
enough to be simply good at catching fish. This reflects the comment made by Interviewee 9 
(see section 4.3 above) that: “a huge amount of fishing economics is around the marketability 
of the product, rather than the catchability of the species”. 
 
In terms of adding value to a fisher’s catch, it was discussed in the workshop that: 
“The advent of smart phones is a massive opportunity… We’ve all got access to the 
internet and couriers and people based in London desperate for sustainable seafood… 
And yet it still comes down to the fact that it takes a lot of time to build up your own 
market and there are some fishermen that just want to fish. I think it is a good time to 
start looking again at cooperatives in Cornwall, but they haven’t been very successful over 
the years... They depend on people, the right type of people working together (WSP 5)... 
It’s also a lot of extra work … fishermen want to go fishing… They like the ability to bring 
their fish in, drop it off somewhere and the cheque comes through the post a few days 
later and they can get on with the business of fishing” (WSP 2). 
 
To some extent, the way in which fishers seek to add value has been outlined above; however, 
it was clear in the focus groups that fishers are wary of openly discussing the extent to which 
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they are able to add value, as well as where their best markets are. There is an intention to keep 
this information to themselves, or at least within their own families, in that there is huge 
competition amongst fishers for obtaining better prices, better markets and so on for their 
catch. 
 
A number of fishermen sell their produce to restaurants or dealers in London, such as Dreckly 
Fish or Kernow Sashimi. It is clear that it is possible through taking this approach to get a very 
considerable mark-up over local market prices, perhaps in the order of 300-400%. Yet, at the 
same time this requires considerable extra work and know how, which many fishermen are not 
prepared to do, preferring instead simply to catch fish. In the case of Dreckly Fish, they have 
effectively created their own market: 
“We don't land anything at Newlyn… I come in with my fish in the morning, I speak to my 
customers [in or near London] and they say I'll have that… and they get it in their shop 20 
hours from when we've caught it. And the buyers can't compete with that… Whatever I 
catch is pictured on twitter, straight to my customers and they take everything we have… 
Like you said, you've got to be entrepreneur, you can't just catch fish, chuck it on the 
market. Those days are gone.” (Newlyn FG) 
 
Developing Dreckly Fish involved travelling to London to make face-to-face contact with 
potential customers, as well as continuing to develop those personal relationships (based on 
trust and continued quality) over time. The local FLAG has also been important in terms of 
helping to fund the purchase of iphones and ipads, as well as refrigeration equipment to help 
facilitate the start-up of the business. It has not been an easy process, requiring both 
commitment and energy to develop these new outlets, as well as a system that ensures that the 
fish reach the end consumer in the best possible condition: 
"I'm not being funny, but a lot of the inshore fishermen are just lazy. They catch the fish, 
they throw it on the market, they don't get a good price, they moan. Well, do something 
about it. That's what we have done… Basically you aren't going to have it given to you on 
a plate; you've got to work for it. Most people can go and catch fish, but it's getting rid of 
it is the hard part. And the quality side of it… There's no point in catching the bloody stuff, 
if you're not going to look after it... If you don't look after it, nobody is going to pay for it". 
(Newlyn FG) 
 
Selling to local restaurants is another market avenue that adds considerable value to the catch. 
In order to do this, it is important to develop a good relationship with the head chef, to the 
extent of calling them every day to tell them about the catch that is available. In this respect, 
Padstow is luckier than most in that there are a number of high-end restaurants and it has 
become a bit of a foodie hotspot: 
“I think several of the boats land to local restaurants. We get quite an inflated price 
compared to most people around, so tourism is doing its bit for the local fishing industry 
without a doubt… I think the fishing boats [in turn] do a tremendous amount for this town. 
It's a big draw. If it was simply to become a marina, I don't think it would have any soul". 
(Padstow FG) 
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Community Supported Fishing has been tried in Helston as another way of adding value, 
following a television programme in 2012. However, it soon failed in that there wasn't the 
variety of fish available and people really wanted fin fish rather than shellfish. Smaller fishers 
also struggle in terms of continuity of supply, which is something that most buyers demand: 
"The trouble is you haven’t got a very long sell-by date with fish… If you hadn't sold it by 
dinner time you ain't going to sell it the next day. If you come in with a bag of potatoes, 
they're going to be there for a week, and they ain't going to hurt… And, as a nation, we 
don't eat a lot of shellfish… People are lazy aren't they, people don't like to sit down and 
pick crab, whereas on the continent it's a nice thing to sit with Spider Crabs on the table, 
sit down with a glass of wine, eat and chat. We don't do that in this country do we?… We 
put three hours into cooking a roast dinner on a Sunday, and 20 minutes into eating it. 
And I think the Europeans, certainly France and Spain, put 20 minutes into cooking Spider 
Crab, and they will pick it clean over three hours of conversation and wine, and it's 
cultural, totally cultural.” (Padstow FG) 
 
In other words, in the UK, and even in Cornwall, fish is generally speaking not part of our culinary 
culture. This echoes what was said in the interviews, and represents a major area where a 
growth in domestic demand could be encouraged with the right incentives and representation. 
In this respect, there was discussion in the workshop that it is risky for small-scale fishermen to 
only develop markets outside the region, not least because they may have a problem in ensuring 
a continuity of supply. As such, there is an opportunity and need to develop more local markets: 
"If only local people would do more with the local product (WSP 5)... But this requires a complete 
cultural change" (WSP2). 
 
4.6.4 Quota 
In all three focus groups, discussions around quota were the most vibrant and heated; 
particularly in terms of having access to more quota than is currently available. The discussion 
focused around three main areas: access to quota; the monetisation of licences and quota; and 
track record and latent quota capping. 
 
4.6.4.1 Access to quota 
Access to sufficient quota that was the single biggest issue discussed in the focus groups, often 
related to the CFP and the opportunity presented by Brexit. The following quote is from a 
Newlyn FG fisher who is active in the group ‘Fishing for Leave’: 
"The only reason why we're dumping fish is because the French have got all the quota. 
You remove the French, then we get our quota back and then we'll give them what we've 
got left… The whole quota system stinks. It doesn't work… What you've got to remember… 
When I first started fishing, them boats were up the Channel, with old 60 foot side-
winders with a 200 hp engine in it. Now they are up there with 38 m beam trawlers with 
3,000 hp in them and fishing under grandfather rights; that's not right. The minute they 
change the vessel and its form of fishing, they should have been kicked out” (Newlyn FG).  
 
In this respect, there was a strong feeling that there are plenty of fish around and it is just a 
matter of allocating them more fairly and re-visiting historic ‘grandfather rights’ and Relative 
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Stability13. There were also concerns that the quota system is not managed properly in terms of 
determining what an appropriate quota is: 
"They haven't any clue what's out there… What we need is for people to work out exactly 
what fish is on the ground and set the quotas accordingly. At the moment they're probably 
two or three years behind what's actually happening.” (Helston FG) 
 
Likewise, in terms of the “disproportionate allocation between the over 10s and the under 10s”, 
whereby: 
“94% of the quota goes to the over 10s and a measly 6% is shared out between the mass 
of the boats, which by far exceed the number of over 10s. It's a pitifully small amount… 
That is the crux of the problem. Little small boat men haven't got enough quota… But to 
get more we've got to take it off the over 10 m. The over 10 m quota is owned personally 
by the fishermen and the boat owner… So if we have it, it's going to affect them, so 
obviously they aren't going to give it up. The only way it's going to happen is if the 
Government was to give the under 10 metres more quota of its own and just leave what's 
up there to them.” (Helford FG) 
 
One suggestion raised in the Helston focus group was that: 
“What needs to be done for the inshore fleet, I would have thought, is you need four or 
six years of fishing without any quota restriction at all and everything logged, so that the 
Government can see exactly what is being caught, exactly what is there, and then bring in 
quota system that's appropriate to the size of the fleet" (Helston FG). 
 
The over 10 m sector can buy, swap and own their own quota, whereas the under 10 sector 
cannot own quota. However, at the Helston FG it was discussed that it would be good if the 
under 10 sector was able to buy quota that could then be leased back to under 10 m boats, 
thereby giving them more flexibility in terms of what they can catch. In this respect, quota 
management for the U 10 m boats might change if there was a dedicated inshore PO, which is 
being mooted and discussed with Defra (see the section on 'representation of inshore fisheries' 
for further details). Flexibility in terms of what they catch is critical to the smaller boats: 
“Under 10 m boats aren't nomadic, we only catch what swims past our doorstep, when it 
swims past our doorstep… Give us our quota estimation for the year [rather than each 
month]. Instead of giving me 135 kilos, give me half a tonne, or a tonne, which is more or 
less what they reckon I'm going to be allocated for the year. I'll manage it; they won't have 
to. You can then use it when you want to use it." (Helston FG) 
 
4.6.4.2 The monetisation of licences and quota 
Originally, both licences and quota were distributed by the UK Government for nothing, but now 
you have to buy them and there are brokers who will sell you a licence or quota. The U 10 m 
boats are unable to own quota, which is allocated to them from the U 10m pool by the MMO, 
although the monetisation of quota will still have an impact on them if they want to lease quota 
that is additional to their allocation from the pool: 
                                                          
13 It was discussed that in this respect the London Fisheries Convention 1964 will need to be repealed. 
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“There's no value to a licence, but I can't go to sea without a licence and I've got to buy a 
licence of about £280 per kilowatt… They were given out originally [with no cost and 
hence value]. Now all boats have to have them, they aren’t creating more of them, and 
they don't automatically say to a guy when he retires, okay, we're going to wipe your 
licence out now and give it to a young fisherman, or put it into the pool, so that the young 
fishermen can take it. There's none of that so people sell their licences. So there is a value 
to them… and they’re getting more and more expensive. You're talking £10,000 plus for a 
little boat like mine to have a licence, it's ridiculous" (Padstow FG). 
 
In other words, this is making it more difficult for people to get into fishing, by adding an 
additional cost burden. Similarly in relation to quota which, it was argued in the Helford FG, 
should not have a value attached to it and instead should be allocated by the Government 
without cost, as it was originally. Historically, because a fixed amount of quota was allocated it 
is in effect a finite resource that has subsequently become monetised because it is in short 
supply. It has been estimated that leasing quota works out at approximately one third of the 
value of the landed fish, putting additional pressure on fishers’ profitability: 
“There's a company called the Cold Fishing Company, that have the biggest beam fleet in 
the North Sea, fishing out of Lowestoft, and when the owner died his son sold off all the 
beamers and just leases the quota out [becoming what is known as a ‘slipper skipper’]. 
Really that quota should be returned back to the pool to be spread out throughout the 
country to all the active fishing boats… It all goes back to when quotas were first 
introduced and they were given a value and that's the problem… There's not supposed to 
be a value to the quota… Like our licences… When you sell your boat, or when you give 
up, the quota should go back to the Government and they then re-allocate it to other 
boats.” (Helford FG) 
 
The issue of licences and quota accruing value was hotly (almost angrily) discussed in the 
workshop as being ‘one of the biggest policy mistakes ever made’: 
“Allowing the licenses to accrue value. They belong to the UK. They don’t belong to 
fishermen, but they suddenly do now because people traded them for money (WSP 2). It 
is basically the fishermen themselves who traded them? (WSP 6). Absolutely. But it’s a 
ridiculous situation. It should never have been allowed. It should go back to the 
government and be reallocated. And they can’t seem to retract from that situation (WSP 
2). There are a number of fishermen who have bought a lot of quota … which obviously 
deprives smaller boats who haven’t got that much money (WSP 4)... It has been running 
for years and people have exchanged quota for loads of money, we can’t get out of it” 
(WSP 5). 
Nevertheless, there was also recognition that reversing the monetisation of licenses and quota 
is a very tricky problem: "They’d have to buy it back and it would cost billions. I can't see the 
government doing that!" (WSP 4). "Do you continue with a system that's broke? Or do you pay 
and fix it?" (WSP 2). 
 
4.6.4.3 Track record and latent quota capping 
Allocation of quota is to some extent based on track record, meaning that there can be a 
disincentive to be conservation minded (as alluded to above). In other words, if fishers are overly 
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selective and mindful in terms of what they catch, they may be penalised for having a lower 
track record of certain species and subsequently in terms of their allocation of quota. This is 
particularly relevant in relation to ‘latent capacity’ (see section 4.2.2.3 of this report), wherein 
the MMO in March 2016 sent letters out to all under 10 m vessel owners that did not have a 
history of catching a particular species in a three-year reference period (2010-2013). If their 
licence allowed them to catch particular species and yet none of these fish were caught during 
this reference period, then their licenses were capped and they would no longer be able to catch 
this species. If a licence is capped, then its value is hugely reduced. It effectively devalues the 
boat as well, in that the license is tied to the boat. It also removes a degree of flexibility, as some 
of the boats clearly like to focus on one particular stock -- such as lobster -- but keep others in 
reserve. However, with latent capacity, if they haven't caught sufficient fish within a certain 
reference period they lose that option altogether. In turn, this threatens their future viability, in 
that if stocks of the fish they are concentrating on (such as crab or lobster) crash because large 
boats come in and work within the 6 nm limit, their alternative options are restricted. 
“Scrap this under 10 m licence capping… If they can diversify and do three or four different 
methods of fishing, they are easing the stocks on each of the other things they are not 
fishing for at that time” (Padstow FG). “License capping is totally wrong... To my mind, any 
vessel which is under 8 m is not going to kill the fishing industry… It is the most passive 
form of fishing you can get" (Newlyn FG).  
 
In reality, only one of the fishers at the FGs had been capped. In two other cases, the fishers had 
appealed and had their capping removed. There was a perception that most of those caught by 
capping were part-time fishermen. The fish that are taken off the capped license go back into 
the main pool. This was the subject of a heated discussion on the morning after the Padstow FG 
in a café frequented by fishers. One fisher felt that it was unfair, the other that if people were 
not using their quota it should go back into the pool so that its use could be maximised. The first 
fisher argued that inshore fishers in particular need the flexibility to not necessarily fish for 
another species until such time that the stocks can recover; the second that: “If you don’t use it, 
you lose it - put it back in the pool and everybody else can get a little bit more”. 
 
One of the main negative consequences of license capping, discussed in the workshop, was that 
there is a danger fishers will be more inclined to hit every stock they can so as not to get caught 
a couple of years down the line with an incomplete track-record. In this respect: "they fear that 
government policy keeps trapping them and putting them in a less flexible position" (WSP 2). 
 
4.6.5 Policy and management 
Policy and management issues were discussed in four key areas: firstly, financial support for 
inshore fishers; secondly, marine conservation areas; thirdly, bureaucratic scepticism; and 
fourthly, representation of inshore fishers. 
 
4.6.5.1 Financial support for inshore fishers 
The Fisheries Local Action Group (FLAG) in Cornwall distributes funding from the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Funds for a wide range of initiatives, including: replacing fishing gear in 
order to make it more selective and sustainable; designing new pots with escape hatches; 
support for health and safety measures; help with marketing and so on. Furthermore, in the 
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latest round of funding they have received another £800,000 to support the fishing industry in 
Cornwall. Under this new programme there are four themes, one of which is around adding 
value and marketing, such as helping fishermen to sell direct. In this respect, Dreckly Fish has 
been helped in a number of ways, including through the provision of iPhones and ipads. In 
general, as an EU Convergent Area, Cornwall has been well supported by European money for a 
number of years. 
 
Despite the importance of European funding for the development of fishing in Cornwall, it was 
not raised as being important in the focus groups, except by the fisher who is part of Dreckly 
Fish. When the issue was raised, it was felt (or at least hoped) that the UK government would 
similarly support the fishing industry, although no evidence was produced to support this 
assertion. 
 
4.6.5.2 Marine protected areas 
As set out under section 4.2.5 of this report, there is a wide range of marine protected areas 
within Cornwall, that is being added to all the time. However, there was a feeling that these do 
not tend to affect the inshore fishers, not least because a high percentage of them do not tow 
any gear and are often only using static gear; furthermore, that they have been fishing many of 
the newly designated areas for many years with no adverse effects: 
“If these marine conservation areas are designed primarily to stop the substrate from 
being ripped apart by towed gear, then I think all the inshore people will say that's fine. 
But I think there should always be the provision that static gear operators can work within 
them, according to the rules of the land, and their quotas and that sort of thing. Because 
we've been fishing those areas all this time and we haven't degraded the substrate or 
degraded the stock.” (Helston FG) 
 
4.6.5.3 Bureaucratic scepticism 
There were frequent discussions about how the people running the fishing industry do not fully 
understand the issues being faced by fishers, and especially the smaller fishers. This was in terms 
of everyday management, such as in relation to the distribution of quota, but also in terms of 
how the UK Government might defend the rights of UK fishers in the forthcoming Brexit 
negotiations. The following quotation illustrates how many of the smaller fishers feel that the 
bureaucracy is inappropriate to what they are doing: 
“In terms of shellfish: we've got Cornwall IFCA and we've got MMO. We have two sets of 
shellfish data that you are supposed to enter every day. The only thing that's different is 
the arrangement of the columns on the top: one is the MMO, one is for Cornwall IFCA. 
They live under the same roof down at Hayle, but they are tribal, they won't speak to each 
other and if you fail to do one, the other one sends you a warning letter … The form is not 
designed by a shellfish expert because a lot of shellfish is stored, you don't land it every 
day. Some people do, but a lot of people don't, they store it and land it once a week. How 
are you supposed to fill in the form when it says daily catch, when you don't even know 
what it is until the end of the week… It’s just not designed properly.” (Helston FG) 
 
There were also concerns about different laws governing aspects of the lobster fishery in 
Cornwall. The first concerned the two different minimum catch sizes for lobster: 87 mm which 
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is the European size and 90 mm through the IFCA (in other words, 90 mm inside the 6 nm limit 
and 87 mm outside). 
"This creates a problem that cannot be policed properly. It means that the little boats are 
being persecuted, because the big boats will come in and haul gear alongside you, keep 
all the lobsters that you're not allowed to legally keep, saying that they caught them 
outside the 6 nm limit." (Padstow FG) 
 
The second issue concerned the catching of ‘berried’ lobster: i.e. female lobsters that are 
carrying eggs: 
“All the berried lobsters, the females that I catch, inside six mile, you've got to return 
them. I haven't got an issue with that, but it needs to be a nationwide ban. Outside six 
miles you've got super crabbers that catch loads. They aren't breaking the law; the law is 
an ass, because they can catch lots of buried lobsters and keep them all. One guy said to 
me, well, why don’t you work one string of pots outside the six mile and all the ones you 
catch inside, land them. I said, because that's not what we do.” (Newlyn FG) 
 
There was also a sense that as small inshore boats they are particularly accessible and as such 
tend to get boarded more than other boats: 
“If IFCA come and board you, the people that board you are really nice, they are friendly, 
they're polite, but you always feel like you've done something wrong when they come 
around you… Hellish. You know full well you've done your very best to make sure 
everything's above board, everything's the right size, but you're always worried.” 
(Padstow FG) 
 
Most of the fishers taking part in the focus groups were 50 or older, with a long memory in terms 
of how things used to be done when they started out in fishing. In this respect, that there is far 
more bureaucracy now than there ever was, making what they try to do ever more difficult and 
frustrating. 
“The other problem is they never let up. You no sooner get one thing sorted out, and then 
they come up with something else, and it's coming from all angles. It might be 
conservationists, it might be Government, it might be this, might be that. Like Paul was 
saying, when we started fishing it was a free for all, you could do exactly what you wanted; 
you could go out there for an hour, you could go out there all day. But gradually we've got 
to fill this, we've got to do that. And the Government listens to all these exterior bodies 
that are all so-called experts on the particular subject, fishing, and you know, you feel like 
you're being bombarded don't you.” (Helston FG) 
 
To a large extent, discussion in the workshop echoed the concerns and frustrations of the fishers 
themselves, even though a number of those at the workshop were involved in administrating 
the bureaucratic rules. In this respect, there was a discussion that legislation and bureaucratic 
necessities need to be better tailored to the needs of smaller boats; notwithstanding that there 
were also concerns about making rules even more complex than they already are: “It’s good to 
avoid exceptionally complex rules or they end up in the court because things have gotten 
ridiculously difficult for people to understand” (WSP 2). 
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The key problem identified in determining the bureaucratic management and legislation of the 
inshore sector is captured in the following: 
“One of the main factors in Cornwall is that it’s such a mixed fishery in terms of things 
turning up and things being available to fishermen… What fishermen want to be able do 
inshore is take advantage of these opportunities and to be versatile; that’s the absolute 
key to inshore fisheries being successful. And it seems that there’s an absolute load of 
measures that have been brought out recently - quotas, catch limits and so on - that are 
completely contrary to the success of inshore fisheries, despite the government saying 
that they support them (WS 2)… That’s true. A lot of the recent more high profile 
initiatives have disproportionately targeted the smaller inshore fisheries. As an 
enforcement officer, they’ve brought us up against the industry… There’s such diversity 
of fishing types that trying to find one rule that fits everybody is incredibly difficult. Finding 
a method that doesn’t hurt someone disproportionately is very very difficult, if not 
impossible. I mean days at sea would be ideal for some people, but it could crucify 
somebody else. [In this respect], legislation tends to be a blunt instrument” (WSP 1). 
 
4.6.5.4 Representation of inshore fishers 
There is clearly concern that the voice of inshore fishers is not being sufficiently heard and that 
their access to policymakers is restricted. Even though there is nominal representation on the 
IFCA, other lobbies are felt to have more sway. Key amongst these is anglers, who are often 
retired people with more time and a perceived agenda of pushing for closures on gill nets and 
for bass. As outlined in the sub-section above, there is also a sense that the people making the 
rules do not really understand fishers or fishing and a perception that ‘those at Defra don't seem 
to be interested in them’. 
“The Fisheries Minister shouldn't be a political position. It should be a permanent job and 
it probably should be occupied by a former fisherman, someone that has got industry-
wide respect and you know is going to get you the best deal. This idiot we've got in charge 
now, we know he's not going to and we know his brother is a very very big bass angler 
that's constantly pushing him to get bass as a recreational species... [Likewise] our local 
MP is a big angler and he also has been pushing in the Houses of Parliament to get a ban 
on commercial fishing for bass… It just feels very stacked against fishing right now." 
(Padstow FG) 
 
The Cornish Fish Producers Organisation (CFPO) has 200 members and the potential to be a 
significant lobby force. Unusually, it also includes 80 inshore fishers as members, mainly from 
the south coast of Cornwall rather than the north coast. Nevertheless, despite the large number 
of inshore fishermen who are members, and that the CFPO claim to represent all fishermen, 
there was a strong perception amongst the focus group attendees that the CFPO is 
predominantly concerned with the interests of the larger scale fishermen. 
“We've got nobody really supporting us. The PO and that, most of us are in a PO, but 
they're not really interested in small boatmen… [Not least] because so much of the PO 
subscriptions comes from the over 10 sector to pay the Executors and pay the Officers 
and Secretary, and a very small amount comes to the under 10s, so we're almost without 
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representation” (Helston FG). “They should take under 10s into consideration, but they 
don't at the minute.” (Newlyn FG) 
 
This perception was endorsed in the workshop, where it was discussed that the PO exists 
principally to manage quotas and that they don't do much for the inshore fishing sector.  
"I think the big POs are going to look out for their members and I would say it's biased to 
the interests of the big players and the smaller ones aren't perhaps represented as well 
as they can be" (WSP 2). 
Partly as a response to this feeling of under-representation, one of the focus group attendees 
was due to visit Defra to attend the inaugural meeting of the committee of a new coastal PO 
whose remit is to support the interests of the inshore fishing sector across the UK. At the time 
of writing, this is still a new initiative that has yet to be fully realised. The proposal is that it 
would work at a British Isles level, but that every sector, like 7E for example, would have its own 
representative. Quota given to a particular sector is not transferrable, so quota given to sector 
7E is not transferable to 7D, for example. This nascent PO is due to build on the work of the New 
Under Ten Fishermen’s Association (NUTFA), which was set up to represent the interests of 
inshore fishers, but which never really had sufficient resources to achieve its aims. The potential 
advantages of having a PO dedicated to the needs of the inshore sector are encapsulated in the 
following: 
“I think the idea of the coastal PO would be that the Government would give that PO the 
chunk of quota that is allocated for whatever it is, 10 or 15 boats, and that PO can manage 
it and they can push it from month to month… The Government get seven or eight percent 
for the under 10s from the national quota, and they then allocate it month by month. But 
if we had our own PO, the Government would say here, PO, this is your quota, you sort it 
out.” (Helston FG) 
 
Of particular concern to the fishers is representation at the forthcoming Brexit meetings, 
something that was articulated very strongly in the Helston FG: 
“I don't know who is attending those [Brexit] meetings… These big players, like CFPO the 
other North Eastern POs, they are going to be around the table and we don't have any 
representation, it's hopeless, we have no salt in the river… The big POs are not going to 
say, yes, we need to give 30% of the quota to the under 10s, because it'll just mean they’ll 
have less for the over 10s and they are who they're representing, mainly.” (Helston FG) 
 
There were similar concerns expressed in the workshop, where this lack of voice or 
representation in the Brexit negotiation processes was seen as being worrying. Who is 
representing the smaller fishers? The POs are recognised as representing fishermen in general, 
as is the Fishing for Leave pressure group, but neither are really focused on the needs of the 
smaller boats. 
 
4.6.6 Resilience, succession and the future 
This section of the focus group discussion is presented as three sections: firstly, the resilience of 
the Cornwall inshore fishery; secondly, the issue of succession; and thirdly the future of the 
inshore fishery in Cornwall. 
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4.6.6.1 Resilience 
As mentioned under section 4.6.1 of this report, the innate passion of fishers means that they 
are likely to be inherently highly resilient and to continue in fishing beyond the time that makes 
economic sense. In order to do this, they exhibit a range of different adaptive capacities, such 
as: carrying extra gear and leaving it to lie for an extra day (which means that there is even more 
gear on the ground that adds to the pressure on particular fisheries); putting more and more 
pots down (which requires more investment and adds to the pressure on stocks); going further 
out to sea (which is inherently more risky); fishing single-handed (which reduces the 
opportunities for new/young fishers to gain experience); adding value and developing their 
markets (which requires new skills and perhaps additional investment, such as in IT equipment) 
and so on. There was a sense that the very small boats in particular would like to work less gear, 
catch less fish and get a better price for the fish that they do catch: 
“If we could work a lot less gear and get the same money that would suit me. I think it 
would suit a lot of people, but everybody's so mistrustful of the authorities that they will 
try and maximise everything they do, all the time." (Padstow FG) 
 
This is largely in relation to ensuring a track record, just in case something changes and the 
fishers involved need to catch different species of fish. Nevertheless, despite the increasing 
pressures, there was a general sense of optimism about the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall, 
at least for those people who are currently fishing: 
"I think that people will get by one way or another… I think we all want to carry on doing 
what we're doing. I can't see anybody packing up really, everybody will still be here 
moaning." (Padstow FG) 
 
The participants at the workshop also felt that those already in fishing are highly resilient, finding 
ways to continue doing what they love doing: 
“Fishers are resilient and increasingly becoming resilient by becoming part-timers … going 
out and getting a second job, to sustain them in the profession that they want to remain 
in. It’s becoming harder and harder to support yourself purely on a fisherman’s wage” 
(WSP 1). 
 
4.6.6.2 Succession 
Although there was optimism about those currently fishing, remaining in fishing, people were 
much less sanguine about the ability of future generations to get into fishing. One of the fishers 
said: “My boy would love to get in to it, but it's where do you start. They've taken my fish away 
[through capping his licence], so that's a door slammed in his face right away." (Padstow FG) 
 
In this respect, cost and opportunity were seen as the two main constraints for those wishing to 
get into fishing.  
"It costs £700 before you go aboard a boat. You've got to have fire fighting, you've got to 
have first aid, you've got to have risk assessment and survival at sea. Each of these courses 
cost anything up to £200, and you're not officially allowed aboard a boat until you've got 
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all the certificates. Then you might go aboard a boat and be seasick. It's not really much 
of an encouragement for the youngsters.” (Helston FG) 
 
There is then the cost of the boat itself, which ranges hugely from perhaps £10,000 up to 
£100,000. One of the Padstow FG fishers had just bought a 6.5 m boat for £38,000, and another 
had bought a boat just under 10 m for £65,000. On top of that there is probably £40,000 worth 
of gear, the need for a truck, a fridge and so on. The Padstow FG felt that there were no obvious 
sources of money for this, apart from a traditional bank loan and there were clearly concerns 
amongst the fishers as to where the new generation will come from. If a potential fisher does 
not have a father/uncle/relation to help them get into fishing, where do they get the finance 
from? 
"That is a problem… I'd have thought nowadays the banks would be very wary about 
lending anybody any money to go fishing… Especially if you didn't have any experience. If 
you just went in to the bank and said I want to be a fisherman, they are going to laugh at 
you… You need to start off as crew and work your way up. Then when you've five or 10 
years’ experience, if you are any good at it, you might want to then invest your money.” 
(Helston FG) 
 
In terms of opportunity, the tendency for inshore fishermen to go single-handed in order to 
remain viable has reduced the opportunities for potential fishermen to get into the industry, in 
that far fewer boats now require crew. The one exception in this respect is the fishing harbour 
of Mevagissey: 
"In Mevagissey there is a history of certain families like the Blameys and the Lakemans 
fishing from Mevagissey. It's a small close-knit community, and the son has taken it on… 
But over the next decade things are going to start / somebody's got to buy these boats or 
I don't know what is going to happen [to the inshore fishing fleet]." (Helston FG) 
 
Those at the workshop were also concerned about succession as an issue and that although the 
FLAG has been very supportive in trying to encourage people into the industry, it is inherently a 
very unsociable job to be doing. "Young people don't want to do it. They want to be out with 
their friends" (WSP 3). 
“The people that are in the game, who have been in it for many years are resilient and 
will probably see it through to retirement. But when it comes to succession … the sons of 
… they’re lacking in some places and I think we are going to see some ports peter out to 
nothing. In the future, it’s hard to see what will attract enough people. It’s never going to 
be making your fortune – it’s a lifestyle choice and it’s probably not as popular a lifestyle 
choice as it was” (WSP 2). 
 
There is also the issue of the monetisation of licences (and quota), as discussed under section 
4.6.4.2, which adds both additional expense and complication for the would-be fisher: 
“When we left school, you could go and buy a boat… The licence didn't have a value, or I 
don't know if there was a licence… It was just registration… So you bought the boat, so if 
it was £10,000, that's what you bought. Now if you bought a boat for 10 grand, your 
licence would be 10 or 15 grand on top of it. Then again on the bigger boats you've got to 
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buy the quota as well. So usually you've got your boat is a third, licence is a third, and then 
your fish quota is a third. So if you bought a £30,000 boat, your outlay is nearly £100,000. 
So the youngster hasn't got a hope in hell." (Helston FG) 
 
4.6.6.3 The future 
Some of the key issues raised in the Helston FG that would help ensure the future viability of the 
inshore sector, include: 
• Making sure there is enough quota. 
• That there is too much inappropriate bureaucracy, which in many cases is designed for 
much larger boats. 
• Ultimately that "we fish in a very sustainable way and we need quota". 
• "We are the visual side of fishing as well". 
• "Communities are a big thing". 
• "You don't know what you've got until you've lost it". 
 
In summary, fishers are not looking for handouts, such as being paid for creating community or 
for public good services, but what they do want is: "better legislation, less bureaucracy and more 
quota. They are the three main things" (Helston FG). In other words, there is a strong feeling 
that the <10s need to have legislation and management that is more specifically tailored to their 
needs. 
 
The following quotes are helpful in terms of capturing the perspectives of the inshore fishers in 
terms of what they would like to see in the future. The first is taken from the Helston FG and the 
second one is paraphrased from the Padstow FG. In the case of the first quote, it becomes critical 
to define what is meant by an inshore fishing sector and subsequently an inshore fishing boat 
(see also Section 4.6.2.4). At present it is generally referred to in terms of boats that are included 
in the under 10 m pool that is managed by the MMO, but this definition perhaps needs to be 
tightened up (as discussed in the workshop), not least due to the 'rule beaters' who may be small 
in length, but have significant fishing capacity. 
“What needs to be done for the inshore fleet, I would have thought, is you need four or 
six years of fishing without any quota restriction at all and everything logged, so that the 
Government can see exactly what is being caught, exactly what is there, and then bring in 
a quota system that's appropriate to the size of the fleet" (Helston FG). 
Extending the limit to 20 nm would help space out the demand and help prevent fishers 
falling over each other because they are effectively squeezed into a 6 nm zone. This would 
also help the stocks to recuperate more quickly and potentially help ensure their long-
term sustainability. This is particularly important for inshore fishers, who are incapable of 
being so geographically mobile and fishing new grounds. 
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4.6.7 Understanding inshore fishers’ institutional arrangements 
Guiding question    
1. Can you please explain where and 
how (channels) you commercialize 
your products?  
The majority of fishermen sell their fish through the three fish markets in Cornwall, as well as Brixham in the 
neighbouring county of Devon. Some fishermen also sell direct to fish processors, restaurants and specialist 
fishmongers both locally and in London. 
Markets and 
marketing 
 
 
2. What are the main challenges you 
have with your customers and the 
demand for your commodities? 
The main criterion that determines the price for the fish being sold, or indeed establishes a demand for it, is 
its intrinsic quality. Fishers stressed how difficult it is to establish a good reputation for quality, and how easy 
it is to lose that reputation. For those fishers selling directly through the fish markets, the price they receive is 
determined by supply and demand on that particular day. For those who have established alternative 
relationships, the prices they receive are likely to be more consistent. 
3. What marketing strategies do you 
have in order to secure better deals? 
The baseline price is achieved at the four markets mentioned above. Other strategies include establishing 
relationships with the head chefs of local restaurants, or in London. The advantage of selling direct to London 
consumers is that in many instances they are prepared to pay higher prices. Other fishers have set up 
businesses whereby they process the primary fish that they catch, and in so doing add value to it. It is 
apparent that in order to remain viable in the long term, fishers need to be more entrepreneurial and to find 
marketing strategies that will allow them to add value to their primary catch. Promoting the intrinsic quality 
of their fish, which may be less than a day old when sold, is critical to establishing ongoing marketing 
strategies; similarly, the development of personal relationships. 
4. Is certification part of your strategy? Certification is not generally seen as important to inshore fishers; rather, they prefer to develop personal 
relationships and to ensure that the quality of their fish is the very best it can be. Nevertheless, certification 
may be important for processors, in that they are more likely to sell to supermarkets who usually do require 
that the fish has certification (such as MSC). In turn this increases demand, which means that certification 
benefits the prices inshore fishers receive, at least indirectly. 
5. Has there been any recent contextual 
change that has influenced your 
current business model? 
Nothing significant at present. There may be significant changes once the Brexit negotiations have been 
concluded, in that 80% of the fish sold through the local markets is exported to Europe. Should significant 
tariffs be imposed, this might work against the prices received at the local fish markets. 
6. How do you finance your activities, 
and what would you require to 
change this? 
All of the fishers present at the focus groups were well-established and had no further need to borrow money 
for their businesses. The issue of finance, or rather lack of it, was seen as being significant in terms of new 
entrants coming into the industry. The traditional route has been to pass the business down through families, 
but this is happening less and less. The only mainstream finance available is through banks, which in many 
cases are only able to loan money against a secure asset such as a house. 
Financing  
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7. Do you work with other fishers? How 
did this start? How is it going? Will 
you continue in the future? 
Instinctively, fishers are disinclined to work with other fishers. There is a strong sense of independence. 
Generally speaking, the only interaction between fishers is within families. Having said that, one of the most 
successful value-added initiatives in Cornwall involves fishers coordinating their activities to some extent - 
Dreckly Fish - where three fishermen pool their catches together and sell directly to London customers. 
Horizontal 
coordination 
8. Do you collaborate with others in the 
value-chain? How did this evolve? 
Will you continue with this in the 
future? 
As above, most fishers are disinclined to collaborate with others. Nevertheless, there are instances where this 
does happen. One of the focus group fishers processed his own catch, as well as that of a number of other 
local fishermen. Kernow Sashimi is also an example of where a local fisherman, who has set up a processing 
business, sources fish not only from his own boat, but also from 10 other local fishermen. In so doing, those 
involved receive slightly higher prices than they would do selling through the local fish markets. 
Vertical 
cooperation 
9. Do you feel that the current policy 
context helps you to improve your 
business performance? 
There was a strong sense amongst the participants at the focus groups that the current policy context works 
against their interests. This is in terms of too much bureaucracy, but more particularly in terms of their lack of 
access to sufficient quota. The CFP is frequently blamed, with frustration at the current policy context cited as 
a key reason why nearly all fishers across the UK voted for Brexit. 
Policy and 
regulations  
 
10. What environmental constraints and 
social challenges do you need to 
address? 
In terms of environmental constraints there is a growing network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which 
are increasingly impacting on the ability to catch fish. This is less of an issue for inshore fishers who more 
often than not use static gear, yet there are concerns that over time as more and more MPAs are introduced, 
it will start to impact their ability to catch fish. In terms of social challenges, there are concerns that the 
average age of fishers is rising and that it is increasingly difficult for younger people to get into fishing. The 
corollary of this is that there will be less and less small boats, impacting on the smaller harbours and coves 
and reducing their attractiveness to tourists who like to see working fishing boats that involve local fishers. 
11. How do you deal with current policies 
and regulations? What are your main 
strategies? 
One of the key strategies was to vote for Brexit, in the hope that current policies and regulations can be 
better targeted towards the needs of the inshore fishing sector. Nevertheless, there is concern that as a 
sector they are not well represented, and that fishing in general may well be traded away as part of the 
overall Brexit negotiation process. 
12. What is the impact of your fishing 
activities on the sustainability of the 
sector; furthermore, how would you 
define this impact?  
In terms of making a direct contribution to the GDP of Cornwall, or indeed the UK more generally, the inshore 
fishing sector in purely financial terms is tiny. Having said that, there is widespread recognition that active 
fishing harbours are known to be a significant attraction to tourists, with tourism contributing 25% of the GDP 
of Cornwall. Inshore fishing as part of the wider fishing industry within Cornwall is again tiny in terms of its 
overall turnover, although the more numerous inshore boats are critical to ensuring the attractiveness of 
many small ports and harbours, as well as the cultural and economic wellbeing of those directly involved. 
Financial 
Sustainability 
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4.6.8 Understanding inshore fishers’ institutional arrangements, diagrammatically 
Figure 14 (developed from a generic diagram produced as part of the Sufisa project’s first interim 
report to the EU Commission) depicts the institutional arrangements associated with the inshore 
fishing sector in Cornwall. The most significant point to note is that there is minimal horizontal 
coordination between the inshore fishers. Indeed, the findings from the focus groups suggest 
that in most cases fishers are highly independent, and indeed secretive, both in terms of what 
they catch, but also where they sell it and for how much. Where coordination does take place, 
it is likely to be within families. This latter point is of some relevance in that many of the ports 
include a number of fishers from the same family. For instance, at the Padstow FG one of the 
participants had a brother, uncle and father involved in fishing, out of a total of 12 inshore boats 
fishing out of Padstow. 
 
Figure 14. Inshore fishers’ institutional arrangements in Cornwall 
 
In terms of vertical coordination, some of the fishers only sell their catch through the harbour 
markets. A range of different fish merchants then purchase the fish from the harbour markets 
before selling it on directly to the end user, or processing it and adding value before they do so. 
It is also clear that a number of fishers have established relationships directly with fish 
merchants, whereby they achieve a slight price premium over selling direct to the harbour 
market, or at least greater certainty as to the price they will receive for their catch. One example 
of this latter case is Kernow Sashimi, who endeavour to source their ingredients from local 
inshore fishermen, paying a 10% premium over the average prices received at the markets in 
Newlyn, Plymouth and Brixham, before selling their produce direct to suppliers in London at a 
better price than could be achieved locally. 
 
Some fishers are also self-evidently increasingly entrepreneurial in their approach to the 
marketing of their catch, not content to simply receive the going price on any given day at the 
harbour market. In most cases this is based on developing personal relationships with either 
head chefs, or alternatively buyers who have a direct link with restaurants. This may be to local 
restaurants, or increasingly to buyers in London, who are able to pay higher prices for the 
products involved. Key to ensuring continued access to these outlets is the maintenance of the 
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very highest quality in the fish being sold, which is highly sought after by top-end fish 
restaurants. The inshore fishing sector has a considerable advantage in this respect, in that 
providing the fish are looked after properly, they are likely to be less than a day old when made 
available to the outlets concerned; something that the larger boats are unable to compete with 
in that they spend up to a week at a time at sea, icing their catch in the meantime. In making 
these more direct linkages, there is significant potential for inshore fishers to add value to their 
catch. 
 
In terms of sustainability, the inshore fishing sector needs to consider four main aspects. Firstly, 
ecological, in terms of the growth in the number of MPAs and the impact this may have on which 
areas may be fished, for what species, using which kinds of gear. Secondly, biodiversity: both in 
ecological terms, but also in relation to the stocks of fish available for the fishers in Cornwall to 
catch. This is of course closely related to the policy issue of quota. Thirdly, economic: again, the 
availability of quota is a critical issue, but so too is access to particular fishing grounds by local 
Cornish fishers as well as fishers from other EU countries. Adding value to their catch is another 
key issue in relation to the economic viability of inshore fishers, which in part is influenced by 
the culture of eating fish within the UK, as well as continued access to EU markets. Continued 
access to EU markets post-Brexit is a major factor, in that up to 80% of the fish caught in Cornwall 
are exported to the EU – mainly to France and Spain in the case of the inshore sector. Fourthly, 
the socio-economic importance of inshore fishing to the overall image of Cornwall as a tourist 
destination is of critical importance, requiring continued policy awareness and support. 
 
It is clear, even from the few paragraphs above, that policy has a critical role to play in the future 
viability and sustainability of inshore fishing in Cornwall. The Brexit negotiations provide an 
opportunity for reflecting upon existing policy and endeavouring to make it more appropriate 
to the needs of the inshore fishing sector in places like Cornwall. In reality, of course, the Brexit 
negotiation process may mean that significant compromises will need to be made. 
 
4.7 Brexit 
4.7.1 The fishers’ perspective on Brexit (taken from the focus groups) 
Brexit was often mentioned as being pivotal to the future of the inshore fishing sector in 
Cornwall, as well as the fishing sector more generally. 
“This is British fishing's main chance it will ever have. If the Government cock this up we'll 
never have a chance like it again. And we have got to get away from the EU. We've got to 
get EU boats out of our waters. We've got to try and take back control of the quota” 
(Newlyn FG). 
 
Apart from access to more quota, the key issue in relation to Brexit discussed in the focus groups 
was to try and extend the limit of waters that are exclusive to UK fishermen. At the moment, EU 
vessels with 'grandfather rights'14 are able to fish within the 6-12 nm range (in Cornwall this is 
                                                          
14 Initially this was for shellfish boats under sail targeting crawfish, which is a great delicacy in France. As 
the boats became motorised, the limit was extended from 3 n miles to 6 n miles to take account of the 
motorisation. As time has gone on, the boats have become replaced with ever more powerful trawlers. 
 135 
mainly French and Belgian boats). Originally, this involved relatively low powered boats, but now 
often involves very modern, technologically-advanced trawlers. Due to the profound changes to 
the boats since the introduction of ‘grandfather rights’, many of the participants argued that the 
whole notion should be revisited, including that the rights should cease once a boat is sold15. 
“First thing we get the French outside the 12 mile limit… Sometimes there's 15 or 16 big 
trawlers working between the six and the 12 mile limit, scooping up and down, especially 
if they can get a bit of lee from the north westerly wind. That would make a huge 
difference" (Helston FG). 
 
The main reason for pushing for this change, especially from an ‘inshore boat that lays pots’ 
perspective, is that any pots they lay between 6 and 12 nm are in danger of being towed out by 
the trawlers (although not explicitly acknowledged in the FGs, there are also UK-based trawlers 
fishing in this area). Over the years, many of the fishers have lost hundreds, if not thousands, of 
pounds worth of gear to this process. As a result, in order to try and reduce this risk, many of 
the fishers have decided not to lay their pots beyond the 6 nm limit. It was argued that extending 
the limit to 12 nm (or better still, 20 nm) would help space out where the pots are placed, 
because at present they are effectively squeezed into the 6 nm zone. This should also help the 
stocks to recuperate more quickly and potentially help ensure their long-term sustainability. This 
is particularly important for inshore fishers, who are incapable of being so geographically mobile 
and able to fish new grounds. 
“You've got a third or half of your day boat fishing fleet that's more than capable of 
working between that six and 12 mile limit. Now those French trawlers, you cannot work 
with them, they will tow your pots. I've probably been towed three times this year… So 
you think to yourself it's not worth losing gear over it, so you come inside the six mile, so 
that's then squeezing all the gear in and you're over-crowding inside the six mile. Opening 
up to the 12 mile and pushing the foreign boats outside into international waters, would 
free up everybody's fishery here... There's been a lot of talk about getting our EEZ back, 
but if the 12, or better still 20 miles, was solely for UK boats, it would benefit all of the 
little boats in towns like Padstow and Port Isaac and Newquay. We could fish outside the 
six mile and we wouldn't be all on top of each other. All our gear would be more spaced 
out. We could leave a two-mile box for the UK trawlers, for two months, and then we 
could shift that box. But we would know our gear is safe” (Padstow FG). 
 
Despite this general sense of optimism that Brexit will result in positive change for the inshore 
fishing sector, there was also concern expressed at the Helston FG, in particular, about the 
dangers of the Brexit negotiations, especially in relation to the export markets for fish.  
"I think it's unfortunate we had to go through a Brexit vote to control this issue, because 
this should have been done a long time ago at a national level. I'm sure there must be 
legislation available for us to have tapped in to, to at least push these foreign vessels out 
to 12 miles. We didn't need to go to Brexit, because Brexit is going to make a hell of a 
mess of the marketing. I don't think people realise the implications if the French and 
Belgians and Dutch suddenly feel they're being pushed aside, especially if they think they 
                                                          
This creates a real problem for local boats working with pots and nets between the 6-12 n mile limit. Over 
the years, many thousands of pounds worth of fishing gear have been towed away. 
15 This is likely to include repealing the London Fisheries Convention, 1964. 
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can be pushed out to the Median line. Straight away there will be a ban on imports and 
everything into EU, to get back to where they started and that will mean most of the fish 
that's now being caught by the British fleet will be dumped on the home market, prices 
will collapse, completely, because we can't absorb it” (Helston FG). 
 
Figure 15. Map of the UK EEZ   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: House of Lords (2016, p. 10) (House of Lords 2016, p. 10) 
 
Similarly during the discussion in the Padstow café with fishermen, where their instinctive 
enthusiasm for Brexit was tempered by a concern that nothing much will change in reality, not 
least because they are unconvinced that the UK Government will fight their corner. 
“I think that fishermen are resigned to the fact that nothing's going to change [post-
Brexit]. The fishing industry was strongly behind it, they’ve kind of pumped the fishing 
industry up: we want our waters back! We want our waters back! What's the likelihood 
that we're going to get them back: probably very, very slim because the French and 
Belgians do rely on these areas to get a certain amount of fish and their governments fight 
like hell to get it. And our Government doesn’t really seem to give two hoots about the 
fishing industry, the way theirs do. I think we will be used as a bargaining chip for 
something else, like farming” (Padstow café). 
 
Brexit was also discussed in terms of being able to more directly influence policy when it is being 
developed at a Whitehall level, rather than by the Commission in Brussels. Having said that, 
there were clear concerns as to whether the perspective of the inshore fishing sector is being 
heard when these issues are being debated. The latter is explored under section 4.6.5.4 on 
‘representation’, but is worth also including under this section on Brexit. 
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“I feel that our voice is more likely to be heard if we're talking to people in Britain, rather 
than if we're talking to people in the rest of Europe. At least, if it's our country, there are 
people we can have meetings with and actually talk to, face-to-face… Whereas dealing 
through the EU takes months and months or even years, before something could happen” 
(Helston FG). 
“I don't know who is attending those [Brexit] meetings… These big players, like CFPO the 
other North Eastern POs, they are going to be around the table and we don't have any 
representation, it's hopeless, we have no salt in the river… Because it is... the over 10s 
who they're representing, mainly” (Helston FG). 
 
4.7.2 Developing scenarios in the workshop 
As set out in the introduction to section 4.6, there were two mains aims for the workshop. The 
first involved ‘ground truthing’ the research that was conducted as part of task 2.2 (which has 
been done in the sections above); and the second involved developing a range of scenarios 
regarding the future viability of the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall, which was inevitably 
linked to the Brexit negotiations. To start this process, the workshop participants were asked to 
fill in the following table (Table 4), individually. This was partly to provide the research team with 
some useful data, but also to get the participants thinking about the issues from the perspective 
of the organisations that they represented. Full details of the participants’ responses are given 
in appendix 6, with the key issues raised in Table 4 being fed into the text below, as appropriate. 
 
 
Table 4. Cornwall Inshore Fishery – looking to the future 
What are your Priorities 
in relation to Cornwall’s 
Inshore Fishery over the 
next five years? 
How will these be 
best Achieved  
What will be the key Challenges / 
Uncertainties in relation to Cornwall’s 
Inshore Fishery, both during the 
negotiations and after Brexit? 
 
4.7.2.1 Taking back control of (UK) waters 
In response to what are the opportunities and threats posed by Brexit, the response was: 
"It depends what is dropped and what we adopt. There’s this clear notion that we would 
adopt the CFP in the short-term and then decide what to keep and what not to keep… But 
what we definitely see is the EU making broad brush decisions about what’s appropriate 
for a particular sector: the gear it has, the net sizes and so on… It doesn’t work in mixed 
fisheries, which we have down here… So if we can hope for the legislation to be made 
more appropriate to particular fisherman in particular areas and that this broad brush 
stuff is abolished” (WSP 2). 
 
Two of the workshop participants, in particular, were adamant that the CFP was not fit for 
purpose and that Brexit offered the opportunity for change: "We need suitable management 
through fisheries legislation which we haven't got at the moment" (WSP 2); furthermore, that 
this included being able to keep foreign boats outside the 12 nm limit (predominantly French 
and Belgian boats in Cornwall). WSP 2 went on to say that in terms of its negotiation tactics, the 
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UK should start by demanding that the UK reclaim its 200 mile EEZ, but more realistically aim to 
end up with the 12 nm limit. 
"Ideally take over all our waters out to the middle of the channel via UNCLOS and out to 
the 200 mile zone. Or at least abandon the London Fisheries Convention so the UK has 
sole access to the 6-12 nm limit.” (WSP 4). 
“I am optimistic about the 12 mile limit because there’s so much pressure from the 
industry. I also think that it’s one of those things that’s tangible to the public: ‘look what 
we’ve got back – it’s our 12 mile limit’. It’s not an airy fairy thing, it’s a physical asset that 
people can see and get a grasp of. In my view it would be politically astute to introduce it 
because the public would see it as a really good thing to have done (WSP 2).” 
 
When asked what would be the impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall should the UK 
Government fail to get the 12 nm limit imposed, the response was: 
“Disastrous really: we’ve got to get that 6 miles back. There’s this huge fleet of French 
vessels towing between our 6 and 12 mile limit (WSP 4).” 
“So from the point of view of the inshore sector it could make the difference between 
surviving in perpetuity and actually going out of business when this generation of fishers 
dies off (WSP 6)?” A statement that was greeted with a chorus of ‘yes!’. 
 
In this respect, there was a general sense that things are not going to get any worse post-Brexit 
in relation to the inshore fishing sector, and hopefully will get better. 
 
A key benefit of taking back more control of UK waters, it was argued, is that it will enable better 
and more place-based marine planning. In this respect, that the ability to develop unilateral 
governance mechanisms that will better suit the UK's purposes underlies why most fishers voted 
for Brexit: "you'd have to argue, what's the point in us leaving the EU if we don't?" (WSP 3). 
“Marine planning is an ultimate aim, I’d suggest, but it can only exist when you’ve got 
control and you can’t control things when you’re part of Europe because there are too 
many players. It only takes one objection and the whole thing falls down... You see gear 
conflict all of the time, because everyone wants to be fishing in the same spot. If there’s 
an understanding that one ground is set aside for that and that, then there’s a lot of scope 
to stop that conflict” (WSP 2). 
 
As an example of this, one of the participants had worked in Australia for the South Australia 
Fisheries Department in the mid-1990s:  
“They’ve got a prawn fishery there and it’s a classic example of the Australian government 
just being able to manage their waters for their own fishermen… The fishing scientists 
would get all the data from the boats and go away and work out what could be caught, in 
what areas… As a result, the fishing was sustainable and this was 20 years ago” (WSP 3). 
 
4.7.2.2 Accurate scientific data 
Whatever happens in terms of the negotiations, several of the participants emphasised the 
importance of having accurate science in terms of fish stocks, otherwise it becomes impossible 
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to determine whether something is sustainable or not. In part, this discussion was prompted by 
the suggestion in one of the focus groups (and presented as a slide to the workshop 
participants), that smaller boats should be allowed to fish without any quota at all: 
"I wouldn’t necessarily agree that there shouldn’t be any quota restrictions... In my view, 
it’s absolutely critical that the science is good and that there needs to be an accurate 
record of what they are doing, so that you can assess if there are any concerns with the 
stock … Without data, you’re going at them blind … Keep the science up and there’s a 
possibility of relaxing quotas I would suggest for some of the very smallest vessels.” (MSP 
2) 
 
There was recognition that there will still need to be coordination with those countries fishing 
under the CFP, or there is a danger that there will be overfishing. This will require negotiation 
between the UK and Europe in terms of what the stocks of a particular species are, as defined 
by ICES, notwithstanding that the advice they give is invariably watered down by political 
processes. In this respect, the emphasis is more in terms of ensuring that UK fisheries get "a fair 
percentage of what fish is in the channel" (WSP 4). Two of the more environmentally-minded 
participants at the workshop argued that:  
“Whether the UK should adhere to the environmental principles that govern the rest: then 
of course it should, unless there’s very good evidence not to (WSP 3)… We have to 
continue to work with Europe to manage those shared resources, because neither side of 
the channel want overfishing… But we can’t go out and catch more, unless the French and 
Spanish catch less. Do you really think the French and the Spanish are going to start 
catching less? No” (WSP 5). 
 
4.7.2.3 Access and quota 
There was discussion that there are two separate issues at play in the Brexit negotiations: one 
is the right to fish within a particular area in the sea; the other is the right to catch a share of the 
fish available in that area (quota). In other words, fishers may have access to fishing grounds, 
but they may not have quota to catch the fish once they get there. There are likely to be 
problems in December 2018 when the new quota negotiations will take place for the following 
12 months between the remaining members of the EU in Brussels, and yet the UK will not be 
subject to the CFP after March 29, 2019. Clearly, the UK cannot be ignored in these discussions, 
even though they may no longer be part of the CFP, much as Norway has to be part of such 
discussions. 
 
There was also some discussion about scrapping tradable quota, as reported under section 
4.6.4.2, above:  
"Would the government have to buy it back if we came out of the CFP? Or will it be written 
off and all of a sudden the quota is worthless overnight (WSP 5)? Some people have spent 
millions of pounds buying quota. They'd be quite cross if you took it off them and said it 
wasn't worth any money (WSP 2). Could the government buy it off them (WSP 8)? That is 
an option, but an expensive option. But it would stop the rot (WSP 2).” 
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At the end of the workshop, participants were shown a slide which set out the proposals from a 
2017 New Economics Foundation publication entitled: Who gets to fish? The allocation of fishing 
opportunities for member states (p. 6): 
"Our proposals for reform vary by Member State, responding to the contexts of each 
system including any national objectives for fisheries that have been established. Some of 
our proposals for Member States include: 
• a government statement clarifying public ownership of fishing rights; 
• a quota reserve for new entrants; 
• a peer-to-peer quota swapping system; 
• a landing tax differentiated for domestic ports; 
• a reallocation of quota using socio-economic and environmental criteria.” 
 
These were discussed as being laudable ideas, but that in reality are highly unlikely to happen: 
"I'm afraid I don't think it will happen. Quota reserved for new entrants -- where are you going 
to get the quota from?" (WSP 4). 
 
4.7.2.4 Access to EU markets 
There was recognition and concern that the EU may impose significant tariffs on UK exports of 
fish, or perhaps even withhold access to certain markets. This could be devastating, in that 
between 80-85% of fish caught in Cornwall is sold to Europe. It was also discussed that the 
demand in France for certain species of fish can only be met by fish caught in UK waters, whether 
by UK fishermen or French fishermen. It was felt that the French and Spanish will carry on eating 
fish, in that it is integral to their culture. In this respect, that access to EU markets will be part of 
the negotiation process, along with access to quota and access to particular fishing areas.  
 
4.7.2.5 Looking to the future 
There was clear recognition that any change is going to take time, perhaps as long as 10 years. 
This is partly because government departments in general, and Defra in particular, have faced 
considerable cuts over recent years and are short of staff. 
"You have to ask yourself, what can be achieved with diminishing resources in two years? 
To ensure that the wheels don’t fall off in two years’ time, and to make sure things are 
not just suddenly up in the air, the Government I believe are trying to do this by the 
adoption process … There’s got to be a plan about where there are opportunities to do 
things differently, whether that be with the CFP or with the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive, or the Habitats Directive, whichever European directive the Government is 
looking at… It’s an opportunity, a once in a generation opportunity for change and it can’t 
happen overnight and I can’t imagine there’s the resource for it to happen overnight” 
(WSP 3). 
 
The following quote usefully sums up the discussion about how the short to medium term future 
of the inshore fishing sector looks, from the perspective of those at the workshop. 
“Looking to the future, we have a transition period which clearly makes sense, not least 
because we don’t have the capacity to move substantially forward over the next two 
years, other than to ‘stop the wheels falling off’ (WSP 3).” 
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“Can you envisage in 5 years’ time that we will have a better managed fisheries system 
within the UK? And if so, what form might that take – both in general and specifically in 
relation to the small boats here in Cornwall (WSP 6)?” 
“I’m an optimist and I’d say, yes, it can’t be worse than it is at the moment (WSP 2). 
Nothing is guaranteed, but I hope things are improved, considerably (WSP 4).” 
“In what sense (WSP 7)?” 
“Quota for the UK boats and access (WSP 4). More appropriate regulation. People that 
are working in Brussels are certainly not aware of some of the intricacies of inshore 
fisheries and therefore get caught up in this broad brush approach and that’s a problem 
and has been for a long, long time (WSP 2).”  
“I can’t be as optimistic as them. I think in 5 years’ time things will be in a real mess, but I 
think in 10 years’ time things may start to look good again (WSP 1). By which time all of 
our fishermen would have retired (WSP 4). I think there’s going to be so much chaos in 
the next 5 years. I think the negotiations over quota will be hostile and ongoing for the 
first few years and we’ll be desperately trying to write our own legislation. We will have 
copy and pasted it by then, but I think we will be looking to change certain parts, but it 
won’t have changed fast enough for the industry and they will be unhappy that change 
has not been delivered. I think in 10 years’ time things will take shape again and markets 
would have balanced themselves out again. But 5 years’ time, I don’t think it will be a 
good place (WSP 1).” 
“In this 10 year time frame, do you think that the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall will 
be managed in a more context-specific way (WSP 6)?” 
“I hope so and I think it’s entirely possible. If we can have our own legislation, one of the 
key benefits is obviously that we are going to be able to be more responsive to specific 
environments and circumstances (WSP 1).” 
 
WSP 2 was the most positive in terms of the outcomes of the Brexit negotiations, most notably 
in relation to ensuring exclusive access for UK vessels within the 12 nm limit. 
“I think one of the reasons why I’m more optimistic about this than anyone else is that 
even if the negotiations ended up with being exclusive access for UK vessels to the 12 mile 
limit and nothing else, I’d say that was a major improvement. Even if it was just that and 
we stuck with the quotas as they are for the time being and we were able to manage what 
we had within the 12 miles (WSP 2). What might we have to give up in order to get that? 
What would we be prepared to give up to get that (WSP 6)? I would say we shouldn’t have 
to give up anything, but we might have to. It might be a case of when we come to do 
quotas, we might not take such a hard line from our end, if we’ve got that 12 mile.” (WSP 
2) 
 
Despite a varying sense of optimism, there was an over-arching concern, also expressed strongly 
in the focus groups, that the UK government is not sufficiently focused on fishing to get UK 
fishers the best deal possible. In this respect, that "fishing could well be used as a bargaining 
chip" (WSP 1). 
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4.7.2.6 Scenarios 
It terms of being able to identify scenarios from the discussion, the idea of transition is central; 
transition in a temporal sense, but also in terms of what is negotiated. There is an ‘ideal’ starting 
position (likely, perhaps to be the UK’s EEZ or Median Line), which will be the subject of a hard 
negotiation, ending up with something that is more or less acceptable (a hoped for 12 nm line), 
depending on the perspective taken. 
“I think the idea of a transition. If you think about it in a temporal sense, you’d probably 
start with what we’ve got – a needs must type of thing – but then you have an ideal: ‘this 
is what we want to do’, but this will be negotiated, so we probably won’t end up with 
that.” (WSP 7) 
 
It is possible, therefore, to suggest three scenarios for the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall. 
However, before doing so, it is imperative to consider a number of over-arching factors, or 
caveats. First, that currently the voice of the sector is unlikely to be heard by those making the 
decisions regarding the future of the fishing industry. Developing the nascent Coastal Producer 
Organisation could be helpful in this regard. Second, that the notion / definition of an ‘inshore 
fishing sector’ is insufficiently precise. The working definition used in this report is that it 
encompasses boats that are under 10 m in length and managed by the MMO (see section 
4.1.2.1). However, it is clear that this needs to be further refined to incorporate the gear used, 
engine capacity, deck capacity, fish sought, quantities caught and so on. In this way, the very 
smallest boats in terms of their capacity may be able to benefit from management that is better 
suited to their needs. This might, for example, include fishing without quota, providing catch 
sizes, net sizes, MPA restrictions and so on are adhered to.  
 
Third, it is important in policy terms to be clear as to the purpose of the inshore sector 
(howsoever the sector is defined). In this respect, is it about catching fish or preserving a way of 
life; making a meaningful contribution to food and nutrition security, or simply providing a 
limited supply of a luxury product; or primarily in terms of its socio-economic contribution to 
rural communities? Having a clearer vision of the future of inshore fishing will help determine 
how it can best be supported by policy and suitable governance mechanisms. Fourth, it is 
important to consider how best to deal with the monetisation of licences and quota. In both 
cases, neither of these had any monetary value when they were originally issued, but due to 
their limited availability both have been increasingly traded between fishers. This has led to a 
situation where the majority of UK quota is owned by a relatively few companies. One option is 
for the UK Government to buy-back this quota and to allocate it to fishers as they see fit. 
Inevitably this would be very expensive, but would allow for a different and more policy-targeted 
approach to be taken in terms of quota allocation. At present the monetisation of quotas does 
not directly affect the inshore sector, in that they are not able to own quota, with their quota 
being allocated from a common pool that is managed by the MMO. However, the monetisation 
of licences does affect the inshore sector. As with quota, licences did not have a value when 
originally allocated, but now cost in the region of £280/kw of engine power. This means that a 
relatively small boat may have an additional cost burden of £10-15,000, that represents a 
significant barrier to those wishing to get into fishing. 
 
Fifth, the timescale involved for any of the possible scenarios to come to fruition may be as long 
as 10 years. While it is clear that interim measures will need to be agreed quite quickly in order 
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to allow fishing in UK waters to continue at all, the more nuanced negotiations will be extremely 
complex and take time. Sixth, the fisheries sector as a whole is very small in terms of its 
contribution to the overall GDP of the UK, with the inshore sector only contributing a very small 
percentage of that. Partly as a result of this there are widespread concerns amongst those 
involved in the inshore fishing sector that it may be used as a bargaining chip in the wider Brexit 
negotiations and effectively become marginalised. This perception is linked to the concerns 
about the sector’s lack of representation. 
 
Bearing these caveats in mind, the three scenarios were developed as follows: 
 
Scenario 1: Retention of the Status Quo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2: UK regains control of its waters to 12 nm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
5. access to fishing areas and the allocation of quota will remain broadly in line with the 
current arrangements under the CFP; 
6. access to the EU’s markets will remain unchanged and no tariffs will be introduced; 
7. management of the UK’s fisheries will continue to be through negotiations with EU 
members in Brussels, rather than at a national or local level; 
8. existing EU environmental designations will be incorporated into UK legislation. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
5. insufficient quota to allow many of them to survive, economically; 
6. often inappropriate and burdensome legislation; 
7. insufficient opportunities for successors; 
8. the decline of the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall. 
 
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
5. the London Convention 1964 will be repealed, ending Relative Stability and 
‘grandfather rights’; 
6. access to non UK boats will be restricted to beyond 12 nm; 
7. more quota is reserved for UK boats, including for inshore boats; 
8. the EU imposes tariffs of 5-10% on all fish imports from the UK. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
7. able to extend their fishing out to 12 nm with less fear of damage to their gear; 
8. reduces the pressure on inshore stocks - especially beneficial to pot fishermen; 
9. more quota is available to inshore fishers than at present, reducing the impact of 
‘choke’ species and improving their economic viability; 
10. a 5-10% tariff is balanced by the fall in the value of the £ relative to the €; 
11. EU market demand continues, but more incentive to develop domestic markets; 
12. succession opportunities improve and the decline in inshore fisher numbers is halted. 
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Scenario 3: UK regains control of its EEZ/median line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.2.7 Presentation of the project’s findings to DEFRA 
Although the Sufisa project has been financed by the European commission, and it is to the 
Commission that the results of the research should be reported, it was felt important to also 
present the results to the UK's government department responsible for fisheries - Defra 
(Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs) – not least due to the forthcoming 
Brexit negotiations. Contact was made with Defra and a meeting arranged with the Marine and 
Fisheries Evidence Department. They were keen to hear the results of the research undertaken 
as part of Sufisa, particularly in relation to the upcoming Brexit negotiations. 
 
A meeting was arranged for 10th May 2017 at Defra's offices in London. Doctors Kirwan and 
Maye attended the meeting and presented the research team's findings on the Cornwall Inshore 
Fishing sector. The aim of the meeting was to: provide a brief context for the work undertaken; 
to explain the methodology used; to flag up some of the key issues that have emerged from the 
research undertaken; and to present the range of scenarios that were developed as part of the 
workshop undertaken under Task 2.3. 
 
Some of the key messages presented by the research team, included: 
• The inshore sector is desperate for more quota and there are concerns about the 
introduction of licence capping. 
• There is a need to consider buying out licences and quota that have been increasingly 
traded over recent years, so that they can then be re-distributed by the state. 
Following the Brexit negotiations: 
6. the London Convention 1964 will be repealed, ending Relative Stability and 
‘grandfather rights’; 
7. the UK will take back control of its 200 nm EEZ, or the median line; 
8. UK fishing will be based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
9. the EU imposes tariffs of 30-35% on all fish imports from the UK*; 
10. access to EU waters for UK boats is strictly curtailed. 
 
Predicted impact on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall: 
7. marine planning of all UK waters is completely under control of the UK authorities; 
8. legislation can be better tailored to local conditions; 
9. a greater share of the quota allocated goes to the inshore sector, reducing the impact 
of ‘choke’ species and improving their economic viability; 
10. EU markets demand for their catch is reduced by 30%, meaning that it is imperative 
to develop more local markets; 
11. restricted access to EU waters will not affect the inshore sector; 
12. greater opportunities and optimism for the future of the sector, including succession. 
 
• If this were to be the case, then tariffs would be set to WTO levels. These operate on a 
sliding scale, with processed fish having tariffs in the order of 25% and raw fish being lower 
than this. 
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• Fishers see Brexit as an opportunity for change, but are sceptical that the UK 
Government will argue the fisheries’ position strongly enough in the Brexit negotiations. 
• The research team presented that the feeling from the FGs and workshop was that the 
UK’s starting position in the Brexit negotiations should be to get the EEZ back and to 
hopefully end up with the 12 nm zone returned to UK control. 
• The point was made that the inshore sector was very keen to see national waters 
extended to 12 nm, whereby no foreign boats would be allowed in those waters. The 
Defra team asked why 12 nm? The response was that much of the current legislation 
works to this level; it is also a key area in which inshore fishers would like to fish, but are 
effectively excluded from due to concerns about their gear being damaged. 
• The need to give voice to the inshore fishers, not least because neither Fishing for Leave 
nor the CFPO do this sufficiently well. Defra was interested to hear that FFL does not 
necessarily speak for the whole of the fishing sector. In this respect, the research team 
said that there was support at the local level for the development of a Coastal PO. 
• Frustration that much of the regulation developed at the Commission is not necessarily 
appropriate at a local level, especially in Cornwall where there is such a diverse fishery. 
In this respect, that 'one size does not fit all’ and that there is a need for more 
appropriate bottom-up regulation that has been developed at a local level. 
• Concern about the potential loss of EU markets. Related to this, there is recognition that 
fishers need to become more entrepreneurial in terms of how they market their catch, 
and that perhaps there is a need to support this through both policy and monetary 
support. 
• In response to the observation that the inshore fishing sector is highly marginal in 
economic terms, the research team responded that it was of critical value to the wider 
economy in Cornwall, especially tourism, as well as to the social fabric of many of the 
communities involved. In this regard, it was discussed that it would be of value to 
conduct an SROI (Social Return on Investment) on the inshore fishing sector in Cornwall. 
This would then provide a clearer idea as to the wider benefits of the inshore sector, 
expressed in monetary terms. 
• It was acknowledged by Defra that it would be critical to review, and perhaps repeal, 
the London Fisheries Convention, in that this convention enshrines the notion of 
‘relative stability’ and hence historic fishing rights. 
• Ultimately, if change along the lines suggested above does not come about to some 
extent, the research team made the point that the future of the inshore fishing sector 
in Cornwall does not look bright, especially after the current generation of fishers die 
out. In this respect, that existing fishers are inherently highly resilient, but that fishing 
as a vocation/job has much less appeal these days, as well as providing fewer 
opportunities than it did a generation ago. 
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5 UK Case Study B: Dairy producers in Somerset 
5.1 Case study introduction and context 
5.1.1 Dairy farming in the UK 
The UK is the third-largest milk producer in the EU after Germany and France, and the tenth-
largest producer in the world (Bates 2016). In 2014, the UK recorded its highest production 
volumes since 1990, with 14.6 billion litres of milk. The dairy sector accounts for about 18% of 
the UK total agricultural output. England is the main dairy producer, but production is increasing 
in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
Dairy farming in the UK is undergoing a sustained process of restructuring, characterized by the 
concentration of milk production in fewer but more intensive farms (Dairy UK 2013). Indeed, in 
the last ten years the number of dairy farms declined at an average rate of 4% per year, 
combined with a 27% reduction in the total number of dairy cows (Figure 16). In the same 
period, the average farm size increased from 75 cows in 1996 to 133 in 2014 (Figure 17) (Bates 
2016). As one interviewee noted, “the average [herd size] in the UK is now around 130/140 
cows, the highest in Europe” (D: Interviewee 1). This process of concentration into a smaller 
number of dairy producers was noted by a number of interviewees. The process has been 
counterbalanced by higher cow productivity. Since 1975, the milk yield per cow increased by 
93%, resulting in a 9% increase of total domestic milk production over the period (Bates 2016). 
 
Figure 16. Restructuring of UK dairy sector (milk production, farmers & cow no.s) 
 
Source: Dairy UK (2013) 
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Figure 17. The number of dairy farms and average herd size in the UK 
 
Source: Dairy UK (2013) (Dairy UK 2013) 
 
The process of concentration and intensification is reflected further in Figures 18 and 19. Firstly, 
Figure 18 shows an overall, national trend towards less dairy farms. This accentuated the 
concentration of dairy farms in the mid-west and western regions of the country (and Yorkshire), 
which have long been well-known for dairy farming (Ilbery 1992). However, even these 
established dairying areas have experienced a decrease in the number of total dairy farms. To 
contextualise these decreases, Figure 19 shows the number of diary farms as a percentage of 
the overall number of farms, per county. This is important as the total number of farms is also 
decreasing. It therefore indicates an overall decrease in the number of dairy farms relative to 
the total number of farms. In 1995, dairy farms typically represented over 18 per cent of the 
farms in many of the mid-west and western counties. However, with the exception of Cheshire 
(where dairy farms still accounted for over 18 per cent in 2013), previously ‘strong hold’ dairy 
counties, such as Devon, Somerset and Cornwall, dairy farms accounted for as little as 3-12 per 
cent in 2013. This is not to say dairy is disappearing. Instead, it reinforces the idea of a trend 
towards fewer, larger and more productive farms (see Figure 16 above), which has been well-
observed throughout developed market economies. In comparison with the EU27 average rate 
of farm exits, which is about -5%, the exit rate in the UK is lower, at about -3.5% (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
A study commissioned by the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB), which is 
a stakeholders group of UK farmers, analysed the factors driving structural change in the UK 
dairy sector (DairyCo 2013). The factors identified can be clustered into two main categories, 
‘social’ and ‘economic’ drivers, as follows: 
 
a) Social drivers: 
• Succession – the presence of a successor induces farm planning for the future, 
by increasing productive investments and reducing the probability of exiting the 
sector. 
• Age – younger farmers tend to be more business focussed, seeking expansion 
and productive innovations rather than exit strategies. 
• Education – farmers with higher qualifications are more likely to seek business 
expansion. 
 
b) Economic drivers: 
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• Profit – the higher the profit, the lower the propensity to exit the sector. 
• Cost levels – input prices account for the majority of variation in profit affecting 
farmers’ decisions to exit the sector. 
• Milk price – prices can affect business intentions indirectly through profits. 
• Family labour – farms with higher levels of family labour are more likely to seek 
expansion. 
 
Figure 18. Number of dairy farms, by English county  
 
Source: Data - AHDB (2015) 
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Figure 19. Number of farms as a percentage of total farms, by English county  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data - AHDB (2015) 
 
The DairyCo (2013) study provides a good summary of the key drivers impacting restructuring 
in dairy and the issues highlighted echo desk review and interview findings reported here, 
especially in relation to market conditions (see below). These factors can also affect farms in 
different ways depending on the type of dairy system, which in the UK are variable despite 
restructuring trends. The types of dairy farm in the UK run from small scale, family, extensive 
units where animals are exclusively grazed, to more business units where cows are housed and 
fed for all of their lactation (Dairy UK 2013). The predominant types of dairy farms in UK are:  
• Cows at grass: grass-based systems operating at lower yields. 
• Composite: use of family labour and a mixed approach to feeding and housing. 
• High-output cows: housed for most of the year with intensive use of inputs. 
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The farmer’s choice towards a specific dairy system depends on several factors, including the 
availability of resources and space, the characteristics of the milk required by the purchaser, the 
capital available and policy support (Dairy UK 2013). Differences between dairy systems, 
particularly grass-based and housed systems, were noted in the interviews. Interestingly, 
interviewees and participants at the first national roundtable argued that rather than comparing 
systems the key factor is management of the dairy unit (in terms finance, input costs, disease 
control etc.). As one interviewee pointed out: 
“Both ends of the spectrum will be making money, providing it's done in an efficient way.  
There will be people that are on three times a day milking, feeding everything to their 
cows, that will make just as much money as a person that's milking their cows once a day 
on a grass fed system, but they know their business and they have fine-tuned it.  They are 
set up for it and that's the thing...it is knowing that your farm is set up for the right sort of 
dairy farming and you can do that year in year out, cost effectively” (D: Interviewee 6). 
 
In 2014/2015 dairy farms in the UK had an average Farm Business Income (FBI) of £83,904, which 
is 4.2% lower than the previous year (McHoul et al. 2016). Factors in 2014/2015 that contributed 
to the farm’s income and margins are: CAP subsidy; a reduction in feed costs which helped offset 
lower milk outputs; good quality conserved forage for the winter period; lower fertiliser and 
energy costs (McHoul et al. 2016). Small dairy farms have a FBI that is 9% higher than the UK 
average dairy farm, despite the fact that labour costs on small farms are higher than the average 
and production contracts are less utilised (McHoul et al. 2016). 
 
5.1.2 The UK case study area: Somerset 
In order to study the conditions, strategies and performances in which dairy farmers operate in 
the UK, Somerset was selected as a case study area because of its high representativeness in 
terms of agro-ecological and socio-economic characteristics and dairy farming structure. 
Somerset is a rural county located in south-west England (Figure 20). Somerset’s climate is 
temperate and generally wetter and milder than the rest of England. The landscape is a 
combination of hills and large flat levels. The agro-ecological habitat on the hills is calcareous 
grassland, with some arable land. About 70% of the flat area is grassland and 30% is arable. 
 
Figure 20. Somerset Location Map 
 
Source: Wikipedia (http://familypedia.wikia.com/wiki/Chard,_Somerset; accessed 21.03.16) 
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Somerset has a strong tradition of agriculture, especially dairy and livestock farming. Half of 
Somerset’s gross output is constituted by agricultural value added (NFU Somerset). The majority 
of the area is grassland, with a significant proportion also dedicated to arable crops (Figure 21). 
The county has heavy soils, which is one reason why there is a concentration of dairy farming 
(i.e. the land is suited to this form of production). Farms in the county were also small (Ilbery 
1992), which further explains the traditional concentration of dairy farms in the county. About 
60% of the farmed land is owner occupied (NFU Somerset 2016).  
 
Figure 21. Land use types in Somerset 
 
Source: NFU Somerset (https://www.nfuonline.com/assets/9494; accessed 29.09.17) 
 
The total number of agricultural holdings in Somerset in 2007 exceeded 9000 units (Table 5), of 
which about 30% were small farms lower than 50Ha, and more than 50% were very small farms 
below 5ha. Dairy farms are quite numerous, accounting for about 12% of Somerset’s farms. The 
number of dairy farms has remained concentrated over time (see Table 5 and Figure 17), 
although the sector locally has seen some exiting the sector, as noted in interviews. One 
interviewee usefully summarised the profile of dairy farming in Somerset as follows: 
“We've got some real long-term dairy farms here that are family, very traditional…Most 
of them, virtually every farm in this county, is family run…There are very few, you know, 
there would be a handful, literally a handful within the county, of farms that are over 
1,000 cows, five, four, it's very few…the herds average size in Somerset is probably 200 
cows now” (D: Interviewee 1). 
 
In short, herd size numbers in the county have increased but essentially the county retains a 
profile of mostly family run dairy farms. The county is also home to a number of large processors 
and high-quality dairy industries, including Dairy Crest, Müller Wiseman Dairies, Wykes, Barbers, 
the Ilchester Cheese Company and Yeo Valley Organic, which collectively supply domestic food 
retailers with a wide range of dairy products including yoghurts and cheeses. Among Somerset’s 
traditional dairy products, West Country Farmhouse Cheddar was awarded a Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) designation in 1996 (see section 5.3.6). 
 
In more general terms, Somerset is quite developed from a socio-economic perspective. The 
unemployment rate is lower than the national average. The most developed sectors are retail, 
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manufacturing, tourism, and health and social care, which employ the largest part of the 
population. Agriculture and food and drink production are among the major industries in the 
county, employing over 12,000 people. 
 
Table 5. Agricultural holdings, farming structure and the dairy sector in Somerset. 
Somerset1 2000 2003 2005 2007 
Total number of holdings 6,030 8,210 8,550 9,410 
Number of holdings in LFA 360 510 540 650 
Number of holdings <5ha 1,980 4,060 4,220 4,940 
Number of holdings with 5-50ha 2,440 2,520 2,680 2,780 
Dairy cows, number 109,470 104,570 95,800 91,780 
South West2      
Milk output (Mio £) 590.7 644.2 600.6 647.1 
Total Agricultural output 1,699.4 1,889.2 1,938.1 2,0364.4 
1Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/agriculture/data/database; accessed 15.04.17) 
2Source: Defra (https://www.gov.uk/agricultural-survey; 29.09.17)  
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5.2 Regulatory conditions 
This section gives an overview of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and related measures 
which have an impact on the UK dairy sector. It also reviews a broader set of regulations – not 
only emanating from the CAP- which influences the UK dairy sector. 
 
5.2.1 The CAP and its implications for the UK dairy sector 
The CAP sets out the overarching policy conditions for all farmers in the EU. Since its inception 
in 1962 the CAP has been reformed in 1992, 2003 and 2013. A detailed analysis of those reforms 
is not warranted here but in essence until 2013 they moved from a product-based support 
system, focused on preserving food security, to a producer-based support system aiming for 
greater efficiency (see Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22. Timeline of the development of the CAP  
 
Source: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm; accessed 
March 2016)  
 
The milestones in the CAP’s evolution that have had and are having an influence on the UK dairy 
sector are (for more details on the first three see Banks and Marsden 1997): 
• The introduction of milk quotas in 1983; 
• The 1992 CAP Reform and farmers’ payments for ecosystem services; 
• The abolition of the Milk Marketing Boards in 1994; and  
• The abolition of milk quotas in 2015 (see section 5.2.2) 
 
The CAP provides direct financial support to dairy farmers, through its two pillars: the direct 
support package (Pillar I) and the rural development programme (Pillar II). All CAP payments in 
the UK are managed by the Rural Payment Agency (RPA). The Single Farm Payment (SFP; now 
Basic Payment Scheme) accounts for about 30% of FBI, while payments from agri-environmental 
schemes accounts for about 6% of the FBI (McHoul et al., 2016). A brief summary of CAP 
payment and related packages is provided below, alongside assessment and comment from 
interviewees on the role of CAP support. 
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5.2.1.1 Pillar I support  
The 2003 CAP Reform introduced the Single Payment Scheme, based on payments decoupled 
from production volumes and linked to the number of hectares of land managed by the farm 
and to cross compliance standards (environmental, food safety and animal welfare practices). 
From January 2015, the SPS has been replaced by the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS)16, which is 
the largest direct support for the farming industry granted by the EU. Only farmers with at least 
5 hectares of agricultural land and 5 ‘entitlements’ can apply for the BPS. Applications are once 
a year - in May - and payments start in December.  
 
In addition to the BPS, farmers can obtain further direct support through, for example: 
• Young farmers’ top-ups: in order to encourage generational renewal, new entrant 
farmers with less than 40 years can receive additional payments for a period of up to 5 
years. This is in addition to other measures for young farmers under Pillar II. 
• Small Farmers Scheme: farmers can receive an annual payment of €500 to €1250. 
Participants are not subject to cross-compliance controls and sanctions, and are exempt 
from greening. 
• Voluntary coupled support: this is support for struggling sectors due to economic, social 
and/or environmental reasons. Member states can provide limited amounts of 
"coupled" payments. This is limited to up to 8% of the national envelope, or up to 13% 
if the current level of coupled support in a member state is higher than 5%17. 
 
In addition to BPS support, other support targeted at specific groups of farmers/sectors is 
theoretically available. BSP is important to dairy farmers and is by far the most significant form 
of support dairy farmers receive. Interviewees noted that when milk prices are good the reliance 
on subsidy support is not as significant as some other sectors or for farmers in more deprived 
regions. However, in the current environment and in other periods of poor milk price the BPS is 
regarded as a lifeline, particularly for smaller farms and/or farms exposed to global market 
fluctuations. Interviewees did not always agree with direct support – it was argued, for example, 
that it helps to keep some dairy farms in business who would otherwise have exited, which was 
not good for the long-term sustainability of the sector. The following two quotes capture the 
views expressed regarding basic payment (direct) support: 
“At the moment they're [BPSs] sort of a lifesaver in a way, because that keeps you, it'll 
keep your head above water, whereas two years ago, when prices were good, yes, we 
had, we actually bought land, 18 months ago, but they, our single farm payment was less 
than half of one milk cheque at the time and now...I suppose it would be pretty much 
equivalent to one milk cheque now...it sort of distorts the market as well a bit doesn't it, 
in a way” (D: Interviewee 3). 
“If your farm's not making a profit without that money, it's not sustainable way of farming 
is it and I think that's the biggest one, a lot of people do rely on their single farm payment 
to back their business up at the end rather than actually looking at their business and 
thinking should we invest” (D: Interviewee 6). 
 
                                                          
16 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-937_en.htm accessed on March 2016 
17 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-937_en.htm accessed on March 2016 
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5.2.1.2 Rural development programme (Pillar 2) 
The 2014-2020 Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE) consists of four main 
elements: 1) Countryside Stewardship; 2) Countryside Productivity; 3) the Growth Programme; 
and 4) LEADER. Under the RDPE, £3.5 billion will be invested in rural development until 2020, 
with £2.1 billion on existing environmental schemes and £900 million on Countryside 
Stewardship. Countryside Stewardship provides financial incentives for land managers to look 
after the environment. In 2013, 65% of dairy farmland in England had been entered into 
Countryside Stewardship agreements (DairyRoadmap 2013). Farmers can also apply for support 
to convert conventional to organic production or to maintain organic production.  
 
The Countryside Productivity Scheme supports investments in resource management, including, 
for example, aid of up to 40% of the total eligible costs for machineries improving the efficiency 
of slurry application and reducing nitrogen loss, aid for the installation of LED lighting in livestock 
housing for non-intensive dairy farms and improving water management for farmers or groups 
of farmers. The Growth Programme18, on the other hand, addresses dairy producers who wish 
to diversify into non-agricultural activities. The RPA manages the grants, working with Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), financing: business development; farm diversification into non-
agricultural activities; micro, small and medium-sized dairy processing; and small-scale tourism 
infrastructure. Similar to the Growth Programme, the RDPE’s LEADER programme aims to 
provide funding for businesses and organisations seeking developments in rural areas through 
ad hoc projects, which can include support dairy farms if the proposal fits at least one of six 
priority areas.19 One interviewee, who runs a LEADER Local Action Group, explained the key 
difference between the last two mentioned forms of support as follows: 
“[T]here’s a lot of similarities between the two but the theoretical difference is LEADER is 
supposed to be bottom-up, so it's supposed to be what communities and what local 
people need, and we will deliver that, and then you've got the Growth Fund which is much 
more DEFRA top-down, which is a national programme”. 
 
Interviews noted that uptake of Pillar 2 schemes was minimal on dairy farms in Somerset, 
particularly since the latest round of agri-environmental supports was introduced, which are 
much more prescriptive and off-putting to farmers because Pillar 2 payment penalties also 
impact Pillar 1 payments. The following interviewee summarises the situation well: 
“ELS payment in the new countryside stewardship measure is […] more prescriptive, it's a 
lot more record keeping and the payments are worth a lot less, so to access the same sort 
of levels of payment, you would have to seriously compromise your farming system […] 
it's more legislative, it's less money, let’s not bother, and the fact that you're open up to 
inspections, which affect both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 payments, so if you breach your ELS 
agreement, and get a 3% penalty, that reflects on your basic payment” (D: Interviewee 4). 
 
                                                          
18 Growth Programme: grants for the rural economy  
19 These priorities aim to: 1) support micro and small businesses and farm diversification; 2) enhance and 
support rural tourism; 3) increase farm productivity (e.g. projects are supported that develop low carbon 
approaches to improve agricultural efficiency); 4) increase forestry productivity; 5) provide rural services; 
and 6) provide cultural and heritage activities. 
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Accessing funds via LEADER was also difficult and the application process onerous and off 
putting. This was acknowledged also by the manager of a Local Action Group, who explained the 
application process: 
“Well, the first thing is there's an outline application which is basically a basic checking 
process, so are you in an eligible area, because it's very very tightly defined 
geographically...They then do a full application which is a horrible, horrible form and it's 
designed by a policymaker in Westminster without any realisation of what actually 
happens on the ground...Then it gets externally appraised by an external appraiser...That 
appraisal is then checked by the RPA and that's where the RPA are now coming in and 
making all sorts of completely unjustified requests... It then goes to the LAG group for 
their final decision and if the LAG group say, yes, then actually then it goes through” (D: 
Interviewee 7). 
 
5.2.2 Abolition of the milk quota system 
Milk quotas were abolished in March 2015. Quotas were originally introduced in 1983 for 5 years 
(Banks and Marsden 1997). The decision to remove milk quotas had been resisted several times 
but in 2008 it was finally agreed that the quota system would be abolished, through a 
progressive 1% annual increase of quotas from 2009 to 2013, towards complete removal in 
2015. The decision to remove milk quotas was motivated by the increase in demand for dairy 
products globally, especially in emerging countries like China. The quota regime was viewed as 
a potential barrier to EU producers responding to this growing global demand, hence limiting 
the EU dairy sector’s competitiveness and growth. 
 
Along with opportunities for expansion and intensification of production, inevitably the abolition 
of quota also created production and marketing issues that dairy farmers had to face. In the UK, 
the Milk Quota Scheme was administered by the RPA. Producers exceeding their own quota 
were subject to a levy based on the volume of milk produced in excess. There were two types of 
quota: for milk sold wholesale and for milk sold via direct sale. Wholesale quota covered whole 
milk which was sold in bulk by a producer to a first purchaser. Direct sales quota covered milk 
and milk products sold directly by the producer to consumers. Ending the milk quota system 
implied that production should be based on market demand and opportunities, with the dairy 
industry self-adjusting the quantity of milk produced by monitoring and responding to market 
signals. In practice, for milk producers the end of milk quotas can: firstly, lead to administrative 
simplification by reducing the on-farm daily monitoring of milk production levels; and secondly, 
can increase the need for close and regular monitoring of market signals so that production 
matches demand (DairyCo 2013). As a result, the removal of quota can be either a business 
opportunity or a risk factor.  
 
The removal of milk quota is therefore a significant change to regulatory conditions and in the 
worst case scenario it can lead to more dairy farms exiting the sector. Abolishing milk quotas 
has several implications, but in general terms they can be classified into two main effects: 
 
• Production effect: Predicting the changes in milk production due to the lifting of quotas 
is not straightforward. In theory, removing the quota should result in an increase in 
output and, consequently, in a decrease of milk prices. Lower prices can potentially 
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increase consumer demand, but in the absence of new markets for the additional milk 
produced, the market is likely to settle at a lower price level (Kovács 2014). The global 
milk market is an open system influenced by several conditions which make this 
theoretical equation somewhat invalid. For instance, milk buyers’ behavior is uncertain 
and any changes in their behavior will be (partially) transferred to dairy farmers, 
influencing the amount of output. In this case, the use of production contracts, which 
can stabilize prices and market access, will largely affect future dairy production levels. 
However, the introduction of greater market orientation can provoke a shift towards 
more competitive value-added products, especially for export. For instance, EU cheese 
production from 2003 to 2013 increased by 26% and the volume of cheese exports rose 
by 69%. 
 
• Price effect: The dairy market is not a single commodity market, but it is composed of 
several types of products, with different levels of processing (liquid milk, cream, 
powdered milk, butter, fresh cheese, mature cheese, etc.). This implies that each 
product can suffer from specific price effects. By removing milk quota, dairy supplies are 
no longer constrained, and production volumes can largely vary, exposing farmers to 
higher milk price volatility. Moreover, higher production volumes combined with 
unchanged demand levels can provoke prices to drop. If domestic production levels in 
the UK remain stable, the most significant price changes will come from international 
markets, that is, from the EU and/or the global market. The greatest price effects will 
therefore concern tradable commodity milk products, as their prices follow 
international markets. Overall, how farmers will be affected by the price effect of quota 
removal will depend on the product they supply, the supply chain and their ability to 
adapt to market price changes. Dairy producers who will be able to respond to market 
variations are less likely to exit the sector. 
 
Interviewee responses, when asked about milk quota and its potential impact on UK dairy 
farmers, were interesting. At one level, interviewees argued the abolition of milk quota was not 
really an issue for UK dairy farmers because reaching quota has not been an issue for several 
years due to significant restructuring and downsizing in terms of dairy farm numbers. In other 
words, the UK has not been close to meeting its quota limit and is therefore not important. 
However, as interviewees also pointed out, the removal of quota impacts the wider milk pool, 
particularly at a European level, as noted in the following quote, for example: 
“[Quotas have] not been relevant to this country for a long time because we fell below 
our milk quota a long time ago. It had an effect on other European countries, who have 
been constrained by quotas. You've seen this huge surge in production in some countries, 
Germany, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, for other reasons, so that's depressed the 
global market place and the reason why there hasn't been a price response is because, 
having made this investment, farmers are clinging on and eventually there will be a new 
equilibrium and we'll go through the price cycle again, so UK farmers have been impacted 
by abolition through the general depression of the market place, but not directly.” 
 
The impact of milk quota on UK dairy farmers has thus so far been indirect. Symbolically the 
removal of quota also signals a further step towards complete deregulation of milk markets. 
There was debate and disagreement among interviewees about whether the milk market is 
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better under a free market system or a regime of control, with some referring back although not 
necessarily proposing a renewal of a Milk Marketing Board-type model. For example: 
“I think perhaps agriculture sometimes needs protection...that's why we had Marketing 
Boards and they actually, sometimes it seems a bit immoral, but putting a bottom on the 
market was very helpful for farmers. Perhaps we've still got that but it depends if we want 
to keep family farming as a viable business, then it will have to be supported more than it 
is and, at the moment, the level of support through basic payment isn't enough if 
commodity prices are this low...it's something that we, as a nation, we've decided, and 
Europe as a whole has decided, that we go free market, but we're suffering because of it” 
(D: Interviewee 9). 
“I think we threw the baby out with the bath water. I think the quotas were brought in to 
cure the butter mountains and the wine lakes and stuff. It did that. Rather than just 
throwing it out, and saying it's crap, people tend to do that, they say, ‘oh, this has got a 
fault in it, so we'll chuck it out’, but if they've looked at the system and said can we 
improve it, rather than binning it” (D: Interviewee 3). 
 
Interviewees (D2, D4, D5, D10, D11) noted too that milk quota in the past was an asset, including 
for tenant farmers, which now no longer exists. 
 
5.2.3 The Milk Package  
Published in March 2012, the “Milk Package” consists of a series of measures and policy 
instruments devised to better support the participation of dairy producers in the milk supply 
chain, in response to the 2009 milk market crisis. It was also designed to help ensure the long-
term future and sustainability of the dairy sector following the abolition of the dairy quota 
system. The milk package measures have been applicable since 3 October 2012 and apply until 
mid-2020. The measures constitute a major amendment to the Common Organisation of the 
Markets in Agricultural Products (Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council) in which the milk sector is integrated 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk/policy-instruments/index_en.htm; accessed: 
03.05.2016). The rules of the package are concerned with: 1) written contracts between milk 
producers and processors; 2) the possibility to negotiate contract terms collectively via producer 
organisations; 3) new rules to regulate the supply of PDO/PGI cheeses; and 4) specific rules for 
inter-branch organisations.  The overall aim of the package is therefore to enhance information 
availability and the transparency of the market. According to the Milk Package, written contracts 
between dairy producers and processors can be made compulsory at member state level, and 
dairy purchasers are obliged to offer minimum contract durations to farmers. The contracts 
should be made in advance of delivery and must set specificities such as price, volume, duration, 
payments, collection and rules for force majeure. Contracts are expected to be negotiated and 
farmers may refuse offers of minimum contract duration.  
 
An important aspect of the package is the possibility for farmers to collectively negotiate 
contracts. With the abolition of milk marketing boards, the role of producer organisations (PO) 
has increased. As well as the potential to negotiate milk prices, the “volume of milk that a PO 
can negotiate is limited to 3.5% of the EU production and to 33% of the national production of 
the Member States involved”. For member states with a production of less than 500,000 tonnes 
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the limit is set at 45% of national production instead of 33%. This is expected to balance the 
bargaining power of milk producers across the EU. The other important aspect is that the “limits 
allow negotiations between POs of approximately the same size as a major dairy processor while 
maintaining effective competition on the dairy market” (EU commission 2014). Upon request of 
either a PO, an interbranch organisation or a PDO/PGI group, member states can devise rules to 
regulate the supply of PDO/PGI cheeses. As noted, “[t]his measure is aimed at ensuring the value 
added and quality of cheeses with a protected designation of origin (PDO) or protected 
geographical indications (PGI), which are particularly important for vulnerable rural regions” (EU 
commission 2014). Specific EU rules for inter-branch organisations allow actors of the dairy 
supply chain to develop dialogue and to carry out joint activities such as “promotion, research, 
innovation and quality improvement, for a better knowledge and transparency of production 
and the market” (EU commission 2014). 
 
The Milk Package, particularly the possibility to create POs, was discussed with interviewees. 
Stakeholders recognised and were supportive of the overall intentions of the Milk Package and 
noted the potential to establish POs and to give dairy farmers greater power in terms of 
negotiating contracts. However, there is limited uptake of this activity in the UK. The reason is 
partly because of a general culture of non-co-operation among farmers but the scheme is also 
rather cumbersome as currently implemented by Defra. There is one PO which has set up called 
Dairy Crest Direct, which has recently split into two POs, one retaining the original name and 
another linked to supply milk for Davidstow cheddar. The following two quotes nice capture the 
views expressed regarding the package and especially POs: 
“Dairy Crest Direct, or PO, we were one of the few / only ones pretty much that used the 
money from the dairy package to help set up the PO's to invest in the futures trading... 
the main thing about the PO for us was negotiating prices and now volumes...we had to 
register to be a PO to be able to do that without being in breach of competition law” (D: 
Interviewee 3). 
“The trouble is to create a producer organisation you still have to get together, find a 
leader, get organised, whatever, a very long protracted process...fundamentally it can't 
alter the milk price because the milk purchaser has to be sure that they get the 
competitive milk price, otherwise they go out of business. The Commission came up with 
this package of measures, look, we've given you the tools to improve your negotiating 
positions, go out there and exploit them...They're not really relevant to improving their 
milk price and it doesn't really mitigate the impact of price volatility, so the package of 
measures is really a bit neither here nor there” (D: Interviewee 12). 
5.2.4 Exceptional EU support schemes exclusive to dairy farmers 
In addition to the financial aids of the CAP outlined above, there are EU support schemes that 
have been set up exclusively for dairy farmers. The need for additional aid and support is 
motivated by and responding to recent market risks and price volatility that dairy producers are 
facing. For example, through the Private Storage Aid scheme, dairy producers could receive aid 
to store production excess when markets are unfavourable (i.e. when prices are very low). 
Funding depends on the cost of storage, the quality depreciation and market price changes. 
Products such as butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder can be stored under the scheme. In 
summary, the scheme is a form of intervention that subsidises private processors and co-ops to 
take product off the market. As one interviewee put it,  
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“It is the European Union intervening in a market and taking product off the market…it 
hasn’t been used for such a long time, its only really come back in the last 12 months” (D: 
Interviewee 1). 
 
In October 2015 the European Commission also announced a €500 million aid package for EU 
farmers intended as an urgent response to the situation facing the dairy and pigmeat markets. 
The support package provided flexibility in terms of how member states want to use the €420 
million targeted aid to benefit farmers20. In December 2015, the UK dairy farmers received “a 
one-off support payment linked to milk production to help with their cash-flow problems caused 
by volatile prices”21. In England, dairy farmers were meant to be sharing £15.5m “in recognition 
of the prolonged period of low prices in this particular farming sector” (ibid). The Farming 
Minister for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), George Eustice, 
commented that “[d]airy farmers are a vital part of our £100billion food and farming industry 
and I’m pleased to confirm that ministers across the Union have agreed to distribute the aid in 
the simplest way – linked to milk production - to ensure the RPA can get this money into farmers’ 
bank accounts promptly.” In England and Wales, the payment for an average-sized dairy farm 
was about £1,800. 
 
Following the aid package, in April 2016, the European Commission published new rules 
providing the opportunity for farmers to jointly plan milk production. This option is provided in 
the context of Article 222 of the CAP Market Regulation (1308/2014), which was introduced for 
the first time in the 2013 CAP Reform. Article 222 allows for special measures to be activated 
when there is severe imbalance in the market. Specifically, the Commissioner granted member 
states authorisation to curtail production for an initial period of six months and up to one year. 
The European Commission allows member states (with the coordination of cooperatives and 
Producers Organisations) to pay farmers up to €15,000 (£12,000) each as an incentive to “freeze 
production” in a bid to address oversupply in the dairy market. This quote nicely summarises 
the rationale behind Article 222: 
“It's on the same lines as allowing farmers to take up producer organisations. Article 222 
measures said, okay, what we'll do is basically give a further derogation from competition 
law to allow producer organisations and coops to, which is academic here because it 
doesn't work in this country, but to come together and basically agree on managing milk 
supply. In theory, we are in a situation now where the Commission has given the legal 
basis that all the coops in the European Union come together and say, okay, there's too 
much milk on the market, we'll all agree to cut production, limit production by X, Y and Z.  
So it's a derogation from competition” (D: Interviewee 12). 
 
As interviewees explained, the UK and UK POs have no plans to take advantage of Article 222, 
but other countries (e.g. France) are in favour of market stabilisation measures, including 
restrictions on the amount of milk produced. Even though the UK has not applied directly for 
Article 222 support, there are indirect impacts via the common market and global milk markets. 
                                                          
20 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsroom/231_en.htm accessed on March 2016 
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eu-farming-support-package-allocations-announced accessed 
on March 2016 
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The application of voluntary temporary “dairy quotas” by other member states can indirectly 
affect UK dairy producers’ price conditions, for example22. 
 
5.2.5 Regulations 
The following sub-section covers regulations and legislation that are of significant importance 
to dairy farmers, including the Animal Welfare Act 2006, animal health regulations, especially in 
relation to bovine Tuberculosis (bTB), and nitrogen reduction measures within the Water 
Framework and Nitrates Directives. The regulations were identified via the desk analysis but 
there importance was confirmed and given high priority (bTB, for example) in the interviews. 
 
5.2.5.1 Animal welfare 
The main piece of legislation ruling animal welfare in the UK is the Animal Welfare Act 2006. The 
act states that any unnecessary suffering caused to any animal constitutes an offence. 
Moreover, people owning animals have the responsibility to make sure that their needs are met. 
The legislation is founded on the ‘five freedoms’ of the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC). 
Animal welfare includes: 1) a suitable environment; 2) a suitable diet; 3) the ability to exhibit 
normal behaviour patterns; 4) any need it has to be housed with, or apart from, other animals; 
and 5) protection from pain, suffering, injury and disease. According to the legislation, loose 
yards should not be overcrowded. For average cows of 600 kilograms, a bedded area of 6.5 
square meters (m²) and a loafing area of 2.5m² per animal, with water troughs sited in the 
bedded area, should be provided. Cleanliness of animals is important in decreasing the 
likelihood of disease and milk contamination with bacteria or other micro-organisms. Animals 
with infectious diseases should be isolated appropriately. In addition to the Animal Welfare Act 
2006, DEFRA provides a Code of Recommendations for the welfare of cattle23. The code is not 
mandatory, but farmers are legally obliged to make sure that all staff attending cattle have 
access to the welfare code, and the welfare codes effectively sit below the welfare act. 
Interviews recognised the importance of regulating animal welfare. Animal welfare issues are 
mostly governed through standards, with the Red Tractor guidelines providing a 
benchmark/basic standard. As one interviewee from Dairy UK remarked,  
“I think [animal welfare] shows a relative degree of stability because I think the industry 
has demonstrated the same credentials to the Red Tractor Scheme” (D: Interviewee 12). 
 
5.2.5.2 Animal health, especially in relation to bTB 
In terms of animal health, diseases and related regulations fall into two main categories: 
‘notifiable diseases’ and ‘non-notifiable diseases’. For notifiable diseases a list of 13 or so cattle 
diseases exists at present and are classified into ‘endemic’ (i.e. diseases already present in the 
UK, such as bTB) and ‘exotic’ (i.e. diseases not normally present in the UK, such as Foot and 
Mouth Disease) (https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/notifiable-diseases-
in%20animals; accessed: 21.09.16). Farmers are legally required to notify authorities. In the UK 
farmers report to the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) if a notifiable disease incidence is 
suspected. Non-notifiable diseases include infectious diseases such as Bovine Viral Diarrhoea 
                                                          
22 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/newsroom/271_en.htm accessed on March 2016 
23 Code of recommendations for the welfare of cattle 
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(BVD), Leptospirosis, Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (IBR) and Paratuberculosis (Johne’s 
disease) and endemic non-infectious diseases (i.e. production disorders), such as mastitis, 
lameness and fertility. Much of the regulation related to cattle diseases covers control of 
notifiable diseases. As one interviewee from the British Cattle Veterinary Association (D13) 
noted, there are very few regulations for most non-notifiable cattle diseases. For instance, there 
are no specific regulations for lameness, mastitis or fertility. There are no regulations for 
infectious diseases such as BVD or Johne’s disease. Instead good practice guidelines exist, 
supported by advice and input from private vets. Milk buyers often have requirements regarding 
milk quality that cover production disorders. For instance, bacterial contamination cell counts 
are required as part of milk quality checks, which indicates sub-clinical mastitis. Supermarkets 
and other retail customers will also have certain expectations and will require dairy farmers to 
meet minimum standards in terms of lameness, housing, etc. which are often included in milk 
contracts or via farm assured standards. 
 
Animal health pressures and compliance with biosecurity regulations are therefore a key 
production issue for dairy producers. As noted by a number of interviewees (D1, D2, D4, D6), 
the most significant piece of animal health regulation that impacts dairy farms concerns bTB. 
BTB has serious consequences for cattle farmers. In 2014 11.1% of herds in Great Britain were 
not officially bTB free, leading to the slaughter of 32,858 cattle (DEFRA 2015). Analysis of bTB 
disease spread shows that most counties in the west and south-west of England are endemic, 
including Somerset (Enticott et al. 2015; Fisher et al. 2012). The increased spread of bTB over 
the past 20 years or so has been attributed to the transmission of the disease from badgers to 
cattle. However, other factors have also been identified, including cattle movements and farm 
management and animal husbandry (Fisher et al. 2012). The UK has a national control plan for 
bTB and legislation which underpins it (DEFRA 2013b), including animal movement restrictions, 
compulsory testing and other biosecurity measures (Maye et al. 2014). Interviewees regarded 
animal movement restrictions as particularly significant and delimiting for dairy farms. 
Movement restrictions can make it difficult to move and sell young calves, for example, pre- and 
post-movement testing is required on farms, and bTB testing is costly, disruptive and 
emotionally draining, particularly if farms are on a 60-day testing cycle. This legislation has a 
significant impact for dairy farms in counties, such as Somerset, where the disease is endemic, 
as farms are more likely to be put on 60-day testing cycles with movement restrictions. 
 
5.2.5.3 Water Framework Directive 
The EU Water Framework Directive (Dir. 2000/60/EC) requires measures for mitigating point 
and diffuse pollution, in order to ensure that water bodies meet environmental quality 
standards (Fezzi et al. 2010). In the UK, one of the major challenges for the implementation of 
the directive is the reduction of diffuse pollution from agriculture. In the case of dairy farmers, 
the main source of pollution comes from nitrates from livestock manure. Under certain 
unpredictable weather conditions, such as flash floods, slurry tanks may overflow, with the 
contents washed into water bodies in the local area. This may cause an excessive amount of 
nitrate pollution. The Nitrates Directive (see below) covers nitrates but the Water Framework 
Directive covers a wider range of diffuse pollutants that may impact the water environment / 
water cleanliness. As one interviewee put it, “this is picking up on phosphates and other minerals 
[in addition to nitrate] that were getting in…it’s setting a standard for water purity” (D: 
Interviewee 1). 
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5.2.5.4 Nitrates Directive and Nitrate Pollution prevention 
Nitrate Pollution Prevention Regulations 2015 (SI 668-2015) came into force on 1 May 2015 
(Beharry-Borg et al. 2013). In total, 62% of the land area of England was designated as Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones in 2010. This was mainly due to high concentrations of nitrates from fertilizers 
and manure. Figure 23 shows the Nitrate Vulnerable Zones in England for 2013.  
 
Figure 23. Nitrate Vulnerable Zones in England, 2013  
 
Source: Defra (2013c) (DEFRA 2013c) 
 
If a dairy farm is within an NVZ zone the regulations are prescriptive regarding allowable nitrate 
levels and farms must have adequate slurry storage (6 months), which has meant significant 
investment costs for some farms. Fezzi et al. (2010) estimated the economic impact of measures 
to reduce nitrate leaching and found that costs of implementing measures may differ 
significantly across and within farm types, according to the individual characteristics of each 
farm. This variability is the result of the mixed conditions under which farms operate. 
5.2.6 Food safety, antibiotics and marketing standards for milk consumption 
The UK Food Safety Act of 1990 is an important piece of legislation for the dairy supply chain. 
The Act defines the traceability standards required for food safety. Traceability can benefit high-
value dairy producers who want to diversify their product from others, monitoring where their 
milk is processed and/or which are the most successful commercial strategies. Hygiene and 
safety standards are a priority on dairy farms to prevent contamination. Milking operations, for 
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instance, should follow the basic principles of cleanliness as set out in the EU regulations.24 There 
are also requirements in place for milk transfer and storage, the details of which are usually set 
out in milk contracts. Requirements include, for example, that milk should be quickly cooled to 
minimize bacterial multiplication. 
 
During the interviews antibiotic and veterinary medicine residues were noted as an increasingly 
important issue. As one interviewee, from the British Cattle Veterinary Organisation (D13) 
explained, the use of antibiotics and the issue of antibiotic residues needs to be set against a 
wider context and emerging public concern about anti-microbial resistance. Antibiotic and 
veterinary medicine residues are closely monitored in dairy supply chains. Maximum residue 
limits (MLR) are set and all milk that leaves a farm is required to be below the MRL, for both 
antibiotics and all other medicine residues. In terms of veterinary standards, animals treated 
with a veterinary product should be identified and records of the use should be kept and 
updated within 72 hours, specifying: 1) date of administration; 2) identification of animals; 3) 
product name; 4) quantity used; and 5) milk withdrawal period. Records of feed supplies, 
diseases that may affect the safety of milk, sample results and checks made must also be kept. 
The FSA regularly inspects holdings and dairy farms have to communicate any changes to the 
production of products for human consumption. 
 
The Single Common Market Organization Regulation specifies marketing standards for drinking 
milk and includes rules for the use of whole, semi-skimmed, and skimmed milk designations 
(Barkema et al. 2015). Drinking milk can be supplied as: 1) raw - not heated above 40°C or 
treated for the same effect; 2) whole - heat treated with the fat content of at least 3.5 per cent; 
3) semi-skimmed - heat treated with fat content of between 1.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent; and 
4) skimmed - heat treated with fat content of 0.5 per cent maximum. Milk can be modified by: 
1) changing the fat content by adding or removing cream, or by mixing with whole, semi-
skimmed or skimmed milk; 2) enriching with milk proteins, mineral salts or vitamins; and 3) 
reducing the lactose content by converting it to glucose and galactose. These standards are 
important for the milk chain but do not impact dairy farmers directly. 
5.2.7 Social issues in dairy linked to policy and regulation 
A number of social and demographic issues emerged from the desk review and interviews which 
are linked, in part at least, to regulation and policy, or which concern regulation and market 
conditions that are socially orientated. The first issue concerns tenanted dairy farms. Tenancy 
agreements, for example, have user clauses and some may stipulate that the farm must remain 
a dairy farm. It was thought unlikely that a landlord would be strict about this if a tenant needed 
to change to stay in business, although it may be something enforced if the landlord wanted to 
get rid of the tenant. Some dairy farms that have come up for tenancy has stipulated that the 
tenant must have a milk contract in place, to guarantee likely viability (D4). Across the tenanted 
dairy estate it was noted that there is a general lack of investment in new equipment/parlours. 
There are a number of different tenancy arrangements, particularly as dairy farms who are 
expanding rent extra blocks of land. This adds complexity to the way dairy farms are managed. 
                                                          
24 These are: 1) making sure teats, udders and adjacent parts are clean before milking; 2) using pre- and 
post- milking teat disinfectants (teat dips and sprays) according to the manufacturer’s instructions; 3) 
keeping dip cups and spray devices visually clean; 4) cleaning excessive dung from floors and stallwork; 
and 5) keeping milking equipment clean at all times. 
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With the loss of milk quota, dairy cows are now a tenant farmer’s main asset, and this can be 
impacted if milk prices drop. 
 
The second issue concerns succession and strategies for entry to and exit from the sector. 
Succession emerged as an important issue, particularly during the interviews. Several 
interviewees regarded succession as a difficult and emotive issue that can significantly constrain 
the development of an individual farm business, as well as the sector. The following quote, from 
a regional manager for Barclays, summarises the situation well: 
“[Farmers are] not very good at handing over, so you will see situations where 80 year old 
dad is still in charge, 60 year old son does the work, 40 year old grandson hasn’t got a 
clue, just does what he's told and you think somebody needs to let go and hand this down 
[…] It's getting less [to see this situation]…but it's still the majority I would say” (D: 
Interviewee 11). 
 
It was noted earlier that dairy farmers are exiting the sector. Interestingly, as noted in interviews 
and at a national stakeholder meeting, not all exits are because producers are bankrupt – some 
exit because they realise there is better money to be made doing something else. In other words, 
exiting may be the best strategy, or because the producer is not willing to do the work required 
for the level of reward. That said, some dairy farms are ‘locked in’ because of heavy investment 
or because they have not borrowed heavily and because of this are able to ride out the storm. 
The issue of attracting new blood into dairying was mentioned, particularly during the 
interviews. Joint ventures, partnerships and matching schemes were discussed, the latter in 
particular to encourage new entrants into the sector. 
 
A third issue concerns paperwork, farm management skills and farming lifestyles. Interviewees 
commented that farmers are good at farming. However, some struggle to manage the 
paperwork side of the business (managing the paperwork needed for EU and UK regulations and 
related standards, for example). It was noted that often the farmer’s wife/partner may be the 
one dealing with the paperwork/business side of the farm. The need for good farm management 
was identified as a key asset for farmers, particularly to manage price volatility. A number of 
interviewees made the point about needing to get farmers to better respond to market signals, 
which includes managing their own business but also thinking about what the market wants, 
focusing sometimes less on quantity of milk, and working together more. As two interviewees 
usefully put it: 
“[T]he key to any farm these days is to look at who you are supplying and what do they 
want.  This is something farmers are incredibly poor at actually because they're not 
market orientated.  They don't think that way.  They live to farm.  And they don't think 
about the market or business” (D: Interviewee 1). 
“What's been really interesting is, in this country, and Ireland, and across Europe, quite a 
lot of farmers have been looking at their own situation in isolation and saying, do you 
know what, the milk price is coming down, I've already got my overheads covered, with 
what I'm doing, actually, when I work it out, the best thing I can do is go and get another 
20 cows or 30 cows or whatever, to produce more milk” (D: Interviewee 8). 
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There was discussion too about the way dairy farming is a lifestyle as much as a business, 
although some suggested this was changing, particuarly for larger dairy farms: 
“In this country, unlike in New Zealand, I think we are very brought up that farming is a 
way of life and it's not a business… Like my Dad farmed, my grandfather farmed it, we've 
always been dairy farmers and always will, but in New Zealand, dairy farming it's a 
business, like money comes first... Lifestyle's very important but if you're not making 
money why are you going to carry on...but then people are very attached, it is still a way 
of life, even though it is a business (D: Interviewee 6). 
“Farmers as they go larger are just going more professional and whereas before it they 
ran it as a way of life and it was a culture and a massive shame if they were forced out of 
the industry.  I think more that you'll get a slow generational change to say, well, I'm in it 
for a business, I'm only being awarded according to commodity valuations, that's how 
society judges me, I'm not going to crucify myself at this game, and they are taking a much 
more pragmatic approach” (D: Interviewee 12). 
 
5.3 Market conditions of dairy producers 
Global, European and UK dairy markets are strongly integrated and changes in production 
volumes, supply and prices in one place can have repercussions on the dairy sector at the 
opposite side of the globe. During the interviews recent drops in milk price were linked to the 
Russian trade sanction and oversupply of milk on the global market, for example. In short, UK 
diary is embedded within and more exposed to global commodity markets. Moreover, given the 
seasonality of production and the fresh nature of dairy products, market changes can frequently 
occur. From 2003 to 2013, world milk production increased by about 23%, but in the same period 
the EU’s global market share reduced from about 29% to about 24% (Table 6). This lose in global 
market share also impacted the UK, which dropped from 2.9% to 2.2%. 
 
Table 6. Global milk production 2003, 2012 and 2013 
 
Source: AHDB (2015) 
 
Despite the loss in market share, both the EU as a whole and the UK in particular are still major 
global dairy producers, and production volumes in the UK are relatively stable (Figure 24). From 
2013/14 to 2014/15, the UK’s milk production increased by 5.4%. One of the reasons for this 
significant increase in production volumes is the high milk price in 2013/2014, which encouraged 
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farmers to boost production by expanding their herd, for example (AHDB 2015). Given the 
overall reduction in numbers of dairy farms in the UK, increases in supply indicate an 
intensification of dairy farms’ production systems. It also suggests that UK dairy producers are 
quick to respond to market signals, taking advantage of price opportunities. However, it can also 
create exposure to price fluctuations. Balancing and responding to market signals is a real 
challenge for the sector, as noted by the following interviewee: 
“[M]ost manufacturers of things are working to set contracts, to set volumes...[w]hereas 
with milk, dairy in particular, when things are good, they say well we want every damned 
last liter you can produce and then find some more. And it's a very, very slow response. 
The signals are very, very poor forwards and backwards” (D: Interviewee 1). 
 
Figure 24. The UK milk production volumes from 2012/13 to 2015/16 
 
Source: Defra (2016) (DEFRA 2016) 
 
The higher production volumes in 2014/2015 were followed by an increase in dairy exports, 
turning the overall UK dairy trade balance from negative to positive (Table 7). The positive trade 
balance was mainly driven by liquid milk, while imports of cheese and butter exceeded UK 
exports (Bates 2016). 
 
Table 7. UK dairy imports and exports over the period 2004-2014 
 
Source: Bates (2016) (Bates 2016) 
 
While 2013/2014 was characterised by high production volumes and promising market prices, 
in 2014/2015 the average milk price dropped by about -4.8%, resulting in a loss of £107.4m of 
total revenues. The negative effects of low milk prices were further exacerbated by a significant 
reduction of the per capita consumption of liquid milk in the EU-28, which reduced the overall 
demand for dairy with respect to the volumes available (Table 8). The low EU prices and drop in 
consumption of dairy products were coupled with other international conditions: a worldwide 
 168 
oversupply of milk; the slowdown in Chinese demand; the Russian ban on EU foods; and the 
increase in production levels across the EU due to the removal of EU quotas (D2, D3, D10, D12). 
This combination of events constituted a “perfect storm” and initiated a period of crisis for the 
UK dairy sector which continued into 2016. 
 
Table 8. UK consumption of dairy products over the period 2003-2013 
 
Source: AHDB (2015) (AHDB 2015) 
 
However, the unpredictability and volatility of dairy markets are not always negative and 
unfavourable conditions can improve if some markets change. At a European level, for example, 
EU dairy producers may benefit if the bilateral EU-Mercosur trade deal goes ahead, as the 
Mercosur is a net importer of dairy products (AGRAFACTS 2016a) and trade negotiations post-
Brexit may open up new markets for UK dairy producers. 
 
5.3.1 Production and inputs costs of UK dairy farmers 
UK dairy farmers operate at higher average production costs than other global and EU 
producers, such as France, Germany and Ireland. The extra cost in the UK is 4 pence per litre 
(ppl) with respect to the global average. However, costs of production vary from farm to farm 
and they also change from year to year (DEFRA 2016). These differences in production costs can 
affect UK dairy farmers’ competitiveness and their ability to remain in the market. The key 
components affecting production costs are herd replacement costs, feed and forage costs, 
labour costs and power/machinery costs (D2, D3, D12).  In the last ten years, total dairy 
production costs followed an upward trend, but since 2014 this trend has reversed. Total fixed 
costs have continued to increase by about 2% per year, but with differentiations: while labour 
(2%), contracts (7%) and rents (4%) have increased, machinery depreciation and other 
machinery costs have fallen by -1% and -4% respectively (McHoul et al. 2016). On the contrary, 
total variable costs fell by 5.5%. The most notable inputs which showed a cost reduction on the 
previous year were purchased concentrates (-8%), coarse fodder (-22%), seed costs (-12%) and 
fertilizer costs (-7%) (McHoul et al. 2016). The overall reduction in inputs costs has helped to 
mitigate the negative effects of low milk prices, at least by reducing the margin of losses. 
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5.3.2 The UK dairy supply chain 
Dairy products in the UK are consumed and delivered in a variety of forms, involving a large 
number of actors from the farm to the table, and thus creating a complex supply chain. The main 
elements of the UK dairy supply chain are summarised in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. The supply chain for UK dairy products  
 
Source: AHDB (2015) (AHDB 2015) 
 
UK domestic milk production is not sufficient to fulfil demand for dairy products, with milk from 
UK dairy farms supplemented by imported milk. The bulk of available milk, including imports, is 
almost entirely transferred to dairy industries and cooperatives which transform half of the raw 
milk supplied into manufactured dairy products (e.g. cheese, yogurt, desserts), with the 
remaining raw milk pool treated according different specifications and sold as liquid milk for 
human consumption. The most successful manufactured dairy products in the UK are cheese 
(+19%) and cream (+13%), while the production of other traditional products such as milk 
powder and condensed milk has decreased (see Table 9). 
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Table 9. UK production of dairy products, 1994-2014  
 
Source: Bates (2016) (Bates 2016) 
 
Over 70% of UK dairy products are produced in consumer packs for sale, of which the majority 
is fresh liquid milk distributed through a chilled chain (Dairy UK 2013). The dairy industry also 
provides a diversified offer of packed liquid milks, which are branded according to quality, 
health, ethical and provenance attributes (Dairy UK 2013). The variety of milk products now on 
the UK market has been taken by some as an indicator that healthy eating is a key driver for the 
dairy industry (Dairy UK 2013). The trend towards lower fat dairy products started some time 
ago, with semi-skimmed and skimmed milks, but more recently has developed significantly, with 
1% fat and below liquid milks in demand, as well as low fat “lighter” cheeses (Dairy UK 2013). 
Provenance attributes, especially locally supplied products, are also important in the UK dairy 
market. To satisfy growing demand for provenance products, in 2010 the UK food industry 
developed a Voluntary Code of Practice on country of origin labelling for meat and dairy 
products. The development of the code was facilitated by Defra (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
Overall, the dairy sector concerns mainly fresh and highly perishable products which need 
adequate logistical organisation to be distributed daily over the UK. UK milk is collected from 
farms by milk hauliers using a fleet of approximately 1,300 vehicles driven by over 2,000 drivers. 
Milk collection vehicles are typically operated by hauliers contracted by milk purchasers, and 
around 15% of the vehicle fleet is owned and operated by milk purchasers themselves (Dairy UK 
2013). Specific standards and certifications for the transport of dairy products govern this 
process, the main elements of which are described in Section 5.3.6. 
 
Whilst farmer engagement in processing is rising, almost 91% of UK milk is purchased and 
processed by processing facilities, which process over 100 million litres of milk (Dairy UK 2013). 
There are five major organisations leading the UK dairy industry. Three are UK co-ops: Arla 
Foods, First Milk, and United Dairy Farmers; one is a public UK company: Dairy Crest; and one is 
a German-based private company: Müller Wiseman Dairies. The UK dairy industry and supply 
chain is therefore characterised by a relatively low level of concentration compared to 
continental counterparts, hence further opportunities for industry rationalisation and merges 
still exist (Dairy UK 2013). UK dairy processors typically have direct links with dairy farmers and 
purchases are often ruled by specific contracts (see Section 5.3.4), but not all milk bought from 
farmers is processed by the purchaser; the purchaser can sell the liquid milk to other companies 
for processing. A disparity between the volumes of milk purchased and the volumes of milk 
processed is therefore common (Dairy UK 2013). For example, Arla Foods is the main milk 
purchaser and processor of UK milk, First Milk buys much more milk than it actually processes 
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and Müller Wiseman Dairies process more milk than the volumes bought directly from farmers 
(Figures 26 and 27) (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
A substantial percentage of UK milk goes into the ingredients sector e.g. biscuits, cakes and 
ready meals. This sector is diverse and fragmented but continues to grow as consumers eat more 
processed and prepared foods (Dairy UK 2013). In addition, the industry pays careful attention 
to the school and nursery milk market. Initiatives to encourage milk consumption at school age, 
for example, are supported by the EU and UK authorities. The current subsidy rates of the EU 
School Milk Subsidy Scheme are €0.187 per litre from the EU with a further 3.98p per litre “top-
up” from the UK Government (Dairy UK 2013). The most important customers for UK dairy 
farmers are retailers, followed by wholesale distributors, catering outlets, institutional 
customers (hospitals, schools, and prisons), food processors and traders (Dairy UK 2013). The 
UK retail market is dominated by four major supermarkets (Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and 
Morrisons), accounting for 76% of all dairy sales in the UK (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 26. Volume of Milk by Purchaser (million litres) 
 
Source: Dairy UK (2013) (Dairy UK 2013) 
 
Figure 27. Volumes of Milk Processed (million litres) 
 
Source: Dairy UK (2013) (Dairy UK 2013) 
 
Only a small proportion of the industry’s total output is sold directly to consumers via doorstep 
delivery service or through local markets. Between 1995 and 2015, doorstep delivery declined 
from 45% to 3% of the retail milk market. This decline has been accompanied by a growing price 
differential between supermarkets’ milk and doorstep delivery. In the UK in 1995, the average 
cost of a pint of milk at the doorstep was 37.9p and 23.9p from retailers. By the end of 2015, a 
pint of milk cost 81p at the doorstep and 24.8p from retailers (Bates 2016). Several major 
retailers have put in place ‘integrated supply arrangements’, meaning that a retailer buys liquid 
milk exclusively from a specific group of farmers. Under these arrangements, farmers generally 
receive a higher price, which varies from retailer to retailer (Table 10).  
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Figure 28. UK dairy market share of retailers 
 
Source: Dairy UK (2013) (Dairy UK 2013) 
 
Table 10. Milk pricing systems of major UK retailers (2013) 
 
 
By taking part in such arrangements dairy farmers can obtain a partial insulation from the 
volatility of market prices. In exchange, farmers may be required to produce and deliver milk 
according to specific animal welfare and/or environmental standards as set down by the retailer, 
or to share detailed information on farm performance data (Dairy UK 2013). Given the high 
volumes of milk purchased by Tesco, the farm-gate price set by this retailer is seen by many as 
setting a benchmark for the whole industry (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
5.3.3 The UK dairy price crisis, asymmetric price transmission and price volatility 
Milk price is currently a major and sensitive issue for dairy producers. As noted earlier, the UK 
dairy sector has faced a severe crisis since 2015, characterised by very low milk prices. In 2015 
there was a SOS Dairy Campaign and a number of well publicised farmer protests at leading 
supermarkets and processors. Farmers argued that the price they were receiving for their milk 
was not sufficient to cover production costs. The reasons behind low milk prices (lower global 
demand of milk combined with milk oversupply, the ban of dairy exports to the Russian market, 
the deregulation of the EU milk quotas) were noted during the protests and in subsequent media 
coverage. Interviewees commented that the SOS Dairy Campaign helped to raise awareness 
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about the crisis facing many dairy farmers. However, it was suggested that the farmers who 
benefited from subsequent actions by supermarkets were not necessarily the ones most in need 
(i.e. farmers on aligned contracts). Interviewees also noted that when milk prices are discussed 
the price of milk per se is not the issue but more margin and profitability. 
 
As discussed in the policy section, price support has been an essential feature of the dairy sector 
(Banks and Marsden 1997), shaped until recently by a series of policies that were strongly 
interventionist. With the abolition of milk quota, policy and regulation regarding milk price is 
now non-interventionist. With the current reduction of policy intervention at the EU level, the 
variability of milk prices has become more evident and the removal of the quota system has 
made the sector more susceptible to changes in international markets. The average farm-gate 
milk price in the UK has fallen by more than 10p per litre (ppl) from its peak in late 2013, reaching 
23.71ppl in December 2015 (see Figure 29). With an average cost of production of 25ppl, some 
producers find it difficult to cover the cost of milk production (DEFRA 2013a). 
 
Figure 29. The evolution of UK farm-gate prices 2011-2015 – price per litre 
 
Source: Defra (2016) (DEFRA 2016) 
 
However, farmers receive different prices depending on the buyers and product quality (see 
contracts section below). Milk price crisis is not the only problem related to dairy prices. There 
are two further issues to consider: asymmetric price transmission and price volatility. In relation 
to the first issue, when discussing dairy prices in the UK, it is important to distinguish between 
three price categories: 1) farm gate prices; 2) wholesale prices and; 3) retail prices. These price 
categories are interlinked as they reflect three steps in the UK dairy supply chain. It is assumed 
that within the supply chain price transmission is symmetric – i.e. dairy prices evolve 
simultaneously passing from one node of the supply chain to the next. It is also assumed that 
prices are set at the farm-gate level, and that wholesalers (processors) and retailers add a fixed 
‘mark-up’ to cover their costs and to enable profit. These assumptions are often far from the 
reality. The dairy supply chain is characterised by asymmetric price transmission – i.e. prices at 
different stages of the chain do not move up and down in line with each other (Ruslan 2011). 
Asymmetric price transmission is due to: differences in market power between supply chain 
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actors; differences in market and cost structures across actors; government intervention; and 
the value added by manufacturing of dairy products with respect to liquid milk. For these 
reasons, the price received by farmers can be disproportionate to the price of the final product 
sold in supermarkets. 
 
Regarding milk price volatility, in the last ten years it has increased in the EU and in the global 
market (Tangermann 2011), which coincided with a progressive reduction of farmers’ protection 
towards a more market-oriented EU agricultural sector (Bardaji 2011). Price volatility can lead 
to market risks and to increased uncertainty that have undesirable effects on farmers’ 
investment decisions (Tangermann 2011), sourcing strategies of retailers and/or processors, and 
food consumption (Hernandez et al. 2014). Among the factors that contribute to price volatility 
there are: trade restrictions in major producing countries; climate hazards; and animal health 
scares. These factors can provoke unexpected changes in the supply and demand of milk, and 
consequently lead to sudden increases/decreases in milk prices (Bardaji 2011). Price volatility is 
often considered a negative issue related to low prices and income instability. However, price 
volatility can also be advantageous to those who can seize opportunities and build strategies 
around it (Assefa et al. 2015). The risky nature of price volatility is a function of three factors: 
the persistence of price fluctuation; the reason why prices continuously change; and the 
direction of price deviations (Assefa et al. 2015). For example, the long term persistence of price 
volatility over one year or over more production cycles can delay the return on investments 
(Assefa et al. 2015).  
 
To understand why UK dairy farmers are particularly exposed to price volatility, it is important 
to understand the peculiarities of the UK dairy market. About 65% of dairy production in the UK 
is sold as liquid milk, and only 25% is turned into cheese and 10% into powders and butter. This 
contrasts with the rest of Europe, where only 30% of dairy production is sold as liquid milk. Since 
liquid milk cannot be easily stored as milk powder or cheese or butter, UK farmers tend to be 
more affected by volatility and global market changes (DEFRA 2016). As two interviewees put it: 
“Trade is defined by a very few supermarkets and it's competitive and milk happens to be 
a very competitive market” (D: Interviewee 9). 
“It’s a global market. You cannot get away from the fact that whatever's happening in 
Australia, New Zealand, Russia, China, has a direct impact on this now. It's almost a cliché 
isn't it, we're in a global market, but we definitely are...” (D: Interviewee 8). 
 
When prices are low, farmers’ production decisions can be affected, influencing farms’ 
productivity. For example, a recent study showed that with low milk prices, high-yield systems 
reliant on expensive concentrate feed may not provide the expected financial returns. 25 
Concentrate-based systems are more productive but low milk prices can fail to cover production 
costs. On the contrary, lower yield forage-based and grazing-based systems can still provide 
profits. This suggests that market risks are critical drivers of: i) farmers’ production and 
management strategies; ii) adaptation strategies; and iii) adoption of productive systems. As a 
consequence, in the long run, low prices can also affect investments in more productive 
innovations, affecting the long term improvement of dairy productivity. Some interviewees (D1, 
                                                          
25 http://www.fwi.co.uk/livestock/high-yield-lower-forage-dairies-don-t-make-financial-sense.htm  
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D11) argued firmly that rather than comparing systems the key thing that differentiates dairy 
farms is management of the unit (finance, inputs, managing markets, etc.).  
 
A final issue concerning milk prices is the “price war” between supermarkets. Supermarkets sell 
milk at a discounted price relative to their competitors in order to attract consumers into their 
stores. Milk is effectively a loss leader. Milk demand in the UK is quite inelastic, meaning that 
the volumes of milk sold do not change dramatically if milk prices change, because milk supply 
in the UK is a staple good (DEFRA 2016). The “price war” reflects asymmetric price transmission. 
Supermarkets are transparent in stating that the retail price is not necessarily related to the 
farm-gate price. Only 7% of the milk produced in the UK is sold on the basis of a pricing 
mechanism which relates to the cost of production. This mechanism is followed by Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, Marks & Spencer, Waitrose and the Co-op, which all have long-established 
relationships with supplier groups (see Section 1.3.2); meanwhile, Asda, Morrisons, Aldi and Lidl 
have a minimum price for liquid milk, and milk supplies can come from any producer which 
accepts the minimum price (DEFRA 2016). 
 
5.3.4 Contracts, A and B pricing and futures 
Contractual relationships in the UK dairy industry are highly developed. Dairy farmers can 
engage with the dairy industry through a variety of contract types. Contracts can be individual 
or collective. In the latter case, the contact concerns a group of farms and the members can 
benefit from improved bargaining power. The main benefit of production contracts for farmers 
is achieving a degree of price stability, by agreeing in advance the purchase price. This provides 
a certain degree of protection from price volatility. However, contracts can also have 
disadvantages. For example, producers can face penalties if they decide to exit the contract 
before the signed ending of the agreement. Moreover, contract prices can vary depending on 
the farm’s production scale and location (Wilson 2010). Indeed, large conventional milk 
producers in the UK lowlands can obtain higher milk prices over smaller-scale LFA producers, 
thanks to the higher number of buyers present and the competition among them. Similarly, 
organic producers can receive a price premium over conventional milk, but these producers can 
be restricted in the number of buyers available and contracts can have longer penalty periods. 
In 2010, 29% of milk producers were unhappy with their milk contracts (Wilson 2010). 
 
To enhance contractual relationships within the supply chain, the industry agreed the Dairy 
Industry Voluntary Code of Best Practice on Contractual Relationships in September 2012. The 
code was developed to improve equity of contractual relationships and to provide an alternative 
to the government regulation of contracts. Adoption of the code is voluntary but currently 
involves 85% of UK milk purchasers (Dairy UK 2013). The code provides purchasers with greater 
flexibility in deciding purchase prices according to developments in the market place and 
farmers can in theory obtain fairer prices and security and continuity with respect to market 
access (Dairy UK 2013). 
 
During stakeholder interviews contracts and the variability in milk price between farmers based 
on whether they are aligned or not to a supermarket or production contract was a key issue. In 
the interviews the example was given where you have one farmer on 30p per litre and a 
neighbouring farmer on 20p or less, simply because one farmer is aligned to a contract. The 
following quotes reflect this difference and the increasing role of contracts: 
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“I've got people that are on that Sainsbury's contract and obviously they've been able to 
invest in their farm, they can buy new machinery, they can invest in buildings and stuff 
like that.  People that are just on like liquid milk contracts, supplying the likes of like 
Muller, and people like that, they just have to ride the market out don't they” (D: 
Interviewee 6). 
“You could be a really good farmer, but if you, you don't have to get many decisions 
wrong, and you could come really seriously unstuck, because a lot of it depends, like now 
there's some really, just as good farmers, but if they're selling into a commodity cheese 
market, compared to on a Sainsbury's contract its [very different]” (D: Interviewee 3). 
“The contract is now very important. It didn't used to be, because it was only two or three 
years ago when if you didn't have a contract, or didn’t like a contract, you moved to 
somebody else and they would take you.  Nowadays, if you lose your contract, you 
probably can't find anybody who will take your milk” (D: Interviewee 10). 
 
During the SOS Dairy Campaign, interviewees noted that farmers on contracts did not protest. 
Some interviewees suggested that farmers who were part of contracts got lucky, and/or it was 
down to timing or appropriate geographical location for a supermarket or processor. It is not 
possible at the moment to get new supermarket aligned contracts. There are two conditions 
that make negotiations difficult when they are available. First, primary producers have less 
flexibility to exploit economies of scale unlike retailers. Second, there is a sole-trading business 
culture and mentality amongst farmers in the UK, which has developed because of a long history 
of guaranteed prices. As noted earlier, producer organisations are a potential route for 
improving bargaining power and reducing the price taker position that many dairy farmers 
currently find themselves in, but uptake so far has been slow to materialise. 
 
The other interesting market arrangement is A and B pricing. This is a pricing matrix with a core 
price and a market realisation price. There is some debate about whether A and B pricing is the 
best way forward, or whether it would be better to just have one price. Some interviewees 
argued that A and B pricing was an attempt by processors to manage supply. The B price is 
worked out using the Actual Milk Price Equivalent and is usually low (e.g. 17ppl). It is payment 
for what some termed ‘marginal litres’ (e.g. D3). One argument is that you should not chase 
marginal litres – it is best to focus on achieving core litres. Some processors also use A, B and C 
pricing. Prices are worked out on what the farm produced last year. This provides the benchmark 
and core price for the current year, or whatever the processor agrees to take. If you produce 
beyond that you get a much lower B price. If you fall below the benchmark you get penalised on 
the core price (C price). This was viewed as unfair by farmer representatives. That said, 
interviewees were generally supportive, in the sense that they balance supply: 
“I'm quite pleased that we've got A/B contracts in place now […] Because what that does 
then is it actually stops people just producing more to try and balance it out. That's not 
very good for everybody I know but I think that makes, at least the solution isn't produce 
more which makes it worse” (D: Interviewee 11). 
 
Another form of contract which is being discussed in the dairy sector, especially after the 
abolition of milk quotas, is futures markets. Futures contracts exist for butter, skimmed milk 
powder (SMP) and whole milk powder (WMP). A futures market (DEFRA 2016) is an organised 
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auction market for trading futures contracts. Futures contracts include “a commitment to accept 
or deliver a specified quantity of a commodity at a specified time, for a specific price”. There is 
no actual commodity exchange unless and until the contract comes through. Overall, the use of 
futures contracts is not well developed among UK farmers. This is because a futures contract 
still has elements of uncertainty, although the degree of uncertainty faced by farmers is 
lessened. For example, if a farmer agrees to be paid a certain price he or she will only receive 
the amount agreed at the time the contract was agreed as stipulated in the terms of conditions. 
If by then, average prices have increased, the farmer will be transacting at a loss. On the 
contrary, if the average prices have decreased, he or she will have increased his/her profit. In 
this regard, futures contracts help in planning cash flows, as they help farm business 
management on the basis of a guaranteed income for the milk commodity. 
 
5.3.5 Organic dairy production 
The story of organic milk is different to conventional milk. Similar to supermarket-aligned 
conventional dairy farmers, the price for organic milk is currently good. The situation was 
different a few years ago when some organic milk producers exited and returned to 
conventional. This is not the case now. The UK is the second largest organic dairy market in the 
EU, involving about 11% of dairy producers (OMSCo 2015). In 2014/15 organic producers were 
favoured by increasing incomes and margins, while conventional dairy farms saw declines in 
incomes and margins (McHoul et al. 2016). This difference in performance is due to differences 
in variable and fixed costs. Variable costs decreased by 6% on conventional farms, but decreased 
by 11% on organic farms. In contrast, fixed costs increased by 2% on conventional and by less 
than 1% on organic farms (McHoul et al. 2016). 
 
Organic dairy products represent a significant share of UK dairy markets, and their production is 
strongly linked to small family farms. The development of organic dairy is linked in part to policy 
support, but is significant too as a mode of on-farm diversification because organic production 
provides price premiums. From 2013 to 2014 the organic sector experienced 6.4% value growth 
compared to a decline of 1.6% in the conventional milk sector (Table 11). This growth equates 
to £9 million revenue, while the conventional sector had a £40 million loss (OMSCo 2015). 
Among organic dairy products, the largest is the organic liquid milk category, accounting for 
around half of all organic dairy demand, followed by yogurt and cheese (OMSCo 2015). The UK 
dairy organic sector is dominated by private label and branded products. The leading brand, Yeo 
Valley, recorded a 13.2% increase in sales value, versus 4.5% for private label organic dairy sales 
(OMSCo 2015). 
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Table 11. Value and performance of the UK organic dairy sector 
 Organic market 
value 
Growth year-on-
year (YOY) 
Conventional market 
growth YOY 
Milk* £152m 5.7% -3.1% 
*Milk total £168m 6.40% -1.60% 
Yoghurts £142m 14.2% -2.5% 
Cheese £24m -2.7% 0.5% 
Source: OMSCo (2015) (OMSCo 2015) 
 
Although organic represents a key strategy in the UK for dairy farmers to achieve price premiums 
at a time of depressed milk prices, supply for UK organic milk is currently in balance, and there 
is little scope for new producers to enter the market (OMSCo 2015). Stakeholder interviews 
noted the differences in the fortunes of organic and conventional dairy producers but were 
cautious about organics wider transformative potential due to market balance. As interviewees 
explained, organic milk producers have experienced low prices for their milk in the past. 
Currently producers enjoy a good premium because organic milk is balanced and carefully 
managed by the organic supply chain, as the following quotes explain. 
“[In] a crisis situation like this, lots of dairy farmers would have gone to organic from 
conventional. There are several things stopping them now.  One is it takes two years [to 
convert] and there are no grants to encourage them to do it […] some of them, a lot of 
them, can remember, not very long ago, when either themselves or their neighbour or 
their cousin, converted to organic and then ended up getting a crap ride to organic 
because it was overdone” (D: Interviewee 8). 
“I’m very confident for the future of organic, just because of the way its been regulated, 
so I'm appreciative of what OMSCo has done and that regulation of contracts has been 
probably very, very useful for the organic market and finding external markets outside of 
the UK has also been very important, that seemed to have really helped the price” (D: 
Interviewee 9). 
5.3.6 Voluntary standards and products of origin 
Dairy farmers can comply with a series of voluntary international standards. In general, at farm 
level, the most relevant are: 
 
• HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point): this is a system that helps food 
business operators look at how they handle food and introduces procedures to make 
sure the food produced is safe to eat.  
• British Global Standards (BRC): this is a safety and quality certification program, used by 
over 23,000 certificated suppliers in 123 countries, with certification issued through a 
worldwide network of accredited certification bodies.  
• EFSIS Safe & Legal Standard: this is designed for small food manufacturers to provide an 
all-encompassing food safety audit. 
 
These standards are voluntary, but HACCP is compulsory by definition as it is unlikely that 
production sites will get authorisation without it. Since 2008, the UK dairy industry has also 
voluntarily committed to a plan to reduce the environmental footprint of producing liquid milk. 
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Farmers committed to a range of targets covering renewable energy, efficient water use, carbon 
foot printing and environmental stewardship (Dairy UK 2013).  
 
More specifically, in the UK dairy sector the most important voluntary standard is the Red 
Tractor farm assurance scheme. This is a private and voluntary standard developed by the UK 
dairy industry to ensure benchmark standards of animal welfare and product quality at the farm 
level. Industry stakeholders involved in the development and management of the scheme are 
Dairy UK, the NFU, the British Cattle Veterinary Association, the Scottish Board of Dairy UK and 
the British Retail Consortium. The scheme aims to build the confidence of consumers in dairy 
products by setting standards for animal health as well as responsible production processes. 
Farms are inspected every 18 months. The assessors are further verified by random audits. In 
2013, the scheme covered 64 milk purchasers and 11,012 milk producers. This corresponds to 
about 11.1 billion litres of milk produced.  
 
Another important voluntary standard concerns milk transportation. In this respect, the Dairy 
Transport Assurance Scheme is the UK industry’s assurance scheme for milk transport, applied 
to by 80 to 90% of milk haulage capacity in the UK. The scheme provides assurance to milk 
purchasers that the transport of fresh milk and milk products meets food safety requirements, 
industry good practice guidelines and customer needs (Dairy UK 2013). The scheme is based on 
annual inspections of the milk haulage depots. The assessment is conducted against 56 
standards covering haulage operations, vehicle hygiene, site and statutory requirements, 
HACCP, personnel and training, subcontractors and contingency procedures (Dairy UK 2013).  
 
In addition to voluntary standards, the EU protection of food names legislation on a geographical 
or traditional recipe basis, introduced in the 1990s, is also of importance. There are three 
different labels of origin, which provide legal protection against imitation throughout the EU: 
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO); Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and the 
Traditional Specialty Guaranteed (TSG). In the UK there are 17 designated dairy products (11 
PDO and 6 PGI) and almost all of them are cheeses. Somerset has one PDO cheese, the “West 
Country Farmhouse Cheddar”, exclusively produced in the counties of Dorset, Somerset, Devon 
and Cornwall, and one PGI cheese, the “Exmoor Jersey Blue”, exclusively produced in West 
Somerset and parts of the Exmoor National Park. 
 
Standards such as the Red Tractor cover regulatory issues outlined earlier related to animal 
welfare and health, water cleanliness, etc. They thus play an increasingly important role as a 
system of private governance. Standards are important also for international trade. Some 
interviewees noted, for example, that European standards will need to be reached even if the 
UK is not in the EU: “in order to trade with Europe, we have to meet European Standards 
whatever happens, so any legislation that's European led we have to abide by, within the sector” 
(D: Interviewee 1). Interviewees also noted farmer frustrations regarding the paperwork 
required to comply with standards and duplication between some standards. 
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5.4 Key issues identified in the literature, media and interviews 
5.4.1 SWOT analysis 
The analysis of regulatory and market conditions (task 2.2) through literature review, media 
sources and stakeholder interviews for the dairy farming case study in Somerset has identified 
a list of key issues that are discussed in this section. Some of the issues are summarised initially 
through a SWOT analysis (Table 12). The text below discusses some of the issues in more detail. 
The key issues described will inform future discussions with producers and other supply chain 
representatives as part of Task 2.3. 
 
Table 12. SWOT analysis – dairy   
 
Overall, arguably the most interesting finding to emerge is the relationship between regulation 
(especially the abolition of milk quota) and markets (in terms of emerging contracts, market-
based ways to control supply and demand, the role of standards in terms of quality control and 
potentially also increasing roles for banking institutes).  
 
Among the regulatory conditions, the key issues that emerged are as follows: 
1. A progressive process of deregulation of the sector in terms of milk quotas and reduced 
market protection (through the 2013 CAP Reform) is of particular importance, as it 
triggers regulatory changes affecting production volumes and farm-gate prices. UK 
production volumes of milk were below the milk quota allocation in recent years, 
therefore quota abolishment is unlikely to represent a significant direct weakness or 
threat in the immediate period. However, quota abolition can represent an important 
indirect threat. Specifically, some interviewees noted that quota in the past was an 
Strengths 
 
• Good agro-ecological conditions (high 
quality grass/grazing) 
• Well established dairy tradition and 
expertise/knowledge in the county 
• Key dairy co-operatives and processors 
in close proximity 
• Dairy farming is part of the county’s 
identity 
 
Weaknesses 
 
• Price volatility and increased exposure 
to markets 
• Poor milk price (for some) does not 
match cost of production 
• High input costs 
• Farm succession & ageing farmer profile  
• Entry to the industry is difficult due to 
high costs / land availability 
• bTB regulations and business impacts 
Opportunities 
 
• Attempts to establish new producer 
organisations (e.g. Dairy Crest Direct) 
• Greater flexibility with abolition of milk 
quota  
• Futures markets for milk/dairy products 
• Brexit? 
Threats 
 
• Continued oversupply of liquid milk 
• Price volatility and exposure to global 
milk price markets 
• Lack of access to milk contracts 
• Climate change (increased pressures to 
reduce impact from dairy) 
• Brexit? 
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asset, including for tenant farmers. This asset now no longer exists. Moreover, with the 
abolition of milk quota some countries (notably Ireland) have significantly increased 
their milk production. This creates potential market threats, but milk quota also 
presents opportunities (e.g. farms can exploit economies of scale by increasing 
production volumes). How farmers will be affected by the price effect of quota removal 
will depend on the product they supply, the arrangements within the supply chain and 
the producers’ ability to adapt to market price changes. 
2. The CAP’s direct subsidies still form a substantial part of dairy farms income, about 30%, 
and are vital for some dairy farms, particularly smaller farms. Brexit may result in a 
severe reduction of this support, threatening the survival capacity of some farms. 
However, lower protection can also represent an opportunity to improve the 
managerial skills of farmers to be more responsive to market signals. 
3. Bovine TB and antibiotic residue regulations can represent weaknesses for dairy 
farmers as they can limit the farm’s operations. Particularly relevant is bTB regulation 
which restricts cattle movements, particularly in endemic areas such as the county of 
Somerset. Regulations on antibiotic residues are more a concern in pig and poultry 
production, but the dairy sector needs to encourage careful management and health 
beliefs among farmers and vets. Most dairy contracts and related standards provide 
specific guidelines on what veterinary medicines are allowable. 
4. From the interviews some issues emerged in relation to tenanted dairy farmers. For 
instance, tenancy agreements have user clauses and some may stipulate that the farm 
must be used as a dairy farm. It was thought unlikely that a landlord would be strict 
about this if a tenant needed to change to stay in business, although it may be 
something enforced if the landlord wanted to get rid of the tenant. With the loss of milk 
quota, cows are now a tenant farmer’s main asset. 
5. Brexit emerged as a major policy shock that brings with it several uncertainties, but its 
overall effect is highly debated. On the one hand, Brexit represents a threat, especially 
with respect to the loss of CAP direct subsidies, the loss of access to the EU Single Market 
and potentially reduced access to a skilled migrant labour force that is vital for the UK 
dairy industry. On the other hand, Brexit is a potential opportunity to obtain better 
agricultural and environmental policies targeted specifically to the UK dairy sector and 
better trade deals with international partners. However, the net effect of Brexit on the 
UK dairy sector will be unclear until policymakers make decisions on when the UK. 
 
While regulatory issues are important, market issues are the most critical. The critical role of 
market issues was noted at the stakeholder workshop and also dominated interview discussions. 
There are several aspects linked to markets and their organisation that emerged as key issues in 
the analysis: 
1. The “milk crisis” is presenting major threats to UK dairy farmers. The milk crisis was 
triggered by current low milk prices and, in general, by problems related to milk price 
volatility. The reasons for low milk prices are global and complex (e.g. lower global 
demand of milk combined with milk oversupply; the ban of dairy exports to the Russian 
market) and options to manage this threat is not straightforward. With the current 
reduction of policy intervention at the EU level, the variability of milk prices has become 
more evident and the dairy sector now operates in relatively unpredictable international 
markets. Farmers receive different prices depending on their buyer and product quality. 
The milk crises led to a number of well publicised farmer protests at leading 
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supermarkets and processors. The SOS Dairy Campaign argued that the price producers 
were receiving for their milk was not sufficient to cover production costs. Some 
interviewees suggested the farmers who benefited from the campaigns were not 
necessarily the ones most in need. 
2. The progressive deregulation of the sector, combined with an increased exposure of 
farmers to international market volatility, boosted the development and adoption of 
production contracts between producers and supermarkets/processors. There is clear 
variability in milk price between dairy farmers based on whether farmers are aligned to 
a supermarket or production contract or not. It is an interesting signal that during the 
SOS Dairy Campaign farmers on contracts did not protest. The playing field is very 
uneven, which is a reflection of market conditions. Interviewees suggested some who 
were part of contracts got lucky, and/or it was down to timing or appropriate 
geographical location, particularly for some processing contracts. It is not possible at the 
moment to get new supermarket contracts. They are not available. 
3. Another key market arrangement is A and B pricing. This is a pricing matrix with a core 
price and a market realisation price. There is debate about whether A and B pricing is 
the best way forward, or whether it would be better to just have one price. Some argued 
that A and B pricing was an attempt by processors to manage supply. It is important to 
note that the pricing matrix system seems to be a market tool replacing quotas. Farmers 
are discouraged to produce above the A price level with price B often below production 
costs, creating de facto a system that voluntarily limits the production volumes to a 
market equilibrium level. These market arrangements are more flexible than the quota 
system, as contracts and pricing matrices can be negotiated every year and are largely 
dependent on the local availability of supermarkets or processors willing to engage in a 
contract with farmers. 
4. New partnerships and Producer Organisations (POs) represent further opportunities to 
manage the current market challenges, and they are also supported by the EU’s Milk 
Package. The idea is that POs would give producers greater power in terms of 
negotiating contracts. There is limited uptake of this activity in England and Somerset 
particularly. The reason is partly because of a general culture of non-co-operation 
among farmers but the scheme is also rather cumbersome (at least as implemented by 
Defra). There is currently one PO set up in Somerset: Dairy Crest Direct (which has 
recently split into two POs). Stakeholders recognised the need for greater co-operation 
to sell milk, including also joint ventures at farm level (to share capital, expertise, etc.). 
5. Further opportunities for the dairy sector come from organic milk. Similar to 
supermarket-aligned conventional dairy farmers, the price for organic milk is currently 
good. The situation was different a few years ago and some organic milk producers 
exited and returned to conventional production. This is not the case now. However, the 
market is clearly defined. Volumes are defined by OMSCo, for example. There are 
opportunities for some new producers to enter organic markets, but this is sometimes 
dependent on location (e.g. close to / within catchment for a major organic processor, 
such as Yeo Valley). There are some opportunities also to develop markets for grass-
based milk (i.e. less intensive but conventional). 
6. In order to differentiate products, the role of quality standards is also very important. 
Red Tractor is the baseline quality standard for UK dairy. Quality standards cover a lot 
of the regulatory issues related to animal welfare and health, water cleanliness, etc. 
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Some interviewees noted farmer frustrations regarding the paperwork required to 
comply with standards and the duplication of standards. 
 
Finally, in addition to regulatory and market issues, during the analyses some key finance and 
social issues also emerged: 
1. Finance issues are mainly related to access to credit and assets. There are significant 
differences between owner occupier dairy farmers and tenanted farmers. Credit access 
is a strength for owner farmers, as for them access to finance is relatively easy because 
the farmhouse and land can be used as security assets against borrowed capital. On the 
contrary, access to finance is a threat for tenanted dairy farms. 
2. Social issues are mainly related to succession, exit strategies and new entrants. 
Succession emerged as an important issue in the stakeholder interviews and the 
roundtable workshop and it has been described as a difficult, emotive and persistent 
issue facing the sector. Dairy farmers are exiting the sector; however, interestingly, not 
all exit because they are bankrupt or due to a lack of successor – some exit because they 
realise there is better money to be made doing something else (i.e. exiting is the smart 
strategy) or they are not willing to do the work required for the level of reward. That 
said, some farmers are ‘locked in’ because of heavy capital investment or because they 
do not have high loans and are able to ride out the storm. Joint ventures, partnerships 
and matching schemes are opportunities to encourage new entrants. 
5.5 Dairy supply chain arrangements: focus groups, additional 
stakeholder interviews and participatory workshop 
This section reports on the findings of three focus groups with dairy farmers, 11 additional 
stakeholder interviews and one participatory workshop that were conducted as part of task 2.3, 
with the intention of complementing and building on the findings of task 2.2. 
 
A series of three focus groups were held with Somerset/north Devon diary farmers in March 
2017. Details of the numbers of farmers involved in each case and a brief synopsis of their socio-
economic data are given in appendix 8. The main purpose of conducting these focus groups was 
to complement and build on the analysis of regulatory and market conditions reported above 
under sections 5.1-5.4, in order to provide an insight into the perspective of the farmers 
themselves. As per the fishers’ case study, although the focus groups were composed of 
individual farmers, analysis of the data is intended to elicit understanding of the wider dairy 
sector within Somerset/north Devon, rather than simply of individual farmers. 
 
Each of the focus groups lasted approximately 1.5 hours and was digitally recorded for later 
verbatim transcription. In terms of their individual comments, anonymity was promised to the 
participants. As such, any direct quotations that are used in this report refer simply to the 
relevant focus group, rather than to any individual farmers. The focus group schedule was 
divided into seven different sections, details of which are given in appendix 9. 
 
Data from the focus groups was rich and insightful, but attendance at two of the three focus 
groups was lower than expected, due to dairy farmers very busy work schedules. To complement 
the focus group data, it was decided to carry out a further series of supply chain interviews, 
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especially with representatives of the dairy supply chain. Consequently, 11 interviews were 
conducted, mostly with dairy processors, farmer co-operative representatives or individuals 
who were in some way involved in buying milk from dairy farmers and/or helping to set up milk 
contract arrangements (see appendix 10). This proved to be a hugely informative exercise, 
deepening the analysis and understanding of different institutional arrangements available to 
dairy farmers. The interviews typically lasted one hour, but some lasted longer. All were 
recorded and transcribed. The interviews have been coded so as to anonymise the identity of 
the interviewee. A copy of the interview schedule is provided in appendix 11. 
 
The workshop was conducted in May 2017, following reflection on the focus group and interview 
data. The aims were similar to inshore fisheries workshop. In other words, to firstly present the 
key findings of the research conducted so far as part of task 2.2 and 2.3 to a range of 
stakeholders from the dairy industry and to get their feedback and comments on it. The findings 
from the focus groups and interviews were reported under seven key areas (see below), which 
were then presented to those at the workshop for feedback and comments. The presentation 
was structured so that it was possible to allow the participants to make comments at any point. 
This led to a very participatory and interactive meeting. As per the fisheries case study, the 
workshop comments are reported as part of the focus groups data under section 5.5, below. 
 
Dairy workshop 30th May 2017 
 
 
 
The second aim of the workshop was to discuss a range of scenarios regarding the future viability 
of dairy farming in Somerset, linked to the Brexit negotiations. This part of the workshop 
significantly informs work that will be conducted under WP4 in terms of developing solutions 
and scenarios more generally. Data from this paprt of the workshop is reported as a distinctive 
section from the other workshop and focus group data (section 5.6), including further details 
about how the scenarios were constructed and analysed by participants. 
 
The workshop lasted for four hours and was digitally recorded and transcribed, which resulted 
in a 106-page transcript of the discussion. The agenda for the workshop is available in appendix 
12, with the research findings presented before lunch and scenario work after lunch. There were 
a total of 14 people at the workshop, four of whom were part of the research team. The 10 
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stakeholder participants included key voices from the industry, including dairy processors 
(organic and conventional), farmer union representatives, key advisors/analysts from the dairy 
advisory board, a young farmers’ representative and an academic who specialises in dairy 
farming and food chain management. Details of those who attended are given in appendix 13. 
As with the focus groups and interviews, anonymity was promised to the participants. 
Consequently, for anonymity purposes, any direct quotations used in this report are given a 
number (e.g. DWSP 1, where WSP means ‘dairy workshop participant’). 
 
Analysis of the interview and focus group data revealed that there were seven key areas that 
required further examination, and these structure this and the subsequent section of the dairy 
report. The seven key areas are as follows: 
 
• Milk price and price volatility 
• Institutional arrangements for milk 
• Contractualisation and pricing instruments 
• Collective action (DPO and co-operative models) 
• Market data and futures 
• The future (succession and social drivers) 
• Brexit 
 
5.5.1 Milk price and price volatility 
Although price volatility has been a consistent characteristic of the dairy industry over many 
years, it has intensified in recent years. Price variability was largely associated with the seasons 
(lowest during the ‘spring flush’ and highest in the winter months); however, more recently, it 
has been less associated with a seasonal pattern and is more sporadic (see Figure 30; see also 
Section 5.3.3). As noted in previous sections, this notable volatility has been the source of 
significant discontent amongst dairy farmers and has mobilized high profile protests and a 
wealth of media coverage.  
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Figure 30. Farm gate milk prices, 2000-2016 
 
Source: Data – AHDB  (https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/farmgate-prices/uk,-gb-and-ni-farmgate-prices/#.WbvhEMYo9pg accessed 15.09.17)
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The issue of milk price volatility was recognized throughout the interviews and focus groups as 
a key characteristic of the dairy industry. However, there were numerous suggestions that 
volatility was intensifying; resulting in more dramatic highs and lows, as well as also becoming 
more frequent. 
“If you go over 12 years, you’ll see the peak and trough gradually gets bigger and bigger 
each time and they get closer together each time. Whereas 15 years ago, it was quite a 
steady flow” (Sedgemoor Focus Group). 
 
Participants had some clear ideas about what caused milk price volatility. With reference to the 
low farm gate price in mid-2016, participants described the price as ‘lousy’ and ‘inadequate’ and 
price volatility was a divisive topic across all participant profiles. One interviewee, representing 
the Arla farmer co-operative, identified three key factors in the recent price crash – all three 
factors compounded to mean there was a surplus of milk on the global market: 
• Firstly, China and Russia – “two of the big buyers of global dairy products stepped out 
of the market”  
• Secondly, a good production year around the world meant “we all produced a shed load 
of milk” 
• Thirdly, as from 1st April 2015, milk quotas were abolished. “All my European colleagues 
who were being constrained by milk quotas suddenly had the opportunity to turn the 
taps on because they’d been held back for years, they’d had this shed full of cows 
waiting and off they went, regardless of pricing because they were fed up of being 
constrained” (D: interviewee 16). 
 
Participants understood milk price volatility as the product of global issues, rather than an 
isolated national problem. As the Arla interviewee explained further: 
“We are not isolated in milk anymore… So now you’ve got a situation where the market 
is quite fragile, and suddenly all this milk comes running forth out of Europe. Is it any 
surprise that the price bombed?” (D: Interviewee 16).  
 
The impact of overproduction is particularly evident within the organic sector, where, as above, 
government conversion schemes caused an increase in organic milk production, unwarranted 
and poorly matched by demand.  
“[It did have a bit of a crisis, was that in 2008?] It was. [Yes. So what happened?] Over-
supply [Okay] Linked to government grants. The supply exceeded demand (D: interviewee 
21b).  
“It was over-supplied and there were people converting or expanding their heards, who 
didn’t notify anybody, and then they’d ring up and say, ‘are you going to buy my milk? 
We’ve converted, we’re … and suddenly there was a whole extra amount that came on 
board and because OMSCo didn’t want to discourage people, and we agreed we would 
buy it, it had to be at a reduced price” (Sedgemore Focus Group). 
 
In the conventional milk market, price was largely understood to be the biggest determinant of 
production levels, i.e. farmers increased production in response to higher prices.  
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“Since the price rising in November last year, we’ve seen significant increases in the milk 
volume, as a result of just putting the price up […] a lot of consultants are saying, you 
know, ‘yes, you’re getting a bit more money, but don’t go mad and produce all this milk, 
we’ll be in the same situation again, so pay your bills, reign it in, but don’t get excited and 
go mad” (D: interviewee 19) 
 
Participants agreed that issues of oversupply and undersupply were the cause of market 
volatility and there was a clear sense that producers needed to be far more sensitive to the 
market in order to maintain a stable milk price. Increasing sensitivity, and mechanisms such as 
A&B pricing, according to one interviewee (D15), was what “partly drove the recovery in milk 
prices in 2016”, which the respondent asserted was supply driven, and not demand driven. As 
he put it: 
“The recovery we’ve seen in milk prices in the last, you know, seven or eight months, has 
been supply driven, not demand driven […] Demand is still pretty soft, globally, and in the 
UK, but supply has been really weak and so that’s what causes it. So the danger with it is, 
and that’s one of the things we talked to our farmers about last week, at our farmer days, 
we mustn’t let history repeat itself again and just, as an industry, go charging off into 
producing lots of extra milk, now that we’ve got a higher milk price, only to crash the 
market and that’s true both on a national level and just on a Crediton Dairy level” (D: 
interviewee 15). 
 
The terms ‘accommodation milk’ and ‘milk washing’ (i.e. oversupply) emerged in the Sedgemoor 
Focus Groups as a cause of milk price volatility. One focus group participant attributed this to a 
government intervention: 
“I’m going to be quite blunt and say I think it was caused by Defra, AHDB [Agriculture and 
Horticulture Development] (Dairy), RABDF [Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers] … 
I don’t know what they called it, they launched something at the dairy event, was it three 
or four years ago, it was when quotas were coming off, they said there’d be fantastic 
exports and all the rest of it, and they talked up the industry […] this is absolutely true, so 
it led people to be over-producing and the processing wasn’t there and then of course all 
the supermarkets can play the tune” (Sedgemoor Focus Group). 
 
This claim was met with some resistance in the focus group. For example, one participant 
suggested that “…the underlying thing was [farmers] wouldn’t have over-produced if the price 
hadn’t been there” (Sedgemoor Focus Group). In contrast, members of the Coombe Focus Group 
suggested dairy farmers, especially in the organic sector, tended to be quite sensitive to market 
demands. 
“They understand the ethos of what’s going on […] just by whacking on a load more cows 
doesn’t necessarily mean you’re going to get any more money” (Coombe Focus Group). 
 
Price wars between supermarkets, started initially by Iceland were also blamed for triggering 
price lows. The idea that one supermarket could cause such a knock on effect is testament to 
their levels of power over the dairy industry. As one focus group participant explained: 
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“Iceland started it. Iceland were the culprits that started it. They don’t sell much milk … 
or they didn’t at the time, so they decided to drop their price as a loss leader, to get people 
in, and then Aldi and Lidl […] then dropped their price. And as soon as they did that, I think 
Asda were the next ones, Tesco [So you get a price war kicking off?] So then you get the 
price war kicking off. It hasn’t recovered from that really” (Sedgemoor Focus Group). 
 
5.5.2 Institutional arrangements for milk 
The analysis identified a number of different institutional arrangements for selling milk. These 
different arrangements represent different options or strategies that at least have the potential 
to help dairy farmers manange market volatility, although as explained below some 
arrangements have been in place for some time so it is more about the strategies developing 
within these supply chain arrangements (e.g. new pricing mechnisms, contracts) that represents 
the response to volatility. The following discussion, based on analysis of the interview and focus 
group data, outlines the key institutional arrangements identified, and their associated 
characteristics. The different arrangements confer their own advantages and disadvantages. As 
one respondent put it, “there are lots of different arrangements … and none of them wrong. 
They’re just different” (D: interviewee 19). In general terms, it is possible to distinguish between 
collective and individual arrangements. Examples of each are now described in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.2.1 Collective organizational sales 
(i) Co-operatives 
Cooperatives such as Arla and OMSCo, purchase milk from farmer members and are 
subsequently responsible for processing and then selling the products. The milk is covered by an 
obligation to deliver arising from the farmer’s membership of the cooperative in accordance 
with the conditions set out by the cooperative.   
 
Arla 
Arla is a European dairy cooperative with around 13,000 farmer members across Denmark, 
Sweden, Germany, UK, the Netherlands and Belgium (see Figure 31). It has an annual turnover 
of around £9 billion, and trades predominantly in Europe. It is 100 per cent owned by farmers. 
The Arla group originally established over 100 years ago, although it has evolved significantly 
over this period, involving the merger of various cooperatives. Most notably, in 2012, Milk Link 
and its circa. 1000 members was dissolved into Arla to bring the total number of UK farmers in 
1. Collective organisational sales 
(i) Co-operatives (e.g. Arla, OMSCo, First Milk) 
(ii) DPO (Dairy Crest Direct)  
2. Individual sales  
(i) Supermarket aligned contracts (account for 10% of sales) 
(ii) Direct to processor/milk buyer (e.g. Muller non-aligned, Crediton Dairies, 
Barber’s, Wykes) 
(iii) Informal arrangements (direct to the consumer)   
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the cooperative to 2,500. Milk collected from farmer members is taken to one of their processing 
sites throughout Europe, where it is processed and sold. Money is pooled and redistributed 
through the monthly milk price. As a respondent from Arla explained, “that’s the point about 
the co-op, there’s nowhere else for the money to go. Ultimately it finds its way back to the 
farmers”. Arla has begun to recognise the opportunity for business growth in areas such as 
China, the Middle East and North Africa. As a European cooperative the ‘Arla model’ relies 
heavily on milk and associated products moving freely across European boundaries. For 
instance, Lurpak is made in Denmark before being imported into the UK and so the group 
currently takes advantage of the free movement of goods in the Single Market.  
 
Figure 31. Arla institutional arrangements 
 
 
Farmers buy into the cooperative, and receive a monthly milk price, plus an appropriation (also 
termed ‘the 13th payment’). A further sum – a consolidation or reinvestment figure – gets paid 
back to reinvest in the businesses. Arla can only be funded by farmers and no one else can take 
a profit share out of the cooperative. This exclusivity is “fundamental because […] the difficulty 
is whenever you introduce another equity partner into a co-op. They usually have a diametric, 
opposite requirement to the farmer, in the sense that they need to minimize the milk price to 
reach the profit” (D: interviewee 16).   
 
Arla offer evergreen unlimited contracts. For the Arla representative and some focus group 
participants this was important. For example: 
“That’s one of the virtues of Arla over most of the other processors, is my contract with 
Arla is evergreen, so they can’t get rid of me, and in the current downturn, or rather the 
recent downturn, the benefit of that has come to light where some of the smaller 
processors have actually shoved farmers out the door because they couldn’t cope. And 
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another virtue of the Arla contract is that they will buy all my milk without restrictions, so 
I can go on expanding and they have guaranteed to buy all my milk on the same price, 
now that’s not widespread in the industry […] they’ll buy all that milk at the same 
contractual terms as they buy everything else” (D: interviewee 16). 
“We could go and take on another 400 cow farm tomorrow, and ring up Arla and say 
‘right, we’re going to put another million litres on our contract’, they’re quite good like 
that” (Young Farmers Focus Group). 
 
Whilst unrestricted contracts have been criticised by some for lacking sensitivity to the market 
and allowing dairy farmers to freely overproduce, Arla claim their pricing mechanism is sufficient 
to discourage overproducing. The following quotes capture this. 
“I mean we’ve had a slight price cut, to various howls of anguish around the industry, but 
the accompanying narrative with the price cut is ‘listen guys, the market is topping out 
[…] we are getting a bit of a correction, just hold your horses” (D: interviewee 16). 
“The Arla theory is, because we are like 25 per cent of UK producers, for everyone that 
goes up within Arla, there will be another one that will drop out” (Sedgemoor Focus 
Group) i.e. it balances out because the cooperative is large enough.  
 
Arla described themselves as a strong cooperative, with significant bargaining power. They 
attribute this leverage to three factors: (i) scale, (ii) the ability to export, and (iii) branding.  
“Scale helps a little bit but more important than scale, there are two leverage tools for us. 
One is get it out of the country, so export, tighten the supply. And the other is branding 
i.e. they have to come to us to buy the product, they can’t get it from anyone else […] so 
we are the biggest milk buyer in the UK. In terms of branding, Lurpak, Cravendale, 
increasingly the Arla brand, Costello Cheese which is a smaller brand, Anchor, those are 
all our brands … now the point is, Lurpak, the biggest selling butter - £300 million of sales 
annually, Tesco’s can only come to Arla for Lurpak, so we’ve got the leverage” (D: 
interviewee 16). 
 
As the largest UK cooperative, Arla thus described themselves as having the ability to ‘keep the 
market straight’, because as long as they are recruiting farmer members, other buyers cannot 
afford to be too far out of line. To avoid exposure to volatility, Arla supply milk via both 
commodity and branded markets, with branded market prices tending to be much more stable 
than pure commodity prices. As the representative from Arla explained, “it’s important for a 
farmer to look at the product mix of the business he’s supplying because that will have a bearing 
on the volatility or the level of volatility he’s going to be subject to going forward” (D: 
interviewee 16).  
 
OMSCo 
OMSCo is the largest organic milk cooperative in the UK. Their central role is “to operate on 
behalf of members to secure milk fields on their behalf, whether they are going into liquid milk 
fields, or ingredients areas” (D: interviewee 21b). Critically, like Arla, they purchase the milk and 
manage it all the way through to the retailer (see Figure 32). OMSCo currently has 232 members 
but is expanding its membership and is soon to have in excess of 250 members across the UK, 
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owing to opportunities in global markets such as America, Australasia and China. OMSCo 
“manage everything relating to the farmers and milk supply and endeavor to give them 
opportunities to enhance their businesses and returns.” (D: interviewee 21a). Organic dairy 
farmers who are accepted to joined pay a one-off joining fee to become full members.  
 
Figure 32. OMSCo institutional arrangements 
 
 
OMSCo market the milk in a number of different ways depending on what is appropriate for 
the milk. These range from long-term contracts for liquid milk, to spot markets for dairy 
ingredients. Although they market milk in a range of different ways and to a range of buyers 
(ranging from larger buyers such as Yeo Valley and Muller, to numerous smaller buyers), OMSCo, 
unlike Arla, sell only to commodity markets. Whilst Arla view the mix of selling to branded and 
commodity markets as important to achieve stability, OMSCo claim that not having specific 
brands gives them ‘more flexibility’ as to where they put the milk. As one representative from 
OMSCO explained, “if you’re tied into a brand, then obviously it’s a tighter net that you’re sort 
of filling” (D: interviewee 21b).  
 
The milk price for OMSCo members is set out on the 1st April every year. Purchasing is based on 
a seasonality profile, so farmers are paid three months of the year on a flat fee, whilst the 
remaining months depend on how much milk is produced in the spring. This mechanism aims to 
prevent a ‘spring flush’ – i.e. is designed to ensure a stable production system. The price received 
by OMSCo farmers over the last 3 years has been very stable and increased last year. It has 
consistently succeeded the conventional milk price by in excess of 16p per litre. The stability of 
OMSCo’s milk price is the product of careful monitoring of supply and demand.  
“We are very carefully monitoring the people who wish to convert and ensuring 
that we only take on anybody where we have a home for that milk, so basic criteria. 
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Everything we do is about maintaining a supply and demand balance” (D: 
interviewee 21a). 
“The organic sector has shown that the milk industry can remain a lot more stable 
if we monitor it and the industry has learnt from previous episodes where there has 
been increases in supply, that don’t match demand” (D: interviewee 21b). 
 
The efforts to monitor demand and subsequently control supply are central to OMSCo’s success 
(both in terms of the price and the stability of the price). Whilst there are lessons the 
conventional market could learn from this, it is important to note that organic milk makes up 
just 3 per cent of the dairy market. Such tight monitoring of demand and control of supply are 
harder – if not impossible –in the conventional market.    
 
(ii) Dairy Producer Organisation (DPO) 
 
Dairy Crest Direct 
Dairy Crest Direct (DCD) is an agency DPO, which is formed to collectively negotiate terms (both 
with reference to prices and contract terms) with the processor, or in some cases, the retailer, 
on behalf of its members (Figure 33). The actual milk contract remains between the individual 
farmer and the processor. As the DCD representative put it,  
“We [Dairy Crest Direct] act on behalf of our members, but each member holds a contract 
with Dairy Crest to supply milk. They have a contract with us and a contract with Dairy 
Crest, but their milk supply contract is with Dairy Crest” (D: interviewee 19). 
 
Figure 33. Dairy Crest Direct (DPO) institutional arrangements 
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The DCD DPO evolved from a larger DPO which at the time represented 1,020 farmers supplying 
1.5 billion litres per annum to Dairy Crest in December 2015, which formed after the sale of the 
Dairy Crest’s dairies business to Muller. DCD DPO continues to represent farmers in the south 
west who supply their milk into Dairy Crest’s Davidstow Creamery in North Cornwall. DCD 
members transferring from Dairy Crest to Muller were subsequently established to represent 
DCD members who transferred out of DCD to Muller. The DCD DPO currently represents 360 
farmer members; it has eight elected geographically specific Forum Members and three Elected 
Directors. This highly formalised governance arrangement is characteristic of the DPO model, 
which some interviewees argued may not appeal to smaller groups or those where a strong 
supplier-buyer relationship already exists.  
 
The DCD DPO essentially formalised a structure that already existed.  
“It legalised what we already doing. We were meeting and negotiating milk prices with 
Dairy Crest on a regular basis and developing contract options and representing our 
farmers in those contexts […] so it allowed us to formalise and become the correct legal 
entity to do what we were doing” (D: interviewee 19). 
 
An agency DPO, such as Dairy Crest Direct, aims to represent the best interests of its farmer 
members. 
“It gives the farmer some confidence that his milk supply, or his agreement with his milk 
purchaser is being fully represented by the people who have only got his interest at heart” 
(D: interviewee 19).  
 
For example, following Dairy Crest’s implementation of the voluntary “Code of Good Practice” 
in 2012, Dairy Crest DPO “negotiated with Dairy Crest to adapt the voluntary code to make some 
changes to it that we felt made it more beneficial to our members” (D: interviewee 19).  
 
According to DCD (2015: 1), DPO status “provides competition compliant authority and the 
bargaining strength to constituted farmers’ groups to negotiate contract terms and milk prices 
with their buyer on their members’ behalf”. The DCD Chairman described the DPO as providing 
“legitimacy, accountability and rigour” which helps “future proof effective farmer 
representation in a fast evolving marketplace”. Farming Minister George Eustice congratulated 
Dairy Crest Direct on forming the first DPO in the UK and anticipated that the DCD, supported 
by a £110,000 grant from Defra’s Dairy Fund, would mean farmers had “greater power to 
negotiate the price of their milk and give themselves more clout in the market place”.  
 
Processors, such as Dairy Crest, benefit from the formalisation of the 
relationships/communication between themselves and their producers. “It provides them with 
a point of contact for them to discuss and consider ideas for the future” (D: interviewee 19). 
Although the benefits of the DPO were cited amongst those in the industry, with specific 
reference to the DCD DPO, there was some caution noted by interviewees and focus group 
participants in terms of viewing the DPO structure as a ‘silver bullet’. As the DCD DPO 
representative put t, “it’s the relationship [with the buyer] that’s relevant […] it’s not the DPO 
that delivered […] it’s been a long period of working with the milk buyer that does it” (D: 
interviewee 19). 
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Inherent to their relationship with Dairy Crest, was their negotiation of a contract that was 
introduced in April 2016. The DCD interviewee described the innovative contract type 
established by the DPO as “loosely A and B”. As part of this, every farmer has a monthly core 
volume they can produce at a monthly-negotiated price. Where it differs to a standard A and B 
contract, is that if the group as a whole produce less than what Dairy Crest needs, farmers 
producing more than their core volume will be paid the set price for their ‘surplus’. If the DCD 
farmers produce more than what, as a whole, Dairy Crest need in that month –otherwise known 
as their ‘collective core allocation’ – the set price is only received for their core volume, with 
surplus litres being paid on a transparent market price; the market price has the potential to be 
higher than the core set price, although although it was noted that this had not yet been the 
case. The contract in place means all milk produced by DCD farmers is guaranteed to be 
purchased by Dairy Crest. However, if Dairy Crest obtain more milk than they need from DPO 
members that month, surplus litres will be sold on an open market basis. DCD DPO members 
are not penalised for under production.  
 
DCD refer to the contract as a supply management risk contract which sought to address the 
problem of oversupply and the resulting price volatility. They hoped it would protect farmers 
who provided the right amount of milk from price decreases caused by oversupply.  
“We had Dairy Crest on the one hand saying, if you keep supplying more and more milk, 
we don’t know what we are going to do with it, and we wanted to ensure that those 
farmers that didn’t keep supplying more milk weren’t losing out to the same level as 
others that were causing the problem” (D: interviewee 19). 
 
In addition to agency DPOs, which act on behalf of members in price negotiations, two further 
types of DPO exist. 
• DPOs acting as an agency contracting with processors on behalf of its members: In 
practice, this means the PO contracts directly with one or more processors on 
behalf of its members, but like an agency acting on behalf of its members in price 
negotiations, it does not take ownership of the milk. Members of this kind of PO 
will have a legally binding agreement with the PO that commits them to supply 
their milk to whomever the PO has a contract with.  
• DPOs acting as a principal taking ownership of the milk: The PO takes ownership of 
the milk buying it from members and selling it onto one or more processors; 
effectively the DPO acts as a milk broker on behalf of its members. This option will 
require that the PO is responsible for milk logistics, quality, administration 
(including liaison with the RPA) and milk balancing. 
 
5.5.2.2 Individual sales 
Individual sales refer to various arrangements.  
 
(i)  Supermarket-aligned contracts 
Although supermarket-aligned contracts they represent a relatively small proportion of the milk 
buying market – accounting for around 10 per cent – they are an important arrangement. 
Examples include Tesco Sustainable Dairy Group (TSDG), which is supplied via Muller (see Figure 
34). Retailer-aligned contracts emerged as a response to the negative PR supermarkets received 
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about the prices they were paying to dairy farmers, and out of a desire on the part of the 
supermarkets to secure milk supply.  
“They wanted to ring fence a group of producers that they knew they could look after a 
bit better and guarantee future supplies” (D: interviewee 16).  
In retailer-aligned contracts, farmers sell their milk, via a processor, to a supermarket retailer 
such as Tesco or Sainsbury’s. The price they receive covers the cost of production and includes 
a premium. It protects farmers from market volatility and prices are set in advance to ensure a 
stable income for dairy farmers.  
“The only guys that are isolated [from price volatity] are the guys that have retailer aligned 
contracts… So they’ve been doing OK throughout this … kind of haloed ground […] if you 
are on them, they are fantastic […] when we were getting 18/19 pence, they were still 
getting 29 pence” (D: interviewee 16). 
“If you can get on them and you can stay on them you are on to a winner aren’t you” 
(Young Farmers Focus Group). 
 
Figure 34. Supermarket aligned and non-aligned institutional arrangements 
 
 
(ii)  Direct processor/milk buyer 
Farmers selling their milk direct to the processor or milk buyer are also a key individual sales 
arrangement. In the Somerset and North Devon case study examples included arrangements 
with large processors, such as Muller (direct supply contracts), to arrangements with smaller 
dairies / specialist cheesemakers, such as Barbers, Crediton Dairies and Wykes.  
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Muller non-alligned contracts  
Farmers on Muller non-aligned contracts – also known as direct supply contracts – supply milk 
to Lidl, Morrisons and Aldi, as well as schools, hospitals, corner shops and retail chains such as 
Starbucks. Muller non-aligned contracts run alongside supermarket aligned contracts (see Figure 
28). They differ to aligned contracts in that the price is set by Muller, although many retailers 
supplement the prices received by farmers, in response to negative PR (D: interviewee 18). 
 
The Barber’s Assured agreement  
Barbers –one of the world’s oldest cheddar makers –has established a milk pool that purchases 
milk from 145 farmers across Somerset and Dorset. It supplies milk for over 100 different 
branded and own label farmhouse cheeses (see Figure 35). The cheeses have Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) status. Barbers supply 200 customers across 20 countries. They have 
recently launched a new transparent milk contract. The “Barber’s Assured” agreement is 
voluntary code compliant, and encourages farmer forecasting and introduces a base milk 
volume for 2017, with an 8 per cent added threshold for producers, based on volumes set in 
December 2016.  
 
Figure 35. Barbers’ institutional arrangements 
 
 
The contract, which utilizes an A and B pricing mechanism, claims to be more market sensitive 
and transparent. It requires farmers to supply Barbers with a forecast, four times a year, to 
enable them to understand what volumes of milk they will need to sell. The introduction of the 
new contract formed a response to overproduction and a move towards monitoring of demand 
and control over supply: 
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“Just over a year ago, Barbers were getting so much milk they didn’t know what to do, 
they had no method of control at all, so they had two choices, they either had to take the 
price down on ever litre, which they did […] they also served notice on farmers because it 
got that severe, so it was a very salutary lesson and they wanted to do something that 
was different from that” (D: interviewee 22). 
 
The arrangement ensures stability for Barber’s as a business, as well as their farmers, as 
overproduction only impacts on those who have exceeded their base volume, rather than the 
whole milk pool.  
 
Central to the way in which Barber’s milk pool operates is an exchange of information between 
the supplier (the farmer) and the processor (Barber’s).  As above, as part of the contract, farmers 
are required to supply Barber’s with a production forecast, four times a year, to enable them to 
understand what volumes of milk they will need to sell. Equally, farmers receive key market 
information from Barber’s enabling them to make informed decisions about their production 
levels.  
“I want farmers to start looking at markets closer than they’ve done before. Because they 
are affected by them and if more farmers looked at markets it would help them make 
more informed decisions about where they take their businesses… I want our farmers to 
become match fit with this sort of stuff, and the AMPE stuff and forecasting” (D: 
interviewee 22). 
 
The milk pool has undergone significant changes in 2017; farmers in the milk pool have “gone 
from a position where they’ve had discretionary advice, very simple contract, no requirement 
for any particular standards, no volume management at all” (D: interviewee 22) to a strict 
contractual arrangement. Although at present, horizontal cooperation – i.e. cooperation 
between farmers within the Barber’s milk pool – is low, they aspire to drive this forward in the 
future, as the interviewee explained.  
“I want to get this producer group established, get them to fall on their feet a bit, and to 
start working together, to start to provide some value. They need to be able to provide 
some value to Barber’s as well, and we’d like to encourage them to be part of that. We’ll 
have the reviews at the end of the year for how the base milk volume grow and progress 
and I want to involve them in that process, how that process is worked and managed” (D: 
interviewee 22). 
 
Although Barber’s currently lacks the formal arrangements compared to be a DPO, it is 
nonetheless moving towards a more formal representation of its farmers, akin to a DPO model.  
“[Barber’s wouldn’t do a DPO-type arrangement, for example?] We can’t think about 
DPOs, that’s a long way off … you need the building blocks I feel for putting together the 
building blocks in five years’ time” (D: interviewee 22). 
“It would be a long way off […] what you’ll notice here that within Barber’s Assured there’s 
a requirement for us to have a representational group […] you’ll see, going through that 
[Barber’s Assured] contract, I’ve actually got the authority of the group actually enshrined 
in the contract. I know what value it can bring, so what I’m doing at the moment is I’m 
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asking the farmers themselves how they want their elections to take place” (D: 
interviewee 22). 
 
Crediton Dairies 
Crediton Dairies is a small, relatively informal milk pool, compared to the DPO model, for 
example. The site itself is 70 years old and was previously part of Express Dairies, and 
subsequently Northern Foods, before returning to Express Dairies and then Milk Link (a farmers’ 
co-operative). The dairy continued running under Milk Link until its merger with Arla (October 
2012). Arla already had a similar UHT facility, which led to the management buyout of Crediton 
Dairy in August 2013. In October 2013 it became a standalone site, although in its infancy it 
relied on an agreement with Arla to supply milk until they were fully established. Now Credition 
have acquired their own pool of local farmers (within a 20-mile radius). As well as being local, 
farmers are only recruited if they are able to provide a level supply (i.e. no spring bias).  
 
Crediton Dairies work closely with a number of relatively small dairy farms (as opposed to a 
fewer number of large suppliers) to reduce risk; as the interviewee explained they did not want 
to be reliant on a big farmer that could pull the plug and leave them with a “bloody big problem!” 
(D: interviewee 15).  
 
As they have established themselves and the availability of milk has grown rapidly, they have 
adopted an A&B pricing system to avoid problems of oversupply in the future.  
“Our milk volumes were growing rapidly and whilst it wasn’t a problem, we could envisage 
it becoming a problem, if milk volumes carried on growing unfettered at the sort of level 
that they were going at and so that’s why we took the view to introduce A&B” (D: 
interviewee 15).  
 
Effectively Crediton Dairies saw their role as a DPO but without the formal status of a DPO.  
“I mean I would say that we act as a DPO without having the formal rules of a DPO behind 
us” (D: interviewee 15).  
 
They had a general preference for a moreinformal and local approach.  
“We consulted with people in the group as to whether they wanted [some] sort of elected 
representation to elect somebody and so on, but the feedback was that it’s such a small 
group, and if any of them have a major issue, they can pick the phone up to me, or the 
phone up to our MD, my boss, and just get the issue addressed and sorted sort of thing 
[…] Alongside that, we have what we call our farmer days at a local pub, where they 
basically come for the best part of the day, they sort of come from 11 until 3, and as part 
of that, we update them on what we’re doing, what’s happening in the market place, what 
are we doing as a business to drive innovation …” (D: interviewee 15).  
 
Wykes Farms 
Wykes Farms is one of the UK’s largest family run cheese producers and milk processors. They 
have a milk pool comprising 116 farms within a 40-50-mile radius, from their base in Bruton, 
Somerset. The majority of the 13,000 tonnes of cheese made annually, is sold to supermarkets, 
with about 15 per cent exported to 160 different countries worldwide.  
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Wykes place significant emphasis on the quality of milk produced and reward their farmers for 
high quality produce. There is no cap on total fats and proteins and farmers can earn more from 
increasing these elements. They see this as the ‘unique selling point’ of their milk contract, 
encouraging innovation and competition.  
 
Similar to Credition, they described themselves as an ‘informal DPO’, and did not feel the need 
to formalise this arrangement.   
“I think if you’re looking after your farmers and you’ve got representation from your 
farmers, there’s no real need for them [DPO], to be honest, and that’s what Muller has 
done. We have a farmer committee which consists of 9 farmers. We’ve got a chairman 
and 8 members. So they are the voice of our farmers. We meet on a monthly basis. We 
go through like a business review of what our business is doing, you know, where we’re 
up to with our customers, we’re quite open with them, you know, and we discuss milk 
price and any other issues that they have really, any other contractual issues”  (D: 
interviewee 23). 
 
Wykes pride themselves on a strong but ad hoc relationship with their suppliers. Wykes 
recognised that dairy farmers were particularly vulnerable to price volatility because of the 
changing price of the end product. Prices received by farmers can change at any point depending 
on the price of cheese. Going forward, Wykes are putting an increasing emphasis on their export 
market.  
 
5.5.2.3 Revaluing milk: Free Range Dairy Network  
Unlike free range eggs, which are well-established in the UK market, free range milk is a 
relatively new and contested concept. However, free range milk and the associated movement 
is becoming increasingly popular in the UK. In contrast to laying hens, there are currently no EU 
laws governing free range dairy farming. The Free Range Dairy Network has established what it 
describes as a “simple set of standards for producers” (D: interviewee 23) enabling them to 
“provide consumers with a clear assurance that they are buying milk from cows that enjoy the 
freedom to graze” (http://www.freerangedairy.org/; accessed 14.09.17). Producers conforming 
to the standards – which includes committing to grazing their cows for at least six months of the 
year (180 days) – are able to utilize the Pasture Promise label (Figure 36).  
 
Figure 36. Free Range Dairy ‘Pasture Promise’ logo 
 
Source: Free Range Dairy (online) 
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The label is used by members to demonstrate their commitment to keep their cows out in fields. 
As the Free Range Dairy Network manager explained: 
“Well it is that commitment to cows going outside […] if you’re going to start to call it free 
range, the cows really need to be out for at least half the year, so 180 is about the 6 month 
mark and that’s where it came from, it was no more scientific than that really (D: 
interviewee 23). 
 
Ultimately the concept of Free Range Dairy is a way of increasing the value of the product at the 
farm level, regardless of how it is sold going forward. It represents a strategy of adding value to 
the milk and increasing the potential return to the farmer before it is purchased from the 
farmer. The Free Range Dairy initiative was formally registered as a Community Interest 
Company (CIC), under the name of the Free Range Dairy Network, in July 2014. 
 
Figure 37. Free Range Dairy institutional arrangement 
 
 
Free Range Milk is sold through different retail channels and farmers producing milk with the 
Pasture Promise label are selling their milk to different dairies (see Figure 37). Significantly, large 
retailer Asda started stocking the free range milk (processed by Cotteswold Dairy) in 109 of their 
stores in March 2017 and have recently announced they will soon stock it in 367 of their stores, 
including those in Wales and Sctoland, in the coming months. This access into Asda stores has 
been transformative for the network. 
“Asda launching on March 1st has transported us to a different place, you know, we are 
now becoming very widely recognised” (D: interviewee 23). 
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In this sense, FRD and the FRD network instituional arrangement spans different retailers and 
contracts, in order to add value to milk. 
 
Free Range Dairy and the Pasture Promise label aim to maximise the amount of time cows spend 
outside each year; during the spring and summer months, free range dairy cows are free to roam 
pastures throughout the day and night. Generally, in the winter months, cows are housed inside, 
fed on grass conserved as silage and hay, although in some areas cows continue to spend winter 
outside. The Free Range Dairy Network aims to “win recognition for the farming system, not for 
a milk brand, but for a farming system, so I seek to define recognition for a farming system, 
centred around this commitment to grazing cows in fields” (D: interviewee 23). Integral to this 
is the desire to reduce the ‘distance’ between the producer and consumer and “[to] encapsulate 
the values of cows in fields” into the product.  
“What we’re trying to do is actually return people, the consumer to thinking about, 
actually the real value in my milk lies in the farm, you know, the way the cows are treated, 
the rural fabric of the communities it comes from, and all those things, and by doing that, 
I believe we can restore bargaining power, if you like, to the final producer and that’s 
exactly what this is all about at the end of the day” (D: interviewee 23). 
 
Like the organic movement, the Free Range Dairy Nework is acutely aware of the importance of 
matching supply to demand. “I get farmers who grumble to me that ‘I graze for 150 days, why 
can’t I join your club?’ but I don’t want every man and his dog doing free range milk because 
we’ll be in oversupply” (D: interviewee 23). 
 
Despite its obvious rise to success, free range milk was a contentious topic throughout the 
interviews and focus groups. It is heralded by supporters as a means of adding value at the farm 
level, rather than simply waving the ‘white stuff’ off to an “increasingly convoluted supply chain” 
(D: interviewee 23).  
 
Although the manager of Free Range Dairy Network confidently described the free range milk 
concept as an important revolution revaluing milk, it was subject to notable criticism during the 
interviews/focus groups. Specifically, participants were skeptical and ambivalent about the 
meaning behind ‘free range’. They were particularly concerned that the definition of free range 
and the welfare standards associated with the term were being falsely interpreted by members 
of the public. They also noted that there were welfare issues with cows being out all of the time, 
which they feared the public may not understand. As one focus group participant explained:  
“I’m mixed about it a little bit because well we tick that box quite well […] but the biggest 
welfare thing with the cattle, like the guys that have got the cows in all year round, it may 
not be what the consumer thinks they are buying, but a lot of them, they are the most 
well looked after, probably the happiest cows really, is the irony, and perhaps some of the 
grazing systems when they are out all year round, in the middle of winter, when they are 
in mud up to their bellies […] there’s welfare issues there, so there’s welfare issues 
whichever way, there’s welfare issues in any system, any system done well works really 
well. I like to see cows out to grass, and I think the consumer does” (Sedgemoor Focus 
Group). 
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Those in the organic sector considered free range as an imitation of organic systems without the 
need to adhere to the same level of standards.  
“You might have heard all this nonsense at the moment about this free range milk? […] 
We’ve been doing free range milk for an awful long time, it’s called organic! And the 
difference between free range and us is that ours is actually audited to a standard, 
whereas I think, you know, you could basically have what you like, and as long as your 
cows are out in a field, you can call yourself free range. Not sure there’s any auditing goes 
on, whereas ours are very stringent” (D: interviewee 14). 
 
It was suggested too that the consumer was not to blame for the interest in free range dairy 
products and that it was confusing from their perspective. Similarly, there was concern in the 
focus groups that the free range movement was causing the public to think non-free range 
products experienced a lower standard of welfare.   
“I’m not a big fan of free range dairy to be honest […] I think it’s similar to what happened 
with the chickens really, people think ‘oh yes, that’s free range, so the other stuff’s not 
free range, and it creates a negative image I think about farms” (Young Farmers Focus 
Group). 
 
 
  
 204 
5.5.2.4 Understanding dairy farmers’ institutional arrangements – a summary of key issues 
Guiding question    
1. Can you please explain where and 
how (channels) you commercialise 
your products?  
Dairy farmers sell their milk in a number of ways.  
1. Collective organisational sales 
(i) Co-operatives (Arla, First Milk, OMSCo) 
(ii) DPO (Dairy Crest Direct)  
2. Individual (direct) sales  
(i) Supermarket aligned contracts (account for 10% of sales) 
(ii) Direct to processor/milk buyer (Muller non-aligned, Crediton Dairies, Barber’s, Wykes) 
(iii) Informal arrangements (direct to the consumer)   
Markets and 
marketing 
 
 
2. What are the main challenges you 
have with your customers and the 
demand for your commodities? 
Public perception of dairy plays a significant role in customer’s interest in/desire to purchase milk. The industry 
has recently come under scrutiny in the news and social media for its treatment of cows and calves. This 
negative press has led to increasing demand for milk from the small/local/family farm, as opposed to the big or 
factory farm (even though there is little suggestion that small/local/family farms have higher welfare standards 
etc. and that, although important to public perception, this notion is relatively meaningless).  
3. What marketing strategies do you 
have in order to secure better deals? 
For farmers who have secure contracts, marketing strategies are of less importance to their sales. However, in 
some cases, such as those selling milk on a more informal basis (either where milk being sold is in addition to 
milk sold elsewhere or their primary mode of sales) marketing was regarded as vital. These farmers are 
increasingly required to be more entrepreneurial to firstly, add value to the milk they produce, and secondly, 
to promote it (taking to the internet and social media for example).  
In response to their perceived ill-treatment of farmers, many of the big supermarkets have adopted a ‘milk 
story’ to connect consumers with where their milk comes from.      
4. Is certification part of your strategy? Standards/certification was seen as integral to dairy farmers. Red Tractor is the minimum industry standard 
and all dairy farmers interviewed had this as a minimum. Very few contractual arrangements identified require 
only Red Tractor alone. Depending on the intended destination of the milk, additional criteria are imposed.  
Standards serve two key purposes in the dairy industry. Firstly, they act to protect the brands and businesses 
they are associated with, and secondly, they are key to the appeal of UK milk and milk products.  
Although certification was universally important for members of the industry, it was particularly integral to 
those selling organic or Free Range Milk. In these cases, the unique selling point of the milk is only evident with 
achievement of the organic or Pasture Promise certification.  
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5. Has there been any recent 
contextual change that has 
influenced your current business 
model? 
The dairy industry has suffered significant milk price volatility since 2007. This volatility has prompted a number 
of different business models/strategies to ensure continued survival. These include strategies to add value to milk 
at the farm level (either by increasing the nutrient content of milk or through a ‘milk story’ e.g. Free Range Dairy). 
Other strategies have included selling milk directly on the farm (e.g. the Horrington Milk Hut), hedging the price 
of a set amount of milk for a number of months to guarantee prices (one dairy, Yew Tree, allows their farmers to 
do this and Muller have also recently introduced it for one of their manufacturing contracts) and finding 
alternative buyers. At the industry level, the establishment of Dairy Producer Organisations such as Dairy Crest 
Direct, aim to represent the best interests of its farmer members and organise collective action in the negotiation 
of prices (as well as contract terms). In addition, dairy farmers are beginning to engage with price information and 
forecasts to guide their business plans. It is anticipated that the outcome of the Brexit negotiations could have a 
significant influence on dairy farmers’ business strategies – particularly for those farmers supplying to Arla and 
Muller.  
 
6. How do you finance your activities, 
and what would you require to 
change this? 
All of the participating dairy farmers were well-established and did not identify borrowing money for their 
business as an issue at the time. However, the issue of finance, specifically the capital required for new entrants 
to establish themselves in dairy farming, was a key industry issue that emerged in all interviews and focus groups. 
In addition, there was some concern that uncertainty relating to Brexit was likely to limit bank lending further, 
particularly for new customers. Intergenerational farm transfer remained the dominant mode of entry into dairy 
farming, although there were exceptions such as herd managers who had no familial connection to the industry.  
Financing  
7. Do you work with other dairy 
farmers? How did this start? How is 
it going? Will you continue in the 
future? 
Farmers talked of significant interaction with other farmers, both through formal and informal channels. 
Horizontal coordination – particularly in the form of knowledge exchange (events, discussion groups, meetings 
etc.) – was common amongst collective and individual sales arrangements. The Free Range Dairy Network is a 
particularly good example of horizontal coordination; farmers pay a membership fee and have access to a series 
of network events and activities. In the past farmers have perhaps been disinclined to work with other farmers 
(valuing their autonomy), but the recent market volatility has encouraged farmers to work together to identify 
best practice etc. to improve their resilience in a difficult economic context. 
Horizontal 
coordination 
8. Do you collaborate with others in 
the value-chain? How did this 
evolve? Will you continue with this 
in the future? 
Producers are increasingly having to engage with other members of the value chain. This is in part a response to 
the market volatility and represents a response to find new ways to work. It is particularly common amongst more 
informal and individual sales arrangements such as the Free Range Dairy Network and amongst the smaller milk 
pools. Increasingly, farmers are required to communicate and engage more and more with processors through 
forecasting. In some cases, e.g. Barber’s contract, information flow between the producer and processor is two-
directional, with processors communicating market information to farmers and farmers contracted to supply 
accurate forecasts. To avoid issues of oversupply (a significant factor in the price volatility), communication and 
Vertical 
cooperation 
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collaboration between producers and processors is likely to continue in the future and is likely to be increasingly 
formalised, i.e. stipulated in producer contracts.   
9. Do you feel that the current policy 
context helps you to improve your 
business performance? 
Farmers expressed mixed feelings about the usefulness of the current policy context. Whilst farmers felt subsidy 
was not well targeted (and was the route of many of the industry’s issues, e.g. inflated land prices), they equally 
expressed concern about the potential lack of subsidy post-Brexit. Farmers generally felt policy could be improved 
by being targeted to the specific needs of the UK in the form of the British Agricultural Policy. It was anticipated 
that a more targeted policy and support provision would encourage a more efficient and productive industry.   
Policy and 
regulations  
 
10. What environmental constraints and 
social challenges do you need to 
address? 
Dairy farms located within Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) face significant constraints regarding allowable nitrate 
levels and slurry storage times. These constraints have resulted in significant investment costs for some farmers. 
There are also environmental constraints relating to water quality that are also impacting on dairy farmers’ 
activities. More broadly, there are concerns over the general environmental impact of dairy farming which are 
likely to constrain certain activities as the industry faces the need to sustainably intensify.  
A key social challenge for the dairy industry was the issue of the availability of new entrants and their ease of 
access to the industry (primarily because of the costs involved – this links to the SFP inflating and sustaining land 
prices). It was recognised that entry to the industry was typically through intergenerational farm transfer and that 
it was very difficult, if not impossible, for new entrants to establish themselves in the industry. It is anticipated 
that the reduction or redistribution of agricultural support, post-Brexit will reduce land prices and make this easier 
for new entrants. Although a reduction in the value of the land may prove problematic for incumbent farmers 
who have borrowed money against the current value of their land.  
11. How do you deal with current 
policies and regulations? What are 
your main strategies? 
A key strategy (for some dairy farmers at least) in response to the dissatisfaction with current policies and 
regulations was to vote for Brexit in the hope that a more targeted British Agricultural Policy would ensue. 
Nevertheless, there is significant concern amongst farmers and those associated with the industry, that 
agriculture and particularly dairy, will not be given adequate consideration in Brexit negotiations.  
More generally, dairy farmers are seeking a diverse range of ways to sell their milk and dairy products. Where 
they are dissatisfied or struggling, they are seeking alternatives. They are increasingly required to be 
entrepreneurial – seeking new ways of adding value to their products. They are also finding (some degree of) 
solace amongst groups of other farmers, whether that is via large collective organisations such as Arla, or smaller 
and more independent networks such as the Free Range Dairy Network. The legal status of Dairy Producer 
Organisations (DPOs) also represents a strategy which farmers are deploying to deal with the current political and 
economic context. 
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12. What is the impact of your farming 
activities on the sustainability of the 
dairy sector; furthermore, how 
would you define this impact?  
The diversity of institutional arrangements in place are intended to ensure the financial sustainability of the 
sector, i.e. secure the best price for the milk produced. The different arrangements to some degree offer farmers 
alternative ways of securing a better (or at least adequate) milk price. Farming activities such as Free Range Dairy 
(which stipulate cows have to be outside for 180 days a year, as a minimum) are potentially increasing the financial 
sustainability of the dairy sector by enable farmers to add value to their products at the farm level, and thus 
having some control over the prices they receive. Although these strategies represent definite efforts to improve 
the sustainability of the sector, milk price is still volatile and in recent periods have failed to cover the cost of 
production. This has prompted protests and social media.  
Financial 
Sustainability 
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5.5.3 Contractualisation and pricing instruments  
Table 13 outlines the characteristics of the different contractual arrangements observed, 
including:  
• Pricing determination 
• Length of contract in years 
• Cancellation/notice period 
• Quantity to supply buyer 
• Exclusivity 
• Price change notice period  
 
The contract information presented is true of July 2017. 
 
We now explore participants’ understandings of the different pricing mechanisms identfitied, 
including their relative advantages and disadvantages.  
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Table 13. Comparing contracts  
 Contract stipulations 
 Price determination  Length in years Cancellation period  Quantity to supply 
buyer  
Exclusivity  Price change notice  
1. Collective organizational sales 
a. Co-operatives  
Arla • Formulaic and basket 
prices  
• Evergreen • Recent proposal 
to extend notice 
to 12 months 
• Unlimited 
volumes (farmers 
can add on more 
litres at the same 
price) 
• Largely 
exclusive 
(can sell up 
to 10% via 
other 
means) 
• Price changes can 
be a min. of a 
week 
OMSCO • Milk price set on 1st 
April every year 
• Farmers are paid 3 
months of the year on 
a flat fee. Remaining 
months depend on 
how much milk 
produced in spring 
• Long term 
contracts 
• 12 months  • Closely monitored  • Exclusive • Declare price on 
an annual basis  
b. DPO 
Dairy Crest  
Supply Management 
Risk Contract 
• Core paid at 
negotiated price 
• Adapted A&B: if whole 
group is under that 
month, those 
producing over will get 
paid A price 
• Evergreen 
(although 
Dairy Crest 
reserve the 
right to apply 
12 months 
notice to 
supplier) 
• Standard 12 
months either 
side 
• Can be reduced 
to 3 months in 
special 
circumstances 
• Buy all milk 
produced but 
above core 
volume paid spot 
market price 
• Quarterly 
forecasting for 
next 12 months 
 
• Exclusive • At least 30 days 
advance notice of 
any reduction 
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 Contract stipulations 
 Price determination  Length in years Cancellation/notice 
period  
Quantity to supply 
buyer  
Exclusivity  Price change notice 
2. Individual sales 
a. Supermarket-aligned   
TSDG • Cost of production+ 
• Strict additional 
quality stipulations to 
receive price 
• Evergreen • As per Muller or 
Arla (processor) 
standard 
conditions  
• Agreed sum 
allocation, surplus 
paid via Arla or 
Muller standard 
pricing 
• Exclusive • TSDG provide at 
least 30 days 
notice of price 
change 
• Surplus litres 
change to 
standard notice 
periods 
b. Direct to processor/milk buyer  
Muller non-
aligned 
• Basket price (using 
five prices from 
different processors in 
the market)? 
• In the futre, 
ingredients customers 
can hedge/sell 
forward a proportion 
of their milk 
• Evergreen  • 12 months notice 
to farmers 
• 3 months notice 
to Muller 
following milk 
price change 
• Requirement to 
inform and seek 
approval  from 
Muller if the 
farmer intends to 
expand by more 
than 10% in a milk 
year 
• Exclusive • 30 days notice for 
price increases or 
decreases 
• May apply 
changes mid-
month  
Crediton • Base price with 
bonuses and 
deductions relating to 
quality criteria  
• A&B pricing – B 
receives AMPE price 
• Evergreen • 12 months either 
side for 
cancellation 
• 2015 production 
volume + 1.5% 
• Exclusive • 30 days notice 
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Barber’s • Composition (protein 
& butterfat) 
determines 95% of 
price 
• Prices determined by 
forecasting + 8% 
• A&B mechanism: 
anything above 
forecast receives 
AMPE-2  
• Evergreen • 12 months note 
given to farmers  
• 6 months notice 
to Barber’s 
• 3 months notice 
to Barber’s within 
30 days of a price 
decrease 
• Forecasting 
required (+8% 
allowed) 
• No penalties for 
over supply, yet  
• Exclusive • One month’s 
notice on price 
changes 
 
Wykes • Paid on the 
compositional quality 
of the milk  
• No cap on total fats 
and proteins and can 
earn more from this  
• Evergreen  • 12 months note 
given to farmers  
• 6 months notice 
to Wyke’s 
•  
• No restrictions • Exclusive • Can change at any 
time up to month 
in which price 
applies 
Coombe • Cost of production + 
i.e. prove price is as 
low as possible 
• Pay more for winter 
milk 
•  
• Evergreen • 12 months  • Quarterly reviews • Exclusive • Provide up to 30 
days notice in 
consultation with 
Waitrose 
c. Informal arrangements 
Davis and 
Parsons  
• Basket of prices from 
four other processors 
(incl. Muller and Arla + 
2 ‘high-end 
manufacturing 
contracts from 
milkprices.com) 
• 12 months • No data • Unlimited and 
keen for more 
milk from their 
farmers 
• Not 
exclusive  
• Basket price 
reviewed monthly 
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5.5.3.1 Price determination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A&B pricing 
As depicted in the description of institutional arrangements, Barber’s have adopted an A&B 
pricing mechanism to tightly control supply in line with market demand. The contract, which 
utilises an A&B pricing mechanism, claims to be more market sensitive and transparent. It 
requires farmers to supply Barber’s with a forecast, four times a year, to enable them to 
understand what volumes of milk they will need to sell. The introduction of the new contract 
formed a response to overproduction and a move towards monitoring of demand and control 
over supply: 
“Just over a year ago, Barbers were getting so much milk they didn’t know what to do, 
they had no method of control at all, so they had two choices, they either had to take the 
price down on ever litre, which they did […] they also served notice on farmers because it 
got that severe, so it was a very salutary lesson and they wanted to do something that 
was different from that” (D: interviewee 22).  
 
Larger companies such as Arla and Muller have not needed to adopt such mechanisms, because 
of their global connections and ability to ‘ship things around’: 
“Muller is international, so we can ship things around, import and export, and we have 
that power to do that […] we [Muller] can just say, ‘right, we’ll just dry it’, we’ve got a 
drier in Severnside, put it into skimmed milk powder, so there are a lot more places that 
we can send the milk ... more capacity” (D: interviewee 18 
 
A&B pricing mechanisms were described as a processor level replacement for government-
imposed quotas.  
“As the government restrictions have been taken away, so processors have needed to 
step into that gap, which is entirely appropriate, you know, it’s important that you know 
quotas were a very blunt instrument for restricting production, much better that 
production is regulated at the processor level” (D: interviewee 15) 
 
Whilst A&B pricing mechanisms are regarded as a useful tool by many in efforts to keep supply 
and demand tightly controlled, there are nonetheless negative connotations of the term. 
“A&B pricing had a bit of a bad reputation because some of it was brought in without any 
discussion with producers and this was brought in overnight and there was no 
transparency” (Sedgemoor Focus Group). 
“My concern with them is a lot of the processors use them as a smoke and mirrors tool to 
reduce the price they pay to farmers because they make them hideously complicated and 
Summary of mechanisms: 
• A&B pricing 
• ‘Cost of Production, plus’ 
• Hedging/futures market pricing  
• Formulaic pricing  
• Basket pricing  
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the framers, you just can’t see through them. In theory they’re good tools. In practice, I’m 
worried about the smoke and mirrors …” (D: interviewee 16) 
 
Rather than A&B, Arla suggested their pricing mechanism gives a far clearer signal to producers 
to slow production. Although Arla guarantee to purchase all their famers’ milk on the same price 
and contractual terms, without restrictions, price signals limit overproduction and encourage 
production in times of undersupply.  
 
However, those on A&B contracts (or similar arrangements) questioned the morality of 
unlimited contracts when overproduction has been largely to blame for poor prices in the recent 
past.   Aside from pricing mechanisms, Muller highlighted the importance of farmers’ levels of 
understanding of the relationship between demand, supply and market price to keeping the milk 
price stable. This raises questions about the scope/potential for educating/training farmers on 
this aspectof their business.  
 
Cost of production plus 
In ‘cost of production plus’ the farmer receives a price for their product that covers cost of 
production as a minimum, plus a bit more, ensuring sustainable profitability of their business. 
For example: 
“Cost of production type contracts have proven their worth where there are strong 
working relationships and trust along the supply chain and as such have many benefits.  
For raw material buyers, cost of production type contracts can help develop better 
relationships with suppliers, aids control over product quality standards and can improve 
the ability to plan ahead.  Paying a price that covers production costs helps demonstrate 
good corporate responsibility to consumers” (ADAS, 
http://www.adas.uk/News/delivering-producer-and-buyer-benefits-with-cost-of-
production-contracts; accessed: 15.09.2016) 
 
The disadvantages of ’cost of production’ contracts are largely felt by the buyer: 
• The buyer takes on the risk and typically means paying more than their competitors for 
milk, e.g. Tesco claim to have paid £240 million over market prices to their milk 
farmers since 2007 
• Developing dynamic and fair cost evaluation systems is highly time consuming for 
buyers 
 
The exceptionality of aligned contracts was widely recognised amongst participants. One 
processor explained hwo they initially emerged as follows:  
“[Supermarket X] started their dairy development group, and they spoke to the local 
people, local advisors, in the area, and said ‘right, what farms do you think would be 
good for this plan, and if those farms had really good quality, good attitude, good 
welfare, you know, ticked the box, then they were offered the contract in the area […] 
but since then, there is a lot of farmers outside of those contracts that are bloody good 
farms, really good welfare and really on it, and they are desperate for a supermarket 
contract, but there isn’t any” (D: interviewee 18). 
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5.5.4 Collective action (DPO and co-operative models)  
Although intended to give farmers greater power to negotiate milk prices and give them more 
influence in the market place, DPOs were widely criticised by many interview participants. 
Criticisms came from (1) those involved in less formalised milk pools and (2) farmer cooperative 
members.  
 
Those involved in less formalised milk pools, such as Crediton and Wykes, felt they had many of 
the same beneficial structures in place without the added complication of having to formalise 
the DPO structure (see section 5.5.2.1 (i) above). Whilst less formal milk pools rejected the level 
of formalisation required to become a DPO, the cooperative criticism of DPOs was more cutting. 
Arla, for example, was concerned DPOs did not have any leverage over the price the processor 
is offering.  
“I can’t get my head around them because I can’t see where the leverage is and no one’s 
ever been able to tell me where the leverage is. They are a common negotiation body so 
they might represent all the dairy producers in Dairy Crest, but where does the leverage 
lie? What tools have they got if they don’t like the price that their processor sets for them 
because that’s how it works with Dairy Crest … you know they tell the farmers effectively 
what they’re paying … what tool have they got at that point … the only tool that they’ve 
got is to pick the milk up and take it elsewhere … well on those volumes of milk, you can’t 
do that … you can’t pick up all of Muller’s milk supply and go out to the market and say 
‘does anyone want 2 million litres of milk please?’” (D: interviewee 16). 
 
Similarly, OMSCo felt without purchasing the milk from farmers, agency DPOs were powerless 
as a negotiating body, particularly at times of over-supply.  
 
Discussion of the merits of DPOs in the Sedgemoor Focus Group suggested that they were “the 
next best thing to a coop”.As one farmer put it, “you can’t [as a DPO] beat the market but you 
can operate the best you can and jointly work together rather than in an adversarial way” 
(Sedgemoor Focus Group). 
 
There was also some suggestion that the work done by the DPO structure is underestimated.  
“The PO we have, so we have a forum which is 60 farmers roughly, one forum person and 
then seven, as it is now it’s just seven forum guys, three directors, and a company 
secretary, so to speak, who is a non-farmer […] so they have all had negotiation training 
[…] actually they do hell of a lot of research about market backgrounds and whatever … 
sort of extending the negotiation processes to try and hammer out the best deal […] and 
then they come back and the farmer says ‘that’s still a rubbish price’” (Sedgemoor Focus 
Group). 
5.5.5 Market data and futures 
A wealth of market data and statistics exist to support dairy farmers and processors in their 
decision making (see https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/#.WWuDEXS1upo).  
 
The Barber’s milk contracts manager made no apology for pushing market data amongst 
members of the Barber’s milk pool, incorporating futures and AMPE data (see Figure 32) into 
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monthly newsletters, to encourage farmers to “start looking at markets closer than they’ve ever 
done before” (D: interviewee 22). As the AHDB suggest, you do not have to be actively trading 
on the futures market for it to be of use. Specifically, they highlight how “tracking European 
futures pricing can help shed some light on market prospects” and that “the price of a futures 
contract gives us information on what the market currently expects supply and demand 
conditions to be at the time of delivery (or expiry of the contract) relative to what they are now” 
(AHDB,https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-articles/august-2016/using-futures-to-read-the-
market/#.WbvLDcYo9pg accessed 15.09.17).  
 “I want farmers to become match fit with this sort of stuff, and the AMPE stuff, and 
forecasting, because ultimately it will make a difference because it’s when you’ve got 
those litres that are too much, that no market can sustain, things fall off, or the legs fall 
off, and likewise when you haven’t got enough milk, the wheels fall off” (D: interviewee). 
 
Figure 38. Example of futures data provided by Barbers 
 
Source: Barber’s – personal communication  
 
The high degree of one-way transparency and information asymmetry in favour of the retailers 
has been described by Lehman et al. (2013) as ‘highly unfair’, positioning retailers in a stronger 
position to assert price claims against dairy companies. Specifically, Lehman et al. cite how the 
price paid by dairies to farmers is regularly published and argue that this information advantage, 
as well a the oligopolistic structure of the retail industry, means the retail industry is in a stronger 
position to assert its price claims against dairy companies. However, with reference to the 
availability of such information, the Barber’s interviewee argued farmers can, and should, use 
this information to their advantage.   
 
Although this data is widely available, and can be used to improve farmers’ bargaining power, a 
number of interview participants noted farmers’ lack of engagement with such material.  
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 “I bet actually, if you started going around talking to farmers, that actually you’d find a 
lot of farmers … I’m not sure that a lot of them even know how much money they get for 
their milk sometimes” (D: interviewee 20). 
 
Arla had a more sympathetic understanding of why farmers were not engaging with market 
information as much as they should, suggesting a lot of farmers are too busy. Interestingly, 
Barber’s efforts to get farmers to engage with such material was recognized by other interview 
participants as a good way of getting busy farmers to engage with this material. 
 
There was some suggestion emerging from the interviews that farming in a time characterised 
by such volatility required a different set of skills – particularly business skills. 
“There’s a lot more skills involved than there were 20 years ago” (Sedgemoor Focus 
Group, p.41) 
“You’ve got to be business savvy, yes, you’ve got to know your margin” (Coombe Focus 
Group, p.23) 
 
One farmer, who has set up a milk broker company, attributed farmers’ lack of engagement with 
such material to “the mentality of a lot of the farming community” (D: interviewee 20). 
Specifically, he argued many farmers felt they had a ‘God given right’ to sell their milk.  
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The futures market and its different uses in UK dairy  
 
It is important to note the following distinctions regarding futures markets, emerging from 
participant interviews: 
 
It is important to note the following distinctions regarding futures markets, which emerged from 
participant interviews: 
 
• Traders: Processors actually trading liquid milk and ingredients products on the future 
market (e.g. Muller milk and ingredients contracts) 
• Hedgers: Processors using futures market data (e.g. UKMFE futures) to set fixed prices 
for suppliers who are able to hedge certain proportions of their produce against these 
fixed prices 
• Spectators: Suppliers and processors who are using futures market prices to inform 
decision making and price negotiations 
 
Participants were positive about the use of futures data as a means of controlling milk price 
volatility. 
What is the futures market? 
 
Futures are standardized, legal contracts based on the delivery of a specified quantity 
and quality of a commodity – in this case milk – at a set time and place. The value of the 
contract is negotiated at a futures exchange, which acts as an intermediary between 
the buyer and seller, and is based on the present-day value of the physical item. Futures 
contracts can be used by those involved in the supply chain (such as farmers and 
manufacturers) who are looking to reduce their risk and exposure to market volatility 
through ‘hedging’. The futures market allows both buyers and sellers to lock in a price 
for the future and spreads the risk between the seller and buyer.  
 
Whilst futures markets for grains are long established, dairy futures markets are 
relatively new. There are currently only two exchanges in Europe where it is possible to 
trade dairy futures: namely the Eurex and NYSE Liffe. Dairy futures in these European 
exchanges have only been introduced relatively recently and AHDB describe them as 
being ‘in their infancy’; interestingly, one participant in the Coombe Focus Group 
thought it was not possible to trade milk on the futures market; a testament to its low 
uptake in the UK context to date. AHDB cite the use of dairy futures in the US, where 
markets have been operating for approximately 20 years, as providing a ‘glimpse of the 
potential’ for Europe.  
 
(AHDB https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-articles/august-2016/using-futures-to-read-the-
market/#.Wbvl6cYo9pg accessed 15.09.2017) 
 
(AHDB https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-articles/august-2016/using-futures-to-
read-the-market/#.Wbvl6cYo9pg accessed 15.09.2017) 
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“It would enable everybody to have a say in what the price is going to be. Because they 
can understand how much a customer is willing to pay and work backwards from that” 
(Coombe Focus Group). 
 
The main exception to this was organic farmers who felt the market was too small and already 
well enough controlled to not need such mechanisms for price stability.  
“I don’t think there ever will be organically [need for the futures market], it’s too small” 
(Coombe Focus Group).  
 
Whilst Arla had talked about the idea of futures market and had ‘some work going on about it’, 
the need for futures mechanisms will be related to the level of volatility we the industry can 
expect. The Arla representative argued the recent price volatility as an anomaly and anticipated 
that typically dairy farmers would try to ride out modest volatility, without the need for futures 
mechanisms.  
 
OMSCO explained that they were not selling produce on the futures market per se, but they 
were utilising futures pricing mechanisms to offer their suppliers the ability to fix prices within 
their contracts.  
Barbers were utilising the same approach. They were particularly proactive in getting their 
farmers to engage with such pricing mechanisms, printing the UKMFE on the back of the 
newsletter in a format which allowed farmers to engage with it quickly and efficiently.  
“I’m starting to quote these future prices, now I think that there’s huge mileage in that 
[…] [it’s] translated in to pence per litres, so farmers can understand it […] I believe it’s all 
part of the farmer’s armour that they need to have so as they need to be as smart as they 
can, rather than just blaming what the markets are doing, look at what the markets are 
doing, use the data, manage your own business. I think that’s the key, so I’m going to 
publish this every month” (Michael Masters, p.15) 
 
5.5.6 The future (succession and social drivers)  
There was significant concern from those interviewed that opportunities in dairy farming 
remained limited for young people without familial connections to the industry because of the 
high start up costs. Whilst participants recognised opportunities to be employed as a non-
familial employee were abundant (see below), they feared entry into the industry in any other 
way was typically impossible because of the capital required to do so.  
“You can work on a dairy farm quite easily, there’s people looking for jobs, you are looking 
for workers, but to start on your own, takes massive guts, and you need an opportunity 
and the opportunities aren’t there” (Coombe Focus Group). 
 
This concern prompted participants to appeal for innovative start up initiatives such as share 
farming schemes developed in New Zealand.  
 
Participants recognised an increase in interest in and enthusiasm towards agricultural work in 
contrast to recent years.  
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“I’ve had more people asking me for work than ever before […] I think it has stepped up. 
I think people are getting more interested in it.” (Coombe Focus Group).  
 
This positivity ties in with wider observations in the academic literature of a renewed interest in 
agricultural careers, attributable to the (re-)emergence of food security in the political agenda 
in developed market economies. The so called renaissance in agriculture (Whitehead, Lobley 
and Baker, 2012), has according to industry leaders, reinvigorated the appeal of the industry. On 
a more practical note, one participant attributed this increased interest in agricultural work to 
an increase in university tuition fees, forcing young people to look for alternatives, such as jobs 
or apprenticeships.  
 
Whilst there was significant positivity about interest in the industry, others described dairy 
farming as generally unappealing – mainly relating to the unsociable working hours required, 
but also relating to the hard work required.  
“If you’re not from a farming background, why would you turn down working 9 ‘til 5 and 
having every weekend off to go out with your mates, than working 4 o’clock in the 
morning until 9 o’clock at night?” (Young Farmers’ Focus Group). 
 
Whilst a familial connection to the industry had been recognised as often the only way into 
farming, the family structure was also identified as problematic for the progression of young 
people in the industry. One participant described the inability of young people to have a say in 
the way the farm is run. This issue – also known as the ‘farmer’s boy problem’ – has previously 
been recognised in the family farming literature (see Gasson and Errington, 1993; Chiswell, 
2016) and is considered highly debilitating for the younger generation. There is a wealth of 
evidence in the general business succession and farm succession literature that points to the 
negative implications of a slow or conservative handover of responsibilities to the younger 
generation. Interestingly, one participant identified 32 as a ‘peak time’ for successors and 
appealed they should be ‘right up there in the helm, doing the majority of the work’. There is 
scope here to think about how to facilitate succession in the dairy industry, so as to allow ‘young 
blood’ to come through and benefit the industry.  
5.6 Brexit  
5.6.1 Interview and focus group participants perspctives on Brexit   
As a first step in the analysis of Brexit, interviewees and focus group participants in Task 2.3 were 
asked participants about the perceived impacts of Brexit on the industry. A brief analysis of the 
key findings is presented below. This general discussion also informs a more detailed analysis of 
Brexit-based scenarios, which are presented and discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
Brexit represented a divisive topic. Participants had a range of views and responses to the Brexit 
vote and cited a range of potential implications for the dairy industry after the UK exits the 
European Union. In fact, some respondents refused to speculate on Brexit impacts because of 
the uncertainties surrounding future trading options. For example:  
“I think we feel affected by it but to be honest with you, if anything it might improve our 
exports, but does anyone know what’s going to happen? […] I mean, above me, they might 
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be [thinking about it] but […] but it’s not massive on our agenda […] we are just cracking 
on with what we’ve got to do” (D: interviewee 18). 
“It’s no good getting worried about it […] There’s nobody even talking about it, that sort 
of thing, because what you discuss now could be totally irrelevant” (Coombe Focus 
Group). 
Discussion centred on the following three concerns; each will be discussed in turn. 
• Trade and a trade deal 
• The availability of labour 
• Subsidies and competitiveness  
 
5.6.1.1 Trade and a trade deal  
Trade, and specifically whether a trade deal with the EU would be secured, was the biggest post-
Brexit concern amongst participants. Unsurprisingly, groups that were reliant on exports and/or 
the ability to move products across European boundaries were most concerned about the 
impacts of no trade deal.  
 
“The big one is trade. The Arla model is that we move milk and product across European 
boundaries, freely to optimize the business. So for instance, all Lurpak is made in 
Denmark, and then imported into the UK, easily because there’s no paperwork to worry 
about, there’s no taxes to pay etc. etc. so what happens when we default to the WTP 
rules, and we have a 34 per cent tariff? That doesn’t look so sexy anymore” (D: 
interviewee 16) 
 
“In terms of the access or not to world markets, how the tariff barriers are implemented 
or not. Do we have free trade agreements with other part of the world? What is the 
relationship with Europe going forward?” (D: interviewee 21b). 
 
Whilst those currently reliant on exports feared failure to get a trade deal would have a 
significant, negative effect, there was also recognition that it could open up lucrative export 
opportunities beyond Europe that could counterbalance loss of European trade. 
 
Producers and organisations dealing only within the UK felt Brexit and a trade deal were of less 
importance and even saw Brexit as an opportunity for increasing demand for domestic products.  
“We’re seeing it already with the retailers, looking to cut out imported products. They are 
looking at British products” (D: interviewee 23). 
“We’re something like only about 60 per cent self sufficient in dairy products in the UK, is 
that right? […] So you know there should be room for us to, if we are only 60 per cent self 
sufficient then we should be able to increase production by 20 per cent and charge what 
we want and we’ve not done that” (D: interviewee 23). 
 
Others also saw Brexit – specifically a reduced ability to trade freely with Europe – as an 
opportunity to develop other international markets.  
 
 221 
5.6.1.2 Labour  
There was some concern that Brexit, and particularly a hard Brexit, would limit the industry’s 
ability to access vital labour, including in processing and haulage.  For example: 
“Where I used to work, they used to have … it was a proper intensive unit there, and they 
had, I think it was 12 Polish or Lithuanian people […] they are important people though 
because English people don’t really want … they don’t want to do the hard work do they?” 
(Young Farmers Focus Group). 
 
A recent Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee report (EFRA, 2017) has reported how 
witnesses to their investigation unanimously claimed they had “long struggled to find sufficient 
labour to meet their needs, either from the UK or overseas sources”, notably “they considered 
that these problems had worsened since June 2016 following the UK’s decision to leave the EU” 
(p.1). The report highlights the industry’s reliance on foreign workers, primarily from other EU 
countries. They believe around 20 per cent of all regular, full-time staff in agriculture are thought 
to be migrant labour, largely from Romania and Bulgaria.  
 
5.6.1.3 Subsidies and competitiveness  
Although participants in the Sedgemoor Focus Group recognized that dairy – as a high turnover 
industry – was not especially dependent on agricultural subsidy, they did agree that a lack of 
subsidy in comparison to their European counterparts may result in unfair competition.  
“If your competition, which is in Ireland, and France and so on, and they continue to 
receive basic payments and you’re [not], it’s unfair competition. That would be one of the 
biggest things” (Sedgmoor Focus Group) 
 
Another Sedgemoor Focus Group participant, who was a yound dairy farmer, claimed to be 
excited about the possibility of no agricultural subsidy post-Brexit, which he argued might 
potentially help young farmers and new entrants wanting to establish themselves in farming.  
“Being a young person, I’m not directly a massive fan of this support, because I think that 
… the guys here are all great farmers, and they are making use of their land, and single 
farm payments are a little bonus, but there’s lots of farmers around us which are, kind of 
got 250 acres, which they are not doing anything with, because they are using their … they 
have got £25,000 coming in a year for their Single Farm Payment. They can live off that. 
And I think while the Single Farm Payment’s being given out as a level playing field, per 
acre, across the whole country, it’s perhaps directed the wrong way” (Sedgemoor Focus 
Group, p.25) 
 
Members of the Young Farmers Focus Group expressed a similar opinion. 
“I personally think it’s pretty good for young people, because like the subsidies are just 
propping up farmers that … they’ve got 380 acres of grass and they just cut once a year 
and then claim all the money and then don’t do anything with the land, and like for young 
people wanting to get into farming, those people are just sucking up the farms 
everywhere and keeping the land price high” (Young Farmers Focus Group). 
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Although interviewee recognized the importance of agricultural subsidies to dairy farmers whilst 
“the job has been on the breadline” (D: interviewee 20) but recognised that “we should, as an 
industry, be able to survive without agricultural support”  
 
Organic industry members had specific concerns. OMSCo members, for example, were worried 
about the implications for organic standards and associated market opportunities. “Brexit will 
determine to a degree what organic standards the UK has to adhere to as a minimum” (d: 
interviewee 21a). If the UK wants to continue to trade internationally it will be important to 
adhere to (or exceed) those standards.  
 
Despite the above concerns, broadly speaking, the idea of Brexit was viewed quite positively 
amongst those surveyed in the dairy industry. Interviewees suggested that Brexit provided an 
opportunity to devise our own agricultural policy. 
“Having a domestic agricultural policy ought to be beneficial, because it can focus purely 
on the UK rather than having to be agreed by 27, 28 Member States and the inevitable 
compromises that come with that” (D: interviewee 16). 
 
5.6.2 Brexit scenarios  
Building on the work of van Berkum et al. (2016) and Buckwell (2016), four Brexit scenarios were 
developed relating to trade and policy support (see below). They were designed to facilitate a 
discussion on the future of the dairy industry and more specifically the potential impacts of 
Brexit (depending on the final outcome) on the dairy industry in Somerset and beyond. The 
sceneniors started with a status quo option, where policy support is as it is now and access to 
the single market remains to a trade liberalised option where trade barriers are signiticantly 
reduced and there is no longer pillar 1 support (i.e. deregulation). Having presented the above 
scenarios to the 10 workshop participants, they were divided into two groups of five to 
discuss/consider each of the different scenarios and their potential implications for UK dairy. 
The responses to the Brexit scenarios are discussed in the following sections.  
 
Before we started the scenario activity, we asked participants to respond to the following 
questions in the table below (Table 14), individually. This was intended to facilitate the 
subsequent discussion, nonetheless, the full details of the participants’ responses are available 
for information in appendix 14.  
 
Table 14. Somerset dairy farming – looking to the future (summary of results) 
What are your priorities in 
relation to Somerset’s dairy 
industry over the next five 
years? 
How will these be best 
achieved?  
What will be the key 
challenges/uncertainties in 
relation to Somerset’s dairy 
industry, both during the 
negotiations and post-Brexit? 
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Scenario 1: Baseline/status quo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2: A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the UK and the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 3: WTO-default position – ‘no deal agreed’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 4: UK trade liberalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Under this scenario the UK leaves the EU, but continues to have free access to the Single 
Market and continues to have full access to the four EU ‘freedoms’ (labour, capital, goods 
and services). 
 
As part of this scenario, the UK would adopt a British Agricultural Policy (BAP), requiring the 
same budget contributions as the CAP. Direct support would remain the same as current 
levels. 
Under this scenario the UK seeks a FTA with the EU. This option is not as advantageous as 
free access to the Single Market that EU membership confers but inclusion in the EU 
Customs Union is a possibility. Whilst some products will not be subject to tariffs, ‘sensitive 
products’ such as milk may be subject to some form of tariff e.g. Tariff Rate Quotas. 
Agricultural matters are normally the most difficult part of any FTA, so a functioning FTA 
may take many years to be agreed.  
 
As part of this scenario, levels of direct support would be 50% of their current levels. 
If no deal were to be agreed, the UK would revert to the WTO-default position and would 
trade with the EU on the same basis as other WTO members. In other words, UK 
imports/exports would fall under the WTO’s non-discrimination Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rules and would be subject to a 36% tariff. The EU would apply a Common Customs 
Tariff (CCT) to UK imports and border and customs controls would increase. 
 
As part of this scenario, levels of direct support would be 50% of their current levels. 
In this scenario, the UK allows wider access to UK markets by reducing tariff rates by 50% 
across the board (i.e. removes barriers to trade). This scenario is similar to the WTO-default 
scenario, including increased trade facilitation costs, with the only difference that the UK 
and the EU have different border tariffs: the UK applies 50% MFN tariffs to all imports and 
the EU applies CCT to UK exports to the European Union.  
 
As part of this scenario farmers would no longer receive any agricultural support. 
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5.6.2.1 General reactions  
As was the case during the interviews, workshop participants were uncertain about what post-
Brexit scenarios was most likely to prevail. 
Facilitator “In terms of these options are there any one which are more likely to 
happen? Is it really you know ‘we just cannot comment at this stage’?” 
WSP1 “I think because the politics is going to play such a big role in it” 
 
In view of this uncertainty, workshop participants tended to talk about the implications of Brexit 
in general terms. It was felt that whatever scenario was adopted, it would be less protectionist 
than the status quo and would expose the dairy industry to more competition, for which it would 
have to be fitter and more competitive.  
 
Workshop participants perceived one of the biggest challenges associated with the Brexit 
scenarios (FTA, WTO and Trade Liberalisation) to be the infrastructure and manpower required 
to deal with border control. Incidentally, this was not something that emerged during 
interviews.  
“There are no infrastructure at the ports right now, to do any of these things … so the 
biggest challenge for moving any product, either way, is that there is no infrastructure. So 
how would you manage that? You talk about soft borders in Ireland, but Dover is not 
geared up in any shape or form for any kind of inspection, any kind of border control, so 
what’s the electronic systems that we are going to have to have … on all of that. It takes 
some quite serious thinking, because at the moment, we are not geared up for that at all” 
(WSP4) 
There was some feeling amongst workshop participants that in anticipation of the policy change, 
Brexit was already having an impact on farmers in terms of their business decision making and 
the availability of labour. Even before any decisions regarding the free movement of labour have 
been made, the weakening of the pound following the referendum has already limited the 
availability of Eastern European workers.  
“There’s farms near us and local people want to buy them and people are saying to them 
“would you like to rent the ground from us” but the farmers are saying they don’t want 
to enter into a five-year agreement because there may be no SFP so it’s already affecting 
agriculture now” (WSP4) 
“I’ve got a neighbor that’s looking for a herdsman at the minute and he’s gone to LKO that 
supplies labour, and he’s been looking … but all the Romanians, all the Poles, they’ve all 
gone back home. You know … 20 per cent, they’re cutting their income that they can send 
home […] and that’s 20 per cent of their available income has disappeared over night, 
because of the currency” (WSP6) 
 
There was concern that reliance on labour extended beyond the availability of seasonal labour 
in the dairy industry, which has relied on European workers to perform skilled work for a 
substantial period of time. This reliance is not limited to on-farm labour either, but extends to 
the whole dairy supply chain.  
“It’s not just seasonal that’s … seasonal is really important to the horticultural sector and 
that’s because there’s a lot of skilled labour … that’s been there for so long we actually 
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forget they’re migrant labour that might have been on the farm for 10 or 15 years but if 
they don’t have the ability to replace them with the same, if you look in the dairies, and I 
don’t know about next door here, but I know at Droitwich there’s a massive you know … 
¾ of the people that work in there wouldn’t be classed as white British, you know so …” 
(WSP6) 
 
5.6.2.2 Likelihood of scenarios 
It is initially worth analysing the number of responses elicited by each of the scenarios. 
Responses pertaining to each of the scenarios across the entire workshop transcripts were 
coded in qualitative analysis software (QSR NVivo) and the number of references were 
calculated using a basic coding query. The breakdown of the the percentage of references are 
presented in Table 15 and diagrammatically in Figure 39 (where each colour represents 
references to one of the four scenarios and each segment represents a node). If we understand 
the status quo and trade liberalisation as the ‘extreme’ scenarios (as depicted in Figure 40 by 
being at either side of the spectrum), it is perhaps unsurprising that workshop participants 
engaged less with these ideas (12.9 and 14.3 per cent respectively, and engaged more with 
‘more likely’ FTA and WTO scenarios (35.7 and 37.1 per cent of references, respectively). 
 
Figure 39. Number of times each scenario was discussed in the workshop  
 
 
 
Table 15. Breakdown of scenarios 
Scenario Responses (%) 
1. Status quo 12.9% 
2. FTA 35.7% 
3. WTO 37.1% 
4. Liberalisation 14.3% 
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Figure 40. Scenario spectrum 
 
 
The limited engagement with these scenarios was because they were considered extreme and 
therefore unlikely.  
“I think one and four are unlikely” (WSP9). 
“It’s never gonna be exactly the same. Obviously [it will] evolve but because we are on 
our own it would I suppose… it would be less drastic changes. I guess there are so many 
questions around the politics of the negotiation isn’t it?” (WSP1 with reference to status 
quo). 
“The baseline, we didn’t spend much time on that didn’t we? Because we said that that 
wasn’t very feasible in any case” (WSP1). 
Participants swiftly noted that the status quo, although desirable, was unlikely. 
“From a dairy point of view most people would probably want number one but that was 
not going to happen” (WSP4). 
 
They recognised the irony that “a lot of farmers have voted for … to get out, still want a Single 
Farm Payment, don’t they?” (WSP6). 
 
There was also a feeling amongst the two groups that a trade liberalisation scenario would be 
‘dangerous’. Participants attributed this to the issue of equivalency; liberalisation could mean 
that US products, not made to the same standard as the UK, would be able to undercut the UK’s 
prices.  
 
WSP6 “I think it’s quite a dangerous scenario” 
WSP4 “I think it depends where the US sits in that […] because of all the US products 
that are not comparable in how they’re produced and if there was a 
liberalization and not an agreement on standards, then they would seriously 
undercut the UK … so they use hormones for example in milk production” 
 
However, participants made a number of references to the success of New Zealand compared 
to protectionist regimes such as Ireland.  
“You could argue now that the New Zealand dairy sector went huge amount of pain and 
agony when the liberalisation took place but it is absolutely flying now.  you know the 
examples often quoted is that Ireland and New Zealand produce exactly the same amount 
of milk the year before the milk quotas were introduced. So Ireland went the milk quota 
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route, New Zealand went the liberalisation route. New Zealand now produces six times 
more that Ireland- there is a huge difference” (WSP9). 
 
5.6.2.3 The transition period 
Having established that options one and four were ‘extremes’, much of the remaining discussion 
focussed on scenarios two and three – the middle scenarios. Participants saw the WTO as a 
possible interim option on the way to a FTA, and felt the eventual outcome might be 
‘somewhere in the middle’ depending on the negotiations. Even within the FTA, it was felt there 
were different arrangements.  
WSP4 “For me I’d say option 2 is the most likely one but where it sits on the 
spectrum …” 
Facilitator “But there’s grades of option 2 isn’t there?” 
WSP5 “Absolutely” 
 
After the status quo, the FTA was considered the most desirable option (and perhaps the most 
likely option in the long run). However, participants felt it was not going to be easy to implement 
and would likely take some time – perhaps even a decade.  
 
WSP6 “For me [FTA] it’s probably where we’ll end up but I think it’ll take a long 
time to get there” 
Facilitator “Yeah yeah OK … it’s hard to put a time on it, but at least ten years?” 
WSP6 “For me [FTA] it’s probably where we’ll end up but I think it’ll take a long 
time to get there” 
Facilitator  “Yeah yeah OK” 
WSP6 “Yeah yeah ten years, but in the meantime we need some kind of transition 
to be honest” 
 
WTO was seen as the likely outcome of a ‘snap decision’ or a failure to come to any agreement.  
“WTO would likely to be a rapid decision made because we are fallen out and we kind of 
have to sort of be walking away- so we would have very limited time to adjust… Whereas 
the FTA will give us time to plan. So you might be in a phased approach” (WSP7) 
 
5.6.2.4 Opening the door to competition: implications for dairy 
It was anticipated that dairy farming following Brexit would need to be more compeititve, 
regardless of the exact scenario adopted. Without the security of unlimited free trade within the 
EU (the status quo) and direct support, it was felt that the dairy industry would need to ‘up its 
game’ to compete in the global market. Initially, there was some concern around the UK’s ability 
to do this successfully when their EU counterparts would continue to get subsidies and the UK 
would receive either a reduced amount (under the FTA and WTO scenarios) or none at all (Free 
Trade scenario). 
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“We’ve got to be able to compete with them. If they’ve got something that’s distorting 
the market … do you know what I mean? There needs to be a period of transition, because 
even being taken down a particular route …” (WSP6). 
 
However, participants also recognised how the EU budget was unlikely to remain the same, and 
that this might go someway to levelling the playing field, should the UK receive less or no 
agricultural support in the future.  
 
WSP6 “Europe won’t have the same either. Because they’re discussing their CAP 
now, and they’re talking about tools to maintain income, they’re talking about 
… they’re language is very different as well. So if you listen to the 
Commissioner, he’s talking a very different language now …” 
WSP10 “He’s got a very different budget to work with now” 
WSP6 “Yeah … I was with some Italians recently, and their biggest concern was who 
is going to fill the hole that we will leave to maintain their budget. Well it’s 
probably not going to be maintained is it?” 
 
That said, overall participants took a more positive view on the potential reduction of 
agricultural support; they felt it offered an opportunity to revise the way agricultural support is 
targeted and could eventually help to increase the industry’s productivity, efficiency and 
resilience in the global market.  
“Needs to be a little bit more tailored and a little bit more around productivity, so we get 
more efficient as dairy farmers and as an industry, rather than, what’s happened in the 
past … farmers haven’t sort of innovated, have they? Some have. Great. But not 
everybody. We need to encourage productivity” (WSP6). 
 
This message has been echoed in farming policy. For example, Goerge Eustice MP describes 
Brexit as an opportunity to redesign policy support:  
 
“The greatest opportunity we have in leaving the EU is to design a better, more coherent 
domestic policy to support farmers to become more profitable, to support environmental 
outcomes and to promote things such as animal welfare” (The Minister of State for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, George Eustice MP) 
 
Rather than direct support, workshop participants anticipated indirect mechanisms, i.e. 
payments for research, skills development and teaching, tax incentives etc. as a possible way of 
delivering agricultural support for a more efficient dairy industry.  
 
WSP6 “What support we have, should be focused around managing volatility. So 
creating tools to manage volatility, so actually, you know, we all know there’s 
actually some really innovative precision farmers out there ‘we can get better’, 
you know, we can all get better but actually the system as it’s been based at 
the minute has allowed some farmers to be inefficient … I mean that will be a 
 
 
 229 
bigger issue for the red meat sector I think, than us, but equally as much, 
there’s no God given right to be able to make a living as a dairy farmer, if you’re 
not efficient” 
 
A revised agricultural support system was also felt to offer the opportunity to ensure future 
mechanisms would support both younger farmers and new entrants.  
“Single Farm Payment distorts a massive amount of things. It keeps farmers on the farm 
that maybe should retire and allow younger people to farm. Because they won’t leave 
because there’s a payment coming through, so they can actually sit there with a dog and 
a stick and take the SFP, and actually be quite unproductive, which actually doesn’t help 
the younger generation […] we need to somehow make sure we are on a level playing 
field, but maybe do it in a different way, that would be my view” (WSP6) 
 
Participants explained how the reduction or abolishment of subsidy, and the increased exposure 
to global markets and competition, associated with all options but especially the status quo, 
would cause structural change in the dairy industry.  
“If we open the door to competition, then […] there will be a structural change” (WSP1) 
 
Generally, it was anticipated that ‘opening the door’ to competition would intensify and quicken 
current trends in agricultural restructuring – specialisation and increasing farm size.  
 
WSP7 “Parts of the country will look very different – especially arable parts 
probably…”  
WSP1 “It could just enhance the moves that are already happening slowly. Dairy 
farming could concentrate even more in the west…” 
WSP7 “Larger fields of maize...” 
WSP1 “Farms are likely to get…  I think the trend is gonna carry on regardless where 
we go. It’s just the speed at which it happens” 
 
More specifically, with reference to dairy, there was some suggestion that in a bid to increase 
competitiveness to survive in a more open market, “production systems will go either in one or 
two directions” (WSP1) either fully-housed, or low-cost grazing.  
“You are likely to get more polarisation than you have. I don’t know if you are going to get 
completely one of the other but it will certainly be more those two directions” (WSP1). 
“There will be a split because the aligned guys on the liquid side, they can’t do grass –
based. Because you can’t guarantee the consistency of production with the grass-based 
can you?” (WSP7). 
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5.6.2.5 WTO scenario: an opportunity to increase domestic production? 
The WTO default position proved most controversial and illicited the most discussion. Initially, 
there were some significant concerns regarding the implications of the WTO default position for 
the industry. It was synonymous with a ‘hard Brexit’ throughout the disucssions.  
 
Facilitator “In terms of these options that we’ve got down, the four, are any of them 
like ‘dear Lord, let’s please never go there’?”  
DWSP6 “We don’t really want the WTO default position really?” 
 
Participants connected with Arla and Muller were most concerned about a WTO scenario.  This 
was unsurprising given the importance of free movement of goods and access to the European 
market that was so integral to their respective business models.  
“Bear in mind that Arla and Muller Wiseman probably account for 45% of the market in 
the UK. They are both multi-national businesses. And hard Brexit with no trade agreement 
would adversely affect the viability of those businesses. So that would be a bad thing for 
the UK” (DWSP9). 
 
Equally, some participants recognised the WTO position as an opportunity for domestic 
production. This demonstrates the importance of recognising the different institutional 
arrangements when considering the implications of post-Brexit policy; different scenarios will 
have different implications for the different arrangements.  
“I think for milk in general, WTO may not [be good] … for others, it may not be too bad a 
thing. With my Arla hat on, it makes our business pretty much unviable if we can’t move 
things between countries … all the market advantage that we’ve got in those market 
products that we can move around is suddenly gone with a 30-odd percent tariff, all the 
margins taken out of them so they’re two possible outcomes … with my NFU hat on, if you 
like, but for dairy as a whole, ignoring the red meat and all the other sectors, just dairy, 
the WTO is not too bad, but for the 25 per cent of us who are in Arla, it’s probably the 
worst of all the options” (DWSP10).  
“What are we, 81 per cent self-sufficient? And I think, when you put it in euros, there’s 
one billion Euros worth of dairy products going out of the UK and 3 billion worth comes 
in, so that actually you could say is an opportunity in effect, couldn’t you?” (DWSP6) 
“Fortress Britain […] that actually works well for dairy […] but for dairy that presents some 
opportunities in terms if you say go to the extreme level of the WTO for trade agreement” 
(DWSP9). 
“If you are mostly a domestic business with a little bit of export, probably with a WTO- it 
could do you well” (DWSP9). 
 
This stance was echoed amongst the House of Lords Select Sub-Committee on the European 
Union (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/169/16906.htm 
accessed 15.09.17), who claimed: 
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“We are only 61% self-sufficient across the commodities and 75% self-sufficient in our 
indigenous products, so there is huge scope to make sure we provide the standard of 
product that our consumers want”  
 
Although there was initial enthusiasm for domestic producers under a WTO option, there was 
concern that becoming entirely self-sufficient in dairy would eventually thwart both investment 
and innovation.  
“I think if we became insular and put a brick wall around ourselves, we are not going to 
allow any dairy products in [...] ultimately, our industry would die because you get a lack 
of investment anbdeveryone would stop investing and the industry would slowly … it 
might last my lifetime but ultimately, it wouldn’t be a positive industry would it? Because 
it would only be servicing its own … all the innovation, all the investment would stop, 
because the growth areas are outside of the UK, so once you’ve hit that 100 per cent then 
you’re knackered then aren’t you?” (DWSP6) 
 
DWSP1 “For dairy that [substituting imports] presents some opportunities in terms 
of if you go to the extreme level of the WTO for trade agreement […] You 
haven’t got any more opportunities after that […] there’s no growth 
potential if you are not competing” 
Facilitator “There is a plateau isn’t it?” 
DWSP9 “Well that gives us a fair bit … 60% substitution” 
DWSP1 “Yeah but it caps the growth” 
 
Linked to this, there was also concern that a focus on domestic production and self-sufficiency 
would require costly investment and innovation to meet demand. This was amplified by the fact 
the UK was felt to be ‘behind the curve’ in terms of investment in robotics etc.  
“That provides an opportunity to fill that space but you know…for those products that we 
can only produce here it provides an opportunity to perhaps expand into more products 
and higher volumes. But on the down side of that it requires investments. So will we have 
that investment – that is the question. Will there be enough investment to provide that 
opportunity?” (WSP1). 
“If we want to be self-sufficient a massive amount of investment will have to go in. we are 
so far behind on robotics. We are probably about 25% off the way forward compared to 
some of our European counter-parts” (DWSP7). 
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6 Producer survey report 
6.1 Introduction and methodology  
In what follows the results of Task 2.6 (“Producer Survey”) are presented and discussed for the 
UK case study on dairy farms in Somerset and Devon.  
The survey was designed to achieve an in-depth knowledge of the supply chain arrangements in 
the dairy sector in Somerset and Devon. More specifically, the objectives of the survey were to: 
A. Map the existing supply chain arrangements between milk producers (farmers) and milk 
buyers, describing the different typologies of transactions and arrangements, as well as 
their prevalence, in the dairy sector in Somerset and Devon; 
B. Identify the attributes characterising the supply chain arrangements, including 
collecting information about how different parameters of a given type of arrangement 
(e.g. quality level, length of contracts, services) shape the terms of the relationship 
between producers and buyers (e.g. price formation, costs of arrangements); 
C. Assess the sustainability of the supply chain arrangements through producers’ opinions 
and perceptions of the sustainability of the agreements and their attributes, 
disentangling potential effects on the three pillars of sustainability – i.e. environmental, 
social and economic; 
D. Identify future drivers and strategies of dairy farmers, in response to potential emerging 
issues such as adverse climatic conditions and pests, market changes and price volatility, 
policy and regulatory reforms.  
In order to collect the relevant information to achieve the above objectives, a random sample 
of 200 dairy farms in Somerset and Devon was drawn from the local population of dairy farms 
in the two counties. According to the most recent Defra estimations, the current number of dairy 
farms in the two counties is 1,300. Given the current population size, the sample of 200 farms 
guarantees a margin of error of about 5%, which is statistically acceptable (the commonly 
accepted threshold is <=10%). 
Farmers were interviewed by telephone during the period November-December 2017, using a 
questionnaire composed of about 200 questions for an average interview length of 35 minutes. 
Farmers were asked to provide information about their dairy farm relative to the latest 
completed financial year (2016-17). 
The questionnaire was composed of the following sections: 
A. Farm business characteristics 
B. Production and sales channels 
C. Characteristics of the sale agreement and sustainability 
D. Strategies and drivers of farming 
E. Farmer characteristics 
For the purposes of this report, data are analysed using descriptive statistics. 
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6.2 Farmer and farm characteristics 
The sample is composed of 88 farms located in Somerset and 112 in Devon. This proportion 
reflects the higher total number of dairy farms in Devon. In the sample, the majority of 
interviewees were the farm owner, farm manager, or farm owner/manager (Table 16). 
In terms of demographics, the majority of surveyed farmers were male (89%) and the majority 
were between 41 to 65 years of age (see Table 16). Young farmers accounted for 12.5% of 
surveyed respondents. Having a secondary level of education, especially higher secondary 
schooling, was the most common situation reported and 57% of farms have received a 
specialised agricultural education. 
Table 16. Farmer and farm characteristics  
Characteristics Description N. of farms % 
Region Somerset 88 44.0% 
  Devon 112 56.0% 
Status on the farm Farm owner 104 52.0%  
Farm manager 10 5.0%  
Farm owner & manager 65 32.5% 
  Tenant 21 10.5% 
Age 40 years old or less 25 12.5%  
41 - 50 years old 46 23.0%  
51 - 65 years old 97 48.5% 
  More than 65 years old 32 16.0% 
Gender Male 178 89.0% 
Education Primary 3 1.5%  
Lower secondary 74 37.0%  
Higher secondary 92 46.0%  
University 31 15.5% 
  Special agricultural education 114 57.0% 
Succession No expectations 74 38.0%  
Family member will take over 106 54.4%  
Sell the property 10 5.1% 
  Give up tenancy 5 2.6% 
Type of farm Individual farm 13 6.5%  
Family farm 162 81.0%  
Private company 22 11.0%  
Publicly owned 2 1.0% 
  Public-private partnership 1 0.5% 
Organic farming Fully organic 11 5.5%  
Conventional 188 94.0% 
  Partially organic 1 0.5% 
Memberships Cooperative 89 44.5%  
Producer Organisation 43 21.5% 
  Farmers Union 148 74.0% 
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More than half of the survey participants expected that one day the farm will be taken over by 
a family member (54.4%), but about 38% were still unsure about the future of their farm and 
did not have particular expectations or plans in place regarding farm succession. 
In terms of legal organisation, family farms were the most frequent (81%) and a few were private 
companies (11%). Organic farming was not a frequent option, adopted by only 5.5% of the dairy 
farms surveyed (reflecting the general conventional/organic trend).  
To be a member of at least one farmer organisation was very common in Somerset and Devon. 
About three out of four farmers (74%) were members of a farmers’ union, but membership in 
cooperatives and/or POs were also quite frequent among dairy farmers (44.5% and 21.5% 
respectively). 
It is interesting to note the different roles that farmers’ organisations have with respect to their 
sales arrangements. The main role of cooperatives was to buy farmers’ milk (82%) (Table 17), 
while POs provided a wider range of services beyond purchasing milk, acting as intermediaries 
with other buyers in negotiating prices (44.2%) and supporting the design of terms of contracts 
between farmers and buyers (46.5%). On the contrary, farmers’ unions have a bigger role in 
providing farmers with legal advice (39.2%) and insurances (46.6%). 
 
Table 17. Services provided by farmers’ organisations  
Services provided by the 
organisation 
Coop PO Union 
N. % N. % N. % 
Buys the milk 73 82.0% 18 41.9% 6 4.1% 
Puts me in contact with a 
buyer 
8 9.0% 14 32.6% 3 2.0% 
Negotiates the price for me 
with a buyer 
27 30.3% 19 44.2% 5 3.4% 
Supports the design the term 
of the contract/transaction 
with a buyer 
28 31.5% 20 46.5% 17 11.5% 
Legal advice 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 58 39.2% 
Insurance 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 69 46.6% 
 
Table 18 provides details on the characteristics of the dairy farms surveyed. The average farm 
size was 183.7 ha, which is above the South West and national averages of 70 ha and 86 ha 
respectively. About 78% of the farm area was used for the production of milk, and the remaining 
area for feed and fodder production. 
The average herd size was 237.6 lactating cows with an average productivity of 7.9 thousand 
litres of milk per cow in one year. In some farms, productivity reached peaks of 15 thousand 
litres which is almost doubles the national average (AHDB 2017). 
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Table 18. Farm characteristics  
Characteristics Mean Min Max 
Total area of farm land (Ha) 183.7 30 1214 
Land for milk production (Ha) 142.6 4 1011 
N. of cows 237.6 17 1600 
Yearly cows yield ('000 litres/cow) 7.9 1 15 
Total yearly milk production ('000 litres) 1855.7 20 23000 
Percentage of milk sold (%) 96.7% 0% 100% 
Farm Income (% of total household income) 89.1% 1% 100% 
Dairy Income (% of farm income) 80.7% 20% 100% 
N. of full-time workers 3.8 0 34 
N. of part-time workers 1.3 0 7 
 
Most farms entire milk production was sold on the market (96.7%), therefore the level of self-
consumption was very low. 
The main source of income for farm households was agriculture, with just under 90% of farm 
household income coming via agricultural activities. Within the farm income, milk was the main 
income source (80.7% of farm income), suggesting that farms surveyed were mostly specialised. 
About 52% of the farms surveyed did not diversify and were purely specialised in milk 
production. Although farms in the sample are quite specialised, they diversify production by 
combining one or two additional activities to milk production. Production diversification can be 
considered a way to manage risks, by balancing a portfolio of products so that low performances 
in one product (e.g. milk) are compensated with better performances in other ones (e.g. meat), 
provided that the probability of simultaneous failure of two or more productions is very low 
(Vigani et al., 2015). Among the diversifying farms, meat and arable crops productions were the 
most frequent for diversification. 
However, the main risk management strategy reported was insurance (Table 19), specifically a 
combination of  two or three insurances among crop, livestock and income insurance. About 
88.5% of the farms had a livestock insurance to cover against herd diseases and losses, but only 
12.5% were insured against crops risks. 
Interestingly, 35.5% of the farmers adopted income insurance. Income insurance compensates 
farmers for losses of income above a certain threshold (e.g. farmers are compensated if the 
annual income is 30% lower than the 5 year average income). While crop and livestock 
insurances are mainly intended to cover against production risks such as weather disasters or 
diseases, income insurance is designed to cover farmers against market risks such as price 
volatility (Tangermann, 2011). 
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Table 19. Risk management strategies and attitude to risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to assess the risk attitude of dairy farms in Somerset and Devon, during the interviews 
they were asked if, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), they believed they 
were more willing to take risks than their colleagues with respect to dairy production (e.g. adopt 
new milking regimes, new fodder, new breed of cow), marketing and pricing risks (e.g. 
experiment with new sales channels, new markets) and finance (e.g. loans for production 
facilities, new investments). Results at the bottom of table X show that, on average, for each 
type of risk assessed the answers were below 3 (threshold for risk taking) suggesting that the 
surveyed farmers were quite risk averse. 
6.3 Sales channels and agreements 
During the survey, farmers were asked to break down the milk’s sales among a variety of 
possible channels, distinguishing between sales to collective organisations (e.g. cooperatives 
and POs) and individual businesses (e.g. processors, retailers).  
Despite opportunities for diversification among different buyers, sales channels were 
dominated by cooperatives (81.2%) and processors/the food industry (93.9%) (Table 20). In the 
sample, a larger number of main sales (a main sale was defined as the sale of the largest 
proportion of milk produced during the year in a single transaction to a single buyer) were 
directed to individual businesses (58.5%) rather than to collective organisations (42.5%). 
Interestingly, only a few farmers, less than 3.5%, sold milk to a mix of buyers. 
As shown in Table 20, the types of agreements between producers and buyers were different 
for collective and individual organisations. In the first case, the details of the transactions were 
mainly outlined in the rules of being a member of the collective organisation (62.7%). For 
example, the duration of the agreement, milk prices and any services were part of the 
Risk management strategy N. % 
Diversification: Arable crop 47 23.5% 
Fruit orchards 11 5.5% 
Vegetables 2 1.0% 
Meat 115 57.5% 
Rural tourism 22 11.0% 
Other 34 17.0% 
Insurance: 
  
Crop 25 12.5% 
Livestock 177 88.5% 
Income 71 35.5% 
 
Risk attitude 
  
Mean 
Willingness to take production risks 2.77 
Willingness to take marketing risks 2.28 
Willingness to take financial risks 2.36 
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agreement for being member of a cooperative or a PO. In the second case, 70.9% of transactions’ 
details were formally agreed with a legally enforceable contract, signed before the delivery of 
milk. 
Table 20. Sales channels 
Sales to collective organisations   Sales to individual businesses 
  N. % 
  
N. % 
Cooperative 69 81.2% 
 
Local markets or final 
consumers 
0 0% 
Producer organisation (PO) 13 15.3% 
 
Independent small shops or 
restaurants 
0 0% 
Inter-branch organisation 
(IBOs) 
0 0% 
 
Processors/agri-food industry 108 93.9% 
Farmers’ union and 
association 
0 0% 
 
Supermarkets/retailers chains 2 1.7% 
Other collective 0 0% 
 
Traders/Wholesalers 2 1.7% 
Mix of the above 3 3.5% 
 
Exporters 1 0.9%     
Mix of the above 2 1.7% 
Total collective sales 85 42.5%   Total individual sales 115 57.5% 
The main sale was to: 
      
  A collective organisation 83 41.5%     An individual organisation: 117 58.5% 
 
 
Table 21. Characteristics of sale agreements   
Collective Individual All farms 
N. % N. % N. % 
Type Formal before delivery 25 30.1% 83 70.9% 108 54.0%  
Formal at delivery 2 2.4% 9 7.7% 11 5.5%  
Informal before delivery 4 4.8% 14 12.0% 18 9.0%  
Informal at delivery 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 1 0.5%  
Membership rules 52 62.7% 10 8.5% 62 31.0% 
Duration Less 3 Months 0 0.0% 1 0.7% 1 0.4%  
3 to 6 Months 3 3.0% 6 4.3% 9 3.7%  
7 to 12 Months 19 18.8% 19 13.6% 38 15.8%  
13 to 24 Months 0 0.0% 1 0.7% 1 0.4%  
25 to 60 Months 5 5.0% 5 3.6% 10 4.1%  
More 5 Years 56 55.4% 85 60.7% 141 58.5%  
Evergreen contract 18 17.8% 23 16.4% 41 17.0% 
Payment moment Before delivery 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 1 0.2%  
At delivery 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 1 0.2%  
After delivery 74 37.4% 68 32.2% 142 34.7%  
Middle and end season 36 18.2% 24 11.4% 60 14.7%  
On regular basis 82 41.4% 115 54.5% 197 48.2% 
  Other 6 3.0% 2 0.9% 8 2.0% 
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Table 20 also shows that sales agreements have relatively long-term duration, frequently being 
valid for more than 5 years both for collective and individual buyers. The time when farmers are 
paid for the milk can vary, but more frequently payments occur on a regular basis (e.g. weekly 
or monthly) after having delivered the milk. 
In addition to the type of agreement, farmers were also asked for details of the content of such 
agreements. These details are shown in Table 21. The most frequent features for both collective 
and individual sales agreements concern sales exclusivity (i.e. the buyer requests that the farmer 
sells milk exclusively to him and not to other buyers); the possibility to obtain price premiums 
for higher quality milk; the provision of logistic services for the milk, such as collection, storage 
and transportation, from the buyer. These features concern more than 50% of individual buyers 
and just below 40% of collective organisations. Managerial support and technical assistance was 
also a frequent service outlined in the agreement, concerning 26.5% of agreements with 
collective organisations and 34% with individual businesses. Just over 20% of the agreements 
with individual businesses also included the possibility of penalties if producers fail to deliver 
the agreed quantities. 
Other features, such as interests on delayed payments, credit assistance and special assets were 
not particularly well developed in the dairy supply chain arrangements surveyed. 
 
Table 22. Attributes and services in dairy sale agreements 
Attribute Collective Individual All farms 
N. % N. % N. % 
The agreement requires exclusivity 75 37.5% 102 51.0% 177 88.5% 
There are penalties if fail to deliver the 
agreed quantities 
25 12.5% 41 20.5% 66 33.0% 
There are safeguards if the buyer fails to 
fulfil the agreement 
33 16.5% 31 15.5% 64 32.0% 
There are price premiums for delivering 
higher quality products 
76 38.0% 109 54.5% 185 92.5% 
Interest in case of delayed payments 
from the buyer 
5 2.5% 5 2.5% 10 5.0% 
Services like collection, storage, 
transport, handling, etc. 
77 38.5% 104 52.0% 181 90.5% 
Managerial support or technical 
assistance 
53 26.5% 68 34.0% 121 60.5% 
Credit assistance  3 1.5% 7 3.5% 10 5.0% 
Special assets, technology and/or 
machinery 
5 2.5% 2 1.0% 7 3.5% 
Automatic extension of the agreement  57 28.5% 67 33.5% 124 62.0% 
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Regarding prices, during the period surveyed, on average farmers received 24.76 pence per litre 
(Table 22), which is quite low considering the average farm-gate price for milk in February 2018 
was 29.64 (DEFRA), but in line with the average price for April 2016 to April 2017 (24.31 pence 
per litre). However, some farmers benefitted from very high farm-gate prices ranging from 37-
41 pence per litre. 
The way prices have been determined within the agreements is difficult to fully disentangle. 
Individual farm business prices are variable depending on the quantity and quality of the milk 
delivered, but also dependent on the market price at the point of collection/delivery. Collective 
organisation prices are also variable depending on quantity, quality and market prices, but they 
also depend on the shared profits of the collective organisation. In order to verify if participation 
in agreements with collective rather than individual organisations is associated with price 
differentials, the differences in prices between collective and individual organisations have been 
evaluated with a t-test, but no statistical significance was found. Therefore, differences in prices 
do not seem to be associated to the type of buyer. 
Farmers were also asked about milk production costs, expressed as a percentage of milk prices 
(Table 23). On average production costs are 81.7% of prices, but in some circumstances 
production costs can be 140% of prices. For these farms profits might have been negative during 
2016/17. The difference in costs between collective and individual organisations was also tested 
with a t-test, which was statistically significant (**=5% level of significance), suggesting that, on 
average, costs for farmers selling to individual businesses are 7.2% lower. 
Table 23. Milk prices and production costs  
Prices (£/l) Mean Min Max 
All farms 0.2476 0.18 0.41 
Collective 0.2487 0.18 0.41 
Individual 0.2468 0.18 0.37 
Price difference (t-test) 
  
 Collective-Individual 0.0019 
  
Costs (Price %) 
   
All farms 0.8172 0.01 1.4 
Collective 0.8592 0.22 1.4 
Individual 0.7874 0.01 1.4 
Cost difference (t-test) 
   
 Collective-Individual 0.072**     
 
The difference in production costs can be partially explained by the fact that farmers selling to 
collective organisations face costs associated with logistics, marketing, commissions on sales 
and quality testing more frequently than those selling to individual businesses (Table 24). 
Specifically, logistical costs affect 73.5% of farmers selling to collective organisations, compared 
to 51.3% of those selling to individual businesses. 
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Table 24. Different types of costs associated with sale agreement  
Costs of agreement Collective Individual All farms 
N. % N. % N. % 
Membership fee 33 39.8% 36 30.8% 69 34.5% 
Logistics 61 73.5% 60 51.3% 121 60.5% 
Marketing 26 31.3% 13 11.1% 39 19.5% 
Commissions 6 7.2% 7 6.0% 13 6.5% 
Quality tests 34 41.0% 44 37.6% 78 39.0% 
 
In addition, sale agreements require a variety of standards and certification, which can also 
affect costs. Almost all dairy farmers surveyed in Somerset and Devon have to satisfy minimum 
quality, food safety and animal welfare standards, either if they sell to collective or individual 
organisations (Table 25). In addition, standards on climate change mitigation and adaptation 
(CO2 footprint, zero km, etc…) were adopted by 51.8% of sellers to collective organisations, 
while standards on natural resource conservation (organic production, integrated pest 
management, conservation agriculture, no- or minimum-tillage, biodiversity, etc…) were 
adopted by 55.6% of sellers to individual businesses. Interestingly, standards on milk produced 
without the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (i.e. GM-free) were adopted by about one 
out of four farms, and particularly by sellers to collective organisations (28.9%). Moreover, the 
UK based assurance scheme Red Tractor was more frequently adopted by sellers to collective 
organisations (14.5%) rather than sellers to individual businesses (6%). 
 
Table 25. Private standards adopted by dairy farms in the sample  
Standard Collective Individual All farms 
N. % N. % N. % 
Standards on the quality of the 
final product 
79 95.2% 108 92.3% 187 93.5% 
Standards on food safety and 
hygiene 
82 98.8% 116 99.1% 198 99.0% 
Standards on natural resources and 
nature conservation  
41 49.4% 65 55.6% 106 53.0% 
Standards on animal welfare 81 97.6% 115 98.3% 196 98.0% 
Standards on mitigation and 
adaption to climate change  
43 51.8% 54 46.2% 97 48.5% 
Genetically Modified free  24 28.9% 25 21.4% 49 24.5% 
Red Tractor 12 14.5% 7 6.0% 19 9.5% 
 
Finally, farmers were asked about their level of overall satisfaction with the agreement for their 
main sale, indicating satisfaction on a scale from 1 (completely unsatisfied) to 5 (completely 
satisfied). In addition, they were also presented with statements about what they might 
like/dislike of the agreement, again on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Results are shown in Figure 41 and the threshold value is 3. 
Overall, all farmers were quite satisfied with the agreement they have for their main milk sale, 
with an average answer close to 4. Farmers selling to individual businesses were particularly 
satisfied.  
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The reason for such a high level of satisfaction seems to be linked to the fact that the agreements 
guarantee higher prices and, even more important, that prices were fairly stable, mitigating the 
risks of price volatility. This is particularly true for farmers selling to individual businesses which, 
on average, agreed to the statements “This sale agreement provides higher prices than 
alternative buyers” and “This sale agreement provides more stable prices from year to year than 
alternative buyers”. 
Problems related to excessive production costs and restrictive standards were not signalled as 
particular reasons for dissatisfaction. The surveyed farmers disagreed to the statements “The 
costs associated with this sale agreement are too high” and “The production/quality standards 
required are too restrictive”. 
However, on average farmers also disagreed with the statement “This sale agreement provides 
more possibilities for negotiating prices”, suggesting that they do not have a strong negotiating 
position in the sales agreement. 
 
Figure 41. Satisfaction with agreement  
 
 
6.4 Dairy farmers’ perceptions of the sustainability of sales agreements 
One key objective of the survey was to gather information about how farmers perceive the sale 
agreements they have in place in terms of sustainability. Therefore, farmers were asked to 
assign a score from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) regarding the potential impact to 
sustainability of the sale agreement. 
More specifically, with respect to three groups of sustainability indicators (environmental, social 
and economic sustainability), farmers were asked to assign a score on the following statement 
“The production choices you made in relation to your main sale agreement/membership in 
collective organization helped you to:” 
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a. Maintain biodiversity 
b. Support animal welfare 
c. Maintain water quality 
d. Maintain soil organic matter 
2. Social sustainability 
a. Create a good connection with buyers and input providers 
b. Connect with other farmers 
c. Achieve societal recognition of your farming activities 
d. Secure a successor 
3. Economic sustainability 
a. Maintain profitability 
b. Invest in the farm business 
c. Sell the products in periods of greater difficulty where prices were low 
d. Cope with changing market conditions 
The results are shown in Figure 42. On average, the overall sustainability of the arrangements is 
just above the threshold 3, for both arrangements with collective and individual organisations. 
 
Figure 42. Sustainability of arrangements 
 
 
Looking at the green column in Figure 42 (All farms), animal welfare was the strongest driver of 
environmental sustainability, while connection with other farmers was the strongest driver of 
social sustainability. Coping with low prices and changing markets were the two main drivers for 
economic sustainability. 
Some important differences can be observed between sales agreements with collective and 
individual organisations. Farmers selling to collective organisations perceive their arrangements 
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more sustainable in terms of connections with other farmers and societal recognition. This 
suggests that the arrangements with collective organizations were perceived as particularly 
sustainable from a social point of view. On the contrary, farmers selling to individual businesses 
perceived their arrangements more sustainable in terms of water quality, profitability, 
investments, coping with low prices and changing markets. Therefore, arrangements with 
individual businesses were perceive as particularly sustainable from an economic point of view. 
6.5 Drivers and future farming strategies 
The focus of the survey was on producers’ sales agreements with buyers; however, additional 
questions regarding future farming strategies and the drivers of potential farming changes were 
also asked. 
Initially farmers were asked to indicate how a series of environmental, policy and market factors 
were likely to influence their future decisions regarding production and farming strategies for 
milk, assigning a score from 1 (not at all) to 5 (strongly influenced). Results are shown in Figure 
43. 
Figure 43. Future drivers for dairy farming  
 
 
On average, all farms (green column) individuate low market prices and price volatility as key 
drivers of dairy farming production strategies, underlying the importance of market 
uncertainties for this sector and the dominance of market factors in farmer thinking. 
For the UK, the future of policies is greatly dominated by what will happen after Brexit. The 
potential outcomes of Brexit for agricultural policies are still largely unknown as the UK is still in 
a negotiating phase with the EU. However, from data collected in other work tasks, especially 
Tasks 2.4 and 2.5, it was clear that the main concerns of dairy farmers respecting Brexit were 
linked to future trade opportunities and the availability of workforce, especially seasonal 
workers from EU countries. 
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Results in figure X show that dairy farmers in Somerset and Devon consider potential trade 
issues linked to Brexit to be much more critical than labour issues in relation to future milk 
production strategies. This was of particular concern to farmers selling to collective 
organisations. 
On average, farmers selling to collective organisations have stronger opinions with respect to 
farming drivers, as their scores were higher for a number of factors. Notably, a relatively large 
difference was observable between collective and individual channels with respect to the 
influence of consumer behaviour. 
In the light of potential drivers of future dairy farming strategies, producers were also asked 
about what changes to their dairy farm business they expect to implement in the coming 5 years. 
Results are shown in Table 26. 
 
Table 26. Expected farming strategies for the next 5 years 
Strategy for the next 5 years Collective Individual All farms 
N. % N. % N. % 
Maintain the existing scale of 
operations 
37 44.6% 70 59.8% 107 53.5% 
Expand the scale of operations 31 37.3% 32 27.4% 63 31.5% 
Downscale the scale of operations 4 4.8% 5 4.3% 9 4.5% 
Abandon farming 7 8.4% 6 5.1% 13 6.5% 
I do not know 4 4.8% 4 3.4% 8 4.0% 
 
The majority of dairy farms (53.5%) do not have particular strategies in mind and they expect to 
maintain their existing scales of operation; with trend was consistent regarding both farmers 
selling to collective (44.6%) and individual organisations (59.8%). Interestingly, in the sample 
6.5% of farms expected to abandon the sector. This percentage increased to 8.4% for farmers 
selling to collective organisations, which is relatively high, suggesting that in the coming years a 
number of farms may exit the UK dairy sector. 
More details on what production or market changes were planned by surveyed farmers in the 
coming 5 years are provided in Table 27. 
Among farmers with sale agreements with collective organisations, those who expect to 
maintain the current scale of operation planned to increase in productive investments anyway. 
Moreover, these farmers were planning to adopt new sales channels and to increase the added 
value of their milk (e.g. conversion to organic). 
Increasing investments in production facilities was also a popular strategy, indicated by 34.7% 
of farmers selling to collective organisations which were planning to expand the operations 
scale, combined with 19.4% who planned to increase farming specialisation. In terms of market 
strategies, farmers selling to collective organisations and willing to expand, planned to develop 
new partnerships (for instance with other producers, retailers, processors) and add value. 
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Regarding farmers who foresee a downscale of operations and were selling to collective 
organizations, their plans focused mainly on production specialization and new sales channels 
(4.2% each). 
Moving to farmers selling to individual businesses, table x shows that 19.6% of those expecting 
to maintain their current scale of operations were planning additional productive investments, 
11.2% planned to externalise part of the production activities as well as insure crops or livestock 
and 10.3% to buy income insurance. 
Finally, the main production changes planned by farmers selling to individual businesses willing 
to expand their operations scale were related to productive investments (21.5%), specialisation 
(14%) and income insurance (7.5%). 
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Table 27. Farming strategies planning in the next 5 years 
    COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL 
    Maintain Expand Downscale Total Maintain Expand Downscale Total 
Production changes 
 
Investements 13.9% 34.7% 1.4% 50.0% 19.6% 21.5% 0.0% 41.1% 
 
Externalise 9.7% 15.3% 1.4% 26.4% 11.2% 7.5% 0.9% 19.6% 
 
Specialise 6.9% 19.4% 4.2% 30.6% 9.3% 14.0% 1.9% 25.2% 
 
Crop/livestock 
insurance 
4.2% 12.5% 1.4% 18.1% 11.2% 11.2% 0.0% 22.4% 
 
No plans 1.4% 4.2% 0.0% 5.6% 5.6% 0.9% 1.9% 8.4% 
 
Other 0.0% 5.6% 1.4% 6.9% 5.6% 3.7% 2.8% 12.1% 
Market changes 
 
Diversification 1.4% 5.6% 2.8% 9.7% 4.7% 3.7% 1.9% 10.3% 
 
Income insurance 1.4% 4.2% 0.0% 5.6% 10.3% 7.5% 0.9% 18.7% 
 
New partnership 5.6% 9.7% 2.8% 18.1% 3.7% 5.6% 1.9% 11.2% 
 
New sale channels 6.9% 5.6% 4.2% 16.7% 4.7% 5.6% 0.9% 11.2% 
 
Add value 6.9% 11.1% 1.4% 19.4% 5.6% 5.6% 1.9% 13.1% 
 
No plans 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 2.8% 0.9% 0.0% 3.7% 
  Other 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 
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6.6 Conclusions 
The dairy sector is facing a number of challenges not only in the UK but also in the EU. These 
challenges are mainly related to the globalisation of the supply chain, which is linked to the 
volatility of global milk markets, and expected policy changes such as Brexit and the  reform of 
the CAP in 2020. 
In particular, the UK and EU dairy sectors recently moved from a strong intervention of milk 
supplies through the quota system, which influenced and balanced domestic prices, to a 
complete liberalisation of markets. After the removal of dairy quotas, milk supplies have been 
mainly regulated by the free market through a variety of old and new supply chain agreements 
between milk producers and buyers. 
Moreover, at the EU level, new policies are strengthening the role of producer organisations in 
the food supply chain, such as the Omnibus Regulation, with the objective of increasing the 
share of value added generated in the food supply chain to farmers, by improving their 
bargaining power in their contractual negotiations with the food industry and retailers.All these 
aspects clearly indicate the importance of studying the nature of the commercial transactions 
and agreements occurring along the dairy supply chain, and in particular from a primary 
producer perspective given farmers place at the start of the supply chain. 
This analysis has contributed to the debate by shedding light on what is happening in dairy 
supply chain agreements in two of the most important UK counties producing milk, Somerset 
and Devon. Survey results from a representative sample of dairy farmers in the two counties 
showed that dairy sales channels are dominated by cooperatives and processors/food industry 
actors as the main buyers of milk. 
The most frequent features in the sales agreements concern sales exclusivity, price premiums 
for higher quality milk and collection, storage and transportation services. Almost all dairy 
farmers in Somerset and Devon have to satisfy minimum quality, food safety and animal welfare 
standards, either if they sell to collective or individual organisations.Overall, all farmers were 
quite satisfied with the agreement they have for their milk sales, and the reason for such 
satisfaction was linked to the fact that the agreements guaranteed higher market stability, 
mitigating the risks of price volatility. 
The arrangements with collective organisations were perceived by farmers as particularly 
sustainable from a social point of view, allowing interactions and connections with other farmers 
or with other actors in the farming system. On the contrary, farmers selling to individual 
businesses highlighted the economic sustainability of their agreements, showing a higher 
business orientation.Despite satisfaction or potential sustainability of sale agreements, farmers 
were still facing very high production costs. For some farmers the cost of producing a litre of 
milk was higher than the price they received from a buyer, therefore for these farmers profits 
were either limited or, more probably, negative, running the business at loss. 
The results and data presented in this analysis are highly valuable and more detailed analyses 
are planned using econometric methodologies, including more detailed analysis of the impact 
of supply chain arrangement attributes on farm prices and costs. The analysis of the impact of 
supply chain arrangements on farms’ technical efficiency are also planned as part of the wider 
SUFISA project. 
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7 Conditions, Strategies, Performances: Inventory 
analysis of key trends identified across the two case 
studies 
7.1 Introduction to the inventory  
Primary producers across the UK dairy and fishing case studies are faced with a multitude of 
external and internal conditions. In response they have developed a range of strategies to 
enhance or sustain their socio-economic business performance. This section reports on the 
analysis of the conditions, strategies and performances characteristics of the case study 
producers, as collected in the SUFISA inventory.  
 
A more detailed and holistics analysis of the inventory can be found in the ‘SUFISA inventory 
report’, but what follows here is the presentation of the key trends identified in relation to the 
UK dairy and fishing case studies.  
7.2 Dairy  
The issues affecting the UK dairy sector can be classified in the following five themes: milk price 
volatility, access to markets, environmental protection, recruitment and intergenerational 
succession, and Brexit, with the key trend being price volatility. 
7.2.1 Key conditions  
Table 28 lists the conditions identified within the dairy sector, ranked in order of the most to the 
least cited. For instance, price levels and volatility as a condition was cited 11 times, representing 
37% all reported conditions for this commodity. Although all the conditions reported are salient 
to some extent to the commodity in the UK, some are more significantly discussed than others.  
 
Table 28. Most cited conditions for dairy  
Condition Count % 
Price levels / volatility 11 37 
Regulation and policy 7 23 
Socio-demographic 3 10 
Market access 3 10 
Ecological / environmental 3 10 
Demand 2 7 
Factor access (land, labour, finance) 1 3 
Total  30 100 
 
Regulation and policy (23%) was the second most cited condition. This is understandable given 
the recent major policy transformations. First, that on the 1st April 2015, 30 years after they 
were established, dairy quotas were abolished. Second, Brexit is creating uncertainties amongst 
the farming community. Third, although the Conservative manifesto has guaranteed to match 
CAP payments until 2020, the situation is fragile since agreements with the European Union are 
still in negotiation. 
 
 249 
Socio-demographic conditions (10%), involving intergenerational farm transfer and the 
recruitment of new entrants, are significant both for the sustainability and resilience of the UK 
dairy sector. Because of high start-up costs, familial succession is the most common form of 
transfer. Market access (10%) for UK dairy farmers is another important issue. 
 
Ecological/environmental (10%) conditions are discussed in the CSP inventory in terms of the 
significant environmental impacts of dairy farming on Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs); as such, 
water quality measures can be particularly influential on dairy farming practices. There has been 
significant policy effort over many decades (direct payments linked to environmental 
sustainability rules and minimum environmental requirements); that said, environmental policy 
from the EU tends to be much criticised for its standardised and indiscriminate nature.  
 
Demand (7%) conditions, although less discussed compared to the other conditions, is still 
important in terms of accessibility to emerging markets as European demand for milk plateaus. 
Similarly, factor access (3%) impacts dairy farmers, discussed in terms of access to land, most 
notably young farmers and/or new entrants who may be entirely priced out of the market.  
 
7.2.2 Key strategies  
Table 29 shows the diversity of strategies reported in the UK dairy case study. Overall, market 
orientated strategies prevail in the UK CSP inventory for milk. When the quota regime, viewed 
as a barrier to EU producers responding to growing global demand, was abolished, it implied 
that production should be based on market demand. The dairy industry was in a way expected 
to self-adjust the quantity of milk produced by monitoring and responding to market signals.  
 
Table 29. Most cited strategies for dairy 
Strategy Count % 
Market orientation 5 17 
Flexibility in production and marketing 3 10 
Subsidies and grants 3 10 
Training, advice and investment in research and development 3 10 
Developing markets  2 7 
Financial management 2 7 
Collective arrangements  2 7 
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop focus 2 7 
Lobby access 1 3 
Reducing production costs 1 3 
Succession planning 1 3 
Diversifying income sources, both on- and off-farm 1 3 
Technological innovation 1 3 
Deliberate focus on environmental issues 1 3 
Contractualisation  1 3 
Informal arrangements  1 3 
Total 30 100 
 
In fact, dairy farmers are becoming increasingly sensitive to the fact that oversupply can 
contribute to a decrease in milk prices and the need to be flexible in terms of both production 
and marketing (10%): for example, adjusting butterfat content or converting to organic, in line 
with emerging market demands. Likewise, in terms of marketing: for instance, some ‘free range’ 
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milk farmers are seeking formal recognition/certification for their farming system through the 
Pasture Promise logo (which guarantees that their cows are outside for a minimum of 180 days 
per year).  
 
Despite these market-based initiatives, the milk sector in the UK is in crisis, in need of policy 
level support. Although dairy farmers rely on subsidies and grants less than farmers in other 
sectors, it does represent an increasing proportion of their Farm Business Income (FBI), 
especially in times of low milk prices. Strategies concerned with training, advice and investment 
in research and development were also discussed (10%).  
 
At the business level, developing markets, financial management, collective arrangements and 
changes in production systems (through intensification, specialisation, upscaling, and changing 
crop focus for example) come next. A series of other strategies are mentioned, each relevant to 
particular circumstances. 
 
This variety of strategies reported in the CSP inventory reflects the heterogeneous nature of the 
dairy sector. There cannot be one strategy to address all the issues faced by the sector. In fact, 
just as the removal of quota can be viewed either as a business opportunity or a risk factor, 
Brexit can be also be perceived an opportunity or threat, dependent on the farm business 
involved. 
7.3 Fish 
7.3.1 Key conditions 
Table 30 lists the conditions within the inshore fisheries sector as reported in the case study in 
UK ranked in order of the most to the least cited. The counts represent how often each condition 
was cited. For instance, regulation and policy conditions were cited 11 times out of the 32 times, 
representing 34% all reported conditions for this commodity. Although all the conditions 
reported are salient to some extent to Cornish inshore fisheries, some are more significantly 
discussed than others.  
 
Table 30. Most cited conditions for fisheries 
Condition Count % 
Regulation and policy 11 34 
Market access 6 19 
Ecological / environmental 5 16 
Price levels / volatility 4 13 
Factor access (land, labour, finance) 3 9 
Socio-demographic 2 6 
Demand 1 3 
Total  32 100 
 
Regulation and policy (34%) conditions significantly affect the operational aspects of inshore 
fisheries, particularly in relation to their flexibility in terms of what to catch and when. The Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) is set each year by the Council of Fisheries Ministers, regulating fishing 
quotas. This restriction of the quantities, timings and species of fish that may be caught, 
significantly impact on the profitability of fishers. The pressures on flexibility in terms of what 
quota species may be caught has led many fishers to increase the number of quota-free shellfish 
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they catch. This implies that new markets need to be accessed, both domestically and 
internationally.  
 
Market access issues (19%), and the related economic and market performance of the fisheries 
sector, is not only important to the fishers themselves, but also to the wider communities in 
which they operate, given that several regions depend on the tourist attraction small fishing 
ports represent.   
 
Another priority issue concerns ecological / environmental conditions (16%) mainly in terms of 
marine protection. For many, fisheries management via the CFP fails to deliver sustainable 
fisheries. A lack of transparency and failure to include a wide range of stakeholders’ perspectives 
are the main criticisms made.  For many fishers, selling their fish at harbour-side provides a fair 
price but this can fluctuate considerably dependent on the season and the quantities of fish 
landed that day. The more fish landed, the lower the price received, so that price levels / 
volatility (13%) is an issue.  
 
The issues of factor (land, labour, finance) access is discussed in terms of the monetisation of 
licences and quota, which were previously state-owned and have become privately owned. The 
limitation in numbers has increased their value and this has made it more difficult for new 
entrants to join the industry. Much less discussed, but still an issue, is the question of demand 
(3%), not least that eating fish is not a key part of British culture. 
 
7.3.2 Key strategies  
Today, the inshore fishing sector is not only about catching fish. To survive in the face of the 
multiple challenges mentioned, fishers have to devise a wide range of strategies to ensure they 
earn a living, stay in business and make a profit. This is reflected in the strategies listed in Table 
31, below. 
 
Table 31. Most cited strategies for fisheries 
Strategy Count % 
Market orientation  8 25 
Training, advice and investment in research and development 4 13 
Deliberate focus on environmental issues 4 13 
Developing markets  3 9 
Succession planning 2 6 
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop focus 2 6 
Flexibility in production and marketing 2 6 
Collective arrangements  2 6 
Technological innovation 1 3 
Lobby access 1 3 
Informal arrangements  1 3 
Extensification, downsizing or abandonment 1 3 
Contractualisation 1 3 
  32 100 
 
Given the market access issues and regulatory barriers and constraints perceived, expressed and 
experienced by many fishers, it is logical that the three key strategies are market, policy and 
development focused. The data analysis shows that market orientation (25%) strategies are 
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discussed in relation to the following conditions: market access, price levels and volatility, 
regulation and policy. Although, fishers are highly independent, and there is a reticence to work 
together and to share information about where to catch, or where to market them, some fishers 
are working together to reduce their costs and improve the prices they receive. Second most 
noted strategies concern training, advice and investment in research and development (13%) 
and a deliberate focus on environmental issues (13%). The inshore fishing sector is concerned 
with succession since there is lack of new fishers. Several training schemes have been put in 
place but are largely seen as 'hurdles without meaning' which cannot replace actual fishing 
experience. 
 
The sector’s sustainability depends economically on accessing new markets, and on the long-
term availability of marine resources. Some fishers are turning to processing as well as investing 
in direct marketing. Added value is a key aspect of many strategies which seek to differentiate 
fishing businesses from each other and thereby earn a better price on their products. In this 
respect, improved information and communication improves their ability to be more effective.  
7.4 Inventory – final remarks 
This final table below (Table 32) shows the relationship between the indicators of expected 
performance for each of the two sectors, in relation to the strategies undertaken. The darker 
the shading the more significant in terms of desired performance outcomes and related 
strategies. What the table shows is that in both sectors developing strategies to enable or 
enhance business resilience is the main priority. This reflects the general finding across both 
case studies that dairy farmers and fishers often look first to reduce costs and make changes at 
the production level in response to external shocks. In dairy improving financial stability is the 
other priority, linked to the on-going issues associated with volatility and market uncertainty. 
Strategies to improve profitability, market access and environmental sustainability were noted 
in the UK fishers CSP data.  
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Table 32. Strategies & expected performance indicators – fishing & dairy  
Indicators and 
percentage frequency 
Strategies  
Dairy  Fisheries  
Enhanced farm/ 
business resilience 
Dairy: 23% 
Fisheries: 23% 
Market orientation  
Collective arrangements  
Financial management  
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Contractualisation  
Developing markets  
Diversifying income sources, both on- and off-farm 
Informal arrangements 
Reducing production costs 
Succession planning 
Technological innovation 
Market orientation  
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Succession planning 
Contractualisation  
Developing markets 
Extensification, downsizing or abandonment 
Informal arrangements  
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Greater financial 
stability 
Dairy: 22% 
Fisheries: 9% 
Market orientation  
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Subsidies and grants 
Collective arrangements  
Contractualisation  
Developing markets  
Diversifying income sources, both on- and off-farm 
Financial management  
Informal arrangements  
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Reducing production costs 
Succession planning 
Technological innovation 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Market orientation  
Collective arrangements 
Extensification, downsizing or abandonment 
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Greater profitability 
Dairy: 14% 
Fisheries: 15% 
Market orientation  
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Contractualisation  
Diversifying income sources, both on- and off-farm 
Financial management  
Reducing production costs 
Subsidies and grants 
Technological innovation 
Market orientation  
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Informal arrangements  
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Developing markets  
Contractualisation 
Collective arrangements 
Added Value 
Dairy: 4% 
Fisheries: 9% 
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Market orientation  
Diversifying income sources, both on- and off-farm 
Market orientation  
Collective arrangements  
Developing markets  
Informal arrangements  
Improved access to 
markets 
Dairy: 9% 
Fisheries: 14% 
Market orientation  
Developing markets  
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Collective arrangements 
Market orientation  
Developing markets  
Collective arrangements 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Strengthened 
negotiation power 
Dairy: 6% 
Fisheries: 3% 
Collective arrangements  
Market orientation  
Informal arrangements 
Lobby access 
Market orientation  
Lobby access 
Increased productivity 
Dairy: 5% 
Fisheries: 4% 
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Market orientation  
Technological innovation 
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Intensification, specialisation, upscaling, changing crop 
focus 
Social benefits 
Dairy: 6% 
Fisheries: 3% 
Subsidies and grants 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Succession planning 
Informal arrangements  
Collective arrangements  
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Informal arrangements  
Environmental benefits 
Dairy: 3% 
Fisheries: 14% 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Subsidies and grants 
Deliberate focus on environmental issues 
Deliberate focus on environmental issues 
Developing markets  
Flexibility in production and marketing 
Market orientation 
Technological innovation 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
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Indicators and 
percentage frequency 
Strategies  
Dairy  Fisheries  
Improved information 
and communication 
Dairy: 6% 
Fisheries: 7% 
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
Lobby access 
Informal arrangements  
Developing markets  
Collective arrangements 
Developing markets  
Informal arrangements  
Market orientation  
Training, advice and investment in research and 
development 
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8.4 Appendices 
8.4.1 Appendix 1: Inshore fishing interviewees 
Organisation Role 
1. Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation (CFPO) [Producer organisation] Assistant to CFPO 
chief executive 
2. Marine Management Organisation (MMO) [Regulations and policy] Senior Marine 
Enforcement Officer 
3. Cornwall Inshore Fisheries and 
Conservation Authority (IFCA) 
[Regulations and policy] Principal 
enforcement officer 
4. Cornwall Development Company (CDC) [Wider economic development, including 
markets] 
5. Cornwall Rural Community Charity (CRCC) [Deliverers of Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
FLAG] Rural Development Manager 
6. South West Handline Fishermen Association 
(SWHFA) 
[Small-scale fishing association] 
7. Natural England - Truro [Broad environmental perspective] 
Marine Senior Advisor 
8. Cornwall Wildlife Trust [Wildlife perspective] Marine Awareness 
Officer, Marine Team 
9. National Lobster Hatchery [Marine ecology/environment] Research 
post-doc 
10. Centre for Environment, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) 
[Marine science organisation] 
11. Wing of St Maws [Fish Merchant] 
12. Barclays Bank Plc, Cornwall [Business Manager | Barclays Business – 
Cornwall] 
13. Plymouth Trawler Agents Ltd. [Run the Plymouth fish market] 
14. Sutton Harbour, Plymouth harbour master [Plymouth Fisheries at Sutton Harbour] 
15. Newlyn harbour master [Harbour master] 
16. Looe harbour master [Harbour master] 
17. Mevagissey harbour master [Harbour master] 
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8.4.2 Appendix 2: Inshore fishing focus group summary data 
Si
te
 o
f F
G
  
Co
de
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am
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Age group  Employment Fishing strategy Household Information 
<2
5 
25
-4
5 
45
-6
5 
>6
5 FT PT 
Po
rt
/ 
Ha
rb
ou
r f
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he
d 
ou
t o
f 
Si
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 o
f y
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et
re
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Si
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Ty
pe
 o
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r 
Ty
pe
s o
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h 
Ap
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nn
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Approximate value of 
annual catch/£ 
Ap
pr
ox
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e 
%
 o
f 
ho
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ol
d 
in
co
m
e 
fr
om
 fi
sh
in
g 
N
um
be
r o
f p
eo
pl
e 
in
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
Family members working in 
fishing industry 
Other 
sources of 
income 
<2
00
00
 
20
00
1-
50
00
0 
50
00
1-
10
00
00
 
>1
00
00
0 
Y/N Who Capacity 
St
 M
ar
tin
s/
 H
el
fo
rd
  [
SM
] 
SM
1 
  1  Y  Cadgwith 7.62 N 1 2 3/4 to 10 ½ All species na 
  Y  100 4 Y Stepson Crew Spouse working 
SM
2 
  1  Y  Cadgwith 7.80 N 1 Nets and Pots 
Monk, Red mullet, 
Ray, Crab, Lobster, 
craws 
na    Y 90 5 Y Two sons 
1 Fulltime 
an 1 part-
time 
Spouse 
Teacher 
SM
3 
  1  Y  Helford 8.54 N 2 Nets and Pots Crab, whitefish na na na na na 100 5 Y 1 son na Na 
SM
4 
 1   Y  Helford 8.23 Y - Tangle Nets and gill nets 
Monkfish, ray, Cod, 
Turbo, Brill 15000 
 Y   100 2 N 0 0 0 
SM
5 
   1  Y Falmouth 5.49 Y - 
Handline, 
pots, nets, 
gill tangle 
Mackerel, pollock, 
ray, monk na Y 
   20 1 N na na 
Legal work/ 
Renting 
property 
SM
6 
   1 Y  Helford na na na na na na na na na na na na Y na na na 
N
ew
ly
n 
[N
L]
 
NL
1 
   1 Y  
Newlyn, 
Plymouth,
Brixham 
14.0 N 3 Twin Rig Demersal 25000    500k 15 5 4 Family na 
Retired but 
still owns a 
boat 
NL
2 
  1  Y  Newlyn 5.79 Y - Pots Crab, Lobster 3000  Y   50 2 N - - Spouse working 
NL
3 
 1   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Pa
ds
to
w
 [P
W
] 
PW
1 
 1   Y  Padstow 7.80 Y - Pots Lobster, crab, spider crab 25000 
  Y  100 4 3 
Uncle FT; 
Brother 
PT; 
cousin FT 
na 
Spouse 
works at 
Exeter 
University 
PW
2 
  1  Y  Padstow 6.50 Y - Pots and lines Shellfish, bass, pollock 
10-
15000 
  Y  70 3 Y Son 17m gill netter crew 
Spouse 
working 
PW
3 
 1   Y  Padstow 9.76 N 1 Pots Crabs, lobster, crawfish, spider crab 35000 
  Y  na 4 na na na 
Partner is 
beauty 
therapist 
(na means not available) 
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8.4.3 Appendix 3: Inshore fishing focus group schedule 
Introduction: Can each of you please tell us your name, how you got into fishing and why you go fishing. 
 
First discussion theme: What are the main policy and regulatory conditions that are an issue for you / for the inshore 
fishing industry in Cornwall? 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: Access to quota; Latent capacity; Management of non-
quota species; Landings obligation / discards ban; Environmental regulations; and the implications of Brexit 
 
Second discussion theme: Markets and marketing 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: What are the key issues in terms of selling your catch? 
Where do you sell your catch? Collaboration? What are the implications of the landings obligation, in terms of 
marketing? Adding value; Certification; and Brexit. 
 
Third discussion theme: Finance 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: What are the main issues gaining access to finance? What 
sources of finance are available? Does a lack of finance constrain your business opportunities? 
 
Fourth discussion theme: Recruitment, succession and social issues 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: What are the key issues constraining people coming into 
fishing? What might encourage more people to come into fishing? Do you want your children to go into fishing? Will 
Brexit affect the availability of foreign labour?  
 
Fifth discussion theme: Adaptive strategies undertaken 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: Going part-time, single-handed, adding value, leaving 
fishing etc; to what extent is their adaptive capacity related to flexibility? What risk management strategies are 
available? 
 
In conclusion: Looking to the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall 
Participants were prompted in relation to the following issues: how might greater flexibility be enabled? Any final 
thoughts on the future of inshore fishing in Cornwall? 
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8.4.4 Appendix 4: Inshore fishing workshop agenda 
     
 
SUFISA Workshop – Cornwall Inshore Fishery 
 
Wednesday 22nd March 2017 10.30 – 15.00 
 
 
Venue: 
Brian Etherington Meat Co. – Corporate and Conferences 
Wheal Rose 
Scorrier 
Redruth TR16 5DF 
https://www.visitcornwall.com/brian-etherington-meat-co-corporate-conferences 
 
Agenda 
10.30 – 11.00 Arrival, tea and coffee 
11.00 – 11.10 (10 mins) Brief round of introductions 
11.10 – 11.15 (5 mins) Aims of the meeting 
11.15 – 11.30 (15 mins) Brief introduction to the SUFISA project / Points of 
clarification 
11.30 – 11.50 (20 mins) Presentation of work to date / key findings 
11.50 – 12.45 (55 mins) Discussion of work to date / stakeholder feedback 
12.45 – 13.30 (45 mins) Buffet lunch 
13.30 – 14.45 (75 mins) Debating future scenarios, following Brexit 
14.45 – 15.00 (15 mins) Conclusions and next steps – Delphi and reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SUFISA: Sustainable finance for  
sustainable agriculture and 
fisheries 
Grant agreement no: 635577 
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8.4.5 Appendix 5: Inshore fishing workshop attendees 
Organisation Role 
1. Marine Management Organisation (MMO) Senior Marine Enforcement Officer 
2. Cornwall Inshore Fisheries and 
Conservation Authority (IFCA) 
Principal enforcement officer 
3. South West Handline Fishermen Association 
(SWHFA) 
[Small-scale fishing association] 
4. Natural England - Truro Senior Marine Advisor 
5. Cornwall Wildlife Trust Marine Awareness Officer, Marine Team 
6. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr James Kirwan – senior researcher 
7. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr Damian Maye - senior researcher 
8. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr Hannah Chiswell – research assistant 
9. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Ms Dilshaad Bundhoo – research assistant 
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8.4.6 Appendix 6: Cornwall Inshore Fishery – looking to the future 
Stake-
holders 
What are your priorities in relation to Cornwall's inshore fishery 
over the next five years? 
How will these be best achieved? What will be the key challenges/uncertainties in relation to 
Cornwall's Inshore fishery, both during the negotiations and after 
Brexit? 
S1 Natural England (NE) wants to see a thriving, sustainable and viable inshore 
fishery in Cornwall in the next 5 years 
-MPA designation is/will have an impact on inshore fisheries in certain 
MPAs 
NE would wish to work with: 
- industry, regulators and Defra to help minimize impacts where possible. 
- FLAG to advise on the best use of £810k over the remaining 2 years to 
ensure /help with the goal of a viable and sustainable inshore fishery. 
- Working with lay partners/sea users and industry to provide 
advice and work to positive environmental outcomes which can 
be win-win 
- Help advise on where there are risks to the area of habitats 
/species in MPAS and protected species 
- Help overcome and find solutions to these issues. 
- Adaptive risk management i.e. best and most achievable 
management solutions and adaptation as new evidence and 
information comes to light. 
-Access to EU markets for inshore fleet 
-Continuing with succession/intake to the industry 
-How access to foreign vessels/ historic rights will be governed in the 
inshore sector? 
-How quotas for inshore versus offshore fleets will continue to be 
managed? 
-How MPAs will be managed by UK government and in particular in areas 
which involve other nations i.e. cross border sites and with 'foreign' 
vessels? 
S2 -Sustainable exploitation of sea fisheries resources 
-Viable fishing industry 
-Catches of fish which do not exceed market demand 
-Diverse fisheries 
-Measures taken to reduce discards of marketable fish 
- Suitable management through fisheries legislation 
- Cooperative working by fishermen 
- Codes of Conduct (100% agreement required) 
- Correct balance of fishing activities against impacts on the 
marine environment. 
-EU-CFP not fit for purpose 
-Defra -particularly while UK is part of EU 
-Environmental concerns 
-Access to export markets  
S3 -Enforce fisheries legislation 
-Buyers and Sellers registration, encourage more registration 
-Under 10 recording of catches/ logbooks 
-MPA enforcement increasing 
-Coastal visits --->desktop enforcement 
-Inspections --->desktop enforcements 
-Use of new technology, i.e. apps 
-Use of new vessel monitoring for smaller vessel <10m ability to 
use geofencing 
-Possible falling fish prices post Brexit 
-Nervousness of industry  
-More flexibility post Brexit to introduce new systems, but possibly less 
funding available 
-New hardware required but less (eco) funding 
S4 -Sensible changes in management post Brexit 
-Adequate scientific monitoring of stocks and fishing input 
to include species of commercial importance such as Monkfish, Megrim, 
cuttlefish and scallops 
-Improving local markets for Cornish fish 
-Rewarding sustainable fishing and encouraging improved practice. e.g. use 
of pingers in inshore gill net fishing 
-Encouraging new fishermen 
-Get rid of tradable licence and Quota 
-In the hands of government and IFCAs 
-Pressure on government 
-Presentation of CGSG 
-Getting supermarkets on board 
-Sensible legislation 
-What will happen? 
Catches need to be limited to prevent over fishing, 
but discarding needs to be eliminated 
-Cooperation with EU to ensure stocks don’t get overfished by our 
neighbours 
S5 1) Ideally take over all the waters: international to the middle of the 
channel: via UNCLOS to 200 mile zone 
2) Abandon the London fisheries convention so that UK has sole access to 
the 6-12 mile band. 
3) The UK must have sufficient quotas to make fishing viable and avoid 
discarding large amounts of fish. 
1) By way of UNCLOS 
2) By abandoning /getting rid of the French vessels. Initially this 
was fished by small powered trawlers. Up to 12/20 French 
vessels fish in this area 
Challenges to improve the lot of British Fishermen, so that we have a 
level playing field with other EU countries. 
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8.4.7 Appendix 7: Dairy interviewees 
Organisation Role 
1. National Farmers’ Union (NFU) 
Somerset 
Somerset County Chairman and farm 
business consultant 
2. Agriculture and Horticulture 
Development Board (AHDB)  
[Levy Board] Knowledge Exchange Officer for 
South West England 
3. NFU Dairy Board 
 
South West England Dairy Board Chairman 
and dairy farmer 
4. Tenant Farmers Association  
 
South West England Chairman  
5. Triodos Bank 
 
Lending Manager  
6. Somerset Young Farmers Club  
 
Rural Affairs Chairman  
7. West Of England Rural Network  
 
[Local Action Group] Programme Manager, 
LEADER 
8. Yeo Valley 
 
[Major organic processor] Procurement 
manager 
9. The Soil Association  
 
[Main UK organic certification body] Farm 
Business/Supply Chain Technical Advisor  
10. Lloyds Bank 
 
Area Director Agriculture, Somerset and East 
Devon 
11. Barclays Bank 
 
South West England Regional Manager, 
Agriculture 
12. Dairy UK 
 
[Trade association, UK dairy] Policy and 
Sustainability Director 
13. British Cattle Veterinary Association 
(BCVA) 
BCVA board member and dairy/vet 
consultant 
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8.4.8 Appendix 8: Dairy focus group summary data 
 
Table 1/2 
Site 
of FG  
Code 
Name   
Age group  Employ-ment status Status on the Farm Household Information 
<25 25-45 
45-
65 >65 FT PT Farmer 
Farm 
Manager Other 
Size of 
farm 
(Acres) 
Approximate 
% of 
household 
income from 
farming 
Number 
of people 
in 
household 
Family members wokring in fishing industry Other sources of 
income 
Y/N Who? Capacity 
Se
dg
em
oo
re
 
S1     Y   Y   Y     140 100 2 Y wife farming partner - 
S2   Y     Y   Y     400 50 2 Y parents Farming 
wife full time 
teacher 
S3       Y   Y     Director 1100 0 1 Y   Associated business penion 
S4     Y   Y   Y     160 95 5 Y wife Full-time 
wind turbines and 
house rents 
                                  
Co
om
be
 
S5     Y   Y     Y   1300 70 4 none  - - 
30% Spouse 
income 
S6 Y       Y   na na na na na na na na na na 
(na means not available) 
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Table 2/2 
(na means not available) 
  
Site 
of 
FG  
Code 
Name   
Farm characteristics 
Size of 
farm 
(Acres) 
Number 
of 
workers 
Size 
of 
herd 
Average milk 
yields (litres 
of milk per 
cow per 
annum) 
Types of final product Land -owner  
Tenanted-
farmer 
Approximate value of annual output/£ 
Diversification 
<50000 50000-
100000 
100001-
250000 
>250000 
Se
dg
em
oo
re
 
S1 140 0 100 6100 milk, beef, calves Y Y     Y   Solar panels 
S2 400 3 270 7000 liquid Milk Y Y       Y Beef, cattle, solar panels 
S3 1100 7 700 7700 yogurt Y N       Y Solar panels 1/2 acre 
S4 160 2 160 8500 liquid Milk, heifers, calves, burreners Y N       Y Wind turbines, house rents 
                          
Co
om
be
 S5 1300 6 270 6700 60% liquid; 25% Brie; 15% Cheddar Y Y       Y None 
S6 na na na na na na na na na na na na 
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8.4.9 Appendix 9: Dairy focus group schedule (key themes) 
 
Welcome to the focus group/introduce SUFISA project/aims of the meeting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where do you sell your milk? 
What are the key issues in terms of selling your milk? 
Brexit 
 
 
 
 
 
•  
•  
 
Contractualisation and A&B pricing (vertical co-ordination) 
Producer organisations and collaboration (horizontal co-ordination) 
Standards (vertical) 
Adding value, organic production and alternative markets (vertical) 
 
Introduction: [5-10 minutes] 
By way of an introduction can each of you please tell us your name and 
introduce your dairy farm. If I might start with you… 
First discussion theme: [20 minutes] 
Markets for milk 
Second discussion theme: [15 minutes] 
Milk prices and price volatility 
Third discussion theme: [20 minutes] 
Marketing strategies and standards 
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Policy support (public co-ordination) 
Abolition of milk quota (public co-ordination) 
Milk Marketing Boards (public) 
TB regulations 
Environmental regulations 
Implications of Brexit 
 
 
 
 
• To what extent is your adaptive capacity related to flexibility? 
 
 
• What are the key issues in terms of gaining access to finance? 
 
 
 
 
 
  In conclusion: [5 minutes] 
Looking to the future of dairy farming in Somerset / your business 
Fifth discussion theme: [15 minutes] 
Adaptive strategies undertaken – Buffer / Adaptive / Transformative 
Seventh discussion theme: [15 minutes] 
Recruitment, succession and social issues 
Sixth discussion theme: [10 minutes] 
Finance 
Fourth discussion theme: [25 min.] Policy & regulatory conditions / strategies 
- What are the main policy and regulatory conditions that are an issue for you 
/ for the dairy sector in Somerset? 
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8.4.10 Appendix 10: Additional dairy interviewees 
 
 
  
Organisation Role 
1. Barber’s  [Farmhouse cheesemakers] Milk supply 
manager 
2. Free Range Dairy Network  [Community Interest Company (CIC)] 
Founder & Director 
3. Wyke Farms [Largest independent producer of cheese in 
the UK] Milk buyer and farm liason officer 
4. Coombe Farm Milk Pool Director and farm liason officer 
5. Crediton Dairy  [UK’s leading dairy drinks businesses] Head of 
Milk Supply 
6. Arla Foods [International cooperative and large 
producer of dairy products] Board of 
Representatives  
7. Horrington Milk Hut [Direct, on-farm milk sales] Founder and 
farmer 
8. Muller-Wiseman [Largest milk supplier and distributor in the 
UK] Farm business manager  
9. Dairy Crest Direct [Independent representative body for 
faremrs selling milk to Dairy Crest] Director 
10. Davis and Parsons LTD [Wholesale of dairy products] Directors 
11. OMSCo [Organic Milk Suppliers Cooperative – 
supplies the majority of the UK’s organic dairy 
processing and exporting needs] Farm 
technical manager 
[Organic Milk Suppliers Cooperative – 
supplies the majority of the UK’s organic dairy 
processing and exporting needs] Head of 
membership 
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8.4.11 Appendix 11: Dairy interview schedule  
 
 
SUFISA WP2, Task 2.3 
Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
 
Record these details for each interview: 
 
Interviewee organisation: 
 
 
Interviewee name: 
 
 
Interviewee position: 
 
 
Interviewee contact details: 
Address (inc. Post code) 
 
 
 
 
Telephone number 
 
 
Email 
 
 
Date of interview: 
 
 
Interviewer: 
 
 
 
Recording the interview. Where possible, it is envisaged that the interview will be digitally 
recorded and written up. This will allow for a more complete record of the conversations and 
enable a better understanding of the subtleties of the conversations.  
 
It is important to stress to interviewees that individual confidentiality will be assured through 
the anonymisation of their comments.  
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We want to record the interview, but there will be ‘NO INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTION’ within 
any of the reports produced. 
 
The interviews are expected to last up to a maximum of one hour.  
 
Introduction 
The overall project will encompass 22 case studies in 11 partner countries. Milk will be 
studied in the UK, France, Denmark and Latvia; feta case study in Greece. 
 
The purpose of SUFISA is to identify sustainable practices and policies in the agricultural, 
fish and food sectors that support the sustainability of primary producers in the context of 
multidimensional policy requirements, market uncertainties and globalisation. 
 
Our focus here is on dairy farmers in Somerset. We want to understand how dairy farmers 
can develop resilient systems of production in the face of market and regulatory changes 
(e.g. price volatility, abolition of milk quota, Brexit) and to identify potentially sustainable 
supply chain arrangements that enable this. 
 
We have conducted a desk-based review of the literature available on dairy, but would like 
to make sure we have an accurate and up-to-date grasp of the issues by asking those directly 
involved in the milk chain - such as yourselves. There are a number of different areas that I 
want to talk to you about. 
 
 
 
Section 1 – Contextual information 
 
• Can you please briefly say a few words to introduce the organisation (type of 
company, when it started, main activities, main products sold, etc.)? 
• What is the organisation’s role in the milk supply chain (producer co-op, 
processor/wholesaler, etc.)?  
• What is your particular role within the organisation (e.g. manage milk contracts, milk 
supply chain manager)? 
 
• We are particularly interested in markets and regulations as they relate to dairy 
farming in Somerset/SW England, including small-scale and family dairy farms. 
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Section 2 – Supply chain arrangements 
• Can you briefly describe how many farmers you buy milk from and where and where the milk 
sold to? (i.e. describe SC) 
• How you buy milk from dairy farmers? 
• Has this arrangement changed over time and why? 
• What pricing arrangements do you have and why? (spot market, contracts, A&B, etc.) 
 
Section 3 – Markets and milk prices 
 
Markets 
• Overall, what would you say are the key markets for milk? (processors/wholesale, direct, 
producer co-op, value added chains) UK or non-UK? 
• What are the most profitable activities/markets for dairy farmers in Somerset? Milk, cheese, 
by-products (slurry manure) 
• Pros and cons of particular market approaches, esp. for small-scale/family farms? 
• Are there market access issues for dairy farmers? (e.g. availability of contracts) 
• How are dairy farmers responding to market access issues? 
• Innovations re. marketing strategies? New contract arrangements, adding value, diversifying, 
developing new markets? 
 
• What about production contracts? Types of contract? Main contract arrangements in 
Somerset? 
• Are contracts a good or bad thing? Why? Can they mitigate against low prices/volatility? 
• Supermarket schemes (e.g. Morrisons scheme to support dairy farmers)? 
 
• What role for producer organisations? (e.g. Dairy Crest DPO; now divided into two elements 
(for Muller and Davidstow). Are they a good or a bad thing? Why? 
 
• Organic dairy production and the organic dairy SC? Benefits of moving to organic? Price 
premium? Arrangements? Organic dairy also susceptible to low prices/price volatility? 
 
• What about functional dairy products? E.g., milk with enhanced Omega-3, calcium, lactose 
free? Possible strategy? Raw milk? 
• What about PDO/PGI? Value added (e.g., ice cream, cheese). 
• GM-free dairy? (GM-free feed) 
• Are consumer preferences / demands considered/perceived at the farm level? 
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• Consumer demands, preferences and emerging trends? (sustainable nutrition, traceability 
and transparency) 
Milk prices 
• What is your view of the current milk price situation? Do farmers get a fair price?  
• Is the milk price narrative more complex than sometimes described in the media? 
• Which dairy products/SCs are more exposed to price volatility? 
• How and why is the global market for milk affecting the price for Somerset milk producers? 
• How do communicate milk price issues with dairy farmers in your group/that you buy from? 
• What are the direct/indirect effects of low milk prices on dairy farmers, esp. in Somerset and 
on small/family dairy farms? How do low prices impact the milk chain? 
• Are you monitoring advanced prices/market changes? If so, what tools do you use? 
• How do you/dairy farmers respond to milk price issues? (strategies) 
• What about production factors? Which are the most costly? Also linked to volatility? 
• What role do/should supermarkets/SC actors play? The Gov.? 
 
Section 4: Standards and finance markets 
 
Standards 
• What are the key standards for dairy? (public and private) 
• Please describe the role and importance of standards? Market access / price premium? 
• How do standards impact dairy / the milk SC? The costs involved?  
• Are some public standards burdensome? (labelling, animal welfare…) 
• What labels / certification schemes might help dairy farmers to survive?  
• Ethics; the role of consumers; labelling, such as organic, local, fair trade. How important are 
these different approaches, and what might their role be? 
• A ‘Made in Somerset’ mark?  GM-free. Antibiotics. 
 
Finance markets 
• What role do financial markets play in relation to dairy and the milk SC? (futures, impact on 
selling, prices, access to supply chains, level of risk involved, etc.). Milk products, in general, 
are traded worldwide, but what about milk produced in Somerset? 
• How responsive are investments to shock? i.e: is increasing investments (purchase more 
land, machinery, innovation…) a suitable strategy against low prices, etc..? Untimely 
investments can make farms rigid in responding to changes. 
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Section 5 – Policy and regulation 
 
• What would you identify as the key policies / regulations affecting dairy farming / the milk SC? 
(milk quota, Climate Change policy, environmental regulations) 
 
• What is the impact of these policies / regulations on dairy farmers/the milk SC? 
 
• How are dairy farmers responding / reacting to them? (E.g., intensification, diversification, 
pluriactivity, co-operation, exit). Small-scale dairy? 
 
Abolition of milk quota 
Milk quotas were abolished in March 2015 after more than 20 years. 
• What, in your mind, was the rationale/logic behind this policy change? 
• Supply chain impacts? 
• How has the abolition of quota affected dairy farmers? (positive/negative impacts – 
e.g. production effect, price effect)  
• Is the abolition of milk quota linked to the current low milk prices? If yes, why? 
• Will the change to milk quota create business opportunities? 
 
The Milk Package 
The Milk Package was introduced in March 2012 to better support – through different policies 
and measures - the participation of dairy farmers in the milk SC.  
• Are you aware of it? Aims/purposes? 
• A key feature is the ability for farmers to collectively negotiate contracts? Is this 
happening? What negotiations are happening? Role of producer organisations 
increasing? 
• Is it helping dairy farmers in the UK/Somerset? How and why? 
 
Article 222 of the CAP Market Regulation (1308/2014) 
After the aid package in April 2016 the EC introduced new rules providing farmers the 
opportunity to jointly plan milk production. Article 222 allows for special measures to be 
activated when there is severe imbalance in the market (MS can curtail production for a 
period of 6 months to 1yr (i.e., form of dairy quota). 
• The UK has not used Article 222. 
• Can Article 222 impact UK dairy farmers, even if not implemented here? 
• Do you support Article 222? Why? 
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Section 6 – Dairy – Looking to the future 
 
• What do you consider to be the key issues / challenges / risk factors facing dairy 
farming / the milk supply chain at the moment and why (both internally and externally)? 
[Financial, ecological, climatic, policy, regulatory, market]. Small scale/family dairy 
sector? 
• What do you expect will happen in terms of these issues in the future? What is the 
ability / scope of dairy farming to respond to the pressures / risks they face? 
• What are the implications of Brexit? Opportunities/threats for dairy farming / the 
milk supply chain? Why? 
 
• How might dairy farmers be more innovative in response to the pressures they face?  
• How sustainable / resilient is dairy farming in Somerset?  
 
• What might help dairy farmers to respond better, in terms of policies, regulations or 
access to markets? 
 
 
 
Section 5 – Final comments 
 
• Is there anything else you wish to add, that you feel we haven’t previously covered in 
the interview? 
 
 
At the end of the interview: 
• Consider whether it would be useful for interviewees to take part in the Workshop. If 
so, ask if they would be willing to take part. 
• Similarly in relation to the Round Table. 
• Do you have access to dairy farmers? Would you be able to help with the producer 
survey? 
• Do you have any advice as to how I might contact dairy farmers? 
• Are there any particular parts of Somerset that I should visit? 
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Private Storage Aid Scheme 
Dairy producers receive aid to store production excess when markets are unfavourable (i.e., when prices are 
low. Butter, cheese and skimmed milk powder can be stored. 
• Are UK dairy farmers benefiting from this exceptional EU support scheme? 
 
LEADER 
• What has been the impact and role of the LAGs in supporting dairy farmers in Somerset? What impact 
has the LAG had? Integrate dairy with the wider territory/ local economy? 
 
Animal Welfare 
• The Animal Welfare Act 2006 
• Five freedoms of the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) 
• What, if any impact, has this had on dairy farmers in Somerset? (e.g. the production process, 
management of yards, diets of livestock, vet management) 
 
Animal Health, Biosecurity, Antibiotics 
• What are the key regulations / issues to be aware of? 
• Infectious disease control and legislation? 
• BTB: key legislation/regulations? Cattle movements/trading restrictions?  
• What, if any impact, has this had on dairy farmers in Somerset? 
• Increasing debate about antibiotics used to treat animals? How is this playing out in relation to dairy? 
(milk antibiotic residues) Standards/regulations? 
 
Water Framework Directive 
The EU Water Framework Directive (Dir. 2000/60/EC) requires that measures for mitigating point and diffuse 
pollution are taken, to ensure that water bodies meet environmental quality standards 
• Main source of pollution on dairy farms: nitrates from livestock manure 
• Impact of this Directive on dairy farmers? 
 
Nitrates Directive and Nitrate Pollution prevention 
Nitrate Pollution Prevention Regulations 2015 (SI 668-2015) came into force in May 2015. 62% of England 
designated as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones in 2010 (due to nitrates) 
• Impact of this regulation (to reduce nitrate leaching) on dairy farmers? 
 
Hygiene and food safety 
The UK Food Safety Act, 1990: traceability standards required for food safety 
• Key hygiene and safety standards for dairy farmers? (milk operations, milk storage) 
• Impact on dairy farmers?  
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8.4.12 Appendix 12: Dairy workshop agenda   
 
SUFISA Workshop – dairy farming and dairy supply 
chains in Somerset/SW England 
 
Tuesday 23rd May 2017 10.30 – 15.00 
 
Venue: 
Junction 24 Ltd [Polden Room]  
Market Way,  
North Petherton  
Somerset TA6 6DF 
http://junction24ltd.co.uk/ 
 
Agenda 
 
10.30 – 11.00 Arrival, tea and coffee 
11.00 – 11.10 (10 mins) Brief round of introductions 
11.10 – 11.15 (5 mins) Aims of the meeting 
11.15 – 11.30 (15 mins) Brief introduction to the SUFISA project / Points of clarification 
11.30 – 11.50 (30 mins) Presentation of work to date / key findings 
11.50 – 12.45 (45 mins) Discussion of work to date / stakeholder feedback 
12.45 – 13.30 (45 mins) Buffet lunch 
13.30 – 14.45 (75 mins) Debating future scenarios, following Brexit 
14.45 – 15.00 (15 mins) Conclusions and next steps – Delphi and reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUFISA: Sustainable finance for  
sustainable agriculture and 
fisheries 
Grant agreement no: 635577 
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8.4.13 Appendix 13: Dairy workshop attendees  
 
Organisation Role 
1. AHDB [Levy body funded by farmers] Senior 
Analyst (Dairy) 
2. Wyke Farms [Largest independent producer of cheese 
in the UK] Director 
3. Yeo Valley  [Major organic processor] Founder 
4. Harper Adams University [University and specialist provider of 
education for the agricultural and rural 
sector] Senior Lecturer in Food Policy and 
Management 
5. Arla [International cooperative and large 
producer of dairy products] Senior 
employee 
6. NFU [Member organisation/industry 
association for farmers] Chairman of the 
dairy board 
7. Barclays [Multinational bank, agribusiness division] 
Regional agricultural manager 
8. Somerset Young Farmers Club Vice-chairman 
9. Crediton Dairy  [UK’s leading dairy drinks businesses] 
Head of Milk Supply 
10. NFU [Member organisation/industry 
association for farmers] Chairman of the 
dairy board 
11. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr Mauro Vigani – senior researcher 
12. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr Damian Maye - reader 
13. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Dr Hannah Chiswell – research assistant 
14. CCRI, University of Gloucestershire Ms Dilshaad Bundhoo – research assistant 
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8.4.14 Appendix 14: Dairy workshop pre-discussion table 
 
What are your priorities in 
relation to Somerset’s dairy 
industry over the next five 
years? 
How will these be best 
achieved?  
What will be the key 
challenges/uncertainties in 
relation to Somerset’s dairy 
industry, both during the 
negotiations and post-Brexit? 
Building better and fairer supply 
chain relationships 
Contract law 
Better farmer representation 
Farmers need to be demand led 
Trade  
Agricultural policy  
Better business environment on 
farm competitiveness 
Better tax incentives 
Volatility management 
Labour regulation 
Promote British dairy produce at 
home and abroad  
  
Security of trade across broders 
to protect supply chain 
management on farms 
  
Improved and accessible 
benchmarking  
Data sharing  
Encouragement to use subsidies 
to incentivise  
 
Protecting against commodity 
price volatility  
Insurance products 
Long-term forecasting  
 
Security and labour  Investment in robotics  
Build relationships Communicaton Trade 
Futures market needs more 
work 
 Non-tariff barriers 
Produce to a market – demand 
led 
Contracts 
Forecasts 
Labour  
Promotion of  dairy    
More transparency  Simple to understand figures Tariffs/trade barriers  
Lack of choice where to supply  
Closer relationships with 
producers 
Becoming board members  
Continue to grow as a business, 
but still be sustainable, 
profitable and environmentally 
friendly  
Keeping with best practice and 
become more focused on our 
cost of production  
 
Continuity  
Improving the ‘push-pull’ 
dynamic  
Farmer to consumer 
Better transparency, information 
flow and communication 
Volatility due to rumours, media 
etc.  
Lack of clarify which reduces 
investment  
Measurement  
Clearer identification and 
communication of lead and lag 
KPI – that are relevant to a given 
farming system  
Input in the sector to deliver 
fresh and new KPI and 
associated communication tools 
 
  
 287 
The KPI need to be social, 
economic and environmental 
performance “triple bottom 
line” 
Stability   Future of farm support 
Aligning production to 
requirements of market 
Better information Workforce of farmers and 
processing industry  
Ability to plan long term  Access to international trade  
Will farming cope with a no 
trade deal? 
Access to trade with EU 
Sustainable/affordable levels of 
tariffs for trade 
Sustainable, realistic levels of 
agricultural support for dairy 
farmers within the Uk once we 
exit the EU 
 Uncertainties over possible 
trade tariffs that could be 
implemented 
Competitiveness at global level Improve ability of farmers to 
manage: risks, price, cost disease 
etc. 
Trade relationships 
Access to markets 
Improve revenue stability so 
farmers can invest and improve 
efficiency  
More business management 
tools and skills 
 
Reduce uncertainty  Understanding of how to 
identify and manage risks in 
their business 
 
 
 
